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ABSTRACT 
 
Law is often perceived as an instrument that can effect social change.  National law in Trinidad 
and Tobago, prima facie providing for gender equality, does not fully contemplate issues of 
particular concern to women, such as domestic violence.  Gender equality and domestic 
violence are unwitting partners as women cannot achieve the former without first addressing the 
latter.  Additionally, problems such as male dominance in politico-legal structures and lack of 
political will create practical obstacles to the realisation of gender equality and/or the full 
potential of the law.  A case study of Trinidad and Tobago shows that the achievement of legal 
advances for women is particularly difficult where practical measures are not implemented 
domestically.  Honouring international commitments subsequently becomes problematic as they 
do not guarantee change nationally and they, too, are sidelined.  Gender equality and domestic 
violence are not given priority domestically and laws aimed towards protecting women and 
women’s rights are ineffective, scant and/or not enforced.  The only way to achieve gender 
equality is through a multilevel approach from above (the UN) and, perhaps, more importantly, 
from below, as women have the potential to effect real national and international legal and 
institutional change to ensure gender equality at both levels.   
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CHAPTER ONE  
1.0 Introduction  
1.1 Thesis Statement 
 
Gender equality and protection of the law with respect to domestic violence are enjoyed by very 
few women and relying on the State to promote and make such provisions is not enough.  This 
thesis will argue that gender equality and protection of the law can only be obtained through 
combined efforts at the international level, by states which must create meaningful international 
obligations; the national level, by the same states to give effect to such international obligations; 
and the ground level, through individuals and non-governmental organisations that provide the 
impetus for governments to forge and implement international and national commitments.   
 
1.2 Rationale  
1.2.1 Gender and Law: Women in the West 
 
Gender issues have made their appearance from as early as the seventh century when women 
sought to reinterpret the scriptures which deemed women intellectually inferior by nature and 
given to sin.1  Women fought for universal suffrage in the early 1900’s and have constantly 
battled for equality and are still struggling even three centuries after the fact.  The basis of the 
struggle for gender equality is firmly rooted in the notion that gender equality is a fundamental 
human right and also that women’s rights are human rights.  What exactly does equality on the 
                                               
1
 Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Feminist Consciousness: From the Middle Ages to Eighteen-Seventy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 13. 
 2 
basis of gender constitute?2  For the purpose of this thesis, equality of opportunity (de jure or 
formal or abstract equality) and equality of outcome (de facto or substantive equality) are central 
to an understanding of gender equality.3  Even where ‘formal’ gender equality is guaranteed in 
national constitutions or legal systems which provide for procedural equality, there is a gap 
between this and substantive equality which takes into account the actual lived experiences, 
needs and interests of women.4  An individual’s right to equality should not include only notions 
of abstract equality but also substantive equality where he or she will necessarily have to be 
treated differently in order to protect his or her right to equality.5   
 
At the national level in Trinidad and Tobago, women are confronted with the seemingly 
unending struggle to attain gender equality because of male elitism and its stronghold in the 
power/governance structure.6  National policies of even the developed world are generally 
                                               
2
 The Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations defines gender equality as 
“equal opportunities, rights and responsibilities for women and men… It implies that the interests, 
needs and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration”. United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The World’s Women 2005: Progress in Statistics (New 
York: United Nations, 2006), p. 1. 
3
 See Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The boundaries of international law: A feminist 
analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 217.  UNICEF has produced a report 
that reveals startling global gender inequalities throughout a girl’s / woman’s life cycle. See UNICEF, 
The State of the World’s Children.  Women and Children: The Double Dividend of Gender Equality 
(New York, UNICEF, 2006), pp. 4-5.   
4
 Charlesworth and Chinkin, The boundaries of international law, pp. 10 and 32. 
5
 See Karin Van Marle, “‘The Capabilities Approach’, ‘The Imaginary Domain’, and ‘Asymmetrical 
Reciprocity’: Feminist Perspectives on Equality and Justice”, Feminist Legal Studies, 11 (2003), pp. 
266-272.  Equal rights will not always be appropriate, as in the case of pregnancy where a gender-
specific right would be more suitable. 
6
 Statistics for Trinidad and Tobago rank it at 48 out of 136 countries with a value of 0.8 for the Gender 
Development Index (GDI) and at 22 out of 75 countries with a value of 0.66 for the Gender Empowerment 
Measure (GEM).  See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2006. 
Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis (New York: UNDP, 2006), tables 24-25, pp. 
364 and 368.  The GDI is not a measure of gender inequality.  Rather, it is a measure of human 
development that adjusts the human development index (HDI) to penalise for disparities between women 
and men in the three dimensions of the HDI: a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of 
living.  The greater the gender disparity in basic human development, the lower is a country's GDI relative 
to its HDI.  Trinidad and Tobago’s GDI value, 0.805 should be compared to its HDI value of 0.809.  Its GDI 
value is 99.5% of its HDI value.  Out of the 136 countries with both HDI and GDI values, 60 countries 
have a better ratio than Trinidad and Tobago's.  The GEM was intended to measure women’s and men’s 
abilities to participate actively in economic and political life and their command over economic resources.  
In contrast to the GDI, which is concerned with well-being, the GEM focuses on agency.  It measures 
three dimensions in this area: political participation and decision-making power, economic participation 
and decision-making power, and command over economic resources. These indicators are, of course, not 
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formulated by men, yet they are referred to as national policies despite the fact that women are 
under-represented in the policy making process.  This is now extended to the international level, 
particularly in policymaking, where women are directly affected.  At the international level, the 
problem persists as attempting to gain consensus on gender issues is even more difficult due to 
the varied cultural and religious backgrounds of the nations that comprise the international 
community.   
 
The role of women in society is often defined within the context of cultural and religious 
parameters.  Cultural and religious practices generally have negative impacts on women and 
girls but are integral to the social glue necessary for defining society, particularly for the shaping 
of the male cultural identity.7  This is not to say that specific conventions for the general 
protection of women and children or for the elimination of discrimination against women do not 
exist because they do, and these are apart from the general human rights conventions which 
already include these seemingly minority categories.  Evidence would suggest that these 
conventions are not taken seriously by the state as they are not incorporated into domestic law 
and enforced, as seen for example, with the perpetuation of discriminatory practices against 
women. 
 
As an integral subset of general equality, women are supposedly afforded equal protection of 
the law at the national level.  They are the primary victims of domestic violence and rape; 
however, even when such issues are legislated, they are not adequately dealt with because the 
realm of family life is considered sacrosanct and outside the scope of state intervention and 
                                                                                                                                                   
without their limitations as they are, inter alia, generally skewed due to income figures, not always based 
on gender disaggregated data, or do not capture important dimensions of gender discrimination in human 
development, such as violence against women.  See pp. 279-280.  See also UNDP [online], “Human 
Development Report 2006:  Human Development Indicators. Country Fact Sheets: Trinidad and Tobago”.  
[cited 06 October 2007].  Available from Internet: 
http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_TTO.html.   
7
 See Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press, 1998), pp. 124-125. 
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state bodies generally refuse to intervene.  Trying to raise this as a human rights issue at the 
international level has faced many obstacles.  In the same manner that the state will not 
intervene in so called “private” matters of the family, international law equally lacks the capacity 
to find individuals culpable of violations in private matters.  The United Nations Charter 
guarantees non-intervention into the domestic affairs of a state, except in cases of gross 
domestic violations of human rights or genocide.8   
 
Additionally, public international law only recognises the state as a subject and individuals 
wishing to have an audience at the level of international law must do so through the agency of 
their state.  In the case of human rights conventions, however, individual agency may be 
allowed.  Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, one of six core human rights conventions,9 an optional protocol was adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1999 to afford individuals as well as groups and non-governmental 
organisations the right to report violations by the state of the main convention directly to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.10  This right is, of course, 
circumscribed by the state’s willingness to accede to the protocol.  In the absence of accession, 
it poses particular problems for women as abuses meted out in the home are strictly 
theoretically outside of the sphere of international law due to the public/private divide and the 
notion of the sanctity of the family.  This is further aggravated yet by the fact that the political, 
legal, social, cultural and economic structures are dominated by men. 
 
Essentially, this thesis seeks to assess the strengths and weaknesses of both domestic and 
international law instruments with respect to concrete issues of gender inequality and specific 
areas of concern to women such as domestic violence.  An examination of the scourge of 
                                               
8
 See Chapter 1, Article 2: 7, United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945. 
9
 See Philip Alston, “Richard Lillich Memorial Lecture: Promoting the Accountability of Members of the 
New UN Human Rights Council”, Journal of Transnational Law and Policy, 15:1 (2006), p. 61. 
10
 For more on the Protocol, see section 3.5.1.4 below.   
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domestic violence and its treatment in law and by governmental (and non-governmental) 
institutions indicates the importance given at the national level in addressing the problem and 
provides a somewhat albeit intangible indicator of the distance to be covered in getting to 
gender equality.  Tackling the issue of domestic violence is paramount to the issue of gender 
equality as the achievement of substantive equality by women requires that the status of women 
within the private sphere - the primary site of domestic abuses - be addressed.  There is no way 
that women can consider themselves to have attained equality, in practice or in law, if they are 
still in unequal power relationships at home that end in abuse of any kind. 
 
The efforts of NGOs and other members of civil society are perhaps key in effecting positive 
legislative and social change.  Traditional level of analysis discussions focus on the state and 
the international system as the main levels of analysis.11  At the same time, however, the 
analysis of the state as a level contemplates individuals and institutions, such as NGOs, as 
having the capacity to inform and influence domestic policy as well as national positions at 
international fora.  Such power was clearly evidenced at Beijing in 1995.  While NGOs are 
crucial to change, their ability to effect change depends on their degrees of political and financial 
independence and should therefore not be taken as given as NGOs are generally required to 
promote the agendas of their sponsors.  Achievements may be limited in some cases but can 
provide entry into the male stronghold of legislative drafting, for example, by introducing clauses 
sensitive to women’s needs.  Enforcement, practical application of the law, and establishment of 
accompanying social infrastructure are, of course, entirely different issues. 
 
Nations that resist gender equality in domestic practices can hardly be expected to fulfil 
international obligations seeking to accomplish gender parity.  Ultimately, women must assume 
a greater role in the corridors of power and perhaps only then would there be greater 
                                               
11
 See J. Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations”, World Politics, 14:1 
(October 1961), p. 88. 
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effectiveness with respect to the emerging international legal regime for gender equality.12  
Greater female participation in the formulation of international law on gender equality as well as 
the introduction of the gender perspective into the general international law making machinery 
where appropriate may just assist in making international law efforts more effective.  This must 
of necessity be combined with the efforts of individuals and non-governmental organisations as 
their work in effecting change at all levels should in no way be underestimated. 
 
Trinidad and Tobago is the country under review here.  The study undertaken examines 
measures taken by the government of Trinidad and Tobago to introduce and implement laws 
geared towards the protection of women’s interests at the domestic level, whether on its own 
initiative or as a result of its participation in international conventions or by lobbying from local 
NGOs.  The examination of the national legal system assesses its effectiveness in promoting 
gender equality and demonstrates the level of importance attached to domestic violence.  This 
analysis would perhaps explain why the emerging international legal regime that seeks to 
promote gender equality and deal with domestic violence is largely ineffective and certainly 
brings into question whether the state alone as agent can be left to effect (positive) legal change 
                                               
12
 Studies have been conducted at the national level (in the UK) to assess whether the inclusion of 
women in politics makes a difference.  MacKay, for example, makes the point that the political under-
representation of women was reframed as a serious problem for democracy and human development 
which further brought into question the issue of distribution of power.  It is further argued that women 
make a difference by their mere presence.  She differentiates between numerical representation and 
substantive representation where the latter refers to the theoretical and practical expectations that 
once present (in sufficient numbers) women representatives will ‘act for’ women and ensure women’s 
needs, interests and concerns are more fully represented in the policy process with consequent policy 
outcomes.  Such representation will still vary in its degree, form and content according to different 
political parties, representative sites, issues and political context and is also dependent on the ability of 
the women not to adopt male standards.  Fiona MacKay, “Gender and Political Representation in the 
UK: The State of ‘Discipline’”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6 (2004), pp. 99-
120.  Childs makes the point that women practice politics differently to men – they are less combative 
and aggressive, more collaborative and speak in a different language (layman’s terms).  See Sarah 
Childs, “A Feminised Style of Politics? Women MPs in the House of Commons”, British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, 6 (2004), pp. 3-19.  Puwar also refers to the ‘politics of presence’ 
but notes the greater burden placed on women to perform, be heard, and ‘manage their femininity’.  
Nirmal Puwar, “Thinking About Making a Difference”, British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 6 (2004), pp. 65-80. 
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or whether there needs to be a multilevel effort from below (individuals, non-governmental 
organisations and other social groups) as well as from above (United Nations).   
 
1.2.2 Gender Politics in Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Issues of equality and domestic violence against women are better understood, though still not 
fully or easily explainable, in the context of the evolution of gender in the country under study.  
As a subset of the colonised Caribbean islands, gender politics in Trinidad and Tobago evolved 
in a manner similar to the English-speaking Caribbean generally and has its roots in the colonial 
period.  It has been stated by some writers exploring gender issues during colonialism that 
“slavery on Caribbean plantations gave effective equality to women and men; its levelling effect 
minimized gender differences”13 and that even though “[s]lavery had the effect of levelling the 
sexes”,14 “independence…sharpened the contradictions in gender relations”15 with specific 
reference to the slave population.  Beckles asserts quite categorically, however, that “[c]hattel 
slavery, the dominant social institution, was thoroughly gendered in its design and function”16 
with respect to the slave woman’s role in society.  Interestingly, the socio-legal status of a child 
was in fact dependent on that of its mother and not its father.  A child could therefore be born 
into slavery if his mother was a slave even if his father was a free black or white man. 
 
These ideological differences notwithstanding, other studies focused on the “deviant” forms of 
family evolution among the slave population where the UK model of the nuclear family unit - 
                                               
13
 Bridget Brereton, “General Problems and Issues in Studying the History of Women”, in Patricia 
Mohammed and Catherine Shepherd (eds) Gender in Caribbean Development (Kingston, Jamaica: 
Canoe Press, 1999), p. 124. 
14
 Rosina Wiltshire-Brodber, “Gender, Race and Class in the Caribbean”, in Patricia Mohammed and 
Catherine Shepherd (eds) Gender in Caribbean Development (Kingston, Jamaica: Canoe Press, 
1999), p. 137. 
15
 Wiltshire-Brodber, “Gender, Race and Class in the Caribbean”, p. 142. 
16
 Hilary McD. Beckles, “Taking liberties: enslaved women and anti-slavery in the Caribbean”, in Clare 
Midgley (ed) Gender and Imperialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), p. 139. 
 8 
comprised of father, mother, and children - was deemed “normal”.  Families of lower class Afro-
Caribbean lineage were deemed dysfunctional and disorganised as they tended to be casual, 
that is, without legal sanction, and matriarchal, as men tended to move between families and in 
search of work.17  Families of Indo-Caribbean descent tended to be more stable according to 
the criteria adopted.18  In both family types, representing the majority of the population 
(particularly in Trinidad19), large families and extended family households were, and continue to 
be, common.  It is in these two broad family types that gender relations developed where 
women were the main caregivers and men the breadwinners.   
 
Violence against women was rife during slavery as “[t]he white male bought, sold and degraded 
the black woman.  In the process he placed her in a social position to be further degraded and 
exploited by the black male, who frequently targeted her as an object with which to act out a 
strategy for the restoration of his crippled and dysfunctional masculinity”.20  The Indian 
indentured population of the post-emancipation period also brought with it cultural practices that 
included violence against women to express displeasure and ensure that they remained 
submissive.  Whether these have had influence on today’s version of domestic violence is 
unclear, but what is certain is that domestic violence has survived and remains a very real 
problem. 
 
Domestic violence in the Caribbean is a well known scourge and is specifically recognised by 
the legislature of Trinidad and Tobago as a “social ill” occurring with “alarming frequency and 
deadly consequences”.21  Trinidad and Tobago was among the first Commonwealth Caribbean 
                                               
17
 See Christine Barrow, “Men, Women and Family in the Caribbean: A Review”, in Patricia 
Mohammed and Catherine Shepherd (eds) Gender in Caribbean Development (Kingston, Jamaica: 
Canoe Press, 1999), pp.149-163. 
18
 See Mindie Lazarus-Black, “The Politics of Place: Practice, Process and Kinship in Domestic 
Violence Courts”, Human Organization, 65:2 (Summer 2006), p. 142 
19
 Tobago has a different demographic composition. 
20
 Beckles, “Taking liberties”, p. 150. 
21
 See the preamble to the Domestic Violence Act, No. 27 of 1999. 
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countries to enact domestic violence legislation in 1991.22  Nevertheless, despite the existence 
of legislation and agencies to deal with domestic violence, the problem continues and there is 
handful of studies seeking to discover why this is so but they have not gone into very in-depth 
legal and institutional analyses.  While domestic violence does not appear to be a class issue, it 
is largely the lower class that seems to make use of the legislation but with little effect.  This 
work seeks in part to determine the effectiveness of the legislation in place to protect women 
against domestic violence and assess institutions, whether governmental or non-governmental, 
meant to provide relief to these victims.   
 
There are quite a few studies on gender in the Caribbean but they tend to be cursory, very 
general in nature and/or deal with the Caribbean as a unit or engage in comparative analyses of 
the islands in varying degrees.  That said, Trinidad and Tobago-specific studies on gender deal 
with health (mental,23 metabolic,24 sexual,25 pharmacological26); development;27 
                                               
22
 This Act was subsequently repealed and replaced by the 1999 legislation. 
23
 See for example, H.D. Maharajh et al, “Gender and Ethnic Differences in Urban and Rural First-
Contact Schizophrenia Outpatients in Trinidad”, Reviews on Environmental Health, 21:1 (Jan-Mar 
2006), pp. 69-79; H.D. Maharajh and A. Ali, “Social and Cultural Aspects of Gender Differences in 
Depression among Secondary School Students in Trinidad and Tobago”, Journal of Affective 
Disorders, 78 (March 2004), pp. 558-559; G. Hutchinson et al, “Gender and Ethnicity in First 
Admissions to a Psychiatric Unit in Trinidad”, West Indian Medical Journal, 52:4 (December 2003), pp. 
300-3; H.D. Maharajh and P.S. Abdool, “Cultural Aspects of Suicide”, The Scientific World Journal, 5 
(September 2005), pp. 736-746; A. Ali and H.D. Maharajh, “Social Predictors of Suicidal Behaviour in 
Adolescents in Trinidad and Tobago”, Social Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology, 40:3 (March 
2005), pp. 186-191. 
24
 See for example, F. Babwah et al, “The Role of Gender in Compliance and Attendance at an 
Outpatient Clinic for Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus in Trinidad”, Pan American Journal of Public Health, 
19:2 (February 2006), pp. 79-84. 
25
 See for example, N. Francis et al, “AIDS-Related Knowledge, Attitudes, Beliefs, and Behavioural 
Intentions of Adolescents in Trinidad: A Pilot Study”, International Quarterly of Community Health 
Education, 14:3 (1993), pp. 273-281; D. Castor et al, “Determinants of Gonorrhoea Infection among 
STD Clinic Attenders in Trinidad – II: Sexual Behavioural Factors”, International Journal of STD & 
AIDS, 13:1 (January 2002), pp. 46-51; L.R. Norman, “Predictors of Consistent Condom Use: a 
Hierarchical Analysis of Adults from Kenya, Tanzania and Trinidad”, International Journal of STD & 
AIDS, 14:9 (September 2003), pp. 584-590; E. Assing-Murray, “The Feminization of HIV/AIDS: An 
Analysis of its Impact on Women in Trinidad and Tobago”, Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The 
Humanities and Social Sciences, 67:3 (September 2006), p. 1108. 
26
 See for example, M. Day and L.R. Norman, “An Exploration of Gender Differences in the Initiation of 
and Attitudes toward [sic] Crack Cocaine Use in the English-Speaking Caribbean”, Addiction Research 
& Theory, 15:3 (2007), pp. 285-297; H.D. Maharajh and M. Konings, “Cannabis and Suicidal 
Behaviour among Adolescents: A Pilot Study from Trinidad”, The Scientific World Journal, 5 (August 
2005), pp. 576-585. 
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culture/discursive representations,28 economics/business,29 colonialism/slavery,30 and 
education.31  This is certainly not an exhaustive list but covers a wide range of writings on 
gender.   
 
Gender equality and gender-based violence are equally important issues that are dealt with in 
the literature.  As with the issues mentioned above, these topics are also dealt with in a 
Caribbean-wide context.32  Boxill has done a review of family law, including sexual marital 
                                                                                                                                                   
27
 See for example, D. Ramsaran, “The Interaction of Race and Gender in Development Policy 
Implementation: the Case of a Small Developing Third World Society”, International Journal of 
Contemporary Sociology, 36:1 (April 1999), pp. 32-55. 
28
 See for example, R. Reddock, “Contestations over Culture, Class, Gender and Identity in Trinidad 
and Tobago: ‘The Little Tradition’”, Caribbean Quarterly, 44:1-2 (March-June 1998), pp. 62-80; P. 
Mohammed, “Reflections on the Women’s Movement in Trinidad: Calypsos, Changes and Sexual 
Violence”, Feminist Review, 38 (Summer 1991), pp. 33-47; P. Mohammed, “Gender as a Primary 
Signifier in the Construction of Community and State among Indians in Trinidad”, Caribbean Quarterly, 
40:3-4 (September-December 1994), pp. 32-43; P. Mohammed, “Towards Indigenous Feminist 
Theorizing in the Caribbean”, Feminist Review, 59 (Summer 1998), pp. 6-33; D. Hughes-Tafen, 
“Women, Theatre and Calypso in the English-Speaking Caribbean”, Feminist Review, 84 (2006), pp. 
48-66; J. Rahim, “Trinidad and Tobago Women’s Writing, 1929-69”, in Elsa Leo-Rhynie et al (eds), 
Gender: A Caribbean Multi-Disciplinary Perspective (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 1997).  
29
 See for example, A. Bissessar, “Determinants of Gender Mobility in the Public Service of Trinidad 
and Tobago”, Public Personnel Management, 28:3 (Fall 1999), pp. 409-422; R.N. Olsen and A. 
Coppin, “The Determinants of Gender Differentials in Income in Trinidad and Tobago”, Journal of 
Development Studies, 37:5 (June 2001), pp. 31-56; A. Coppin, “A Comparison of Male-Female 
Earnings Differences across Two Caribbean Economies”, Journal of Developing Areas, 32:3 (Spring 
1998), pp. 375-393; A. Coppin, “Women’s Earnings in Trinidad & Tobago: An Analysis by Household 
Status and Ethnicity”, Social and Economic Studies, 46:4 (December 1997), pp. 61-82; S. Seguino, 
“Why are women in the Caribbean so much more likely than men to be unemployed?”, Social and 
Economic Studies, 52:4 (December 2003), pp. 83-120; P. Wharfe, “How Women Manage Their 
Professional and Personal Lives in a Time of Profound and Rapid Social Change: A Study of Six 
Trinidadian Women in Midlife”, Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social 
Sciences, 65:12 (June 2005), p. 4723-A; L. Tanikella, “The Politics of Hybridity: Race, Gender, and 
Nationalism in Trinidad”, Cultural Dynamics, 15:2 (2003), pp. 153-181. 
30
 See for example, R. Reddock, Women and the Slave Plantation Economy in the Caribbean (with 
special reference to Trinidad and Tobago: Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives (St. 
Augustine, Trinidad, n.d.).  
31
 See for example, E. Taylor, “Women in School Administration: Exclusion and Isolation”, in Elsa Leo-
Rhynie et al (eds), Gender: A Caribbean Multi-Disciplinary Perspective (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle 
Publishers, 1997).  
32
 See for example G.T. Nain and B. Bailey (eds), Gender Equality in the Caribbean: Reality or Illusion 
(Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003); D. Luciano et al, “How to make the law work? 
Budgetary implications of domestic violence law in Latin America, Central America, and the 
Caribbean”, Journal of Women Politics and Policy, 27:1-2 (2005), pp. 123-133; J. Henriques et al, “The 
Legal Response to Domestic Violence in the English-Speaking Caribbean Countries”, Caribbean 
Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, 3:1-2 (January-July 1998), pp. 174-187; P. Hartigan, 
“La OPS enfoca el problema de la violencia contra la mujer”, Pan American Journal of Public Health, 
2:4 (October 1997), pp. 290-294; UNIFEM/ECLAC, Eliminating Gender-Based Violence, Ensuring 
Equality: UNIFEM/ECLAC Regional Assessment of Actions to End Violence Against Women in the 
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offences, as it affects women in Jamaica which briefly compares what obtains in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.33  Ffolkes treats more specifically with the legal response across the 
Commonwealth Caribbean to violence against women and notes that medical and sociological 
issues also need to be taken into account in domestic violence legal reform initiatives.34 
 
In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, there are a few studies on domestic violence which revolve 
largely around health/psychology, culture and law.  Domestic violence has been recognised as 
a serious health issue35 as well as having psychological foundations.36  The root of domestic 
violence is certainly not singular and studies with a historico-cultural focus have also been 
done.37  Data collection is also undertaken.38  Law and policy have been the focus of other 
                                                                                                                                                   
Caribbean (Christchurch, Barbados: UNIFEM, 2005); Vivienne Chin and Yvon Dandurand, Violence in 
the Americas: A Regional Analysis.  National Programs to Prevent, Punish and Eradicate Violence 
Against Women in Ten Caribbean Countries, (San Jose: ILANUD, 2001). 
33
 Eileen Boxill, “The Reform of Family Law as it affects Women”, in Elsa Leo-Rhynie et al (eds), 
Gender: A Caribbean Multi-Disciplinary Perspective (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 1997). 
34
 Suzanne Ffolkes, “Violence against Women: Some Legal Responses”, in Elsa Leo-Rhynie et al 
(eds), Gender: A Caribbean Multi-Disciplinary Perspective (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 
1997), p. 119. 
35
 See for example, J. Rawlins, “Domestic Violence in Trinidad: A Family and Public Health Problem”, 
Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, 5:1-2 (January-July 2000), pp. 165-180. 
36
 See for example, L. Hadeed, “Domestic Violence in Trinidad and Tobago: Why Women Stay in 
Abusive Relationships”, Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 
64:4 (October 2003), pp. 1407-A which examines the typologies of abusive behaviours among Afro-
Trinidadian women and the reason they stay in abusive relationships.  She also examines social 
support systems among the same group: L. Hadeed and N. El-Bassel, “Social Support among Afro-
Trinidadian Women Experiencing Intimate Partner Violence”, Violence Against Women, 12:8 (August 
2006), pp. 740-760. 
37
 See for example, R. Gopaul et al, Women, Family and Family Violence in the Caribbean: the 
Historical and Contemporary Experience, with special reference to Trinidad and Tobago (St. 
Augustine, Trinidad: Center for Gender and Development Studies, UWI, 1996); R. Reddock, Women 
and Family in the Caribbean: Historical and Contemporary considerations, with special reference to 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (Georgetown, Guyana: Caricom, 1999); S. Griffith and D. Chadee, 
“Trinidadian and U.S. Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Domestic Violence and their Willingness to Intervene: 
Does Culture Make a Difference?”, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 37:6 (November 2006), pp. 
761-778; R. Gopaul and M. Cain, “Violence between spouses in Trinidad and Tobago: A research 
note”, Caribbean Quarterly, 42:2-3 (June-September 1996), pp. 28-40; E. Zellerer, “Domestic Violence 
in Trinidad and Tobago: Some Comments”, Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, 
5:1-2 (January-July 2000), pp. 209-227; R. Sukhu, “Domestic Violence and Power: A War of Words 
and Fists”, Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, 5:1-2 (January-July 2000), pp. 
228-236 which looks briefly at domestic violence against men.  A study on the effect of structural 
adjustment programmes on domestic situations was also undertaken: see Charmaine Crawford, The 
Intensification of Violence Against Women in Trinidad and Tobago During the Period of Structural 
Adjustment (Toronto: York University, 1996). 
38
 See CAFRA, “A Pilot Survey on the Incidences of Violence and Responses to such Violence among 
200 randomly selected Women in Trinidad”, St. Augustine, Trinidad, 1998.  Data is also collected and 
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domestic violence studies in Trinidad and Tobago.  There have been brief discussions of 
government’s policy approach to dealing with domestic violence.39  More detailed studies 
include Bissessar’s examination of domestic violence policy and the fact that even though a 
legislative framework was provided sufficient account was not taken of the domestic situation 
such as the factors that gave rise to crimes of violence, the need to provide economic security 
for the victims, and the need for the State to provide shelters for the victims.40  There is a little 
known study that was done by Creque which examines abuse to wives, children, elderly and the 
handicapped through interviews with various institutions and treats briefly with an examination 
of the 1991 Domestic Violence Act of Trinidad and Tobago with respect to the number of 
applications made under the act.41  Interestingly, a foreigner, Lazarus-Black, has done, and 
continues to conduct, extensive research on domestic violence in Trinidad and Tobago (as well 
as Antigua and Barbuda and the United States) which focuses on the actual implementation of 
the Domestic Violence Act in the courts and the structural, cultural and ideological resistances 
that women face there when they attempt to pursue the judicial route to dealing with abusive 
domestic situation.42 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
collated by various governmental and non-governmental agencies with respect to the number of 
applications made under the Act, phone calls made to the domestic violence hotline, and women who 
seek assistance at shelters or government agencies.  This data, however, is not gender-disaggregated 
and affected by multiple reporting. 
39
 See for example, D. Phillips, “Domestic Violence and Public Policy in Trinidad and Tobago”, 
Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, 5:1-2 (January-July 2000), pp. 181-188; J. 
Theodore, “Domestic Violence, National Security and Public Policy”, Caribbean Journal of Criminology 
and Social Psychology, 5:1-2 (January-July 2000), pp. 189-192; M. Williams, “Domestic Violence and 
Family Relationships: Policy Recommendations”, Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social 
Psychology, 5:1-2 (January-July 2000), pp. 193-201. 
40
 A. Bissessar, “Policy Transfer and Implementation Failure: A Review of the Policy of Domestic 
Violence in Trinidad and Tobago”, Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, 5:1-2 
(January-July 2000), pp. 57-80. 
41
 See Merri Creque, A Study of the Incidence of Domestic Violence in Trinidad and Tobago from 1991 
to 1993 (Port of Spain, Trinidad: Trinidad and Tobago Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 1995). 
42
 See Lazarus-Black, “The Politics of Place”, pp. 140-155; “Law and the pragmatics of inclusion: 
Governing domestic violence in Trinidad and Tobago”, American Ethnologist, 28:2 (May 2001), pp. 
388-416; “The Rite of Domination: Tales from Domestic Violence Court”, Working Paper No. 7, Centre 
for Gender and Development Studies, The University of the West Indies: St. Augustine, Trinidad, 
2002; “The (heterosexual) regendering of a modern state: Criminalizing and implementing domestic 
violence law in Trinidad”, Law and Social Inquiry – Journal of the American Bar Foundation, 28:4 (Fall 
2003); pp. 979-1008; “Domestic Violence in Trinidad and Tobago”, in Nicky Jackson (ed) Encyclopedia 
of Domestic Violence (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
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1.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
Feminism provides the backdrop against which the issues of gender inequality and inadequate 
protection of the law for women against violence will be assessed.  The development of feminist 
thought explicitly questions women’s exclusion and marginalisation which is part of the wider 
struggle by women to achieve gender equality.  Liberal feminism, in particular, advocates equal 
rights for women and examines why women are treated as “less than”, where men provide the 
gauge against which they are measured.  While liberal feminism addresses the issue of 
women’s formal equality under the law, it has not fully considered issues of social power and 
women’s social, legal and political under-representation in assessing the effectiveness of law as 
an instrument to advance the status of women or achieve social change more widely.  
Consequently, a combined theoretical approach is required.  Liberal feminist thought, feminist 
legal theory and feminist critical theory provide the necessary theoretical bases to address not 
only gender inequality, but also illustrate the ways in which law may be implicated in the 
subordination of women as well as empower women out of such positions of inferiority.  Critical 
theory further allows for not simply the examination of formal institutions but the placement of 
law, legal instruments and associated institutional framework into a broader social context of 
male power and dominance and lack of political will in the assessment of law as an agent of 
change for women. 
 
This thesis contemplates a critical assessment of law as an instrument to assist women in their 
fight for equality and protection of the law against domestic violence.  Feminist legal theory, 
therefore, is necessary to expose the masculine nature of jurisprudential theory and practice 
which will in itself illustrate the difficulty in achieving gender justice in the absence of legal and 
institutional reform.  This notwithstanding, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women has been significant in transforming law to recognise and 
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incorporate the specificity of the female subject.43  Nevertheless, this is still not enough.  
Combining feminist legal theory, which exposes the male bias of law, with feminist critical 
theory, which offers a space from which women can “emancipate” themselves, allows a 
comprehensive process of reflection and emancipation.  It will be shown that the very idea of 
rights, as currently obtains, is fundamentally conceptually flawed, as the concept of rights 
presupposes ‘man’ as its subject, thereby completely bypassing women and other marginalised 
groups and perpetuating violence, discrimination and subordination of these ‘others’.  Critical 
feminist theory, together with feminist legal theory, is useful in the examination of these issues, 
as it can be used as a means of critiquing and then ‘rescuing’ the idea of rights in favour of 
women by exposing its biased normative assumptions and politicised knowledge claims. 
 
The emancipatory project offered by feminist critical theory envisages independent and critical 
thinking by individuals (in this case, women) to understand hegemonic discourses, criticise them 
and eventually overcome them in their struggle to free themselves from the oppressive and 
subordinating nature of such discourses.  As Benhabib states, “The goal of reflection is 
emancipation from self-incurred bondage”.44  This is important, as emancipation must have the 
effect of both freeing and enfranchising its former prisoners.  The goal here reflects the 
emancipatory intent of feminism.  It is not simply about critiquing rights and remaining content 
with the menu of rights currently available to women (such as the right to vote), but expanding 
the content of substantive rights to address areas that were previously invisible, such as 
domestic violence.  Domestic violence has been legislated in Trinidad and Tobago and is 
therefore illegal, but it is not enough to outlaw the problem.  Women must be able to recognise 
                                               
43
 See for example Hilary Charlesworth, “Human Rights as Men’s Rights”, in J. Peters and A. Wolper 
(eds) Women’s Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1995), 
Hilary Charlesworth, “What are “Women’s International Human Rights”?”, in R. Cook (ed) Human Rights 
of Women: National and International Perspectives (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1994), Charlesworth and Chinkin, The boundaries of international law and Anne Bottomley (ed), Feminist 
Perspectives on the Foundational Subjects of Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1996). 
44
 Seyla Benhabib, “Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism”, in Seyla Benhabib, Situating the 
Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), p. 
207. 
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the problem, seek to free themselves from the situation in which they sometimes find 
themselves and let their voices be heard. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
This thesis involved extensive fieldwork in order to establish the attitude of Trinidad and Tobago 
to gender equality and the quality of protection of the law provided for women.  The case 
analysis focuses on the legal and institutional response of Trinidad and Tobago to illustrate its 
commitment to the implementation of gender equality with specific reference to its treatment of 
domestic violence as a primarily female issue.  The extensive fieldwork involved a 
comprehensive and critical review of the legal instruments at the international, regional and 
national levels to determine their effectiveness with regard to gender equality and the outlawing 
of domestic violence.  More specifically, at the domestic level, an analysis of case law provides 
an insight as to how women and issues of greatest concern to them are treated within the 
judiciary and magistracy.  The institutional analysis involved the review of governmental and 
non-governmental agencies to determine whether and in what manner the law was being 
effected.  This information gathered during this process was both refuted and corroborated as 
applicable by a few women experiencing domestic violence.  
 
With respect to statute law, a colonial legislative framework was created to establish the 
existence of class elitism as the colonial legal system was characterised by attributes that 
seemed to favour the ruling elite.  Laws made relating to gender in the post-colonial era are very 
much shaped by what obtained in the colonial period.  To determine Trinidad and Tobago’s 
legal response to gender equality within this framework, a review of all legislative provisions 
having any significant bearing on gender - existing statutes and ordinances still in force in the 
post-independence era - was undertaken to illustrate how the law deals with the issue using the 
 16 
same categories of analysis that revealed class bias in the colonial legal framework.  The post-
colonial legal response to gender offers a reflection of the colonial structure where the issues of 
gender replace issues of class, illustrating patent male bias.  This is not to say that there are no 
class differentiations within gender as a category currently or that class in the colonial setting did 
not implicitly have gender implications; however, in reviewing the legislation in the colonial 
framework gender did not appear and similarly, in reviewing the legislative framework in the 
post-colonial context, there were absolutely no references to class distinctions within gender 
while the reverse is true in both instances.  It is for this reason that gender is being used as 
substitutable for class in the post-colonial context.  Moreover, legislative provisions with gender 
inferences affect women regardless of class.45  Further still, gender inequality and domestic 
violence know no class.  In addition to this general legal framework, a specific study of one 
piece of legislation designed to provide protection against domestic violence exposes various 
deficiencies.   
 
A review of case law for the period 1983 to 2007 reveals how the judiciary deals with women 
before the court in domestic matters, such as maintenance, custody, division of property, and 
murder as a defence to provocation and domestic violence.  Given that one of the primary 
focuses here is domestic violence which is, narrowly speaking, a family issue, only cases with 
adult male/female parties having direct relevance to family issues were chosen.  Bias in case 
law was determined by examining the reasons for judgements and reviewing the facts of the 
individual cases to see whether the judgements appeared to favour either party.  Where 
relevant, the categories of analysis used in the colonial and post-colonial legal frameworks were 
used to classify bias in case law.  It would appear, however, that case law generally tends to be 
fairly objective except in cases dealing with the murder of the significant other where women 
seem to have a greater burden of proof in pleading their cases than men. 
                                               
45
 Save and except the three pieces of legislation concerning marriage in particular cultural/religious 
contexts in Trinidad and Tobago. 
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Legal analysis aside, the fieldwork also assessed the major state and non-state agencies 
designed to provide assistance to women with particular reference to domestic violence to 
assess the system’s capacity to provide real assistance and measure the gap between alleged 
and actual support.  An examination of the various NGOs involved in dealing with domestic 
violence illustrates three main types of women’s NGOs (lobbying, support services and shelters) 
that give practical expression to the issue of gender equality and support for victims of domestic 
violence and also reveals deficiencies, whether internal or external, to their optimal operation.   
 
Assessment of both governmental and non-governmental resources available to women was 
achieved primarily through interviews.  These interviews were conducted with state authorities 
as well as non-governmental organisations to get perspectives from either end of the spectrum 
of institutions that provide assistance to women in situations of domestic violence.  Interviews 
were also conducted with a few women who were experiencing domestic violence.  The 
research by interviews gathered information from these primary sources and helped to establish 
bias in the operation of the domestic violence regime.  The interviews were guided by a semi-
structured questionnaire46 which allowed for data gathering by combining the structured aspect 
(the actual questionnaire) with the flexibility to ask subsequent questions.  The various 
interviewees unwittingly revealed the (perceived) biases via their responses and this 
substantiated the position taken at the outset that bias is prevalent and does affect the proper 
functioning of the system established to protect and assist women experiencing domestic 
violence.  Information was supplemented with published materials where available and 
especially where interviews were not possible.  The interviews with those experiencing domestic 
violence offered a more comprehensive idea as to the effectiveness of the state and non-state 
machinery designed to assist them and identified gaps in the services provided.  
 
                                               
46
 See Appendix D at page 378. 
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1.5 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This principal focus of this thesis is an assessment of the effectiveness of laws and associated 
institutions of Trinidad and Tobago in the context generally of gender equality and specifically of 
the protection of women by the law against domestic violence.  The detailed and 
comprehensive analysis of some 150 statutes; judicial decisions; and operation of thirty 
institutions, both governmental and non-governmental, has never been attempted before in 
Trinidad and Tobago.  In addition, the unprecedented analytical framework used in the 
assessment of the response of the legal system of Trinidad and Tobago to the challenges of 
achieving gender equality and protection of women against domestic violence had as its basis 
categories of analysis pertaining to the colonial era where the white colonial elite and 
slaves/indentures have been replaced in post-colonial society by the male elite and women 
respectively.  The post-colonial legal response to gender offers a reflection of the colonial 
structure where the issues of gender replace issues of class.  This unique approach to 
assessing laws pertaining to gender and protection of women against domestic violence 
contributed significantly to the conclusion that laws and associated institutions in Trinidad and 
Tobago are inadequate to meet the challenges posed by gender inequality and domestic 
violence and helps to establish the foundation for the consideration of a different approach to 
dealing with these issues, such as the bottom-up approach predicated largely on the efforts of 
civil society.  
 
1.6 Outline of Chapters 
 
Chapter two introduces certain key concepts and theoretical perspectives that underlie the 
development of this thesis.  It is important to understand what is meant by “gender” and 
“feminism” as gender is a key concept and a feminist approach informs the analysis throughout 
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the thesis.  In addition, this thesis proposes to examine domestic and international law through 
the prism of feminist legal theory so as to provide a more accurate understanding of the struggle 
facing women who are often forced to rely on the law to achieve their fundamental human right 
of gender equality.  Moreover, this reliance illustrates the limitation of the law to effect the 
necessary transformation and points to the need for women to take control of the situation so as 
to ensure that the required changes ensue.   
 
Chapter three examines the areas of international law and gender and will provide the basis for 
the argument that international law on many occasions fails to contemplate a gender 
perspective and, even when this is done, the effectiveness of the legal regime is called into 
question.  With sovereignty as the cornerstone of the international system, it is not surprising 
that international law dealing with women’s rights, gender equality and domestic violence is not 
incorporated into domestic law with any kind of alacrity.  Nevertheless, the plight of women with 
respect to their fundamental rights is almost universal in nature and it is therefore 
understandable that requests are made for the issue to be addressed at the international level.  
This approach has many supporters as it is commonly felt that the near global phenomenon of 
gender inequality can only be resolved by a common approach implemented across state 
borders.   Additionally, the changing nature of sovereignty lends credence to the hope that 
action at the international level can have effect domestically.  The development of international 
law with respect to rights and gender equality is also examined.  In this context, the main 
international legal instruments dealing with gender equality and violence against women as a 
subset of equality of treatment before the law of women are studied.  This latter comprises the 
‘legal’ response of the international community to the issues in question. 
 
Chapter four reviews the institutional framework established by the United Nations, including 
women’s groups, for the promotion of women’s human rights through an examination of 
institutions such as the Commission on the Status of Women, the Division for the Advancement 
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of Women and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.  The 
chapter also examines the role of NGOs in influencing the international response to the struggle 
for women’s rights.47     
 
Chapters five to eight examine Trinidad and Tobago’s response to gender equality and, 
specifically, domestic violence.  Chapter five involves a review of the legal system and laws 
(constitutional, statute, and common) of Trinidad and Tobago from a feminist legal perspective 
to observe how the issue of gender is treated domestically.  Of importance to the legal analysis 
is Trinidad and Tobago’s colonial history.  Its colonial legal legacy is extremely relevant to 
understanding how particular kinds of elitism and male privilege have become an intrinsic 
characteristic of post-independence national law-making and is in itself an obstacle to using law 
to promote gender equality and protect women from domestic violence.  Chapter six provides a 
more in-depth analysis of one area of gender equality, namely, the protection of women by the 
law with specific reference to domestic violence.  It is undoubtedly the case that protection of 
women from the scourge of domestic violence is often a barometer of how women fare in a 
society with respect to their fundamental human rights.   
 
Following the specific analysis of the legal regime for protection of women from domestic 
violence, chapter seven analyzes the institutional response of Trinidad and Tobago to domestic 
violence as this reinforces the domestic attitude.  This chapter examines the institutional 
framework, governmental and non-governmental, focussing on the executive and state 
authorities which illustrate government’s commitment to dealing with domestic violence as a 
reflection of the more general treatment of the gender agenda.   
                                               
47
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Building on the domestic attitude of Trinidad and Tobago to gender equality as manifested in its 
general approach to gender and the law and its specific legal and institutional approach to 
domestic violence, chapter eight reviews the attitude of Trinidad and Tobago to its international 
legal obligations pertaining to gender equality.  It explores the various relevant legal instruments 
that Trinidad and Tobago has committed to internationally to gauge the consistency of its 
international attitude with its domestic agenda. 
 
Chapter nine presents the findings of the thesis which show that law as an agent of change has 
not proved quite effective in promoting gender equality or in protecting women against domestic 
violence in Trinidad and Tobago, either from efforts at the level of the state or from the regional 
and international levels.  While legislation seems to have been passed and amended largely 
through the unwavering efforts of NGOs, the concomitant institutional capacity building and/or 
strengthening was not forthcoming, thereby nullifying the positive potential of the law; 
nevertheless, the role of NGOs in effecting change and in providing support should in no way be 
understated, despite the constraints they face.  Trinidad and Tobago’s colonial heritage, 
however, further exacerbated the problem, as it bequeathed a legal legacy of entrenched class 
elitism which provided a ready framework in the post-independence era for the perpetuation of 
this elitism, this time with a gender slant, where laws tend to be written by and for the elite with 
little real reference to a gender perspective.  This reflects unequal power relationships at various 
levels and has translated into a patent lack of political will, creating even more obstacles in 
women’s struggle for gender equality and protection against domestic violence.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 Laying the Theoretical Framework: Feminist Legal Theory and Feminist Critical 
Theory 
 
There are two main theoretical threads from which the fabric of this thesis is woven.  These are 
feminist legal theory and feminist critical theory.  Feminism provides the backdrop against which 
the issues of gender inequality and inadequate protection of the law for women against violence 
will be treated.  Liberal feminism, in particular, advocates equal rights for women and examines 
why women are treated as “less than”, where men provide the gauge against which they are 
measured.  While liberal feminism addresses the issue of women’s formal equality under the 
law, it has not fully considered issues of social power and women’s social, legal and political 
under-representation in assessing the effectiveness of law as an instrument to advance the 
status of women or achieve social change more widely.  Consequently, a combined theoretical 
approach is required.  Liberal feminist thought, feminist legal theory and feminist critical theory 
provide the necessary theoretical bases to address not only gender inequality, but also illustrate 
the ways in which law may be implicated in the subordination of women as well as empower 
women out of such positions of inferiority.  
 
This thesis contemplates a critical assessment of law as an instrument to assist women in their 
fight for equality and protection of the law against domestic violence.  Feminist legal theory, 
therefore, is necessary to expose the masculine nature of jurisprudential theory and practice 
which will in itself illustrate the difficulty of achieving gender justice in the absence of legal and 
institutional reform.  This is still, however, not enough.  Combining feminist legal theory, which 
exposes the male bias of law, with feminist critical theory, which offers a space from which 
women can “emancipate” themselves, allows a comprehensive process of reflection and 
emancipation.  This framework illustrates that the very idea of rights, as currently obtains, is 
fundamentally conceptually flawed, as the concept of rights presupposes ‘man’ as its subject, 
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thereby completely bypassing women and other marginalised groups and perpetuating violence, 
discrimination and subordination of these ‘others’.  Feminist critical theory, together with feminist 
legal theory, is useful in the examination of these issues, as it can be used as a means of 
critiquing and then ‘rescuing’ the idea of rights in favour of women by exposing its biased 
normative assumptions and politicised knowledge claims. 
 
This combined theoretical framework, therefore, provides the setting against which legal and 
institutional structures in place for promoting gender equality and protection for women against 
domestic violence are examined.  Moreover, such an analysis will ultimately reveal that these 
very structures continue to reinforce problems of gender inequality and inadequate protection 
against domestic violence.   
 
2.1 Gender 
 
2.1.1 What is Gender? 
 
 “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.”48 
 
The key concept in feminist thought is gender.  It is therefore appropriate to first interrogate this 
concept.  As elucidated by de Beauvoir’s ever popular statement, feminist theorists understand 
the term gender not simply as physical, biological differences between males and females, but 
as “a set of culturally shaped and defined characteristics associated with masculinity and 
femininity”.49  This is in accordance with the definition set out in the United Nations’ 
Implementation of the Outcome of the Fourth World Conference on Women,  
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 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. and ed. H. M. Parshley (London: Vintage, 1997), p. 
295. 
49
 J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global 
Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 7. 
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…gender refers to the socially constructed roles played by women and men that 
are ascribed to them on the basis of their sex.  Gender analysis is done in order 
to examine similarities and differences in roles and responsibilities between 
women and men without direct reference to biology, but rather to the behaviour 
patterns expected from women and men and their cultural reinforcement.  
These roles are usually specific to a given area and time, that is, since gender 
roles are contingent on the social and economic context, they can vary 
according to the specific context and can change over time.  In terms of the use 
of language, the word "sex" is used to refer to physical and biological 
characteristics of women and men, while gender is used to refer to the 
explanations for observed differences between women and men based on 
socially assigned roles.50 
 
One writer correctly reflected that “sex is biological, gender psychological, and therefore 
cultural”.51  Butler states that the original distinction between sex and gender was 
conceptualised with a view to disputing Freud’s “biology-is-destiny formulation” and that the 
distinction “serves the argument that whatever biological intractability sex appears to have, 
gender is culturally constructed…”52  Socio-cultural constructions of gender are reinforced by 
both sexes as they tend to deliver what they perceive as expected of them.53  Critics claim, 
however, that gender is simply synonymous with women/femininity,54 which is a terribly 
simplistic and uninformed viewpoint, as ‘gender’ examines the social construction of gendered 
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identities which includes both men and women while ‘women/femininity’ deals with the latter to 
the exclusion of the former and does not necessarily examine the latter’s construction.  Gender, 
then, is the result of a process of cultural socialisation and therefore varies across cultures.  It 
refers to the “asymmetrical social constructs of masculinity and femininity as opposed to 
ostensibly ‘biological’ male-female differences”.55 
 
2.2 Feminism 
 
2.2.1 What is Feminism? 
 
“…the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, 
and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.  
Where there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between 
man and animals…, the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them 
as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master.”56  Aristotle 
(350 BCE). 
 
“there is no pursuit of the administrators of a state that belongs to a woman 
because she is a woman or to a man because he is a man.  But the natural 
capacities are distributed alike among both creatures, and women naturally 
have a share in all pursuits and men in all…”57 Plato (427-347 BCE). 
 
Broadly speaking, feminism can be simultaneously understood as theory and social movement, 
which can be aided by the theoretical component.58  As theory, feminism may consist of 
“systems of concepts, propositions and analysis that describe and explain women’s situations 
and experiences and support recommendations about how to improve them”.59  According to 
Randall, however, the best approach to defining feminism is a historical one.  She states that, 
“Feminism emerged as a movement and body of ideas that aimed to enhance women’s status 
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and power.  It called into question power relations between men and women that were 
conventionally defended as ‘natural’”.60  The whole nature/nurture debate has persisted for 
centuries, as illustrated in the above arguments, but it is now accepted (by feminists, at least) 
that the concept of gender is largely, if not, wholly, a socio-cultural phenomenon.61  In other 
words, feminism called for equality between the sexes in economic, social, political, cultural, 
linguistic and legal spheres which was theorised on a notion of rights.62   
 
Feminism should in no way, however, be understood as a monolithic ideology.  As Chapman 
accurately notes, “differences in social and political context produce distinctly different forms of 
feminism”63 such as reflected in Nordic feminism, which is based on notions of social 
democracy; French feminism, which is rather philosophical (existential) in nature; and liberal 
and radical forms of feminism popular in the United States.  On a micro level, the vast amount of 
theorising and debate has led feminism in myriad diverse directions,64 so that even within each 
feminist school of thought there are conspicuous differences.65 
 
2.2.2 The Historical Development of Feminism and Women’s Human Rights 
 
The development of feminist thought explicitly questions women’s exclusion and 
marginalisation.  The term ‘feminist’ first came into use in English during the 1880’s, indicating 
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support for women’s equal legal and political rights with men.66  Feminism, the concept, is 
widely thought to have its roots in the Age of Enlightenment; however, Lerner has traced the 
earliest written expression of feminist consciousness all the way back to seventh century 
Europe, when women sought to reinterpret the scriptures which deemed women intellectually 
inferior by nature and given to sin.67  By the beginning of the fifteenth century, feminism took 
root in liberalist thought.  This era witnessed a European-wide public debate led by Christine de 
Pizan, known as the Querrelle des femmes and which endured for some 300 years,68 
concerning the misogynistic portrayal of women in literature.   
 
There were many influential writers during this period who believed that that both men and 
women possessed a capacity for reason and true knowledge based on individual experience 
and self-discovery.69  Descartes, François Poullain de la Barre, John Stuart Mill, Mary Astell, 
Catherine Macaulay70 and Mary Wollstonecraft all believed that women were necessarily 
capable of reason and could participate equally in all spheres of life – social, economic, political, 
academic and that their shortcomings were based entirely on the type of education they 
received.71  Astell, however, was politically quite conservative and did not believe in the liberal 
idea of extending political rights to women, as she strongly believed in patriarchy and that 
women should be subject to the authority of her husband.72  Mill, too, believed that women could 
equally partake in professional and political life, but there was one integral caveat: she must be 
able to successfully juggle her domestic responsibilities with any other she may choose to 
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undertake.73  While Mill obviously did not problematise the sexual division of labour and 
believed that only exceptional women would choose to compete in the work place,74 he 
“implicitly challenges the liberal concept of the public/private divide and the masculinist notions 
of politics upon which this divide rests”.75     
 
This period also saw the onset of the Industrial Revolution which brought with it changes in the 
traditional division of labour, which now became more complex and, according to Bryson, the 
creation of the distinction between the public and the private.  During this change, women of the 
working class were progressively excluded from trades and professions they previously partook 
in and aristocratic women became restricted to the domestic sphere as they were no longer 
needed in the running of their husbands’ estates.  It was at this point that marriage became an 
economic necessity as women became increasingly dependent on their husbands for financial 
support.  Issues of unbalanced demography and religious reformation further complicated the 
situation and the role of women, now so profoundly altered, came into question.76  Concurring 
with the emergence of a clearly delineated public/private realm was the increasing importance 
of the ancient concept of patriarchy.  Historically, the rule of the king over his people was 
thought to be divinely sanctioned just as a father ruled over his family.  Bryson states that 
patriarchy in the home was used as justification for a parallel power at the state level.77  This 
emergence of the modern secular state embeds, from its very inception, gendered beliefs 
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privileging men and which were accepted as the natural order of things.  The subordination of 
women within this arrangement continues to be of significance today. 
 
1848 was the year of the very first women’s rights convention, the Seneca Falls Convention, 
and was spurred on by the movement for the abolition of slavery across the Atlantic in the 
United States.  A Declaration was issued at the end of the convention and was modelled on the 
1776 United States Declaration of Independence.  Participants of this convention demanded 
that the rights of women as bearers of rights in all spheres of life be acknowledged and 
respected by society.  According to Bryson, the declaration laid the foundation for the structured 
emergence of feminism as a political movement and an ideology.78 
 
2.2.2.1 First Wave Feminism 
 
Spurred on by their disadvantaged social, economic and legal position, women formally sought 
redress.  Thus began in the mid-late 19th century was what is known as the first wave of 
feminism with women seeking formal equality in all spheres of life, including education and legal 
rights.  By 1900, ideological differences in the movement (liberal, socialist, maternal) were 
overpowered by the growing agreement among those in the movement that the “success on key 
legal, educational and economic issues could not be gained without greater political leverage”79 
and it was at this point that the focus of the movement shifted and coalesced to that of achieving 
suffrage and political enfranchisement of women.  Several achievements were gained when the 
vote was won in many countries by the 1920’s.  Educational opportunities expanded for English 
women, both married and unmarried women gained rights and improved maternity and child 
welfare in both England and the United States, and most importantly, winning the vote helped in 
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establishing the legitimacy of women’s claim to equal treatment.80  Notwithstanding these 
achievements, the patriarchal structures remained largely unchanged and “the ideas and the 
economic and political realities underpinning them retained their viability”.81  In any event, the 
energy required to fuel the drive for enfranchisement left the movement drained and the first 
wave of feminism receded.   
 
2.2.2.2 Second Wave Feminism 
 
Feminism regained its vigour and returned in the 1960’s in its second wave.82  Four main types 
of feminism emerged here: liberal, radical and Marxist/socialist, psychoanalytic.83  Second wave 
liberal feminism, too, saw women questioning their role in society, given the increased 
production of labour-saving devices for the home and advances in contraceptive technology 
which bestowed upon women a sense of freedom, sexual, reproductive and otherwise.84  This 
new wave was characterised by de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, Betty Friedan’s The Feminine 
Mystique, Germaine Greer’s The Female Eunuch and Juliet Mitchell’s Psychoanalysis and 
Feminism, three of which focus on the psychological aspects of sex and gender.  Women 
                                               
80
 Vicky Randall, Women and Politics: An International Perspective (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1987), p. 
218. 
81
 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 238. 
82
 According to Randall, however, the movement was not fully dormant in the intervening years and 
states that the reason for the ebb in the movement was a lot more complex than has otherwise been 
suggested.  See Randall, Women and Politics, pp. 218-224. 
83
 For the purposes of this thesis, though, I shall only be looking at liberal feminism, as the feminist 
issues raised here are the most pertinent to my discussion on law and gender equality.  While radical 
feminism, particularly MacKinnon’s offering on radical feminism, explores women’s inequality as a 
product of sexual domination by men, her focus remains too essentialist as she develops “a 
monolithic, “grand” feminist jurisprudence which seeks to reduce all aspects of women’s oppression to 
one dimension, and which treads dangerously close to biologistic essentialism”.  Nicola Lacey, 
“Closure and Critique in Feminist Jurisprudence: Transcending the Dichotomy or a Foot in Both 
Camps?”, in Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), p. 179. It does not take into account factors such as race or class.  
Liberal feminism, however, does not regard the legal system itself as contributing to the inferior 
position of women, while MacKinnon does.  See Charlesworth and Chinkin, The boundaries of 
international law, pp. 38-44.  This is not to decry MacKinnon’s campaign to have sexual harassment 
recognised as a legal wrong as it has been an effective feminist strategy in many ways. See Lacey, 
“Closure and Critique in Feminist Jurisprudence”, p. 180. 
84
 Randall, Women and Politics, p. 222. 
 31 
understood female subordination to be more than simply the effect of dominant political forces, 
but as endemic in all social relations with men.85  The (initially) radical feminist slogan “the 
personal is political” was born in this period and brought to the fore the public/private divide, 
which, as noted earlier, has persisted since the onset of the Industrial Revolution.  “The 
personal is political” “involves a recognition that private and public life interpenetrate in complex 
ways” and is certainly not immune from the dynamic of power.86  As Green notes, “[p]ersonal 
problems are not only private idiosyncratic experiences but part of a social phenomenon 
amenable to political analysis” and cites the example of both child and spousal abuse which 
require social and political action for their elimination.87 
 
A liberalist notion, the public/private dichotomy refers to both the distinction between state and 
society as well as between non-domestic and domestic life.  Okin goes on to make the point that 
in both dichotomies, the “state is (paradigmatically) public, and the family, domestic, and 
intimate life are (again paradigmatically) private”.88   The importance of this binary89 relation to 
feminist theory is that the notion of privacy has always been bestowed upon man as the holder 
of rights to be free from any state (or church) intervention in the running of his household and in 
controlling the members of his private sphere.90  According to MacKinnon, “The liberal state 
coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a gender – 
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through its legitimating norms… and substantive policies”.91  She also asserts that “[t]he state is 
jurisprudentially male, meaning that it adopts the standpoint of male power on the relation 
between law and society…[as] the state, through law, institutionalizes male power over women 
through institutionalizing the male point of view in law”.92  This point is clearly illustrated in 
Blackstone’s infamous legal interpretation of the status of married women where they were 
denied legal and civil rights, deemed to be incapable of political activity, and could only be 
represented by their husband or father.93  Moreover, the state continues to maintain the 
distinction between the private and the public as the legal right to privacy depends on 
government support.94  Man’s right to privacy, therefore, has justified the state’s inaction 
(deemed to be a reflection of male interests) in the face of abuses that are perpetrated within 
the home, as it is not the state’s place to interfere with what takes place in his private realm.95   
 
Equality has always been a cornerstone of liberalist thought and it is therefore no surprise that 
liberal feminists also stress the importance of sexual equality, or as it is contemporarily known, 
gender justice, which is perhaps the single most important goal of women’s liberation.96  But 
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what exactly does sexual equality mean?  Since the beginning of liberal feminist discourse, 
women have advocated equality on the basis that women possess the same capabilities as 
men but simply need to have similar access to opportunities in order to realise these 
capabilities.  Equality in liberal feminist terms, according to Evans, means equality in the sense 
of sameness of attainment, and therefore treatment, and justifies it via sameness or 
androgyny.97  Paradoxically, as Scott correctly notes, “in order to protest women’s exclusion, 
they [feminists] had to act on behalf of women and so invoked the very difference they sought to 
deny”.98  This issue of equality will be dealt with in greater detail in the section below on feminist 
legal theory. 
 
2.2.2.3 “Other” Feminisms 
 
Critiques levelled against liberal feminism (as well as the others) were based largely on their 
exclusionary nature.  They were all charged as being inadvertently classist, racist and 
(hetero)sexist, assuming middle-upper class college-educated married white women to be the 
only affected groups.99  While deemed a useful exercise in the study of sex discrimination 
against one group, it may also be seen as a “case study of narcissism, insensitivity, 
sentimentality, and self-indulgence”.100  It had the inevitable effect of producing feminist 
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scholarship from the margins to refute the universalising claims made by white feminists who 
spoke as if for all women,101 reflecting the divergent historical-political circumstances of each 
type.102  While the various criticisms are acknowledged, liberal feminism makes a clarion call for 
gender equality regardless of individual contexts and provides a useful starting point, together 
with feminist legal theory and feminist critical theory, to examine law as a potentially valuable, 
though not unproblematic, instrument to promote gender equality. 
 
While liberal feminists can be criticised for not questioning the male bias in rights discourse and 
practice, but have merely sought to extend 'male rights' to women, this does not invalidate a 
rights agenda as a tool that can be used to promote the status of women, or even achieve an 
emancipatory end.  Feminist theorists, such as Benhabib, have embraced critical theory 
because it holds out the possibility of rescuing a universal and emancipatory project for 
feminism.  What is universal, however, is determined not by reference to a posited 
transcendental subject/subjectivity, as in liberalism, but is inter-subjectively constituted through 
dialogue.  For example, the NGO forum at Beijing can be presented as one such forum for 
debate and dialogue on women's rights.  Here, activists question the meaning and limitation of 
rights and which rights are women's rights.  In this way, the substantive meaning of rights has 
been transformed to better fit the needs of women.  Of course, NGO forums are far from ‘ideal 
speech situations’ but, nevertheless, represent a ‘best practice' subject to further improvement 
vis-à-vis access and inclusion.103 
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Critical (and other) theorists claim that legal scholarship is elitist.  For them, the production of 
knowledge “is in itself a historical process which is conditioned by the socio-political, economic 
and cultural context in which it is constructed”.104  Critical theorists argue that the production of 
knowledge is integrally related to power and serves particular interests,105 where power is 
associated with the male and masculinity.  The power associated with the male and masculinity 
is underpinned by many factors one of which is the legal system.  It is important therefore to 
develop an understanding of how the law functions to support the power of the male elite and to 
determine how the assessment of the law can be used to both expose its male bias and posit 
the gender equality sought by women as part of their fundamental rights.  The notion of the 
relationship between knowledge and power is also a critical component of feminist legal theory. 
 
2.3 Feminist Legal Theory: Where do Women Figure? 
 
Feminist legal theory, or feminist jurisprudence, came about in the 1980’s “out of a political 
concern for the ways in which law may be implicated in women’s subordination”.106  It may be 
defined very broadly as “the study of the relationship between women and the law”107 which 
exposes the male bias of law.108  West makes the point that  
 
“[j]urisprudence is “masculine” because jurisprudence is about the relationship 
between human beings and the laws we actually have, and the laws we actually 
have are “masculine” both in terms of their intended beneficiary and in 
authorship”.109  
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West identifies two main projects of feminist legal theory, the first of which is the “unmasking 
and critiquing of the patriarchy behind purportedly ungendered law and theory”, or uncovering 
“patriarchal jurisprudence”.110  The second project entails “reconstructive jurisprudence”, or 
feminist law reform in areas such as rape, sexual harassment, discriminatory employment 
practices and reproductive freedom. 
 
Feminist legal theory is multidisciplinary in its approach and draws upon the lived experiences of 
women.  The critical perspectives developed from the other disciplines help to offer “powerful 
analyses of the relationship between law and gender and new understandings of the limits of, 
and opportunities for, legal reform”.111  As such, “Feminist legal theory does not constitute a 
unified body of knowledge or a set of universal concerns or perspectives, but is shaped by 
different political agendas and institutional frameworks occurring within particular societies”.112 
 
2.3.1 Feminist Legal Theory: The Early Years 
 
As seen in the above section on the historical development of feminism, women were denied 
legal subjectivity for centuries, especially when Blackstone conferred “civil and legal death” on 
(married) women.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the feminist critique on legal subjectivity 
                                                                                                                                                   
character of law (which is inherently masculine) and its effectiveness (or lack thereof) in affording 
protection and security of self to individuals. 
110
 Even if women were able to conquer patriarchy (on one level) and obtain equal pay for equal work, 
would that make them immune to the effects of patriarchy elsewhere, such as, say, male violence at 
home?  See Mark Cowling’s interesting insights on patriarchy and feminism, based on the work of 
Sylvia Walby who identifies six patriarchal social structures, in his draft paper, “Socialism, Feminism 
and Patriarchy: Does the Concept of Femininities Provide a Useful Link?”, Political Studies 
Association, Conference Proceedings (University of Nottingham, 1999), pp. 1-24. 
111
 Katharine Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy, “Introduction”, in Katharine Bartlett and Rosanne 
Kennedy (eds), Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1991), p. 1. 
112
 Sharyn L. Roach Anleu, “Critiquing the Law: Themes and Dilemmas in Anglo-American Feminist 
Legal Theory”, Journal of Law and Society, 19 (Winter 1992), p. 423. 
 37 
suggests that it “is a site of violent sexual exclusion”.113  In their quest for legal rights, then, 
recognition as a juridical person was the first step to be taken.114  In the (in)famous 1873 case of 
Jex-blake v Senatus of Edinburgh University115 a group of female medical students was denied 
the possibility of graduating upon successful completion of their examinations on the basis of 
“strict legal grounds”.116  Lord Neaves stated in his opinion that the founding of (Scottish) 
Universities was for the education of young men and that “while males have a right to University 
education, females have none…”117  While the University regulations were amended four years 
earlier to allow admission to women to the study of medicine the court held that these 
regulations were “wholly illegal, and palpably beyond the statutory power conferred upon the 
University Courts”.118  Unfortunately, the Court was of the belief that granting a decision in 
favour of the pursuers “would incur the risk of lowering the standard”119 which the medical 
profession enjoyed at the time.  An immediate problem that stems from such a judgement is that 
not only are women deemed to be physically and intellectually inferior to men, but as a judicial 
pronouncement, such stereotyping gains legal authority.120   
 
The legal fight for women included their wish to be understood as legal persons, as “persons” or 
“man” did not include “woman” in its interpretation.  In a 1930 Privy Council judgement, the 
interpretation of “persons” was expanded to include “woman” on the basis of changing legal 
customs.  In Lord Sankey’s judgement, he ascribed the prior exclusion of women from the 
interpretation of “person” to the fact that women were formerly deemed legally incapable at 
common law of serving in public office.  He dismissed this practice as a “relic of days more 
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barbarous than ours”.121  Should any subsequent interpretation of “person” in fact exclude 
women, it should be stated expressly by Parliament that such is the intention. 
 
Interestingly, the earliest use of the word “person” has been traced to Greek and Roman times 
in its use in drama.  Persona originally referred to the mask that actors wore on stage and later 
meant the part played by a man in life.  Later still, the meaning was refined to refer to man 
himself and then to its contemporary use in law, to mean a right-bearing being.122  It is 
instructive to note that early Greek and Roman theatre expressly banned women from 
performing; therefore only men could have been referred to as “persons” in this context.123  
Perhaps this meaning persisted in denying women legal capacity as the term gained currency in 
legal jargon. 
 
2.3.2 Feminist Legal Theory: The Public/Private Divide 
 
Overcoming the public/private divide remains of very high importance to women.124  As 
mentioned above, this divide holds great implications for women as the private, in this case, the 
sphere of domesticity, which encompasses the site of the family, reproduction and sexuality, is 
deemed to be outside the scope of legal regulation and State intervention.125  This means that 
the site of the family is a site of tremendous near-unregulated violence against women and 
children, as the law affords women little, if any, legal protection against such abuses.  It is for 
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this reason that “feminism has had to explode the private” and sees the personal as political.126  
While there has been legal reform to accommodate sexual reproductive freedom and violence-
free homes, there also needs to be greater understanding and compassion on the part of those 
in authority in order to help make these reforms effective.  Bridgeman and Millns correctly state 
that “[c]ontraception has to be safe, effective and acceptable; abortion services free [and 
legalised] and non-judgmental; and violence within the home has to be treated as a serious 
crime by law enforcement agencies”.127  They also note that an issue may go unregulated if the 
law does not recognise a particular wrong against women as actual harm, such as certain types 
of cosmetic surgery,128 or if it simply privatises the issue, as is common in cases of domestic 
violence.  The enactment of legislation in such areas has caused the line between the public 
and the private to blur somewhat, although, sadly, such enactment does not necessarily afford 
women the protection stated in the legislation as they tend to remain unimplemented for a 
variety of reasons.  
 
Beveridge and Mullally argue that the exclusion of the private sphere from the application of 
rights is based on a pre-liberal notion of the ‘naturalness’ of the traditional family.129  According 
to these authors, the traditional family is seen as a bastion of civilisation and a precondition for 
social stability and is thus immune to judicial reform.  It would appear that rights has been 
unable to contemplate the notion of separate spheres of justice and, consequently, only deals 
with issues stemming from the public sphere.  Legal recognition of the right to privacy has only 
aggravated the situation, as mentioned above.  Unfortunately, this dichotomy exists at the 
international level as well.  International human rights law reflects this gendered approach by 
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focusing on direct State violations of individual rights;130 therefore, the harms suffered by women 
from private individuals or within the family lie outside of the conceptual framework of 
international human rights in the same manner as they do within the State apparatus. 
 
2.3.3 Feminist Legal Theory: The Equality Project 
 
“[T]he master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house”.131 
- Audre Lorde 
Feminist legal theory as a means of improving the status of women is certainly not without its 
criticisms.  The very fact of using law as a means to emancipate women causes concern.  
Lacey asks: “Is there a certain paradox to finding this apparent germ of emancipation of gender 
justice in the very body [law] which has been the object of the denigration of women?”132  The 
very androcentric nature of law makes it difficult for some to understand the use of law by 
feminists as the conceptual (legal) framework for promoting women’s interests.  Smart observes 
“that law is so deaf to core concerns of feminism that feminists should be extremely cautious of 
how and whether they resort to law” and that generally we “need to be far more aware of the 
‘malevolence’ of law and the depth of its resistance to women’s concerns”.133  This 
notwithstanding there must be some framework from which to work.  To completely reconstruct 
law to highlight feminist concerns may not be a feasible approach.  Given the fact that law in 
itself has marginalised and penalised women on the basis of their gender and the fact that law’s 
creators are male and seek their own interests, why not begin from there? 
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There are those who think that diversifying the male character of the judiciary will necessarily 
improve the quality of justice dispensed, as women will bring different perceptions to the 
adjudication table.  It is also argued that women’s absence from the process of decision-making 
in public bodies undermines the democratic legitimacy of those institutions.134  The Courts also 
seem to be of this opinion.135  There seems to be a misguided presumption that securing a 
greater presence of female lawyers and judges will help to transform the legal system away 
from formalism, objectivity, universalism and adversarial methods of conflict resolution towards 
“the subjective needs of individuals and a greater use of alternative dispute resolution such as 
mediation”.136  While this may be true in some cases,137 this will not necessarily hold for all.  It 
has been consistently argued that the legal tradition is masculine in nature.138  Could it not be 
true to an extent to say that female lawyers/judges would be socialised to think and behave in a 
masculine manner and adopt masculine logic as well?139  This is of course not to say that all 
women would do so; however, “the type of women who currently succeed in the male-
dominated legal world are, by definition, atypical of most women”.140 
 
                                               
134
 See Kate Malleson, “Justifying Gender Equality on the Bench: Why Difference Won’t Do”, Feminist 
Legal Studies, 11 (2003), pp. 1-2. 
135
 See for example R. v S. (R.D.), [1997] 118 CCC (3d) para 119. 
136
 Malleson, “Justifying Gender Equality on the Bench”, pp. 3-4.  These presumptions draw largely 
from Carol Gilligan’s “ethic of care” articulated in her In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women’s Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).  See also, for example, pp. 73-
74 and West, “Jurisprudence and Gender”. 
137
 A quick look at lawyers who practice family law, viewed perhaps as less formal [masculine] than 
other areas of law, in Trinidad and Tobago will show that many of them are in fact women.   
138
 A study on women and tokenism in the legal profession in southern Arizona produced interesting 
results reflecting the fact that gender makes a huge difference, regardless of qualifications, and that 
such bias is recognised by both males and females.  See Patricia MacCorquodale and Gary Jensen, 
“Women in the Law: Partners or Tokens?”, Gender and Society, 7:4 (Dec., 1993), pp. 582-593.  
Another study undertaken in Florida on the differential treatment of women and men in the state legal 
system shows that “compared with men judges and attorneys, women judges and attorneys are more 
conscious of gender inequality, observe more gender bias in legal settings, and show a stronger 
connection between experiences with gender bias and feminist consciousness”.  Patricia Martin, John 
Reynolds, Shelley Keith, “Gender Bias and Feminist Consciousness among Judges and Attorneys: A 
Standpoint Theory Analysis”, Signs, 27:3 (Spring, 2002), p. 669. 
139
 The Martin, Reynolds, Keith study would suggest that this is in fact not so, especially with reference 
to women judges. See p. 689. 
140
 Malleson, “Justifying Gender Equality on the Bench”, p. 8. 
 42 
Feminist legal theory has also been accused of uncritically accepting the masculine nature of 
law as the standard by which feminist issues must be measured.141  Law’s masculinity is not 
problematised but accepted as universal and transhistorical and applied as is to women.  This is 
particularly the case in the rights debate concerning equal/special treatment.   With one foot 
inside, having been accepted as “persons”, the next step for women was a fight for equality.  As 
mentioned above, women’s struggle for equality meant that there was some measure against 
which women were gauging themselves.  Difference in the equality debate refers to women’s 
differences from men, “with a clear, implicit acceptance of men as the norm and women as the 
deviators therefrom”.142  Equality in this sense meant that women were to be treated as identical 
to men and denied their natural, biological differences and complexities. 
 
This particular sense of equality has led to what can only be referred to as legal absurdities as 
the law sought to treat men and women on an equal basis.  Nash makes the point that equality 
is problematic as it reproduces a male norm, both in terms of the content of the law and its 
form.143  Sex discrimination legislation uses a ‘male comparator’ test, which, by the very name, 
affirms Nash’s statement.144  This test requires a woman to prove discrimination by showing that 
she has been treated less favourably than a man would have been had he been in a 
comparable situation.  Pregnant women have found it necessary to liken female pregnancy, a 
natural process, to male sickness in order to draw a parallel.  How can this be, given that only 
women can possibly become pregnant?  Pregnancy is specific to women and to describe it in 
gender-neutral terms is to capitulate to the male norm.145   
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Such occurrences have led to a division in the equality camp, with some feminists advocating 
equal rights based on the male comparator test to afford them the ability to compete on equal 
terms with men, which, of course, completely denies their differences; while on the other side 
are the difference feminists who embrace women’s difference and simply want the right to be as 
free as men, yet to be themselves.146  Nash asks whether the women’s movement should focus 
on rights for women to be treated the same as men or on gender-specific rights, enabling 
women’s differences from men to be valued and taken into account as the means of gaining 
genuine equality between the sexes.147  While the latter may appear to be the more desirable 
option, Sohrab articulates quite clearly the fallacy of having to choose one or the other.  She 
advocates an integrated approach and says,  
 
“The perceived necessity of making a choice between equal or special 
treatment is a false choice.  In some areas equal rights are necessary, while in 
others it is gender-specific rights that are necessary, for instance in pregnancy.  
Neither approach is, nor should be, the exclusive ‘answer’ or strategy or claim, 
and arguing over substantive equality by opposing equal with special and vice-
versa is at best redundant and at worst a costly distraction.”148 
 
This is complicated by issues of race, nationality and class149 and is clearly illustrated in the 
case of Betty Dukes and ors v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.  It is interesting to note that sexual equality 
is still not to be had and worse, complicated by such issues, not even in a country based on a 
natural rights tradition and that prides itself on the feminist notion of “equality of opportunity” and 
has anti-discrimination, equal rights and equal pay legislation.  In what is described as the 
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“biggest civil rights lawsuit in US history”150 Wal-Mart is being sued for sexual discrimination 
despite investing heavily in branding itself “a haven for women”.151  According to the plaintiffs, 
the discriminatory practices are “the result of an on-going and continuous pattern and practice 
of intentional sex discrimination in assignments, pay, training and promotions, and reliance 
on policies and practices that have an adverse impact on female employees that cannot be 
justified by business necessity…”.152  The fact that the main plaintiff is of African American 
descent necessarily adds a racial slant to the case.   
 
Many feminists argue for a politics of difference, as denying differences between the sexes 
can have perverse effects.  Phillips makes the point that in the absence of sex-specific 
legislation to deal with pregnancy and maternity leave women enter the labour market at a 
disadvantage.  “The refusal to recognise difference,” she says, “can become a covert way of 
elevating one group alone as the norm.  Men then stand in for humanity, and humanity 
adopts a masculine form”.153  Palmer concurs on this point and, in her critique on equal 
rights, adds that even though women may have a claim to formal rights that the structural 
inequalities of power are likely to remain unchanged.  She raises as a primary concern the 
possibility that “rights may be appropriated by the powerful and women’s concerns will 
continue to be marginalized”.154  She also states that formal equality for women affect their 
ability to claim for substantive rights, as gender can no longer be problematised.  “Formal 
equality in the law means that gender as an explicit category of political decision and 
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distribution has been dismantled with the subsequent loss of its critical foothold”.155  Equality 
in this guise only benefits women who adopt male norms. 
 
Rhode observes that the issue at hand is not difference per se “but the difference difference 
makes”,156 if it does in fact make one.  She states that “analysis should turn on whether legal 
recognition of gender distinctions is likely to reduce or reinforce gender disparities in power, 
status, and economic security”.157  Scales observes that “[i]njustice does not flow directly 
from recognizing differences; injustice results when those differences are transformed into 
social and economic deprivation”.158  For Littleton, the difference that difference makes 
should not be such that it adversely affects the unprivileged group.  In her “equality as 
acceptance” model, she proposes that “[t]he difference between human beings, whether 
perceived or real, and whether biologically or socially based, should not be permitted to 
make a difference in the lived-out equality of those persons”.159  In other words, differences, 
real or perceived, should not be penalised on any basis. 
 
The South African Courts have adopted an interesting model of equality jurisprudence, which 
could perhaps serve as a model to be emulated and improved.  Based on section 9 of the 
Constitution of South Africa, which protects an individual’s right to equality, the Courts 
understand this to include not just notions of abstract equality but also substantive equality.160  A 
court will hold that there are instances in which an individual must be treated differently in order 
to protect his or her right to equality.  Van Marle states, “An approach based on substantive 
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equality takes the concrete circumstances of an individual into account in contrast to a formal 
abstract approach based on sameness”.161  In the case of President of the Republic of South 
Africa and another v Hugo,162 Hugo was imprisoned when the President at the time, Nelson 
Mandela, pardoned certain categories of prisoners by the Presidential Act 17 of 1994, one of 
which was all women in prison on 10 May 1994 who were single mothers of children below the 
age of twelve.  Hugo applied for an order to have the act declared unconstitutional on the basis 
of reverse discrimination on the basis of gender.  While the court held that Hugo was in fact 
discriminated against, said discrimination was not unfair because “he, as a man, was not a 
member of a group that had previously suffered from discrimination” and that the reality of that 
time and foreseeable future was that mothers would bear primary child-rearing responsibility.  
Admittedly, this reinforces certain stereotypes but simultaneously benefited a particular group in 
a very material way.163 
 
In postmodernist terms, feminist legal theorists, in exposing the androcentrism of law,164 are 
accused of seeking simply to substitute their truth claims as preferable and better than other 
truths165 which still fails to deal with the issue of gender bias.  The difference, though, is that the 
masculine truth claims have greater effect as they are deeply embedded in the system as truth 
and have the advantage of exercising power in a society that values this particular notion of 
truth.  The value placed on certain notions of truth by a society is such that it can deny the 
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possibility of other truth claims166 and in this case, it is feminist truth claims that are being 
denied. 
 
Another postmodern critique is the use by some feminists of universalising, totalising theorising 
thereby reducing all aspects of women’s oppression to one or two main factors.  This is one of 
the main criticisms laid against MacKinnon’s radical offering on feminist legal theory.  She 
claims that “the fatal error of the legal arm of feminism had been its failure to understand that 
the mainspring of sex inequality is misogyny and the mainspring of misogyny is sexual 
sadism”.167  Nevertheless, while her theoretical analysis may appear myopic in reducing 
women’s oppression solely to their sexual objectification by men, her legal strategies for fighting 
pornography and sexual harassment have had the effect of empowering women (and men).168  
Lacey also notes that “MacKinnon’s campaign to have sexual harassment recognised as a legal 
wrong has been an important and in many ways effective feminist strategy”.169 
 
While closing the gap between formal rights and substantive rights within such a conceptual 
framework poses a problem many feminists believe that formal legal equality is no longer much 
of an issue.  These feminists remain concerned that it does not give rise to the substantive 
equality that women need to reflect the reality of their life experiences.  However, Kingdom 
makes a fourfold argument on the issue of rights for women.170  Firstly, despite the 
disenchantment and scepticism born out of equality legislation, equal rights must be sustained.  
Poor legislative drafting or sexist judiciaries need to be continuously battled against with 
pressure for legislative reform, better enforcement and public awareness campaigns.  Secondly, 
there are those feminists who believe in putting their efforts into extra-legal strategies which they 
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believe are not tainted by male power, such as the establishment of rape crisis centers.  Thirdly, 
while the gap between formal legal equality and substantive equality is not disputed, law should 
not be read as gender neutral; however, “it is important to distinguish between the law and the 
effects of law and legal processes in order to identify the contradictions which allow space for 
change”.171  Fourthly, supporters of special rights see the answer in the redefinition of the moral 
principle of gender equality in a manner which combines equal rights and special rights and 
which must be translated into law.  
 
Notwithstanding criticisms of feminist legal theory (and there are more), feminist legal theory 
offers a glimmer of hope yet.  To quote Smart, 
 
“The idea of a feminist jurisprudence is tantalizing in that it appears to hold out 
the promise of a fully integrated theoretical framework and political practice 
which will be transformative, unlike the partial or liberal measures of the past 
which have merely ameliorated or mollified women’s oppression (e.g. equal pay 
legislation).  It promises a general theory of law which has practical applications.  
Because it appears to offer the combination of theory and practice, and 
because it will be grounded in women’s experience, the ideal of a feminist 
jurisprudence appears to be a way out of the impasse of liberal feminist theories 
of law reform…  While it is the case that law does not hold the key to unlock 
patriarchy, it provides a forum for articulating alternative visions and 
accounts.”172 
 
Having acknowledged that the law is part of the structure that maintains the power of men and 
restricts women from fully enjoying their fundamental rights including that of gender equality, it is 
important for women not only to expose the male bias in the law but also to use that exposure to 
ensure the reconstruction of the law in a manner that will lead to gender equality.  It is important 
therefore to use a combined theoretical approach, relying on both feminist legal theory as well 
as critical theory to uncover inherent biases as a means of offering hope to women in accessing 
and securing rights.  Feminist legal theory is very much aligned with the goal of critical theory, 
which is to question historically given truths and to expose the inherent biases lying therein as a 
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means for self-advancement; it is for this reason important that the theoretical approach be 
combined to discuss the possibility of women gaining greater access to the rights that are theirs.  
 
2.4 Critical Theory and Feminism 
 
Figure 2.1 “Knowledge is Paralysing” 173 
 
 
The underlying purpose of this thesis is to critically assess the efficacy of law as a tool to 
achieve gender equality and to address the problem of domestic violence.  This necessarily 
requires that the male centred nature of law, with reference to the human rights of women and 
in particular those just mentioned, be interrogated.  Critical theory, together with feminist legal 
theory, is useful in the examination of these issues, as it can be used as a means of critiquing 
and then ‘rescuing’ the idea of human rights in favour of women by exposing its biased 
normative assumptions and politicised knowledge claims.  Benhabib very nicely states the key 
role of the feminist critical theorist by acknowledging that,  
 
the historically known gender-sex systems have contributed to the oppression 
and exploitation of women.  The task of the feminist critical theorist is to uncover 
this fact, and to develop a theory that is emancipatory and reflective, and which 
can aid women in their struggles to overcome oppression and exploitation.174  
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Theorising, however, is not enough.  Feminist theory must translate into feminist 
politics/practice/activism for it to positively affect women’s lives.  Naples cites, as an example, 
the “development and expansion of battered women’s shelters and rape crisis centers” as 
testimony to the success of feminist political activism.175  This holds true for Trinidad and 
Tobago as well, as shelters were established and many groups dedicated to dealing with the 
problem of domestic violence became operational during the 1980s and 1990s when feminist 
political activism gained currency.  According to Naples, battered women’s shelters and rape 
crisis centres provide a site for organised public advocacy, community education, and crisis 
intervention on behalf of battered women.  They also provide a place where incest survivors, 
rape victims and children, and other abuse survivors find political allies and support services.  
Without feminist activism, therefore, these services would not be available to those in need. 
 
In a study on the women’s movement in India, Menon makes the point that “there is no 
alternative to political activism, equality cannot be legislated into existence”.176  A case study of 
Trinidad and Tobago illustrates exactly this point: without feminist intervention, changes cannot 
be effected.  Even with legislative victories, enforcement and implementation require further 
effort from the ground level.  Clauses promoting equality do not always have the intended 
automatic effect.  The struggle, unfortunately, does not end at legislative reform, but must 
continue on to ensure that such changes are made effective taking into account the situated and 
lived realities for those whom such changes are meant to benefit.  Feminist activism is crucial in 
this regard to ensure real change at all levels.  
 
Critical theorists emphasise the intimate relationship between theory and practice/praxis.  This is 
appealing to feminists who seek to employ feminist theory in the service of advancing feminist 
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political goals 'on the ground' so to speak.  Theory is more than critique; it serves specific 
interests in concrete political struggles.  Moreover, theory is not merely an abstract activity 
carried out by 'ivory tower' academics, but is forged in and through practice.  Thus, in 
understanding the emancipatory potential of law, one has to look at what activists have done 
with it.  That is to say, it is necessary to interrogate the way in which activists at the UN, or on 
the ground in Trinidad and Tobago, have used legal discourse and legal instruments to effect 
political and social change.  There might be emancipatory potential in legal discourses and 
instruments even if they were indeed originally the 'tools of the master’.177  
 
Linklater identifies what he considers to be the achievements of critical theory.  The first, and 
most important, deals with the political nature of knowledge claims given that “knowledge does 
not arise from the subject’s neutral engagement with an objective reality but reflects pre-existing 
social purposes and interests”.178  Critical theory further refutes the positivist claim that 
statements of fact are only valid when grounded in experience; however, the perspective of the 
researcher contains “blind spots, tacit presuppositions, and prejudgements of which the 
[researcher] is unaware”.179  “Because cognition is always theoretically mediated,” says 
Hawkesworth, “the world captured in human knowledge and designated “empirical” is itself 
theoretically constituted”.180  It is within this framework that legal and human rights discourses 
have been conceptualised not acknowledging the inherently androcentric claims purporting to 
be universal.   
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This critique of knowledge holds great implications for the notion of rights.  The traditional 
representation of rights in the various discourses, most notably liberalism, is identified with rights 
applicable to men as ‘citizens’, as only ‘citizens’ could be the valid holder of rights.  Rights as 
applied to men then become unproblematically ‘human’ with no regard given to women’s 
specificities or their original exclusion.  While there have been Marxist and cultural relativist 
critiques of the liberal notion of rights, for example, this was still done from the perspectives of 
men.  It was only with feminist intervention that the male biases in knowledge construction, such 
as the construction of human rights discourses, have been exposed and illustrated women’s 
exclusion.  According to Benhabib’s definition above, task number one - uncovering biases - is 
complete. 
 
Critical theory, like other theories, does not present one unified position but has certain common 
ideological assumptions, among which include the ideas of reflection, societal transformation 
and emancipation of the individual.  It is not simply about reproducing society, but 
understanding the oppressive nature of social structures and seeking to overcome and 
transform them.  According to Hoffman, critical theory is “not merely an expression of the 
concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those 
conditions”.181  Given that critical theory is politically and ethically driven by an interest in social 
and political transformation, critical theory is most certainly not neutral.182  Devetak asserts that 
“[i]t criticizes and debunks theories that legitimise the prevailing order and affirms progressive 
alternatives that promote emancipation”.183  Linklater notes that the concept of emancipation 
distinguishes Marxist critical theory from postmodernist critical theory.184 
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While knowledge can indeed have a paralytic and overwhelming effect for some as noted 
above, critical theorists view knowledge as a means of empowerment and ultimately as a 
means of liberation.  Critical theorists believe that knowledge is historically rooted and interest 
bound but its emancipatory project envisages independent and critical thinking by individuals to 
understand hegemonic discourses, criticise them and eventually overcome them in their 
struggle to free themselves from the oppressive and subordinating nature of such discourses.  
This is important, as emancipation must have the effect of both freeing and enfranchising its 
former prisoners.185  The goal here reflects the emancipatory intent of feminism.  It is not simply 
about critiquing rights and remaining content with the menu of rights currently available to 
women (such as the right to vote), but expanding the content of substantive rights to address 
areas that were previously invisible, such as domestic violence.  This is recognised at the 
international level as well, as evidenced by Recommendation 19 of 1992 on the UN Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.  However, implementation of 
measures geared towards the expansion of the content of substantive rights, such as dealing 
with domestic violence, is met with difficulty, particularly in the national environment.  Trinidad 
and Tobago is a case in point, the main issue being deeply culturally entrenched notions of 
masculinity and the difficulties of overcoming the need to exhibit machismo, one such exhibition 
being spousal abuse despite laws criminalising such behaviour.  
 
Can rights as an issue then ever be deemed objective?  Popper says that “the objectivity of 
scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested.”186  The problem 
with objectivity borne of an intersubjectively achieved consensus is that the ‘intersubjectivity’ is 
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often exclusionary.187  Take human rights discourses for example.  These discourses are 
espoused by men for men which then parade as ‘human’; there is no input by those who are 
most adversely affected, thereby taking away from the truly intersubjective nature of the 
discourse.  Women have historically been excluded on the basis intellectual inferiority and 
relegation to the “private” sphere.  Their relegation to the private side of the divide has meant 
that their concerns have had no place in discourses that take place in the public sphere.  
Women’s inability to access spaces where debates take place, such as at the UN, further 
compounds their exclusion.  Even though in Trinidad and Tobago women may have some 
government representatives in the form of Members of Parliament, this does not guarantee that 
their concerns will be given priority, as economic development is at the top of the government 
agenda and government is overwhelmingly masculine in number and in the concerns that 
receive greatest attention.  Unsurprisingly, female Ministers of Parliament have been relegated 
to ministries dealing with what are perceived to be non-economic aspects of development, such 
as women’s affairs, culture, education and the environment.188  Unfortunately, as long as the 
majority, or a powerful elite (in this case, men), holds an idea to be true,189 then it must be so as 
the powerless (in this case, women) are generally voiceless and/or lack the intellectual means 
to know otherwise – this is how hegemonic discourses gain currency and maintain their grip as 
objective and as “the truth”.     
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A similar position is held concerning legal scholarship.  It is said that critical theory, in particular 
the Frankfurt School, has had little influence on legal scholarship;190 however, it is agreed that 
legal discourse, as with all other discourses, is the result of power relationships in society.  “Law 
exists to support the interests of the party or class that forms it and is merely a collection of 
beliefs and prejudices that legitimise the injustices of society.  The wealthy and the powerful use 
law as an instrument for oppression in order to maintain their place in hierarchy.”191  The 
exclusionary and biased character of law cannot be denied and is pertinent to both domestic law 
as well as international law.  This has implications for all minority, voiceless groups and it will be 
shown later on, with particular reference to women, how human rights legal discourse privileges 
men as the advocates of said discourse and take into very little consideration the needs of 
women.  For human rights discourses, a critical reflection on the subject of human rights would 
include women and examine their marginalisation from the discourse as it currently obtains.  It 
can very easily be argued that human rights discourse is an exemplary case of a skewed power 
relationship - espoused by men, for men.  This is not surprising, as discourses are merely 
“efforts to provide reasons or justifications for any kinds of knowledge claims”192 and generally 
tend to be biased.193 
 
On a more general level, post-modernists attack critical theory’s project of emancipation as 
being “logocentric194 and humanist, [they] criticize its emphasis on the societal totality at the 
expense of le quotidian (the local or daily life), and consider the critical theorist’s search for truth 
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to be naïve”.195  Critical theorists’ immediate rebuttal is that post-modernism’s need for 
deconstruction196 is destructive, as it does not construct knowledge, to which post-modernists 
argue that they never made any pretence to theory building.197  Nevertheless, it must be borne 
in mind that theories produced in the social sciences will always be less than perfect compared 
to theories of the natural sciences which can be tested.198  In any event, critical theory offers a 
space to feminists to explore male biases in the law and then rescue the notion of rights to 
include women as well. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
A common link in the different manifestations of feminist theorising is that of gender equality and 
reasons for women’s subordination.  Feminist legal theory, one such manifestation, is significant 
because the law represents a major component of the social fabric and an underlying 
mechanism for attaining gender equality.  Not only is the law important at the national level, but 
also at the international level, as international law is seen as the primary mechanism for 
ensuring that States comply with their global pronouncements.  The application of feminist legal 
theory, therefore, to the domestic legal regime of Trinidad and Tobago exposes the gender bias 
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http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/08/07/australia.lightspeed/  
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in the law while illustrating how legal principles might be employed towards the attainment of 
gender equality.  
 
Critical theory provides a space for women to understand and overcome the oppression they 
face through their own struggles.  The difficulties experienced by the international community to 
forge effective legal instruments that promote gender equality, where such legal instruments are 
negotiated to have States accept the obligations contained therein, and to introduce same in 
domestic legal systems, continue to resonate in debates at the international level.  Even when 
nations accept certain international instruments that promote gender equality, such states have 
to be constantly reminded to meet their international legal obligations. 
 
It is within this combined feminist, legal and critical theoretical framework that the information 
presented in the rest of this thesis will be couched.  The analysis above clearly illustrates the 
male bias intrinsic to legal discourses generally as well as specifically as applied to women in 
the rights debate.  This is further exacerbated by the ability of the powerful to espouse their truth 
claims as knowledge and Truth, making it difficult for alternative versions to gain currency.   
 
Chapter three will examine the machinations of male bias at the international level, with 
particular reference to international law, international relations and international human rights 
discourses and the consequent marginalisation of women. This is important as the effectiveness 
of the “top-down”199 approach in dealing with human rights for women must be properly 
scrutinised.  The real issue to be determined is the effectiveness of the international community 
as an agent of change with respect to gender equality, particularly in the context of developing 
countries that dominate the international stage from a numerical standpoint and where gender 
equality is largely subjected to the whims and fancies of the male elite.  Power and knowledge 
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reside in the male elite and therefore it is not in its interest to voluntarily subscribe to a view that 
would promote the interest of the non-elite, women.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 The Androcentrism of International Law and Human Rights  
 
Law is a social phenomenon.  It has grown into an essential principle of social organisation in 
Western civilisations as a result of the historicity of those societies.200  Law functions as the 
formal machinery for creating and maintaining social order, as seen in the Western world and is 
often perceived as an instrument to effect change.  The plight of women with respect to their 
fundamental rights is almost universal in nature and therefore it is hardly surprising that there 
are calls for the issue to be addressed at the international level.  This “top-down” approach has 
many supporters as it is commonly felt that the near global phenomenon of gender inequality 
can only be resolved by a common approach implemented across state borders.   Important, 
therefore, is an assessment of the effectiveness of international law as an instrument to effect 
change in the context of women’s rights.   
 
An examination of the relationship between international law and gender will provide the basis 
for the argument that international law on many occasions fails to contemplate a gender 
perspective and, even when this is done, the effectiveness of the legal regime is called into 
question.  This aside, issues of sovereignty would suggest that exclusive reliance on 
international law to effect change is perhaps ill-advised and would explain why women’s issues 
in particular are not universally or fully implemented with alacrity, or even at all.  This chapter, 
therefore, will analyse the development of international law, expose its male nature and discuss 
the manner in which the international rights discourse has developed in this regard 
fundamentally privileging men.  The chapter goes on to examine the ‘reinvention’ of international 
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law by feminists in an attempt to carve a place for women’s rights as a real issue at this level.  
Legal initiatives designed specifically for the promotion of gender equality and protection for 
women against domestic violence at the level of the United Nations are assessed and so too 
are a couple of non-gender specific conventions with the potential to enhance women’s rights.  
An examination of the feminist work in international relations towards the end of the chapter 
further points to the heavily gendered nature of international relations, and consequently, 
international law. 
 
3.1 The Development of International Law 
 
International law seeks to maintain order and facilitate relations between states, as well as non-
state actors, in areas, inter alia, such as trade, travel and communication.   International law 
may be defined as that body of law which is composed for its greater part of the principles and 
rules of conduct which states feel themselves bound to observe, and therefore, do commonly 
observe in their relations with each other and includes international organisations and other 
non-state actors.201  Bentham has been attributed with having coined the term “international 
law” in the 1780s.202  In the absence of an international legislative body for creating laws, 
international law is drawn from a variety of sources.  Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice states that the sources of international law are:  
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law.203  
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Other sources include United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, the International Law 
Commission, other United Nations bodies and “soft law” which consists of non-legally binding 
instruments.  
 
Figure 3.1 Sources of International Law  
International Law  
 
 
 
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute ‘Soft’ Law Instruments 
 
 
 
 
Conventions (Treaties, Protocols) Charters 
International Custom Framework Conventions 
General Principles of Law Declarations 
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Teachings of Highly Qualified Publicists Resolutions 
 Recommendations 
 Principles 
 
It follows that, unlike domestic law, international law does not embrace such a formal 
organisational structure for the regulation of international affairs and it has taken on a largely 
“soft law” approach,204 even more so on “softer” issues such as international trade, protection of 
the environment and the promotion of human rights, within which are to be found issues 
affecting women and children, highlighting their marginalisation and exclusion from issues 
deemed worthy of regulation.  Given the economic, political, social and cultural differences of 
international society, it is difficult to secure consensus on new rules.  What soft law does is to 
provide a type of half-measure in the law-making process on the international level.  It can be 
described as “law in the process of making.  It is nascent, incipient, or potential law.”205  
According to Birnie and Boyle, it may take the form of “codes of practice, recommendations, 
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guidelines, resolutions, declarations of principles, standards, and so called ‘framework’ or 
‘umbrella’ treaties which do not fit neatly into the categories of legal sources referred to in Article 
38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute”.206  While critics may argue that the term is inadequate and 
misleading, its flexibility allows for overcoming deadlocks thereby facilitating consensus among 
states pursuing conflicting goals.207   
 
The very legality of international law is constantly questioned, as it is near impossible to enforce 
laws in a realist anarchic framework and was dubbed a “positive morality” by John Austin.208  
This is compounded by the fact that international law is not structured in the same manner as 
domestic law as it does not have a legislative body to enact laws, no judges to apply them in 
particular disputes and limited power to compel obedience.209  Akashi states that from a 
Hobbesian theoretical perspective, because there is “no common sovereign, nor legislative 
body, [that] exists among nations, there is no law in this sense applied to international 
relations”.210 
 
Despite these difficulties, and the view of international law as merely “an aesthetic 
achievement”,211 international law continues to grow in importance in international relations.  
The reasons for its importance are threefold, according to Savage.212  International law has 
grown in practice through the creation of new agreements and conventions for the prosecution 
of ‘war criminals’; developments in international relations have led to a renewal of interest in 
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normative issues (such as sovereignty, statehood, human rights practices) and international law 
is regarded as a mechanism for the incorporation of these concerns in the practices of 
international politics; and, international law is gaining currency as it is linked to wider 
developments in legal thinking which includes, very broadly, jurisprudence and discussions of 
law at a national and political level.  Its mounting value is also derived from the fact that “actors” 
in international law are no longer restricted to “the state”, but include other actors such as 
NGOs.  A tool for promoting progressive social policies,213 international law can be used in 
reliance on the persuasive nature of norms to promote better state practices, such as human 
rights practices.214 
 
Having defined international law and reviewed its growing importance, it is useful to examine the 
development of international law to illustrate the inherent gender bias contained therein as a 
subject of international relations. 
   
3.2 The Male Nature of International Law 
 
International law as is known today was born in the era of Enlightenment, the age of reason, 
which emphasised positivist philosophy.  It highlighted the importance of scientific inquiry, 
reason, empiricism and value-neutral research, allegedly objective traits associated with men 
and masculinity.215  International law, then, was based on observable phenomena of what 
actually took place between states and their relations with one another.  However, in its earliest 
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formulations, international law adopted a somewhat more natural law approach which 
emphasised the importance of morality, justice and reason. 
 
Modern international law, nevertheless, emerged within the philosophical framework of early 
Christian principles which would explain the emphasis on morality.  The leading thinkers of 
modern international law were either theologians or Western scholars coming from civilisations 
dominated by Christian principles.  Christianity, as contained in the teachings of Christ and his 
disciples, contained clear elements of male supremacy.  While it is acknowledged that Christ 
had strong female support from followers such as Mary Magdalene, the traditionalists note that 
there were no female disciples.  Indeed, Paul, who has been associated with the phenomenal 
growth of the early Christian movement, said “[l]et your women keep silent in the churches, for 
they are not permitted to speak; but they are to be submissive, as the law also says”. 216   
 
Hugo Grotius, Dutch theologian and lawyer, is hailed as the father of modern public international 
law, although this is disputed by some, including those loyal to jurists such as Gentili.217  His 
writings in the early seventeenth century on the law of nations as he understood it is very 
heavily reliant on his theosophical beliefs and consequently, of a highly moral nature.  Grotius 
was committed to the pursuit of peace and felt that this was only attainable through consensus.  
In order to achieve consensus, Grotius believed that Christian doctrine would have to be 
reduced to its barest minimum so as to minimise the potential for conflict.218  Once there is 
nothing over which Christians could argue about, there would be consensus, which would lead 
to peace.  Despite Grotius’ heavy leaning on theology and his belief that high levels of individual 
morality and reason could function to keep society regulated, (and by extension states, as 
states are made up of individuals), it is claimed by many writers that he removed the concept of 
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natural law, or divine law,219 from theology making the idea of international law a purely positivist 
conception.   
 
Grotius’ contribution to the development of international law is best reflected in his first major 
work, Mare liberum, which advocated the freedom of the high seas.220  He was writing at a time 
when, according to Shaw, “this theory happened to accord rather nicely with prevailing Dutch 
ideas as to free trade and the needs of an expanding commercial empire”.221  This immediately 
brings to mind Cox’s famous statement that “theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose”222 and always rooted in socio-political spatial and temporal contexts.223  In this work, 
Grotius espouses the complete free use of the high seas for the benefit of mankind; he explains 
the relationship between natural, divine and international law; he states that natural law forms 
part of a higher law and that international law was subject to it; and claims that international law 
applied to all nations, even the nations of the East despite the fact that East Indians were “sunk 
in grievous sin” because they practised idolatry.224     
 
Like many juristic writers of this era, Vattel saw one of the primary functions of the Law of 
Nations as promoting peace and limiting wartime hostilities without prejudice to a nation’s own 
real interests.225  An 18th century Swiss lawyer, his work on the law of nations practically 
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combined aspects of both positivism and naturalism.226  He defined the Law of Nations as “the 
science which teaches the rights subsisting between nations or states, and the obligations 
correspondent to those rights”.227  Vattel was able to clearly delineate two integral aspects of 
international law.  These are natural or necessary law and positive or secondary law.  It may be 
said that natural law provides the standard for measuring the moral rightness of positive law.228  
According to Vattel, “the necessary law of nations consists in the application of the law of nature 
[derived from God and conscience] to states, - which law is immutable, as being founded on the 
nature of things, and particularly on the nature of man…”.229  Like Grotius, he believed that the 
“law [of nations] is not less obligatory [to states] than on individuals, since states are composed 
of men…”230  Positive law comprised three features: voluntary, conventional and customary, 
features which have persisted in contemporary international law.  According to Vattel, they all 
stem from the will of nations – the voluntary from their presumed consent; the conventional, or 
treaty law, from their express consent and the customary from their tacit consent,231 important 
features of current day international law.  He also advocated for the equality of nations.  “A 
dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most 
powerful kingdom”.232 
 
Having demonstrated the male bias in the emerging field of international law as predicated on 
Christian dogma, the next section explores the subsequent transformation of international law in 
the Renaissance period with respect to discussions on the notion of rights.  It is therefore critical 
to understand whether the examination of rights as part of the development of international law 
also contemplated the specific issue of women’s rights and, in particular, the right to equality.  
 
                                               
226
 Shaw, International Law, p. 23. 
227
 de Vattel, The Law of Nations, p. lv. 
228
 Nardin, “International pluralism and the rule of law”, p. 98. 
229
 de Vattel, The Law of Nations, p. lviii. 
230
 de Vattel, The Law of Nations, p. lviii. 
231
 See de Vattel, The Law of Nations, pp. lxii-lxvi. 
232
 de Vattel, The Law of Nations, p. lxii. 
 67 
3.3 International Law and Rights 
 
Rights as a concept has existed for millennia.  Interestingly, from its earliest inception, the right 
of the citizen, which assumed a set of universal ideals such as freedom, equality and liberty,233 
has always referred to the rights of man and not of women.  The notion of citizenship emerged 
in the classical Greek era in the time of Aristotle.  According to Aristotle, citizenship can only be 
bestowed on a property-owning individual very active in political life.  This necessarily excluded 
women, children and slaves.234   
 
3.3.1 States, Sovereignty and International Law  
 
With the Renaissance movement, law took on a more secular character.  Positivist thought 
coincided with the emergence of the modern nation state, the Bodinian and Hobbesian notion of 
sovereignty and the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which is held to be a watershed in the history 
of state relations.  Beaulac states that it is portrayed as a historical fact that Westphalia 
represented a new diplomatic arrangement – an order created by states, for states and that it 
consecrated the principle of sovereign equality of states which, since then, has been at the core 
of international law.235   
 
Autonomy of the nation state is the defining characteristic of realist thought and means that the 
state has supreme authority.  In its relations with other states, a sovereign state is said to exist 
in an anarchic system, meaning simply that there is no common power over and above the state 
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to regulate its behaviour and enforce laws.236  In this state of affairs, power assumed great 
importance, and by extension, issues of security, and was traditionally measured in terms of 
military capability.  Realists described the situation in existence during the nineteenth century as 
a balance of power which prevented the dominance of any one state in the international system.  
The primary aim of the balance of power was not to preserve peace but to preserve the security 
of states, and if necessary, by means of war.237  Despite the move towards a more positivistic 
approach, natural law has re-emerged and plays a very important part of international law, 
particularly with reference to the idea of natural rights and, by extension, human rights. 
 
Reliance on the realist, reified notion of sovereignty, however, poses great difficulty to the 
effective implementation and practicality of international human rights law.  In this particular 
regard, Reisman makes a distinction between territorial sovereignty and popular sovereignty 
where the former term “is used in the jurisprudentially bizarre sense to mean that inanimate 
territory has political rights that preempt [sic] those of its inhabitants”,238 while the latter puts the 
needs of the population first.239  Sikkink correctly notes that “human rights issues offer 
particularly potent challenges to the central logic of a [realist] system of sovereign states”240 and 
one of the most powerful critiques of sovereignty.   
 
Social constructivists offer a more accommodating, fluid version of sovereignty which is perhaps 
better suited to explaining the adoption of better human rights practices in some countries and 
the possibility of promoting change in the more authoritarian states.  In emphasising the 
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ideational factors that propel change, this view is also helpful in explaining the influences at the 
state level from above (United Nations), laterally (other states) and below (NGOs) and how 
international norms, in particular, human rights, impact on domestic politics.  Wendt describes 
sovereignty as “an institution” which “exists only in virtue of certain intersubjective understanding 
and expectations; there is no sovereignty without an other”.241  Sikkink builds on Wendt’s notion 
of sovereignty and explains it as subject to change according to sociocultural context, a 
representation of “shared understandings and expectations that are constantly reinforced both 
through the practices of states and the practices of nonstate actors”.242  The effects of such a 
fluid perspective of sovereignty means that where there is a change in the intersubjective 
understandings and practices by states, or what Legro refers to as concordance,243 that the 
notion of sovereignty will be subject to change as well.  Reisman notes that these shifting 
boundaries of sovereignty also “change[s] the cast of characters who can violate that 
sovereignty”244 which is integral to an understanding of human rights issues.  This notion of a 
shifting sovereignty and its implications for international human rights law will be revisited in a 
later chapter which examines the influences of the UN and NGOs on state practices.245   
 
3.3.2 ‘Universal’ Rights  
 
As noted above, rights discourse has its foundations in natural law concepts which take on a 
moral rather than positivistic character.  It is said that the concept of natural rights in the 
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seventeenth century embodies rights to life, liberty and property and is attributed to Locke.  
According to Locke,  
 
“Man [is] born with a title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of 
all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man… 
[and] hath by nature a power…to preserve his property, that is his life, liberty, 
and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men…”246 
 
It is, of course, significant to note that Locke talks of “man”, as he is not using the word 
generically but to denote that any rights holder can only be white European property-owning 
males, again excluding women, children and non-whites, very similar to the Greek conception of 
a citizen.   
 
Notions of rights and equality can be found in the Bible.  Rights seem to be grounded in the 
notion of equity such that one could “take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, 
foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise”247 in the event of having been 
wronged.  Locke reflects this sentiment when he says that man has a right to be “judge of and 
punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with 
death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it”.248   It would 
also appear that despite the existence and allowance of slavery, there were notions of equality.  
“There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female…”.249  This implies a 
universality, that as Vincent notes, applies to the kingdom of God, not in that of man.250  
 
Human rights are said to belong to all human beings simply by virtue of their very humanity.  
Booth makes a very interesting argument on this definition.  He argues that this is an essentialist 
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and tautological construction.251  According to him, we have human rights in order to make the 
species human and not by virtue of our humanity.252  The issue of human rights was officially 
instituted as an area of international concern following the atrocities of the Second World War 
when Germany had been able to commit acts of genocide against millions of its own people 
with little interference by other nations.  This prompted the formulation of the United Nations 
Charter and the establishment of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights as part of 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1946.253   
 
The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights was adopted on 10 December 1948 in the 
form of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2174 (III), UN Doc A/810.254  It was 
drafted by the first Director of the United Nations Human Rights Division, a Canadian, John 
Peters Humphrey, whose main objective was to make the document universal in its application 
by drawing on sources from many different legal cultures.255  According to Article 1 of the 
Declaration, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights…”.256  Article 2 goes 
on to state that everyone is entitled to the rights and freedom as set out in the Declaration 
without fear or favour.  Importantly, article 4 states that everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of person.  The work of Eleanor Roosevelt as Chair of the Commission of Human 
Rights was pivotal not only in the formulation of the Declaration but in ensuring that the gains 
made on the basis of sex equality were not lost.257  Noteworthy too, with respect to the UN 
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Charter, is the fact that women, again, were the driving force behind the inclusion of the sex 
equality principle.  NGOs working under the umbrella of the Inter-American Commission on the 
Status of Women,258 in particular, Latin American activists from Brazil, the Dominican Republic, 
and Mexico,259 insisted that the application of human rights and fundamental freedoms be 
“without distinction as to…sex…”.260  The UN Charter made the first concrete step in moving the 
issue of rights and human rights into the specific realm of equality of men and women.  This is a 
key moment in history as this represented the first time that women and equality were treated in 
a gender neutral international legal document.  
 
However, the issue of gender parity creates a problem in dealing with the international law 
concept of the “subject” of international law.  In as much as gender equality is a concern of 
human rights law, it faces the obstacle posed by the principle that obligations created by 
international human rights instruments are directed towards the state and it is the state that has 
obligations towards it nationals and foreign nationals within their territory and under their 
jurisdiction.261  The enforcement and application of human rights instruments by the state is like 
a double-edged sword, as “the modern state has emerged as both the principal threat to the 
enjoyment of human rights and the essential institution for their effective implementation and 
enforcement”.262  In some common law countries (like Trinidad and Tobago), international law 
instruments are not automatically applicable in its domestic law as they must first be enacted by 
Parliament and there exists no real mandate to force countries to enact such legislation, in effect 
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removing the state’s obligations towards nationals in its territory and under its jurisdiction.263  As 
the Honourable Madame Justice Désirée Bernard, Judge of the Caribbean Court of Justice 
notes, convention implementation and enforceability present difficulties depending on the 
relationship between a state’s international obligations and its domestic laws.264  She goes on to 
explain that,  
 
“According to monist theory in international law treaties ratified by a state for the 
protection of the human person automatically become part of the municipal law 
of that state.  The dualist theory, on the other hand, advocates separation of 
international law from municipal law, and international obligations of a state are 
not automatically incorporated into its municipal law which is supreme.  For 
international treaties to be enforceable in the domestic court system of a state 
they have to be specifically legislated or adopted into the municipal law… In 
countries where a treaty or convention is not incorporated into the domestic law 
its enforceability depends in large measure on the integrity and commitment of 
the particular state in honouring its international obligations and undertakings by 
enacting the necessary legislation to ensure enforceability in its municipal 
courts.  Most of the countries within the English-speaking Caribbean and which 
inherited the English common law and systems of government adopted the 
practice of the United Kingdom which followed the dualist theory; hence in our 
Region international treaties are not automatically incorporated into domestic 
law upon ratification, and separate legislation and enactment of statutes are 
required to ensure enforceability in the municipal courts of the state”.265 
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This situation creates obvious difficulties, but nevertheless reflects what actually currently 
obtains in such countries, Trinidad and Tobago included, and the problems inherent in relying 
exclusively on international law to effect change in such jurisdictions. 
 
Many say that international law has broadened its scope to capture non-state actors and even 
individuals as subjects of international law.  While human rights abuses that take place within a 
state’s borders are directed towards individuals or groups based on ethnicity, religious beliefs or 
any other status, international law, in a legal positivist sense, cannot treat with such abuses.  
The reasons for this are twofold.  The first is that positivist public international law holds the 
state as the subject of international law where “the individual was not a proper subject of 
international law…public international law went to matters affecting states, while private 
international law266 concerned matters between individuals”.267  Vincent puts it quite succinctly, 
“Individuals and groups other than states have access to this society [the international society] 
only through the agency of their states; they are objects not subjects of international law”.268  
This is compounded by the assurance in the United Nations Charter of non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of a state.269  Dunne and Wheeler, however, believe that in the post-Cold War 
era, the United Nations Security Council has found a way around this assurance.  The United 
                                                                                                                                                   
constitutional amendment allows for automatic incorporation of human rights provisions of international 
legal instruments upon ratification. 
266
 Private international law deals with controversies between private persons, natural or juridical, 
arising out of situations having significant relationship to more than one nation.  Such issues include 
international judicial and administrative co-operation; conflict of laws for contracts, torts, maintenance 
obligations, status and protection of children, relations between spouses, wills and estates or trusts; 
jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments.  Recently, the line between public and private 
international law has became increasingly uncertain, as issues of private international law may also 
implicate issues of public international law, and many matters of private international law have 
substantial significance for the international community of nations.  See Rajendra Ramlogan and 
Natalie Persadie, Commonwealth Caribbean Business Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 
2004), pp. 22-23 and accompanying notes. 
267
 A. Claire Cutler, “Critical reflections on the Westphalian assumptions of international law and 
organization: a crisis of legitimacy”, Review of International Studies, 27 (2001), p. 140.  Quoting Mark 
Janis. 
268
 Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, p. 113.  
269
 See Chapter 1, Article 2:7, United Nations Charter. 
 75 
Nation Security Council has revised its definition of human rights abuses and humanitarian 
concerns which are now viewed “as a threat to ‘international peace and security’ thereby 
legitimising coercive intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter”.270 
 
This strict interpretation notwithstanding, optional protocols to some human rights conventions 
do allow for sub-state agency (individuals, groups).  Under the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, for example, an optional protocol was adopted by 
the General Assembly in 1999 to afford individuals as well as groups and non-governmental 
organisations the right to report violations by the state of the main convention directly to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.271  This right is, of course, 
circumscribed by the state’s willingness to accede to the protocol.  In the absence of accession, 
it poses particular problems for women as abuses meted out in the home are strictly 
theoretically outside of the sphere of international law due to the public/private divide and the 
notion of the sanctity of the family.272   
 
The universal applicability of human rights discourses confronts several barriers.  As Dunne and 
Wheeler observe, the authors of human rights documents such as the United Nations Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with a view to universal application assumed 
that “there was no necessary conflict between the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention 
and respect for human rights”.273  While there are advocates for conceding sovereignty in the 
name of promoting human rights, there are those who are against it.  A case in point is the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court.  The establishment of this Court has not 
benefited from the support of one of the most powerful nations of the world simply because it 
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requires the concession of that which realists hold so dear – sovereignty.  In a newspaper 
article, a former President of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, who was also instrumental in 
the establishment of the Court, was quoted as saying that national sovereignty should give way 
to humanitarian issues with respect to the International Criminal Court.274  He also stated that 
“sovereignty will more and more become subordinated to the importance of the individual, to our 
humanity”.275  This is significant coming from a former President of a fairly new independent 
republic.  In addition to issues presented by sovereignty, the formulation of human rights 
documents were executed by those influenced by Western, liberal, political thought which 
means that any claim to universality would imply an imposition of these ideas on societies and 
cultures with their own conception of rights and morality.   
 
3.3.3 Arguments against the Notion of ‘Universal’ Rights  
 
Human rights discourse as advocated by the United Nations assumes the individual to be the 
holder of human rights.  Eastern and African cultures have very different notions of human rights 
in this regard.  They privilege communal rights over individual rights.  On the African continent 
collective rights reign supreme above economic and social rights, and civil and political rights 
rank third in the hierarchy of importance.276  In China, the importance of communal rights 
emphasises hierarchy, deference and interdependence, which according to Dunne and 
Wheeler, is completely at odds with the West’s understanding of what it is to be human.277  
According to Ames, in China, “an individual can only become a human being in community”.278  
Brown observed that restrictions on individual liberties become a necessary pre-requisite for 
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economic development in East Asian authoritarian regimes which also coincides with local 
custom.279  He seems to be unable to comprehend human equality premised on a caste system 
or on social arrangements that privilege family over individual,280 but then again, he is writing 
from the Western tradition.  Booth may have a point when he says, “The universality of human 
rights is an ideology which is a cover for the imposition of Western values”.281  While western 
human rights discourse presumes a certain hegemony and universality, there are indeed 
positive aspects to it but it needs to be able to accommodate cultural variety.   
 
Cultural relativism, which may be said to have a somewhat postmodernist foundation, provides 
perhaps one of the most pervasive arguments against a universal conception of international 
human rights.  The doctrine of cultural relativism takes a three-pronged approach.  It states 
firstly that ideas and conceptions of morality differ from place to place and (secondly) that they 
can only be understood within their particular cultural contexts.  In the third place, moral claims 
are necessarily an integral part of the cultural context which is itself the source of their validity.282  
As a result, any human rights discourse purporting a universal character must take these 
differences into consideration.  This is, of course, easier said than done.  There have been 
writers advocating the use of a range of minimalist to maximalist understandings of universal 
values.  Parekh gives the example that respect for human dignity can be understood in 
minimalist terms to mean that no human being should be traded as a commodity, subject to 
torture or genocidal policies and in maximalist terms to mean that all human beings should be 
ensured all “the desirable conditions of the good life”,283 which in itself is relative.  While it is all 
well and good to promote harmony in diversity, Booth talks of the tyranny of cultures where 
culturalism reinforces traditionalism which “can have several regressive consequences for the 
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theory and practice of human rights”.284  Traditionalism, it should be noted, is not to be confused 
with traditions as these are very important in holding societies together.  As with all other 
practices, traditionalism has both positive and negative aspects.  For Booth, the negative 
aspects can be profoundly threatening as traditionalist practices, for example, invariably 
translate into masculinist values hostile to women and this legitimises domestic violence, the 
Hindu practice of sati and all other practices of patriarchal society285 which seek to continue to 
disempower and marginalise women.  
 
One of the problems with the defence of cultural relativism in not adhering to positive human 
rights practices is that it is generally a claim made by an elite of the group claiming to speak and 
act on behalf of the group and therefore the reality of the situation is mediated through this self 
appointed group.286  This elite, therefore, speaks on behalf of culture as its ‘authentic’ voice.  
Culture, however, is heterogeneous and cultural claims are contested from within as well as 
without.  An example of culture’s inherently politically and socially contested terrain is 
exemplified in Islamic fundamentalist states where the voices of women’s activists are 
suppressed.  It is curious that those who completely oppose the universality of human rights law 
on the basis of its Eurocentricity or Western nature and its inability to accommodate cultural 
difference gladly retain certain aspects of Western ideologies, in this case, the right to privacy, 
as it helps maintain their physically and intellectually elitist position in society. 
 
Booth has an inverse understanding of the universalist approach to human rights which may 
provide a more appropriate means of dealing with the issue.  He believes that the only universal 
aspect to human rights is the universality of human wrongs.  This is because they are easier to 
recognise than human rights, they are ubiquitous and by inverting the approach, “concentration 
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on wrongs shifts subjectivity to the victims by emphasising a “bottom-up” conception of world 
politics.  This has the crucial effect of humanising the powerless”.287  While human rights 
discourse as currently proposed in the international arena is quite contentious, the very fact that 
it exists and continues to play an important role in international relations signifies some hope 
that perhaps, one day, there will be consensus on the issue.  What of women’s rights? 
 
3.4 Reinventing International Law: Women’s Rights as Human Rights in the International 
Community288 
 
A child of the inherently patriarchal and androcentric structures of both international law and 
international relations, international human rights law is inevitably a profoundly gendered 
discourse privileging men.  It has been accused of belonging to “the masculine world of rights, 
masquerading as “human””289 as it completely ignores concepts of gender.   
 
Due to the fact that Enlightenment man is both the creator and subject of international law and 
human rights discourse, issues dealing with human rights abuses of women have been largely 
ignored or seen to be a natural part of the status quo.  The fact that political entities at both the 
national and international levels are dominated by men “means that issues traditionally of 
concern to men are seen as general human concerns; “women’s concerns,” by contrast, are 
regarded as a distinct and limited category”.290  White, western property-owning men, those 
responsible for creating human rights discourse, were more concerned with protecting against 
violations of their civil and political rights in the public sphere and as a result these concerns are 
privileged in human rights discourse.  As noted by Charlesworth, “rights are defined by the 
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criterion of what men fear will happen to them”.291  Violations in the private sphere - the home - 
were not an issue “because they were the masters of that territory”.292  Power relations and the 
very political nature of the family unit went ignored for precisely this reason.293 
 
‘Women’s rights are human rights’, a phrase that gained increasing currency since the early 
1990s, should be tautological and transhistorical, but unfortunately, this is not the case.  
According to Charlesworth, this should be but a “distracting redundancy”.294  Unfortunately, 
abuses against women have become almost naturalised.  As Kerr puts it, “So pervasive and 
systemic are the human rights abuses against women that they are regarded as part of the 
natural order”.295  For Bell, “the ambiguity of the phrase captures the essence of the feminist 
claim: an assertion for inclusion in the project of human rights and a radical redefinition of what 
that project entails”.296  Bunch thinks that because the dominant image of the political actor on 
the world stage is male that the problem for women is visibility, or lack thereof.297  In an earlier 
article, she takes a more gynocentric approach and uses as a starting point the fact that women 
do have inalienable human rights and sees the crux of the matter as understanding “why they 
were excluded before and how to gain wider implementation of these rights now”.298  Whereas 
Bunch sees visibility as the problem, Ashworth sees the problem as arising out of the silencing 
of women.  “In the silencing, the fact and acts of silencing also become invisible: without a 
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visible victim, there is no crime, and without a crime there is no perpetrator”,299 thereby 
perpetuating the abuses against women. 
 
3.4.1 The Public/Private Divide and Women’s Rights 
 
The public/private debate that permeates international law provides fertile ground in 
international human rights discourse for feminist claims against state (ir)responsibility in 
incidences of abuses against women in the private sphere.  Where has this distinction come 
from?  It is said that the concept of the private sphere (versus the public sphere) is “a distinction 
that came…with a colonial inheritance of personal laws”.300  Charlesworth makes the point that 
the imposition of this distinction “replicates the “reforms” imposed by many colonial 
administrators which often weakened the position of women in colonial societies”.301  Public 
international law is very heavily premised on this dichotomy and this is not surprising given that 
this subject area is a western concept, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter.  The divide 
is therefore a Western import to developing countries and carries with it heavy burdens for 
women particularly in countries where culture and religion are deemed integral to the 
maintenance of the patriarchal structures that rely on the subordination and oppression of 
women for their existence.   
 
Like human rights discourse, the public/private dichotomy is profoundly gendered and “an 
inherently political process that both reflects and reinforces power relations”302 within society.  
The public sphere is said to encompass politics, economics, law and the workplace all of which 
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are associated with men and their relationship with government.  The private sphere on the 
other hand is where the family is found, and by necessary implication, where women belong.  
There is a “primal division of labour between the male warrior and the female childbearer” 
because “[m]an’s place is in the public sphere of political government and the market economy, 
while women’s place in the private sphere of domesticity”303 due to her supposed frailty of body 
and mind.  As one Iranian scholar noted, quoting an ayatollah, “The specific task of women in 
society is to marry and bear children.  They will be discouraged from entering legislative, 
judicial, or whatever careers may require decision, as women lack the intellectual ability and 
discerning required for those careers”.304  It is this self assumed intellectual arrogance coupled 
with the brute force that men may display over women that continues to oppress women and 
keep them dependent on men in such societies. 
 
It is often within the home, or private realm, that women are at risk of facing the greatest 
physical and/or mental abuse and yet, such abuses are “not within the proper scope of national 
criminal justice systems”.305  At the international level, international human rights law operates 
largely within the public sphere (optional protocol provisions and inherent complications aside) 
and the state is encouraged to protect the sanctity of the institution of the family which 
encompasses the family’s right to privacy.  This translates into the non-intervention by the state 
into the realm of family life, because of its allegedly sacrosanct nature, and as Sullivan rightly 
notes “the family is the site of many of the most egregious violations of women’s physical and 
mental integrity, [and] any blanket deferment to the institution of the family or privacy rights 
within the family has disastrous consequences for women”.306  The hypocrisy of the enshrined 
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principle of non-intervention by the state into the affairs of the family is revealed by feminist 
research.  Peterson and Parisi note that “the state intervenes in private sphere dynamics in part 
to impose centralized authority” over women’s sexuality, the transfer of property and certain 
types of socialisation, such as heterosexuality (by criminalising homosexual behaviour).307  
While the state uses its power to intervene in the private sphere dynamics to suit male 
dominated state interests, it uses that same power to promote the public-private divide as 
protecting the private from state interference.308  Such targeted intervention “is a vital part of the 
authority and power the state receives and institutionalizes for men”,309 thereby marginalizing 
and excluding women.   
 
The fact that international human rights law operates primarily within the public sphere reflects 
the fact that the state is the subject of international law and that the transgressions of a state or 
its officials against individuals are the only offences that can be dealt with at this level.  The 
actions of a private individual against another private individual are of necessity not subject to 
international scrutiny.  The irony of the situation is that human rights activists are quick to 
pressure states to prevent other abuses, such as slavery and racism, which are often performed 
by private actors as well.  Could it be that because slavery and racism are largely ungendered 
that they receive greater attention, as all of humanity and not just half (and the inferior half at 
that) is affected? 
 
3.4.2 State Culpability and CEDAW  
 
This is not to say that states cannot be held responsible for the actions of private individuals.  
Indeed, there are ways by which to infer culpability on the state for violations against women by 
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private actors.  With the adoption and ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”)310, despite the myriad reservations and 
notwithstanding its soft law nature, according to article 2, states parties have a positive duty 
towards women  
 
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions 
where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; and  
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish 
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination 
against women…311 
 
Threading the articles of the convention together is the call for the introduction and enforcement 
of legislation designed to protect and promote the social (as well as economic, political and 
cultural) advancement of women.  Such articles, however, are of absolutely no legal force until 
the convention is incorporated into the domestic laws of states parties.312   
 
It is at this point that state culpability may be implied.  Where a state refuses, actively or 
passively, to introduce legislative measures to give effect to the convention and prevent abuses 
against women, it may be said that it gives its tacit approval of such abuse.  In the case of 
countries following the dualist theory of international law, there is even greater onus on the state 
to act and incorporate international law principles into domestic law.  Failure to do so constitutes 
refusal on the part of the state to honour its commitments.  While a state is not directly 
responsible for the abuses of private actors, the state may be accused of a lack of due diligence 
with regard to the awareness of human rights violations as well as its failure to address the 
situation through sanctions and/or compensation and through denying women equal protection 
before the law.  Women’s human rights advocates hold that it is in condoning the acts of these 
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private actors that the state may be held accountable.313  It may even be said that “such actors 
are not really private because they could not function without the approval of the state”.314  
Concerning the abuses against women, “a state may be considered to have facilitated an 
international wrong or to be complicit in its commission when the wrong is of a pervasive or 
persistent character”.315  State complicity in the commission of such abuses generally takes the 
form of a state’s failure to act.  Romany makes the point that a state’s  
 
failure to arrest, prosecute, and imprison perpetrators of violence against 
women can be interpreted as acquiescence in (or ratification of) the private 
actor’s conduct.  State failure to prevent crimes against women can also be 
viewed as a conspiracy between the private actor and the state law 
enforcement agencies, thus rendering the state complicit.316 
 
It must be mentioned that the introduction of legislative measures into the domestic law of a 
state party, while extremely commendable, is not enough by itself.  The judiciary, police and any 
other state entity responsible for ensuring women’s protection must be given the necessary 
capacity to perform.  This includes general sensitisation to the rights of women and the changes 
in the law, education, training to deal with gender specific issues, human and financial 
resources.  Perhaps most importantly is the need to educate men to understand women’s 
issues and get them to recognise the skewed nature of male-oriented “norms”.  Sadly, these are 
all dependent on the political will of the state, as without any state directive (through the 
implementation of laws and all follow up procedures), there is no need to change the status 
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quo.317  This is further compounded by the fact that the relationship between women and the 
state is extremely varied from state to state and continues both to evolve and regress in 
instances.318  This lack of political will is not particular to women’s and human rights law but is 
also seen in other areas considered to be of “lesser” importance, such as environmental law, 
particularly in developing economies, where emphasis is placed on the more pressing issues of 
maximising revenues by whatever means possible.319  Political will and resource prioritisation 
always favour economic development in growing economies.   
 
3.4.3 Cultural / Religious Relativism and Women’s Rights  
 
As mentioned above, the division of society into two different spheres, where one sphere is 
completely unregulated by law, creates greater difficulties for women living in societies 
ostensibly defined by cultural and religious practices.  “No social group has suffered greater 
violation of its human rights in the name of culture than women,”320 observes one Indian writer.  
Culture, for women, includes on a broader level, the denial of civil, political, social, economic, 
sexual and reproductive rights; on a more specific level, it may include female genital mutilation, 
sati, the inability to obtain a divorce, lack of choice in marriage, the imposition of a dress code, 
discrimination in inheritance and property laws, among myriad other issues.  Women in 
countries regulated by religious legal systems, where religion, and by necessary implication 
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culture, becomes enshrined into law and legalises patriarchal norms, face the greatest difficulty 
in abolishing discriminatory practices either through their own agency or with external help.  In 
such instances demands for equality based on sex “is met with resistance on the grounds that 
such demands amount to interference with the right to freedom of religion”.321   
 
Cultural relativists claim that women are the embodiment of a nation’s culture and that the 
current human rights legal regime does not take this into consideration, and as a result, is not 
universally applicable.322  This embodiment depends on the subordination of women and the 
maintenance of male elites.  According to Chinkin, “Cultural and religious groups are often 
identified by the role and behaviour that they designate to women”323 implying that women have 
no choice as to what their role might be.  Women in such groups are ostensibly held to be “the 
repository of tradition and old affection and family history”,324 which provides the justification for 
their continued and unquestioning oppression.  The imposition of the Western notion of the 
public/private divide only reinforced this conception as Coomaraswamy notes that “private life 
remained immune and was constructed and reinvented so that women’s position [in society] 
became tied up with the cultural symbolism of the nation or ethnic group”.325  It is in this way that 
religion, culture and the Western import of the right to privacy have become inextricably linked 
and even more powerful in terms of keeping women subordinated.  As Raday notes, “deference 
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to religious and subculture norms operates to impose patriarchy on women” and is worsened 
when such ideals are formally institutionalised into law.326         
 
Cries of cultural imperialism by non-western countries have allowed many states parties to 
CEDAW to enter significant reservations on ratification, accession or succession despite the fact 
that these reservations have the effect of nullifying the objective of the convention and are 
contrary to article 28(2) which states that “[a] reservation incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted”,327 which is also in keeping with 
Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that says, “A State 
may…formulate a reservation unless: (c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a)328 and 
(b)329, the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty”.330  According to 
the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women website, there are 180 states 
parties as of 18 March 2005.331  From its update on 18 December 2003 to its current update, 
this number went up by only four.  CEDAW, not surprisingly, is known as having the highest 
number of reservations of any other human rights convention ever formulated332 despite the fact 
that it is in apparent violation of specific articles within CEDAW itself and the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, which governs treaty making.  The soft law approach taken in this 
convention allows for “consensus” (in its loosest possible meaning) where it would have 
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otherwise been impossible despite the obvious absurdity the many reservations have resulted in 
and the fact that the status quo of women worldwide remains largely unchanged.333     
 
3.4.4 Gender Equality and The Male Standard  
 
Coming out of the treaty was the obvious and pressing need for gender equality and the means 
by which to achieve this.  Unfortunately, equality for women in the human rights discourse has 
come to be understood to mean the achievement of rights accorded to men with reluctance to 
recognise the inherent differences between men and women.  Men provide the measure by 
which equality is measured.  The very title of CEDAW “presupposes a male standard… 
attempting to bring women into the male world through the removal of legal constraints”.334  The 
search for equality initially led to severe absurdities in the interpretation of the law, particularly in 
cases of sex discrimination and unfair dismissal due to pregnancy.  In the infamous American 
case, General Electric Company v Gilbert et al,335 a group of women brought an action against 
the firm on the basis that the firm’s disability plan which paid weekly non-occupational sickness 
and accident benefits precluded “disabilities” arising from pregnancy.  In a strange turn of 
events, the lower courts held that this amounted to discrimination under the Civil Rights Act, but 
the highest Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, reversed the decision.  Justice Rehnquist, 
referring to a decision taken by him and his colleagues in Geduldig v Aiello,336 stated in the 
decision that the plan “is facially nondiscriminatory in the sense that "[t]here is no risk from 
which men are protected and women are not.  Likewise, there is no risk from which women are 
protected and men are not””.  He also went on to show that the company’s plan simply divided 
“potential recipients into two groups – pregnant women and non-pregnant persons.  While the 
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first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes”.  Could the first 
group possibly be constituted differently?  This was a case of “if men don’t need it, women don’t 
get it”,337 as one author noted rather sardonically. 
 
Kaufman and Lindquist sought to justify this ludicrous decision by emphasising the need for 
maintaining consistency in the common law tradition.338  The Court could have equally overruled 
the decision and still adhered to the principles of the common law tradition and not produced 
such a startlingly gendered (not to mention nonsensical) judgement, although this would have 
meant overruling one of their own decisions.  There are those who believe that the use of 
gender-neutral language and having more female lawyers and judges can help improve the lot 
of women.  While the latter may deal with issues of female under-representation in a male 
dominated arena, most women who undertake such professions are socialised by the legal 
practice to think and behave like men and while sympathetic, may not always be able to render 
objective decisions, or even decisions tending towards a female oriented view of the world.  
They also tend to be discriminated against on the basis of their female gender.339  Those who 
are, in fact, strong enough to maintain a female perspective may not be aggressive enough or 
be able to gather consensus from fellow colleagues on certain issues.   
 
Equality should recognise the inherently differential roles and contributions of both sexes and 
should not seek to level the playing field as such, as again men are used as the standard by 
which to achieve such equality and can result in absurdities as highlighted in the case above.  
Instead of an androcentric approach, or even a gynocentric approach, a “humanocentric” 
approach should be applied which neither reduces women by attempting to eliminate their 
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differences or marginalise them because of those differences, but one which embraces said 
differences and treats women with similar regard as men are accorded all at once.  The concept 
of women’s rights as human rights as painted above does present a picture of gloom; however, 
the situation would appear to be changing with women of all professions and status taking on a 
much more aggressive, active and visible role in promoting the rights of women around the 
world. 
 
3.5 International Law and Women’s Rights: The Struggle for Equal Treatment  
3.5.1 The Politics of Rights 
 
International law’s weaknesses as a tool for the promotion of gender equality and human rights 
generally have been explored.  Inherent gender bias; its soft law character and associated 
issues of implementation and enforcement at the national level; primacy of the state as actor in 
the international arena; unwillingness of states to relinquish any degree of sovereignty; and 
cultural / religious relativist arguments comprise the main obstacles to the effectiveness of 
international law instruments.  These difficulties notwithstanding, international legal instruments 
have the potential to be used as political tools with positive effect.  When states sign up to a 
convention, this provides a site for activists on the ground to organise and pressure states to 
act.  Activists can now engage in “accountability politics”340 to remind governments of their 
obligations and, in the face of inaction, expose the recalcitrant state and bring pressure to bear 
on the powers that be and even successfully force change.  NGOs have been successful at the 
international level in having provisions dealing with the status of women and their participation 
included in international legal instruments and subsequently using these documents as leverage 
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to effect change at the national level.341  Sankey makes the point that international law filters 
downward  
 
“[d]ue in part to the slow but steady pressure of NGOs… declarations have 
been replaced by binding conventions, monitoring their implementation has 
been entrusted to special committees and rapporteurs, and individual 
governments suddenly find themselves being called to account for cases of 
torture, detention and ‘disappearances’.342  
 
The potential for international law to have effect at the national level, therefore, is real and can 
be effected through the work of activists especially where international law seems to lack the 
mechanisms to do so in areas not deemed to be vital to state interests, such as the promotion of 
women’s rights.343   
 
3.5.2 Women’s Rights and the United Nations  
  
 
The fight by women for equality has taken on a largely legal character344 as it is recognised that 
legal reform, combined with the necessary changes to the education system (to deal with 
deeply entrenched patriarchal attitudes), has the ability to provide one of the greatest catalysts 
for societal change.  This fight has to be examined at the international level so as to determine 
the effectiveness of the “top-down” approach in remedying the repression of women’s rights, a 
problem that has existed throughout much of human history.   It should be noted that the term 
“legal” is used loosely as the non-binding aspect of declarations, conventions345 and platforms 
for action (despite States’ ostensible intention to be bound), as well individual legal systems, 
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make domestic application and enforcement rather difficult.346  While protocols tend to be of 
greater force, they too suffer from similar problems.    
 
The United Nations has formulated eight conventions and two declarations that are committed 
specifically to promoting women’s rights.  These include:347 
 The UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation 
of the Prostitution of Others348 which calls for the punishment of those procuring others 
for prostitution;  
 The International Labour Organization Convention on Equal Remuneration (1951) which 
establishes the principle and practice of equal pay for work of equal value as requested 
and endorsed by ECOSOC;349   
 The UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women350 fully supported by the General 
Assembly as early as 1946351 which commits Member States to allow women to vote 
and hold public office on terms with men;352 
 The UN Convention on the Nationality of Married Women353 which sought to protect the 
right of a married woman to retain her nationality;354 
 The UN Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriages355 which states that marriage can only take place with the 
consent of both parties;356 
 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Convention against 
Discrimination in Education (1960) which provides for equal educational opportunities for 
girls and boys; 
 The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women357 which 
declares women’s equal status with men;358 
 The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against women 
which prohibits any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex that 
impairs or nullifies the human rights and fundamental freedoms of women in all areas;359 
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 The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women360 which condemns 
any act causing physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women of 
violence against women by the family, community or state; 
 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which recognises the right of the child to 
fundamental human rights and special care.361 
 
The question here really is whether international legal instruments can have positive effects in 
domestic legal regimes,362 but again this relies on commitment, priority and political will of the 
state concerned.  To determine the effectiveness of the “top-down” approach, one convention 
(including its precursor and follow-ups) and two declarations are examined in some detail.  
 
3.5.3 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women  
 
3.5.3.1 Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
 
While the UN made moves towards establishing a fair amount of legislative and institutional 
support for the promotion of women’s equal rights, the organisation recognised that women 
were still largely unprotected by these changes and discrimination continued unabated.  In light 
of this, the General Assembly requested the drafting of a Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (“DEDAW”) and this was unanimously approved by the General 
Assembly on 07 November 1967.  It consisted of eleven Articles which declare that 
discrimination against women is unjust and incompatible with the welfare of the family and 
society and called on States to implement new laws to end discrimination against women so 
that women would be afforded full protection under the law.363  As a declaration, it meant that 
this was but a statement of intent, moral and political, and was therefore of even less contractual 
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force than treaties which have also proved problematic in terms of enforcement at the national 
level. 
 
3.5.3.2 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
 
The above mentioned UN Conventions provided a very scattered approach to dealing with the 
issue of women’s human rights; a comprehensive approach was required and there was need 
to prepare a single, comprehensive and internationally binding legal instrument to eliminate 
discrimination against women.364  As a means of “preparing a binding treaty that would give 
normative force to the provisions of the Declaration”,365 the Commission on the Status of 
Women (“CSW”) requested the Secretary-General to call upon UN member states to 
communicate their ideas on such a proposal.  This instrument was to be prepared without 
prejudice to any future recommendations that might be made by the United Nations or its 
specialised agencies with respect to the preparation of legal instruments to eliminate 
discrimination in specific fields.366 
 
These initiatives led to the adoption by the General Assembly of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which was subsequently 
dubbed an international bill of rights for women.  Article one of the convention defined 
discrimination against women as  
 
“any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise 
by women irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and 
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women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms on the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil or any other field”.367 
 
While it may have been the swiftest entry into force of any human rights instrument at the 
time,368 it was also the convention with the largest number of reservations entered reflecting 
States Parties’ unwillingness to accept the full scope of obligations stated in the instrument.369 
 
Noteworthy are the reasons for reservations.  The most significant number of reservations, as 
seen in tables 3.1 [which provides an aggregate of the data provided in table 3.2] and 3.2 below 
[which provides a breakdown by country of the specific reservations and declarations made], 
concerns articles 2, 9, 11, 15, 16 and 29 and reflect states’ unwillingness to be bound by 
provisions that strike at the root of the convention, especially articles 2 and 16.  Several 
countries which practice Islamic law have clearly stated that the convention will not be given 
preference over current religious practices which are legislated in those countries; however, it is 
said practices which negate the effect of the convention.370   
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Other countries have also invoked multiculturalism, custom and tradition [or cultural relativism, 
which is ordinarily discriminatory towards women371] as reasons for not implementing the 
convention, thereby justifying the continued discriminatory practices against women, 
representing “nothing more than disguises for the universality of male determination to cling to 
power and privilege”.372  On the other hand, however, there are countries that have entered 
reservations on the basis that their constitutions and/or domestic legislation is already more 
generous than the requirements stated by the convention and will continue to give preference to 
their own legislation even though Article 23 provides for such an occurrence.373   
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Table 3.1 Number of Reservations and Declarations entered per article374 
 
Convention Article Number Number of reservations Number of declarations 
1 9 0 
2 15 1 
5 4 3 
7 5 0 
9 21 3 
11 14 0 
13 9 0 
14 7 0 
15 14 3 
16 32 2 
29 32 3 
TOTAL 162 15 
 
The reservations incompatible with the purposes and objectives of the convention continue 
despite the General Assembly’s appeal at the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights to States Parties to honour their obligations under the convention.375  CEDAW 
has also called on States Parties to remove or modify reservations, especially those made to 
articles 2 and 16, as this  
 
“would indicate a State party's determination to remove all barriers to women's 
full equality and its commitment to ensuring that women are able to participate 
fully in all aspects of public and private life without fear of discrimination or 
recrimination.  States which remove reservations would be making a major 
contribution to achieving the objectives of both formal and de facto or 
substantive compliance with the Convention”.376 
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Table 3.2 Reservations and Declarations entered by States Parties according to specific articles 
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women377 
 
Country*  Articles of the Convention with 
Reservations/Declarations378 
 1 2 5 7 9 11 13 14 15 16 29 
Algeria  R   R    R R R 
Argentina           R 
Australia      R      
Austria      R      
Bahamas  R   R     R R 
Bahrain   R   R    R R R 
Bangladesh  R          
Brazil           R 
China           R 
Cuba           R 
DPR Korea   R   R      R 
Egypt  R   R     R R 
El Salvador           R 
Ethiopia           R 
France   D  D   R  R R 
India   D       D R 
Indonesia           R 
Iraq  R   R     R R 
Ireland  
 
   R R   R  
Israel     R      R D 
Jamaica           D 
Jordan      D    D D  
Kuwait    R R     R R 
Lebanon     R     R R 
* R = Reservation  D = Declaration 
                                               
377
 References to articles do not necessarily indicate reservations or declarations with the whole article, as 
many states entered reservations and declarations to specific sub-articles. 
378
 It should be noted that this table does not include countries that have entered general reservations 
and/or declarations.  The following countries have entered general reservations: Australia, Italy, 
Mauritania and Saudi Arabia.  The following countries have entered general declarations: Australia, 
Chile, Germany, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain, Thailand and Tunisia.  This information is 
correct as at 10 February 2005. 
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Table 3.2 Reservations and Declarations entered by States Parties continued 
 
Country  Articles of the Convention with Reservations/Declarations 
 1 2 5 7 9 11 13 14 15 16 29 
Lesotho  R          
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  R        R  
Liechtenstein  R           
Luxembourg    R      R  
Malaysia   R R R     R  
Maldives    R      R  
Malta      R R  R R  
Mauritius           R 
Micronesia  R R   R    R R 
Morocco  D   R    D R R 
Myanmar           R 
New Zealand  R R         
Niger  R R  
D 
     R R R 
Pakistan           R 
Rep. of Korea     R     R  
Saudi Arabia           R 
Singapore  R    R    R R 
Syrian Arab Republic  R   R    R R R 
Switzerland         R R  
Thailand          R R 
Trinidad and Tobago           R 
Tunisia     R    D R R 
Turkey     D      R 
United Kingdom R    R R   R R  
UK on behalf of Isle of Man, 
BVI, the Falkland Islands, 
South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands, the Turks 
and Caicos Islands 
R R   R R R  R R  
Venezuela           R 
Viet Nam           R 
Yemen           D 
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Despite the myriad obstacles faced in obtaining international consensus on the issue, CEDAW 
may be seen as a watershed in the development of an international legal instrument for the 
promotion, protection and recognition of women’s human rights as well for the recognition and 
incorporation of the specificity of the female subject.  If nothing else, it has certainly contributed 
to raising worldwide awareness of women’s issues.   
 
3.5.3.3 The Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action 
 
At the largest UN Conference ever held, the Fourth World Conference on Women, the Beijing 
Declaration reaffirmed its commitment to continue to promote and protect the rights of women in 
all spheres and to ensure that they are treated with the same respect as men.379  The 
Declaration also called for the implementation of the Platform for Action (“BPFA”) and the 
mainstreaming of a gender perspective into all UN policy and programmes.   The objectives of 
the conference were to review and appraise the advancement of women since 1985 with regard 
to the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies; to mobilise women and men at both the policy-
making level and grass-roots level to achieve the objectives; to adopt a Platform for Action 
which deal with key issues identified as posing grave hindrances to the advancement of women; 
and to determine the priorities for the following five years for implementation of the BPFA.380  As 
a tool for the implementation of the Declaration, the BPFA is an agenda for women’s 
empowerment381 and identifies the following as critical areas of concern for women:382 
 
                                               
379
 See “Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women”, A/CONF.177/20, 17 October 1995. 
380
 UN, Department of Public Information, “Fourth World Conference on Women: Beijing, China, 4-15 
September 1995”, DPI/1324, February 1993.  
381
 UN, Fourth World Conference on Women [online], “Platform for Action: Mission Statement”. [cited 
28 January 2004].  Available from Internet: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/plat1.htm#statement  
382
 UN, Fourth World Conference on Women [online], “Platform for Action: Critical Areas for Concern”. 
[cited 28 January 2004].  Available from Internet: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/plat1.htm#concern  
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 The persistent and increasing burden of poverty on women  
 Inequalities and inadequacies in and unequal access to education and training  
 Inequalities and inadequacies in and unequal access to health care and related 
services  
 Violence against women  
 The effects of armed or other kinds of conflict on women, including those living 
under foreign occupation  
 Inequality in economic structures and policies, in all forms of productive 
activities and in access to resources  
 Inequality between men and women in the sharing of power and decision-
making at all levels  
 Insufficient mechanisms at all levels to promote the advancement of women  
 Lack of respect for and inadequate promotion and protection of the human 
rights of women  
 Stereotyping of women and inequality in women's access to and participation in 
all communication systems, especially in the media  
 Gender inequalities in the management of natural resources and in the 
safeguarding of the environment  
 Persistent discrimination against and violation of the rights of the girl child.  
 
This document provides the countries of the world with “a comprehensive action plan to 
enhance the social, economic and political empowerment of women”.383  It draws on the 
legacies of past UN Conferences that dealt with women’s issues, such Nairobi (1985), New 
York (children 1990), Rio de Janeiro (environment 1992), Vienna (human rights 1993), Cairo 
(population and development 1994) and Copenhagen (social development 1995) and reviews 
and assesses progress in implementing the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the 
Advancement of Women.  Beijing represented a “stock-taking of the progress made in the 
worldwide advancement of women”.384  Unfortunately, the BPFA had to call for efforts to be 
made to achieve the goals drawn up at Nairobi ten years earlier.385    
 
As with the other conferences dealing with women’s issues, it is instructive to note that “[t]he 
most visible and active forces behind this movement [for gender equality] have been the non-
                                               
383
 UN, Department of Public Information, “From Beijing, a Platform for Action and a clear mandate for 
women’s progress”, DPI/1749/WOM, October 1995, p. 1. 
384
 Hilkka Pietilä and Jeanne Vickers, Making Women Matter: The Role of the United Nations (London: 
Zed Books, 1994), p. 160. 
385
 UN DPI, “Beijing Declaration”, para. 22. 
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governmental organizations”.386  Some 30,000 NGO representatives gathered at the parallel 
unofficial NGO Forum held in Houairou, some thirty miles outside of Beijing.387  At the same 
time, however, “some NGOs were part of their country’s state apparatus, serving as advocates 
and even watchdogs for their governments, silencing grassroots NGOs and keeping even those 
from other countries under scrutiny”.388  It was, nevertheless, still quite free and representatives 
stated their opinions. 
 
There were three main problematic issues which Charlesworth correctly described as being 
Sisyphean.389  Just when the feminist movement thought that important advances were made in 
particular areas at previous conferences, objections were taken at Beijing which could have 
negated the progress made before.  The Holy See objected to the use of the term ‘gender’ as it 
could lead to dubious interpretations, with the potential to endorse homosexuality and 
bestiality;390 Islamic states were able keep the universalist-cultural relativist issue alive by 
decrying the universality of women’s human rights as western feminist imperialism;391 and this 
was also applied by Islamic states and the Vatican to their strong opposition “to sections of the 
BPA that dealt with women’s autonomy in relation to sexuality and reproductive function”.392 
 
                                               
386
 UN DPI, “From Beijing”, p. 5. 
387
 Judith Howard and Carolyn Allen, “Introduction”, Signs, 22:1 (Autumn 1996), p. 181.  Why was the 
NGO Forum distanced from the main convention at Beijing?  The NGO Forum represented a threat to 
the political stability [read: state control of power] and the distancing of the Forum expressed “not only 
the leaders’ determination not to let this event disturb China’s political status quo but also the state’s 
suspicion and hostility towards women’s spontaneous activities”.  The situation was so severe that 
Chinese representatives at the NGO Forum had to behave like political puppets, expressing only 
favourable views of the status of women in China.  See Wang Zheng, “A Historic Turning Point for the 
Women’s Movement in China”, Signs, 22:1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 192-199. 
388
 Esther Chow, “Making Waves, Moving Mountains: Reflections on Beijing ’95 and Beyond”, Signs, 
22:1 (Autumn 1996), p. 186. 
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 See Hilary Charlesworth, “Women as Sherpas: Are Global Summits Useful for Women?”, Feminist 
Studies, 22:3 (Autumn, 1996), pp. 542-544.  See also Charlotte Bunch and Susana Fried, “Beijing ’95: 
Moving Women’s Human Rights from Margin to Center”, Signs, 22:1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 202-203. 
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 See “Adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action”, para. 11 and Charlesworth, 
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 Bunch and Fried, “Beijing ’95”, pp. 202-203. 
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 Jill Steans and Vafa Ahmady, “Negotiating the Politics of Gender and Rights: Some Reflections on 
the Status of Women's Human Rights at ‘Beijing Plus Ten'”, Global Society, 19:3 (July 2005), pp. 240-
241.  
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These difficulties notwithstanding there were also some limited but important gains that are 
captured in the BPFA.  Steans and Ahmady state that efforts towards gender mainstreaming 
have institutionalised the link between selected NGOs and women’s groups and various bodies 
in the UN system.393  According to Rao, the BPFA has emphasised women’s rights as human 
rights and believes that there is some, though minimal, acknowledgment of the difference 
between rights versus needs.394  There has been, too, some recognition of violence against 
women as a public issue and not a private one and there have also been some advances in the 
issue of women’s reproductive health. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Beijing +5 (2000) and Beijing +10 (2005) both represent reaffirmations by 
governments of their commitment to implementing the BPFA as well as appeals to governments 
to advocate its implementation.395  Beijing Betrayed, an aptly named report issued in time for 
Beijing +10 which examines global progress made to date vis-à-vis the implementation of the 
BPFA, asserts that  
 
“Governments worldwide have displayed a lack of will in turning their 
commitments to women’s rights into decisive action, instead adopting a 
piecemeal and incremental approach that cannot achieve the economic, social 
and political transformation underlying the promises of Beijing”.396 
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 See Aruna Rao, “Engendering Institutional Change”, Signs, 22:1 (Autumn 1996), p. 219. 
395
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 Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), Beijing Betrayed: Women 
Worldwide Report that Governments have failed to turn the Platform into Action (New York: Women’s 
Environmental and Development Organization, 2005), p. 11. 
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The organisation attributes the non-implementation of the BPFA to a combination of global 
trends.  The lack of practical commitment can be attributed to “the predominance of the neo-
liberal economic framework, growing militarization, and rising fundamentalism” in addition to a 
lack of resources and political will.397 
 
Similar to the Vienna Declaration and Platform of Action, the Beijing Declaration and BPFA are 
not legally binding.  Bunch and Fried make the point that such instruments “carry the political 
and moral weight as policy guidelines” and “must be approached as statements of best 
intentions and commitments to which organized groups can seek to hold governments and the 
UN accountable”.398  Given this, it is the responsibility of individual governments to implement 
the measures suggested in the BPFA for the advancement of women and without the 
necessary incentives (either positive or negative) domestic changes will be slow in coming.  The 
gap between rhetoric and reality is still alarming.  Governments keep pledging their commitment 
but there is little of substance to reflect this.  In the absence of any truly legally binding 
instrument, hope lies possibly only with the NGO movement and civil society which have the 
power to have the Platform effectively implemented by gathering support from those who are 
truly affected and lobbying governments from below to effect positive change at the national 
level. 
 
3.5.3.4 The Optional Protocol 
 
Hailed as a landmark decision for women,399 the Optional Protocol (“the Protocol”) to CEDAW 
was adopted by the General Assembly on 06 October 1999 at its 28th plenary meeting400 and 
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 Bunch and Fried, “Beijing ’95”, p. 201. 
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 UN, Division for the Advancement of Women [online], “Optional Protocol to Women’s Convention 
Comes Into Force”, Press Release, WOM/1242, 21 December 2000.  [cited 11 April 2005].  Available 
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entered into force on 22 December 2000401 and set out the first gender-specific international 
complaints procedure seeking to reinforce human rights monitoring.402  It was borne out of 
initiatives taken by the CSW and supported by the Vienna Declaration and Platform of Action as 
well as the Beijing Platform for Action.  Optional protocols often follow human rights treaties to 
provide procedures with regard to the treaty or address a substantive area related to the 
treaty.403  They are treaties in their own right and bring specificity to the main treaty.  This 
Protocol was seen as necessary to strengthen CEDAW by giving individuals, groups and NGOs 
the right to complain to the Committee about violations of the convention and to allow the 
Committee to conduct enquiries into grave or systematic abuses of women’s human rights in 
countries that have ratified the Protocol.404  It is meant to: 
1) Improve and add to existing enforcement mechanisms for women’s human rights 
2) Improve States’ and individuals’ understanding of CEDAW 
3) Stimulate States to take steps to implement CEDAW 
4) Stimulate changes in discriminatory laws and practices 
5) Enhance existing mechanisms for the implementation of human rights within the UN 
system 
6) Create greater public awareness of human rights standards relating to discrimination 
against women405 
 
Nevertheless, there are several problems that are immediately discernable with the Protocol.  
First of all, like treaties generally, it is optional, states need not become a party to it.  What is the 
point of having an optional protocol that provides specificity when states are not legally obligated 
to join and further, view the main treaty (CEDAW) as optional in itself and refuse to implement 
                                                                                                                                                   
400
 UN, General Assembly, “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women”, A/RES/54/4, 15 October 1999. 
401
 UN, Division for the Advancement of Women [online], “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women”, updated 10 February 2005.  [cited 11 April 
2005].  Available from Internet: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol   
402
 Janusz Symonides and Vladimir Volodin, A Guide to Human Rights: Institutions, Standards, 
Procedures (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2003), p. 328. 
403
 UN, Division for the Advancement of Women [online], “What is an Optional Protocol?”, updated 10 
February 2005.  [cited 11 April 2005].  Available from Internet: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/whatis.htm  
404
 Kwong-Leung Tang, “The Leadership Role of International Law in Enforcing Women’s Rights”, 
Gender and Development, 8:3 (November 2000), p. 68. 
405
 UN, Division for the Advancement of Women [online], “Why an Optional Protocol?”, updated 10 
February 2005.  [cited 11 April 2005].  Available from Internet: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/why.htm  
 107
the provisions found therein?  Article 17 states that no reservations to the Protocol are 
permitted, but in the same breath, states may opt out of the of the enquiry clause of the 
Protocol, Article 10, by refusing to recognise the competence of the Committee to conduct 
investigations into claims of grave or systematic violations thereby nullifying the potentially 
positive effects of Articles 8 and 9.  This continues to leave the Committee toothless.  Article 19 
also allows for a State Party to denounce the Protocol at any time.  International law is already 
especially problematic as concerns the domestic application of international instruments; with 
these conditions, how is this self-negating Protocol supposed to serve its purpose, besides, 
perhaps, to temporarily placate interest groups until they recognise the Protocol for what it truly 
is?  
 
3.5.4 The Vienna Declaration 
 
The World Conference on Human Rights produced the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action.406  Section II.A.3 deals specifically with the equal status and human rights of 
women, emphasizing the importance of synchronizing the de jure and de facto human rights 
of women.  The Declaration highlighted the inalienability and universality of women’s human 
rights; the importance of gender mainstreaming;407 and the elimination of violence and 
discrimination against women.408  One author believes that Vienna represented the 
commencement of the narrowing of the universalist-cultural relativist gulf which plagues the 
promotion of women’s human rights and the beginning of the ability of the international 
community to achieve practical commitments and enforceable standards for the protection of 
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 United Nations, “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action”, A/CONF.157/24, 13 October 1993. 
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 UN, “Vienna Declaration”, paragraph 37. 
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 UN, “Vienna Declaration”, paragraphs 38 and 39. 
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women’s rights.409  This may be so in light of the steps taken (on paper) at the Conference 
towards institutional and legal capacity building with a view to rendering the legal human 
rights regime of women effective.410  Nevertheless, documents produced as a result of the 
conference are of no legal effect and it is left to governments to decide whether to act on the 
suggestions made. 
 
3.5.5 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
 
Not only was discrimination against women a problem, but so too was the issue of violence.  
The right to equality sought by women included the right to equal treatment by the law and to 
be protected against violence.  In recognition of the scourge of violence faced by millions of 
women and the fact that CEDAW did not expressly deal with violence, the General Assembly 
requested the CSW to draft a document to deal with the elimination of violence against 
women.411  The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (“DEVAW”) was 
adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1993.412  It is important to note that it 
was the NGO movement that spearheaded efforts at the international level to have violence 
against women recognised as a serious problem.413  It was the first attempt to define gender 
based violence that traversed the private/public divide and recognised individuals, 
communities as well as the State as perpetrators of violence against women.  According to 
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Article 1, gender-based violence refers to the “physical, sexual or psychological harm or 
suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, 
whether occurring in public or in private life”. 
This is explicitly developed in Article 2 which states: 
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited 
to, the following:  
 
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including 
battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related 
violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices 
harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation;  
 
(b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general 
community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at 
work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced 
prostitution;  
 
(c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the 
State, wherever it occurs.  
 
Article 4 of DEVAW, which echoes Article 5 of CEDAW, specifically requests that states not 
“invoke any custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to 
its elimination”.  It also declares that “States should pursue by all appropriate means and without 
delay a policy of eliminating violence against women…”   
 
The Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur414 to investigate the issue 
of gender-based violence and make recommendations for its elimination.  Her preliminary report 
revealed that gender-based violence was a result of historically unequal power relations 
between men and women which became institutionalised over time.415  She made a very 
interesting point that “men control the knowledge systems of the world” and that “it is this lack of 
control over knowledge systems which allows them [women] not only to be victims of violence, 
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but to be part of a discourse which often legitimizes or trivializes violence against women”.416  
This ties in very neatly with the arguments made in chapter two above on critical theory and the 
feminist exposure of male biases in knowledge construction.  The Special Rapporteur has taken 
the first step of recognising the bias and making recommendations for its removal.  It is the last 
step of emancipation that is proving quite challenging. 
 
In her conclusions and recommendations, the Special Rapporteur called on states to: 
a) Condemn violence against women and not invoke custom, tradition or religion to avoid 
their obligations to eliminate such violence; 
b) Ratify CEDAW without reservation 
c) Formulate national plans of action to combat violence against women 
d) Initiate strategies to develop legal and administrative mechanisms to ensure effective 
justice for women victims of violence 
e) Train and sensitize judicial and police officials with regard to the issues concerning 
violence against women 
f) Reform educational curricula so as to instil values which prevent violence against 
women 
g) Promote research with regard to the issues concerning violence against women 
h) Ensure proper reporting of the problem of violence against women to international 
human rights mechanism.417 
 
She also called for the formulation of an optional protocol to CEDAW to allow for an individual 
right of petition once local remedies have been exhausted.418 
 
Unfortunately, despite these excellent recommendations, should this Declaration be formalised 
into a convention, it would likely receive a similar response to CEDAW in terms of the number of 
reservations that are liable to be entered.  The duties placed on states to eliminate violence 
against women would be quite onerous and wide ranging and will meet with opposition as it will 
have the effect of ‘infringing’ on custom and tradition and in some cases would require a 
complete socio-cultural and legal overhaul, as is currently the case with CEDAW. 
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3.6 Non Gender-Specific International Legal Instruments 
 
There are other conventions that are non-gender specific but have the potential to enhance 
women’s rights at the international level.  Initially, women played an insignificant role in the 
determination of political, legal and institutional structures both in the USA and in Europe where 
much of the human rights debate was pursued,419 largely because women historically have 
been denied political identity and agency.420  International law as it pertains to the rights of 
women (as humans) is biased by the probability that the main international law makers are men 
and really do not take into account the needs of women.  A look at the various conventions 
dealing with war crimes and crimes committed against humanity would suggest that they still do 
not take into consideration women’s issues.  The Convention of the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide421 defines genocide in reference to national, ethnical, racial or 
religious groups as “(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm 
to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting in the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; (f) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”  It 
is prohibited in the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War422 to commit any of the following: “(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment:…”  The former would appear to 
include women by virtue of section (d), while there are no gender specific references in the latter 
convention.  How does either of these conventions treat with the issue of ethnic cleansing in the 
form of rape after which these women are forced to bear these children?  It is to be inferred in 
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sections (a) and (c) of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
the Time of War?  If not, why has neither of these conventions been amended to consider this 
fact?  Why have there not been any attempts to make new international legal instruments to 
deal with such grievous crimes?423  
 
It would appear from a survey of gender-based treaty law that these types of conventions are 
discriminatory in the sense that they describe “exclusionary provisions which reflect a societal 
concept of women as a group which either should or cannot engage in specified activities.”424  In 
contrast, corrective or non-discriminatory conventions seek to improve treatment meted out to 
women without making overt comparisons to the treatment of man such as seen in the 
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others.425  Hevener goes on to describe the non-discriminatory conventions as 
those which do not separate women as a different group and which do not assert that biological 
differences should create the basis for social of political discrimination.  This is evidenced in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.  
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These conventions prove that historically there has been a concern with the rights of women in 
the arena of international law and human rights.  International law has proven, however, to be 
somewhat myopic and the fact of an absence of a forum for international review of these 
instruments aggravates the situation.  These legal instruments have remained rather restrained 
in their ability to improve, or even affect, the condition of women and are criticised as 
representing little more than statements of good intentions on behalf of the parties to the 
international conventions.426  This is further aggravated by the fact that women generally remain 
under-represented in decision-making structures,427 particularly where governance is concerned 
on both the domestic and international level. 
 
According to Gaer, there are several reasons why women’s issues do not rank high in the 
United Nations human rights mechanisms.428  Firstly, many delegates to these UN conventions 
are lawyers and there is a tendency on their part to focus on due process and traditional formal 
procedures.  Further, human rights bodies tend to focus on civil and political rights rather than 
on socio-economic rights.  Even if socio-economic rights are contemplated, it is generally 
through the lens of development issues.  Gaer states that there would appear to be a lack of 
consciousness of gender discrimination among human rights organisations.  Finally, the 
sentiment that gender discrimination is a private affair justifies keeping it outside the 
responsibilities of governments.  There would also seem to be little communication between the 
separate UN bodies mandated to examine the legal instruments.  
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3.7 Managing the Relationship Between States: International Relations and the Gender 
Bias 
 
The above discussions clearly place the state as the central actor in international law and it is 
therefore critical to examine the attitude of states in the management of their relationships with 
each other as this attitude would certainly enhance the understanding of the place of women’s 
rights issues in the spectrum of international law.   Feminist writings illustrate that gender is in 
fact enormously important to the understanding of international relations.  Peterson notes that 
international relations feminists have expanded and transformed international relations theories 
as they pertain to issues of identity, sexuality, militarism, polity, revolutions, nationalisms, social 
hierarchies, transnational economics, political movements and international organisations.429  
Sylvester has grouped such issues and identified three main areas of international relations in 
which gender is interested: critique and reappropriation of stories told about the proper scope of 
international relations; revisions of war and peace narratives; and reevaluations of women and 
development in the international system and its parts.430  It is the very first area which is of 
concern here, as it forms the subject of study here in illustrating male bias. 
 
The very notion of the principal actor in (realist) international relations, the sovereign state, is 
gendered.  Sovereignty revolves around notions of the exercise of power within state 
boundaries, the duty of non-intervention in the affairs that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
other states, and protection of the people and property that form part of that state.431  In order to 
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fulfil these requirements the state adopted a certain character and came to personify an 
idealised concept of masculinity.432  Certain decidedly masculine characteristics were projected 
onto the state - strength, power, autonomy, independence and rationality433 - all necessary in 
exercising sovereignty and maintaining the integrity of state security.   
 
According to Steans, this personification of the state into a “purposive individual”, known as 
sovereign man or rational political man,434 is a rational choice-making individual able to 
legitimise violence.  He is placed at the centre of the conceptual universe and therefore 
becomes the subject of knowledge.  Sovereign man is held to embody the “truth” of international 
relations where international relations refer to the relations between “him, the state…and a 
series of marginalized and displaced others”.435  Examining international relations critically from 
a gender perspective allows not only for rendering visible structural gender inequalities but also 
for “empowering women as subjects of knowledge”436 and not seeing them solely as passive 
objects. 
 
Runyan and Peterson posit a very interesting argument concerning women’s ostensible 
unimportance to international relations.  According to these authors, women are “both invisible 
in and yet central to the tenets of realism”.437  They liken woman to all that realist international 
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relations theory has no control over, such as the state of anarchy, war and crises, which states 
ultimately seek to control.  They examine it from the perspective of patriarchal relations of 
“manstate” seeking to control “women,” which it construes as an unreasonable (mad), 
anarchical “outsider” or “other”.438  This construction of woman as madness, other and outsider 
is coterminous with realism’s definition of international relations and gives rise to the need to 
“tame” and “domesticate” her as she must be brought under control due to her inability to ever 
be capable of reason.439  This reinforces Enloe’s examination of “how the conduct of 
international politics has depended on men’s control of women”.440   
 
As an alternative perspective and part of the “third debate” or “inter-paradigm debate”, the 
introduction of the gender viewpoint problematises the “truths” presented in various paradigms 
of international relations.  It questions the “underlying ontological, epistemological, and 
axiological premises and assumptions”441 of these paradigms by highlighting the gendered 
premises on which international relations is based.  Feminist theorising  
 
“critically probes social theories for marks of gender that have gone unnoticed, 
and reveals distortions, biases, exclusions, inequalities, and denied identity 
politics in such theories; it traces how it has come to be that gendered theories 
seem neutral and universal and without gender; it transgresses the boundaries 
of supposedly true theories by posing gender experiences or narratives that 
counter or deepen our knowledge, or that reveal another side, a different 
puzzle, perhaps a different story than gender; it looks in ‘strange’ places for the 
people, stories, or even data…to fill out or rewrite, sometimes with unusual 
linguistic moves, what we think we know”.442 
 
Whitworth’s approach to analysing gender in international relations is to ask whether 
international relations theory allows for a discussion on the social construction of meaning, 
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historical variability and for the theorisation of power, as gender cannot be understood without 
reference to these issues.443  In using these premises, Whitworth deliberates whether there 
exist any spaces within the various paradigmatic traditions of international relations to facilitate 
gender discussions.444  According to her review, realism’s ontological commitments to states 
and statesmen preclude any incorporation of gender into its analysis; neither can it theorise 
power.  Pluralism is equally myopic as it is ahistorical and incapable of understanding the 
structural features of gender inequality and women’s oppression.  Critical theory, however, 
takes into account the three criteria mentioned above as central to theorising about international 
relations and holds the greatest promise for incorporating gender into international relations 
theory.  Criticisms of critical theory itself notwithstanding, critical international relations theory 
presents the most appropriate place for treating with feminist concerns. 
 
Whitworth also assesses mainstream feminist theories and identifies important deficiencies.445  
Liberal feminism was concerned mainly with the absence of women from both the study and 
practice of international relations, erroneously implying that women were not there in the first 
place.  It uncritically accepts the realist “high politics” agenda and fails to comprehend the 
structural features of socio-political behaviour.  Radical feminism suffers from essentialism, as it 
privileges women over men and perpetuates gender dichotomies.  Feminist postmodernism 
argues for the social construction of meaning but also lacks the ability to identify and change 
gender inequalities.  Again, for Whitworth, only critical feminist theory is able to assess biases, 
why and how such biases came into being, the effects of such biases and the possibility for 
change.  Concurring with Whitworth, Steans states, “Feminist critical theory attempts a complex 
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analysis of why and how the construction of gender has served to legitimize the subordination of 
women and of how hegemonic structures are imbued with patriarchal ideology”.446 
 
Tickner identifies the origin of the dichotomisation of gender roles with the birth of the 
public/private divide at the onset of the industrial revolution as the foundation upon which 
modern theories of international politics have been constructed.447  This is coupled with the fact 
that policy formulations on the core concerns of international relations are conducted by men 
and international relations as a discipline that analyses these activities are “bound to be 
primarily about men and masculinity”.448  The reverse of this notion may also be true.  If 
international relations, from an orthodox perspective, is comprised mainly of the activities of 
men, then this may also provide a forum for the production and maintenance of masculinities.  
According to Hooper, “It is likely that political events and masculine identities are both 
simultaneous products of men’s participation in the practices of international relations”.449   
 
Women are also generally absent from warfare, but according to Steans, this is no historical 
accident.450  Women symbolise masculinity subordinated or insufficient.  Echoing de Beauvoir’s 
sentiment, a boy is not born a soldier; he becomes a soldier.  Many studies on the military 
reveal the fact that “[w]ar does not come naturally to humans.  Men must be trained to fight and 
kill others”.451  Such training is achieved through misogynistic means by expunging feminine 
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traits and behaviours in men in order to make them “real men”.452  Steans goes on to make a 
link between war and domestic violence.453  The cultivation of a particular brand of masculinity 
for the killing fields, strongly linked to patriotism and violence, unfortunately makes its way into 
homes where it is completely inappropriate as the battered are simply not similarly mentally and 
physically equipped.454 
 
Brown’s definition of a critical feminist international relations reflects the ideas postulated by 
both Whitworth and Steans and is quite instructive.  
 
“A feminist international relations that is genuinely emancipatory will take 
gender difference as its starting point but will not take it as given.  Its proper 
object and purpose must be to explain how gender has been constructed and 
maintained in international relations and if and how it can be removed.”455 
 
For Steans, critical feminist international relations has a fourfold purpose.  It must point to the 
exclusions and biases of mainstream international relations; make women visible as social, 
economic and political subjects in international politics; analyse how gender inequalities have 
been embedded in the daily practices of international relations; and importantly, empower 
women as subjects of knowledge.456 
 
These indeed amount to a monumental task and are what this work seeks to achieve with 
particular reference to law.  It is of fundamental importance not to reduce gender relations in 
international relations to women in international relations,457 as gender is simply not 
synonymous with ‘woman’.  Brown recognises that a feminist critical theory of international 
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relations is basically a political act of commitment to see the world through the eyes of the 
socially subjugated.458  An immediate problem that arises here is that the socially subjugated 
speak from a position of marginality (and powerlessness) but lack the resources, access and 
knowledge to be heard.459  The difficulty for the critical feminist theorist is to get the socially 
subjugated to appreciate the implications of what they see and to improve their condition if 
possible. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
Groups are discriminated against on the basis of class, nationality, race, gender and sexual 
orientation.  Human rights conventions have evolved over time and are indeed becoming 
increasingly inclusive.  This is evidenced by the fact that human rights theory has expanded 
across ethnic and national lines in the context of decolonisation.460  Interestingly, though, human 
rights are not necessarily synonymous with women’s rights and have not included the notion of 
gender where gender may refer to the ideological and material relations which exist between 
men and women;461 human rights would seem to be the human rights of men.  
 
Early international law was predicated on Western theological notions and the role of women 
was accorded little or no significance.  The situation did not change perceptibly in the 
Renaissance period when international law assumed a more secular character.  This period 
emphasised the notion of sovereignty and rights, but rights as applicable to men.   
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In the post-World War II era with the establishment of the UN Charter, human rights discourses 
assumed great importance.  The UN Charter and the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations reflect the priorities of powerful states by firmly emphasising the 
importance of sovereign equality and the duty of non-intervention, with the UN Charter 
simultaneously promoting human rights and gender equality.  These latter are also reaffirmed in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but there is obvious tension in reconciling state 
concerns and individual rights.  Continued bias at the level of the state in international law has 
circumscribed the inclusion of women’s rights as part of general human rights discussions.  The 
male bias in the system of governance in most nations has translated into a similar bias in the 
management of the relationship between states rendering it hardly surprising that women’s 
rights in international law have been ascribed limited importance. 
 
The picture painted above is admittedly bleak but it is the reality facing the world’s women.  
Does international law provide the means for women to achieve equality?  Yes and no.  As seen 
above, while the international community can get together and achieve some degree of 
consensus on the advancement of women’s human rights, obvious problems of resource 
prioritisation combined with a lack of political will can spell a death sentence for the promotion of 
women’s human rights nationally and internationally.  International instruments mean nothing if 
they are not incorporated into domestic legislation.  Even if incorporated, legislation alone 
cannot change the very real power imbalances that exist between men and women.462  
Important to the process are education to change traditional and (often) discriminatory attitudes, 
training, legal literacy, adequate gender representation in top policy making positions and the 
provision of resources, financial and otherwise, which, if provided, would indicate political will at 
the level of the state.  This political will can be forced through the application of pressure from 
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above and below.  The discussions on international law, international relations and the rights of 
women, particularly with respect to the right to equality illustrate the limitations of the “top-down” 
approach.  Noteworthy is the fact that DEVAW arose from the pressures being asserted by 
NGOs concerned with violence against women, exemplifying the strength of the “bottom-up” 
approach and illustrating the fallacy that international law can exclusively effect change.   
 
In this vein, chapter four examines the role of the United Nations in promoting women’s human 
rights.  It will treat with the development of the international machinery dealing with women’s 
human rights in the post 1945 period through the various United Nations bodies. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 The Institutional Framework: The United Nations and Non-Governmental 
Organisations Post-1945 
 
4.1 Women and the United Nations 
 
Women have been struggling to have their voices heard for centuries.463  It was only until the 
late 1800’s, however, that women were truly able to mobilise themselves in the fight against 
gender discrimination concerning political, economic and social issues.  With the establishment 
of the United Nations in 1945 and the formulation of the Charter of the United Nations came the 
purposive call for the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.464  The 
inclusion of this sex equality provision is attributed to the work of feminists working with the 
Inter-American Commission on Women.465   
 
This chapter will review the institutional framework established by the United Nations, including 
women’s groups, for the promotion of women’s human rights through an examination of 
institutions such as the Commission on the Status of Women, the Division for the Advancement 
of Women and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.  The 
chapter will also examine the role of NGOs in influencing the international response to the 
struggle for women’s rights.  Figure 4.1 illustrates the structure of the UN human rights bodies.   
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4.2 Institutional 
Figure 4.1 Structure of the United Nations Human Rights Bodies and Mechanisms466 
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4.2.1 Commission on the Status of Women 
 
 
The development of women’s issues at the level of the United Nations began as early as 1946 
with a request from the United States delegation at the inaugural session of the General 
Assembly to governments of the world “to encourage women everywhere to take a more active 
part in national and international affairs”.467  This was very quickly followed by the establishment 
of a Commission on Human Rights and a Subcommission on the Status of Women by the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) for the purposes of pursuing the 
objectives stated in Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations.468   
 
The Subcommission was established “to make proposals about how to raise the status of 
women to equality with men in all fields of human enterprise”469 thereby providing the 
Commission on Human Rights with special support regarding problems relating to women.  
Immediately upon its establishment, though, interest groups and non-governmental 
organisations (“NGOs”) recognised that the parent body would not have been able to give due 
attention to the Subcommission in face of the vast amount of work facing it, including the 
drafting of an international bill of rights, and feared that women’s issues would not be 
considered with the urgency required.470  The Subcommission therefore requested that it be 
elevated to the status of Commission.  ECOSOC conferred upon the Subcommission status of 
full Commission, now known as the Commission on the Status of Women (“CSW”), less than 
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one month after the request.471  ECOSOC stated the CSW’s functions as focussing on the 
preparation of recommendations and reports to ECOSOC on promoting women’s rights in 
political, economic, social and educations fields. 
 
In its first report to ECOSOC, the CSW recognised the need for legislative change to advance 
the status of women and stated that it intended  
 
“to raise the status of women, irrespective of nationality, race, language or 
religion, to equality with men in all fields of human enterprise, and to eliminate 
all discrimination against women in the provisions of statutory law, in legal 
maxims or rules, or in interpretations of customary law”.472 
 
 
It further went on to state that its aims included the equal participation of women in government 
and full citizenship; full equality for women to exercise all civil rights; full opportunity for women 
to take equal part in social life; and equal opportunity for compulsory, free and full education, all 
very important in empowering women to realise their full potential.  In recognition of the 
importance of strengthening the legal framework to provide women with the means to achieve 
equality, ECOSOC requested CSW to examine the legal and customary disabilities that women 
face with regard to political, economic, social rights and educational opportunities with a view to 
framing proposals for action.473 
 
Despite what appeared to be very positive moves towards advancing the status of women in all 
spheres of life, there existed a very disturbing restriction on the powers of the CSW.  While the 
CSW, like the Commission on Human Rights, was free to receive communications from 
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individuals, groups and NGOs, neither was given the power to take any action in regard to 
complaints concerning the status of women.474  The CSW had neither the power to investigate 
specific cases of discrimination nor did it have the authority to take measures to ensure 
compliance with United Nations standards.475  So, what was its purpose?  It was established to 
be the main policy-making body of the United Nations dealing with women that promoted global 
sensitisation to women’s status and encouraged governments to incorporate international 
conventions into their domestic laws.   
 
The CSW faced many other problems as a body dealing specifically with women’s issues.  
While it was suggested that the CSW be comprised of experts serving in a personal capacity so 
as to avoid governmental control, it was decided that its composition should be of States 
members and meant that it was basically an intergovernmental body representing the official 
policies of States rather than the concerns of interest groups.476  At the same time, 
nevertheless, the CSW’s members are largely women, but if they do not have necessary 
support of their respective governments, and it can be argued that women’s issues will not have 
the same force as economic development, for example, and therefore not be afforded priority, 
the operations of the CSW will continue to be constrained.  This is further compounded by the 
CSW’s lack of institutional weight as evidenced by the budgetary and procedural restrictions 
imposed on the CSW by ECOSOC.477 
 
The mandate of the CSW was expanded in 1987 to include the objectives of the Nairobi 
Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women to deal not only with matters of 
equality for women, but also to include women as integral agents of change and beneficiaries in 
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issues of development and peace.478  At the General Assembly’s request,479 after the Fourth 
World Conference on Women, ECOSOC once again modified the CSW’s terms of reference 
stating that it shall:  
 
(a) Assist the Economic and Social Council in monitoring, reviewing and 
appraising progress achieved and problems encountered in the implementation 
of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action at all levels, and shall advise 
the Council thereon;  
(b) Continue to ensure support for mainstreaming a gender perspective in 
United Nations activities and develop further its catalytic role in this regard in 
other areas;  
(c) Identify issues where United Nations system-wide coordination needs to be 
improved in order to assist the Council in its coordination function;  
(d) Identify emerging issues, trends and new approaches to issues affecting the 
situation of women or equality between women and men that require urgent 
consideration, and make substantive recommendations thereon;  
(e) Maintain and enhance public awareness and support for the implementation 
of the Platform for Action.480  
 
While the CSW was previously emphasising gender-specific machinery and projects, it was now 
responsible for implementing the Beijing Platform for Action and for mainstreaming a gender 
perspective into the activities of the United Nations.481 
 
Despite the many obstacles faced by CSW, it has still been able to secure recognition in law of 
women’s rights in many countries, notwithstanding the de jure / de facto divide, and has raised 
the problem of discrimination against women politically, economically, socially and 
institutionally.482 
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4.2.2 Division for the Advancement of Women 
 
The CSW has had the support of a unit within the United Nations Secretariat dealing with the 
status of women.483  While the Division for the Advancement of Women (“DAW”) as it is now 
known was established in 1946, it was originally established as a Section on the Status of 
Women within the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Department of Social Affairs.  In 
1972, it was upgraded to the Branch for the Promotion of Equality of Men and Women and 
moved to the Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs established in the same 
year.  It was renamed the Branch for the Advancement of Women in 1978 and was further 
upgraded to its current status as a Division in 1993 when it was moved to the UN headquarters 
in New York and is now part of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs which in turn 
forms part of the UN Secretariat.   
 
DAW is meant to act as a catalyst in mainstreaming gender issues and has four main 
branches:484 
1. The Gender Analysis Section conducts research and develops policy options, fosters 
interaction between governments and civil society and provides substantive servicing for 
UN intergovernmental and expert bodies; 
2. The Women’s Rights Unit assists in breaking down the barriers between human rights 
and development and fosters the attainment of women’s human rights as an integral 
part of development; 
3. The Coordination and Outreach Unit raises awareness, promotes international 
standards and norms and sharing of best practices, and strengthening communication 
between the international and national policy-making processes and the women of the 
world; and 
4. The Gender Advisory Services Unit provides governments with advisory services and 
technical support in the activities related to gender in development. 
 
DAW’s most important role came about in 1995 when it acted as the substantive secretariat for 
the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, the largest conference in the history of the 
United Nations, and was also responsible for the preparations for the three previous World 
                                               
483
 See United Nations, The United Nations and the Advancement of Women, p. 15. 
484
 Extracted from Dorothea Gaudart, “Charter-based Activities Regarding Women’s Rights in the 
United Nations and Specialized Agencies”, in Wolfgang Benedek et al (eds), Human Rights of 
Women: International Instruments and African Experiences (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 60-61. 
 130
Conferences on Women (Mexico 1975, Copenhagen 1980, Nairobi 1985).485  In its mission 
statement, it says: 
 
…the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) advocates the 
improvement of the status of women of the world and the achievement of their 
equality with men. Aiming to ensure the participation of women as equal 
partners with men in all aspects of human endeavour, the Division promotes 
women as equal participants and beneficiaries of sustainable development, 
peace and security, governance and human rights.  As part of its mandate, it 
strives to stimulate the mainstreaming of gender perspectives both within and 
outside the United Nations system.486 
 
DAW’s placement in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs was aimed at “ensuring the 
integration of gender issues in policy formulation and coordination, including the servicing of the 
intergovernmental machinery.”487  As seen above from the responsibilities of its four main 
branches, it is meant to foster dialogue, provide advisory services and raise awareness.  It is 
therefore very important in the UN’s decision to move away from gender specific machinery 
towards gender mainstreaming in all areas and continues to provide the support required by the 
CSW. 
 
4.2.3 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
 
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (“the 
Committee”) was established in 1982 to monitor compliance with CEDAW and is composed of 
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23 experts, elected by States Parties but serving in their personal capacity,488 on women's 
issues from around the world.489 
 
Part V Articles 17-22 of CEDAW outlines the form and functions of the Committee.  Article 17 
establishes the Committee and its main tasks, as stated in Article 18, is to meet annually (Article 
20) to report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which States Parties 
have adopted and to indicate the factors and difficulties affecting the degree of States Parties’ 
ability to fulfil their obligations under the convention.  This single annual meeting proved 
inadequate and Article 20 was amended in 1995 where the duration of the meeting of the 
Committee would be determined by States Parties to CEDAW, subject to the approval of the 
General Assembly.490  In addition to communications received from States Parties, the 
Committee may also request information from other UN agencies and NGOs to assist its 
members in assessing government reports.491  While NGOs are accorded no formal 
involvement in the Committee’s work,492 either as part of the Committee’s procedures and 
practices or through CEDAW, the involvement of NGOs cannot be overstated as they have the 
ability to get information at the ground level to which other groups may not have access. 
 
According to Article 18 of CEDAW, States Parties are obligated to submit an initial report within 
one year after the entry into force of the State concerned and thereafter at a four yearly interval 
or whenever the Committee so requests.  The initial report is meant to be comprehensive, 
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establishing a baseline of information against which progress can be measured in the four 
yearly reports.493  Due to the lack of enforcement capabilities of the Committee and associated 
sanctions, many countries have been delinquent in submitting their reports.  As at the end of 
January 2005 at the Committee’s thirty-second session, 112 countries have a total of 219 
overdue reports,494 35 countries have yet to submit their initial reports with three countries 
having initial reports due as far back 03 September 1982.495  Predictable is the fact that most of 
the countries which have not submitted even their initial reports are developing countries, as this 
reflects prioritisation and commitment at the level of the state.496  Even when some countries do 
submit reports they are of such poor quality that both the tardy submission as well as the 
wanting character of the report is a sad but true reflection of the level of commitment of the state 
involved.497  In light of the backlog of reports, the Committee has decided to allow states to 
submit combined reports to encourage submission of reports.498   
 
Trinidad and Tobago is, regrettably, one of those delinquent states and only submitted its 
combined initial, second and third periodic report in January 2001,499 even though it ratified the 
convention 11 years earlier.500  Its fourth periodic report was due on 11 February 2003.501  The 
country stated as its reason for the delay in submitting the report that “no mechanism existed to 
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deal with reporting under international human rights treaties and insufficient resources had been 
allocated for that purpose”.502  This problem of insufficient resources is ubiquitous and not 
limited only to the issue of the submission of reports or to this country or to the national level.  
Insufficient resources are normally compounded by a lack of political will concerning the 
implementation of measures designed to promote women’s issues.  Again, this reflects the level 
of commitment that the government is willing to give towards honouring its international 
obligations concerning women’s human rights.    
 
The reporting procedures of the Committee take the following simplified format.503  Countries 
must submit their written reports which the Committee considers to determine whether it 
conforms to the guidelines elaborated by the Committee.504  After having considered the report, 
a representative of the government of the state whose report is up for discussion is invited to 
introduce the report.  The representative may then field questions or supply additional 
information or clarification as required by the members.  The Committee then supplies its 
concluding comments on the positive actions taken by governments; the factors and difficulties 
affecting the implementation of the Convention; notes principle areas of concerns; and makes 
recommendations.505  This document drawn up by the Committee is particularly important as it 
points out priority areas of concern and provides detailed recommendations for action.506 
 
While this latter action is commendable, like the CSW, the Committee lacks the institutional 
weight required to make it as effective as it should be.  The budgetary and procedural 
restrictions placed on the Committee by the General Assembly prevent it from effectively 
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pursuing its mandate.507  It is also like the CSW, in the sense that it is not empowered to take 
action with regard to investigating individual cases of violations of women’s rights but is only 
concerned with following general trends and patterns.  As stated in Article 21 of CEDAW, the 
Committee may make suggestions and general recommendations based on their review of the 
reports and information received to the General Assembly through its parent body, ECOSOC.  
This means that it is left to the General Assembly to decide whether any particular action can be 
taken and what that action should constitute. 
 
4.2.4 Gender Mainstreaming and the United Nations  
 
Attention has been given to promoting women’s issues over the years, albeit in a piecemeal and 
largely ineffective fashion. In light of this, the BPFA mandates gender mainstreaming as the 
main global strategy for promoting gender equality.  In each of the twelve critical areas of 
concern in the BPFA is stated the need for the promotion of “an active and visible policy of 
mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes” which takes into account 
the effects of such policy on women and men.508 
 
ECOSOC, in 1997, defined gender mainstreaming as, 
 
“…the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any 
planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and 
at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns 
and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, 
economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and 
inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender 
equality.”509 
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The International Labour Organization summed up the definition of gender mainstreaming nicely 
by saying that mainstreaming is “the transformation of unequal social and institutional structures 
into equal and just structures for both men and women”.510 
 
Gender mainstreaming is meant to incorporate a gender perspective into all activities at all 
levels with a view to ensuring that gender equality is placed at the centre of policy decisions, 
medium-term plans, programme budgets and institutional structures and processes,511 instead 
of having separate structures for dealing with women’s issues.  Initial efforts to achieve gender 
equality by the UN focussed on separate targeted activities for women, but it was later admitted 
that this approach did not tackle the structural constraints to gender equality and that an 
integrative approach would be better suited.512  Yet, it must be understood that mainstreaming 
does not replace the need for targeted, women-specific policies and programmes, but are 
complementary strategies, as affirmative action is still required for women’s empowerment.  
Such targeted interventions are necessary where there are “glaring instances of persistent 
discrimination of women and inequality between women and men”.513 
 
At the national level, there is debate as to whether the establishment of a single national 
institution (better known as ‘national machinery’) for the purpose of gender mainstreaming 
would be more effective than having gender immediately incorporated into the overall 
governance structure of the state.514  In 2000, the UN General Assembly held a special session 
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to review the progress made and the obstacles remaining to the implementation of the BPFA.515  
Paragraph 24 recognises that “National machineries have been instituted or strengthened and 
recognized as the institutional base acting as “catalysts” for promoting gender equality, gender 
mainstreaming and monitoring of the implementation of the Platform for Action”, but at the same 
time their effectiveness has been hindered largely by “inadequate financial and human 
resources and a lack of political will and commitment” which have pervasive effects on other 
related issues.516  It must also be noted that national machineries have to be sensitive to the 
socio-political climate of each country and therefore are generally not intersubstitutable.  
Incorporating a gender perspective into the general governance of a state, however, would have 
the effect of naturalizing gender issues by moving them from the margin to the centre, as they 
would not be treated with by a separate, single national institution; although, national 
machineries just might prove to be the most feasible starting place for achieving such a goal. 
 
4.3 Non-Governmental Organisations 
 
Women’s NGOs play an important role both nationally and internationally in the promotion and 
protection of women’s rights and for this reason must be included as one of the key institutional 
players at the international level.  Their central role is further enhanced by their very active 
interface with the UN concerning women’s issues the world over.  NGOs are certainly not a new 
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phenomenon but today hold greater political influence517 and have established themselves as 
important actors in international relations.518  Women have been organising to effect social 
change from as early as the mid-1800’s, advocating the abolition of slavery and universal 
female suffrage.519  Today, the mandates of women’s groups may be wide-ranging but their 
objectives are nevertheless the same: to promote the interests of women at all levels of social, 
legal, economic, political and cultural development.  While environment and development NGOs 
may be perceived to be of greater effect in promoting social change, perhaps because the 
results of some of their activities are more readily visible, the importance of women’s NGOs 
should in no way be understated.  Their importance as part of the human rights movement is 
gaining similar popularity in their ability to effect [real] social change, even though such change 
may be much more muted and difficult to achieve.   
 
Edwards and Hulme state that development NGOs secure small scale successes which tend to 
be highly localised and fleeting and have little, if any, impact on the distribution of power and 
resources within and between societies,520 as their influence has been confined to projects 
rather than fundamental attitudes and ideology.521  Women’s NGOs, however, with particular 
reference to the post-Beijing era, hope to achieve much more widespread and permanent 
successes that necessarily question the status quo privileging men and which ultimately would 
affect the distribution of power and resources to the benefit of women.  Social transformation of 
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this type is a much more lengthy process with much less readily visible results and would 
explain why the successes of women’s NGOs tend to be low-key and difficult to attain.522  
 
While many agree that it is difficult to capture the essence of what an NGO is in a simple 
definition,523 the term ‘NGO’ consequently has a variety of definitions but “typically are entities 
that are entirely or largely independent of government and have humanitarian or cooperative 
rather than commercial objectives”.524  Despite this rather vague and all-encompassing 
description, Hilhorst denounces such definitional attempts as she believes that NGOs are many 
things at the same time, as they are required to present different faces to the various 
stakeholders (donors, beneficiaries, colleagues) in order to satisfy each.525  Lewis and Wallace 
also perceive the term ‘nongovernmental organisation’ as “a virtually meaningless label” 
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precisely because their functions and nature are so diverse.526  Hilhorst sees NGOs “not as 
things but as open-ended processes” as they are constituted of people and do not operate in 
isolation and consequently are in a state of constant flux.527  For her, the question is not what an 
NGO is, but how ‘NGO-ing’ is done.528  Further, Hilhorst states that NGO definitions and 
classifications do not question why and how organisations become NGOs or what causes such 
organisations to adopt the label ‘NGO’.  For Hilshorst, the term ‘NGO’ is a claim-bearing label 
imputing a moral component and meaning that the organisation is doing good for the 
development of others.529  Women’s NGOs certainly seek to do good for the development of 
women worldwide, providing a forum in which woman are more comfortable to express 
themselves.   
 
NGOs have created a space for themselves within civil society, both nationally and globally.  
According to Marchand and Runyan, “civil society is one of the most familiar grounds for 
feminist activists and women NGOs”.530  They go on to state that “[s]trengthening civil society is 
often seen as an important tool and objective in the struggle for democracy and in the fight to 
improve women’s/human rights”.  Within this space, NGOs provide alternative decision-making 
structures which claim to allow for “greater participation and broader democracy than other top-
down institutional forms”.531  It is important, however, not to equate NGOs with civil society, as 
NGOs are just one of the many actors within civil society and play an important role in its 
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development.532  According to Grzybowski, “NGOs are a minute fraction of the organisational 
and active universe that constitute[s] civil societies.  To confuse [NGOs] with civil society itself is 
to ascribe to them capacities and a legitimacy that they do not possess…”533 
 
4.3.1 NGOs at the International Level: The UN  
 
At the level of the UN, NGOs do not hold any powers of negotiation or decision making; they are 
allowed consultative status.534  The use of the term “consultative status” was deliberately 
chosen to indicate their secondary role - they would be able to give advice but not take part in 
the decision making process; in some fields, such as human rights and sustainable 
development, however, NGOs have become high status participants at the centre of 
policymaking.535  Article 71 of the UN Charter provides for NGOs consultative status within 
ECOSOC: “The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation 
with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence”.  
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In 1946, ECOSOC granted consultative status to 41 NGOs.536  Currently, there are 135 NGOs 
with general consultative status, 1566 with special consultative status and 942 with roster 
consultative status with ECOSOC.537  The table below illustrates the various categories.  
 
Table 4.1 NGOs in Consultative Status with ECOSOC 
STATUS NUMBER 
ECOSOC General Consultative Status 135 
ECOSOC Special Consultative Status 1566 
A1 - ECOSOC Roster Consultative Status 387 
A2 - ECOSOC Roster Consultative Status 98 
B - ECOSOC Roster Consultative Status 33 
C - ECOSOC Roster Consultative Status 424 
TOTAL 2643 
 
In 1968, ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV) defined the rights of NGOs conferred with 
consultative status538 and up until 1996, only international NGOs were so privileged.  ECOSOC 
resolved in 1996 that the process be widened to include the participation of national, sub-
regional and regional NGOs as well.539  In view of such an achievement, if women’s NGOs have 
no decision making powers, what is the purpose of such consultative status?  Such status is 
meant to facilitate advice and information gathering540 by ECOSOC or any of its bodies and to 
allow NGOs that represent important elements of public opinion to express their views.541  The 
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benefit to NGOs of having consultative status is that they are able to lobby governments and 
have successfully done so, even though such successes may be fairly limited.  This forum is 
important in allowing local women’s NGOs to represent themselves and increasing the diversity 
of voices at the UN.542   
 
Gaer makes the point that “[s]trategic, technical and organisational leadership in the UN human 
rights programming has always come from the NGO sector”.543  Women’s movements at the 
UN provide similar skills in promoting women’s rights.  The World Conference on Human 
Rights, held in Vienna, is said to have marked a turning point in women’s participation in the UN 
as a forum in which to advance women’s rights.544  Women in all regions formed an active and 
effective lobby presence in the preparatory meetings for the conference, participating directly in 
defining NGO positions and lobbying on women’s issues.  Since then, women’s NGOs have 
refined their approach and developed key strategies to participate effectively in UN conferences, 
whether gender specific or not.545  They: 
 Mount global campaigns.  In order to exert pressure on official policy makers, women’s 
NGOs mount global campaigns calling for dialogue and action at the local level; for lobbying 
at the national, regional and international levels; for gathering empirical data; and attending 
meetings at all levels. 
 Build coalitions and consensus.  In order to build coalitions and consensus, women’s NGOs 
network and hold meetings with women’s NGOs from around the world at all levels. 
 Prepare policy documents.  Women’s NGOs draft their own documents (resolutions, 
treaties, protocols, conventions, platform documents) to present to and influence policy 
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makers.  Being prepared makes it much easier to argue points and persuade than simply 
presenting one’s self “on the spot”.546 
 Influence official delegations.  Women’s NGOs not only gather and disseminate information 
but discuss, lobby and nominate representatives to be members of official delegations to 
influence the position of national governments. 
 Bridge NGO and official deliberations.  Women’s NGOs have developed a mechanism 
known as the women’s caucus which facilitates daily meetings between NGOs and official 
delegates and policy makers to have their voices heard. 
 
With such detailed organisation, NGOs are sometimes, if not most times, better prepared than 
official delegates.  It is argued that the parallel NGO forums are much more productive than the 
official conferences, if for no other reason than the fact that they are necessarily less formal and 
can provide feminist alternatives or lay out issues that have not been addressed by the official 
conference.547  West observed that NGO forums “brought to life a participatory democracy that 
generated immeasurable discussion” in what she calls “counterpolitical spaces”.548  This was 
certainly the case at the parallel NGO forum held in the Beijing suburb of Huairou, despite the 
difficulties the host government attempted to create to make it difficult for participants to attend.  
Nevertheless, some activists have questioned the strategy of working through the UN 
conference process to advance women’s rights for fear that participating to influence pre-set 
agendas and intergovernmental documentation would result in cooptation.549  Further, working 
with governments and UN agencies legitimises the frameworks offered by them which do not 
typically represent women’s interests. 
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In terms of international activity, women’s NGOs are seen to be “more effective in changing 
policy statements” and “able to lobby their own governments to follow UN recommendations”.550  
While this may hold true for what is presented on paper, what actually happens in practice 
would indicate that these are but hollow victories, both internationally and nationally.  Stienstra 
makes the point that even though women’s concerns have been integrated into UN 
deliberations [and national policies], “the incorporation of these issues has followed a pattern of 
commitment on paper while ensuring marginalization of these issues through inadequate 
allocation of resources”.551  The emphasis can no longer remain on measuring “success by how 
many words or phrases [NGOs] were able to have inserted into international agreements”, but 
the goal must ultimately take into account the need to shift emphasis to implementation and 
monitoring.552  This may call for NGOs to form strategic alliances with other civil society based 
organisations to develop the capacity required to make this ideological shift.553 
 
Stienstra has identified what she considers to be reasons for the limited achievements of 
women’s groups at the international level.554  The first is that negative changes in the global 
political economy, such as war and economic crises, disproportionately affected women, who 
tend to be the most vulnerable group in society and therefore most susceptible to negative 
change.  This was particularly the case in countries which adopted structural adjustment 
programmes.  The second reason lies with the inherent conservatism of social institutions which 
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reflect power relations and resist any changes to the status quo, particularly as concerns 
changes in gender relations favouring women.  The third reason, related to the second, is that 
institutions, and by extension, governments, are simply unwilling to undertake the radical 
restructuring of economies and societies required to truly facilitate women’s requests.  The 
easiest concession is the incorporation of language that supports broad principles of equality, 
which tends to appease women’s groups, despite the poor history of implementation of such 
clauses.  
 
4.3.2 NGOs at the National Level: The State 
 
At the domestic level, Ackerly identifies six ways NGOs work to promote women’s human 
rights.555  These include making legal changes such that domestic or international laws better 
conform with CEDAW and other international agreements which recognise women’s human 
rights (legal change); reinventing local legal practices (training the judiciary and police officers) 
(support); providing support systems for survivors of violence (support); educating society 
generally and broadly (in schools, through the media, gender training programs, creative arts 
[which could include songs, role-playing, theatre and various other non-threatening forms of 
advocacy tools to promote political awareness especially among the poorly literate556]) 
(education); networking and promoting alliances with women’s groups and other civil society 
organisations (networking); and integrating women’s human rights efforts with other initiatives 
for social, economic and political change (integration). 
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NGOs’ most essential role, either at the national level or the international level or in tandem with 
each other, is perhaps their role as agents of change.557  Historically, it has been NGOs and 
private citizens, rather than states, that have served as prominent conduits of pressure and 
influence on state activity and policy with regard to human rights and environmental 
principles.558  The question now is how can NGOs have true influence on state activity?  Apart 
from the fact that NGOs prioritise single issues to the exclusion of all others and focus all their 
energies on promoting that issue, theoretically, social constructivism offers a possible answer.559  
Chapter three above introduced the problems of relying on a realist, reified conception of 
sovereignty for the purposes of understanding the effects and practicality of international human 
rights law.  It is therefore important at this point to revisit the usefulness of a social constructivist 
approach, as this offers a better understanding of how (better) human rights practices are 
adopted by states, especially in conjunction with NGO activity. 
 
Risse and Sikkink offer a theory of socialisation560 that deals with “the process through which 
principled ideas (“beliefs about right and wrong held by individuals”) become norms (“collective 
[intersubjective] expectation about proper behaviour for a given identity”) which in turn influence 
the behaviour and domestic structure of states”.561  Norms may also be seen as “standards of 
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behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations”.562  They identify three types of 
socialisation processes which operate in conjunction with each other and are necessary for 
enduring change in human rights issues. 
 
 Processes of adaptation and strategic bargaining  
 Processes of moral consciousness-raising, “shaming,” argumentation, dialogue, and 
persuasion 
 Processes of institutionalisation and habitualization563 
 
They define socialisation as “the induction of new members… into the ways of behaviour that 
are preferred in a society”, the goal of which is “for actors to internalise norms, so that external 
pressure is no longer needed to ensure compliance”.564   
 
Unfortunately, it is only with pressure from “above and below”, ordinarily initiated by NGO action, 
that any sort of change takes place.565  The first process concerns the instrumental adaptation 
by the state to domestic and international pressures.  Governments reacting to accusations of 
human rights violations may make superficial but tactical concessions such as signing 
international agreements or releasing political prisoners.566  Such actions are the result of 
strategic [crude] cost-benefit analyses, or in Checkel’s words, rational means-ends logics,567  
based on the forced imposition of norms executed by the state in question with a view to 
maximising or optimising given interests and preferences, such as having embargoes lifted or 
ensuring/regaining access to international aid.568  The second process, usually coupled with 
material sanctions, deals with the shaming and persuasion of deviant states.  Joachim asserts 
that when issues are adopted by the UN it sends a signal to states concerning which actions are 
                                               
562
 Andrew Cortell and James Davis, “How do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact 
of International Rules and Norms”, International Studies Quarterly, 40:4 (December 1996), p. 452. 
563
 Risse and Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms”, p. 11. 
564
 Risse and Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms”, p. 11. 
565
 See Alison Brysk, “From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and 
Human Rights in Argentina”, Comparative Political Studies, 26:3 (October 1993), pp. 259-285. 
566
 Risse and Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms”, p. 12. 
567
 Jeffrey Checkel, “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist 
Divide”, European Journal of International Relations, 3:4 (1997), p. 475. 
568
 See Thomas Risse, “International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative 
Behaviour in the Human Rights Area”, Politics and Society, 27:4 (December 1999), p. 530. 
 148
considered proper or satisfactory within the international arena.  As a result, NGOs can 
capitalise on this intersubjective understanding of acceptable behaviour to exert pressure on 
norm-violating states to “follow through on their international commitments or to shame them by 
pointing out the gap between national practice and international agreements”.569  This use of 
tactics such as shaming and denunciation is not meant to change state attitudes with logic but 
by the isolation and/or embarrassment of the target state.  Persuasion need not be only trying to 
reason with the norm-violating state but by applying pressure in the form of sanctions.570  The 
application of sanctions, though, may prove fruitless if the state continues to receive military 
support, as happened in the early years of the Pinochet regime.571  It is only when human rights 
norms become internalised in domestic practices and states comply with them whether or not 
they believe in their validity is the third and final stage in the socialisation process achieved.572 
 
In effecting change at the domestic level, NGOs see five phases of state responses when 
applying pressure from above and below with the help of the transnational network of NGOs.  
These are: 
 Repression 
 Denial 
 Tactical concessions 
 Prescriptive status 
 Rule-consistent behaviour. 
 
The first stage begins with a repressive situation in a norm-violating state where domestic 
opposition is too weak and/or oppressed to pose a significant threat to the government.573  It is 
during this time that domestic NGOs, depending on the level of government oppression, can 
activate links with transnational NGOs.  The role of domestic NGOs here is information 
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gathering which will be forwarded to the transnational network.  When the network has gathered 
sufficient information it can expose the norm-violating state at the international level taking it to 
the second stage.574   
 
In raising international awareness of the violations taking place in the target state through the 
production and dissemination of information, the transnational network can now begin to lobby 
international human rights organisations and influential governments, reminding the latter of 
their own human rights standards, thereby using moral persuasion to get them to take 
condemnatory action against the norm-violating state.  The reaction of the target state tends to 
be denial where denial means that the government of the norm-violating state refuses to accept 
the validity of international human rights norms.  Denial also includes the government claiming 
that such criticism is tantamount to intervention in the sovereign affairs of its territory and may 
even mobilise nationalist sentiment and domestic support.  It is interesting that the government 
does not deny human rights, but frames its denial in terms of the encroachment of its sovereign 
rights.  Risse and Sikkink state that the fact that the state feels compelled to deny such charges 
indicates that a process of international socialisation is already in progress.  The transition to the 
third stage depends largely on the strength and mobilisation of the transnational network and 
the vulnerability of the norm-violating government to international pressures.   
 
Should international pressures continue and escalate the norm-violating government would now 
feel obliged to make tactical concessions by instituting cosmetic changes in an attempt to pacify 
international criticism with the strategic result of lifting sanctions or lessening international 
isolation.575  While visible changes will be effected, this does not translate into a stable 
amelioration of human rights conditions.  This stage facilitates social mobilisation in the target 
country; it is during this time that domestic groups can mobilise and mount its own campaign 
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against the activities of the government.  According to Risse and Sikkink, this is the most 
precarious stage as it can have the effect of moving the process forward towards lasting change 
in human rights conditions or it can result in greater governmental oppression of domestic 
opposition either ceasing the forward movement or temporarily and indefinitely halting 
progress.576  Government can throw the domestic movement off, as at this stage it is often 
relatively small and dependent on a few key leaders.  By removing the leader (by whatever 
means), the movement becomes leaderless and unable to function.577   
 
For those countries on the forward moving path, in addition to the mobilisation of domestic 
pressure groups, norm-violating governments can no longer deny the validity of international 
human rights norms when they start making tactical concessions.  The explanation for this is 
that in making the minor concessions, governments are unaware of the potent impact this act 
engenders.  Once governments start “talking the human rights talk” they become entrapped by 
their own rhetoric and are forced to continue in the face of international processes and strong 
domestic opposition.  At this point, the choices available to government are few.  It can begin 
implementation of human rights norms domestically or increase the level of repression which 
only strengthens domestic opposition and alienates itself from any remaining international 
supporters578 which in turn results in a regime change.  This stage in the socialisation process 
marks the transition to stage four. 
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Stage four sees the target country accepting the validity claims of human rights norms, even if 
the actual behaviour of the state does not improve.579  The international community becomes 
satisfied that governments have accepted the validity of human rights norms when the target 
state ratifies international human rights conventions; incorporates international human rights 
instruments into domestic law; establishes a human rights violations complaints mechanism; 
and no longer denounces international criticism as interference in the sovereign affairs of the 
country.  It is also important that the state maintain a consistent discursive stance on human 
rights despite regime changes and/or the effluxion of time.  Governments may at this time 
create institutions for the promotion of human rights and start training public officials on the 
subject matter. 
 
With continued pressure from above and below, the state can make the transition to stage five, 
rule-consistent behaviour.580  Risse and Sikkink correctly note, however, that at the end of stage 
four, much of the international community is satisfied that the target country achieved 
prescriptive status and that there has been a visible reduction in the intensity of human rights 
violations; as a result, international attention begins to wane and governments may falter.581  
Consistent pressure is required from above and below to bridge rhetoric and reality.  Only when 
this gap is closed can the final stage in the socialisation process be reached.  This is where 
international human rights norms are fully institutionalised domestically and norm compliance 
becomes a habitual practice of actors and is enforced by the rule of law.  When this is achieved, 
it can be inferred that human rights norms have been internalised. 
 
While this five stage model applies to highly oppressive and abusive regimes, there is validity in 
applying parts of the model to more democratic states, such as the country under study here, 
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Trinidad and Tobago.582  This country has never been under authoritarian rule, but as with other 
developing countries, it has to prioritise the issues on the national agenda.  As such, human 
rights issues are not quite at the top of the agenda, let alone issues dealing with the promotion 
of women’s rights.  In terms of the model proposed by Risse and Sikkink, Trinidad and Tobago 
skipped the first three stages and is at the fourth stage, where all international human rights 
conventions and women-specific conventions have been ratified and some have been 
incorporated into domestic law in one way or another.  The problem lies with the lack of political 
will which translates into inadequate resources for implementation, monitoring and enforcement 
procedures.  While the role of NGOs should in no way be trivialised in the politicisation and 
promotion of women’s human rights issues, the fact remains that governments still play 
influential roles in promoting human rights domestically.583  Brysk makes the point that “[i]n a 
democratic regime, human rights change must be promoted from above, from below, and from 
within”.584  It is perhaps only with pressure from above and below that political will can be forced 
and the gap between rhetoric and reality can be closed, but as a nation without a history of 
gross women’s human rights abuses, this may prove quite a challenge.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The UN institutional structure for advancement of women’s rights is affected by major obstacles 
that undermine its ability to foster real and meaningful change.  The analysis of the UN system 
points to the lack of enforcement capabilities regarding state compliance with international legal 
obligations, such as reporting under CEDAW.  The lack of enforcement capabilities coupled with 
budgetary and procedural restrictions create an environment conducive to ineffectiveness.  This 
picture is hardly surprising considering that the UN governance structure is a reflection of the 
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attitude of the majority of its members.  The numerical dominance of developing countries 
where the greatest levels of abuse of women’s rights exist contributes largely to the somewhat 
apparent apathetic approach of the UN.  Even where a committee of the UN, such as the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, has a majority membership of 
women, the fact that around 78 percent of its members are from the developing world could 
account for the relative ineffectiveness of such a committee.  These women members are 
coming from governance structures that are male dominated and are therefore constrained by 
how far they can proceed in the struggle for the enhancement of women’s rights at the 
international level. 
 
The struggle for women’s rights is not limited to inter-governmental organisations such as the 
UN.  In chapter three, it was noted that DEVAW owed its genesis to a large extent to the 
advocacy activities of NGOs.  BPFA which came out of CEDAW highlighted the growing 
significance of NGOs as agents of change in the international attitude to women’s rights.  The 
unprecedented gathering of over 30,000 NGO representatives in the unofficial NGO Forum 
provided a powerful voice that resonated throughout the official meeting.  The institutional efforts 
of NGOs reflect the “bottom-up” approach as it includes grass roots NGOs and NGO networks.  
The very nature of NGOs, where membership is generally exclusive of states, ensures that 
issues can be ventilated without the constraining influence of states.     
 
Having assessed the international approach to women’s rights both institutionally and legally, 
and noted inherent limitations in the “top-down” approach, it is worthwhile to examine the 
behaviour of a one country to help understand why the “top-down” approach is of limited effect 
and why it must be complemented by the “bottom-up” approach.   
 
      
 154
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.0 Trinidad and Tobago’s Domestic Gender Policy: The Legislative Response 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
An examination of the international legal and institutional response to the promotion of women’s 
rights illustrated the relative lack of effectiveness of the response.  This raises the question of 
the efficacy of using the “top-down” approach to resolving the issue of women’s rights.  Given 
that the international community is really a society of individual states, it is useful at this point to 
focus on the attitude of the individual state to women’s rights.  The domestic legal and 
institutional response of Trinidad and Tobago with respect to the promotion of women’s rights 
forms the basis of the discussions in chapters five to eight.  This chapter establishes the legal 
background of Trinidad and Tobago and discusses how the country’s colonial legacy is relevant 
to understanding the manner in which particular kinds of elitism and male privilege have 
become an inherent aspect of its legal system with continuing consequences for the promotion 
of gender equality using this legislative medium. 
 
At the domestic level, the legislature is enshrined in Parliament which is responsible for making 
such laws as it determines necessary for the peace, order and good governance of the land; the 
executive has an administrative role in controlling the affairs of the nation; and, the judiciary is 
necessary for dispensing justice fairly in the hierarchy of Courts.585  Trinidad and Tobago 
emerged from the colonial past with a system of governance that throughout its post-colonial 
history has been dominated by the male elite.  By 2006, or almost forty-four years after the end 
                                               
585
 See Ramlogan and Persadie, Commonwealth Caribbean Business Law, pp. 30-31.  This is dealt 
with further later in this chapter. 
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of colonialism in 1962, the participation of women in the structures of power and decision 
making appears abysmal as appears in Table 5.1.    
 
Table 5.1 Participation of Women in the Structures of Power and Decision-Making586 
Type Male Female Total Percent total 
House of Representatives 29 7 36 19.4 
Senate 20 11 31 35.4 
Mayors 5 0 5 0 
Councillors and Aldermen 107 49 156 31.4 
 
In the realm of the Parliament, which is the highest institution of power, the dominance of the 
male elite is quite apparent.  The House of Representatives has some nineteen percent of its 
membership being female while the Senate, which comprises representatives of the 
Government, the Opposition and Independent Senators, shows a slightly different picture.  
Sixteen percent of the Opposition senators is female; thirty-one percent of the Government 
senators is female; while fifty-five percent of the Independent senators is female.  It would 
appear that women fare better when the selection process is ostensibly not based on political 
imperatives.  Accordingly, there can be no doubt that governance in post-colonial Trinidad and 
Tobago (“TT”) is entrenched in a male elite.   Within the context of a dominant male elite, the 
domestic legal response of TT to gender issues and gender equality will be examined as the 
domestic behaviour is most likely to be mirrored in the international attitude. 
 
                                               
586
 Table taken from Gender Affairs Division, Ministry of Community Development, Culture and Gender 
Affairs, “National Report of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago for the Presentation at the XXXIII 
Assembly of Delegates of the Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM)”, November 2006, El 
Salvador. CIM/doc.32/06, p. 4. 
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5.2 The Legal Tradition of Trinidad and Tobago 
5.2.1 Background to Governance 
 
Trinidad’s colonial history began in 1498 with the rediscovery of the country by Christopher 
Columbus which he claimed for the Spanish Crown.587  In 1797, the island was surrendered to 
the British.  Tobago has had a much more colourful history than most other Caribbean islands in 
that the island changed hands more than 22 times between the French, Dutch, British and even 
Latvians during the colonial period.  Eventually, in 1814 Tobago was ceded to Britain and TT 
became a single political entity on 01 January 1889 by virtue of the Orders made pursuant to 
the TT Act 1887. 
 
The twin island entity gained independence in 1962 and became a Republic in 1976, finally 
freeing itself of monarchal administration.  This is not to say, however, that the vestiges of the 
colonial period are completely gone.  The influences of British rule are still evident in the 
country’s current legal practices.  
 
It is often said that TT is a proud heir to that stock of constitutions drawn on the Westminster 
model.  Noted local political analyst and constitutional expert, Hamid Ghany, states, however, 
that the model followed in this twin island republic should more correctly be referred to as the 
Whitehall model, as it was the civil servants in Whitehall who were intimately involved in the 
                                               
587
 For a brief history of Trinidad and Tobago, see NationMaster [online], “Encyclopedia: History of 
Trinidad and Tobago”. [cited 12 September 2005].  Last updated 2004.  Available from Internet: 
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/History-of-Trinidad-and-Tobago.  Trinidad and Tobago’s 
history is generally taught from an Anglophone perspective.  An interesting non-Anglophone account 
from a country laying claim to Trinidad during the colonial period is provided in Jesse Noel, Trinidad, 
Provincia de Venezuela: Historia de la Administración Española de Trinidad (Caracas: Academia 
Nacional de la Historia, 1972).  Figure 5.1 below illustrates Trinidad and Tobago’s geographical 
position within the Caribbean (at the very south of the archipelago) and the Americas (at the north 
eastern tip of Venezuela), while figure 5.2 shows a more detailed map. 
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process of drafting independence constitutions for the Commonwealth Caribbean.588  The major 
and most important difference between the two models is that while the “original Westminster 
formula emphasises parliamentary sovereignty, the Whitehall variant enshrines the supremacy 
of the written constitution”,589 England being the only member of the Commonwealth with an 
unwritten constitution.590 
                                               
588
 Hamid Ghany, “Parliament in Trinidad and Tobago 1962-1987: The Whitehall Model at Work”, in 
Selwyn Ryan (ed), Trinidad and Tobago: The Independence Experience 1962-1987 (St. Augustine, 
Trinidad: Institute of Social and Economic Research, UWI, 1988), p. 175. 
589
 Selwyn Ryan, Winner Takes All: The Westminster Experience in the Anglophone Caribbean (St. 
Augustine, Trinidad: Institute of Social and Economic Research, UWI, 1999), p. 8. 
590
 The British Constitution is drawn from statutes, conventions, case law, custom and common law 
and authoritative legal writings, but not compiled into a single document.  See R. Mosley, Westminster 
Workshop: A Student’s Guide to the British Constitution (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1967), pp. 4-5. 
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Figure 5.1 Map of Central America and the Caribbean591 
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 University of Texas Libraries [online], “Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Map 
of Central America and the Caribbean”. [cited 27 April 2005]. Last updated 22 March 
2005.  Available from Internet: 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/central_america_ref02.jpg 
Figure 5.2 Map of Trinidad and Tobago592 
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Ghany identifies five basic tenets of the Whitehall model which distinguish it from the 
Westminster model: 
1) A Bill of Rights in the constitution that diminishes the legislative supremacy of Parliament 
2) A bicameral system with a Senate that is unique 
3) A definitive enforcement of the Separation of Powers between the Legislature, the 
Executive and the Judiciary  
4) Constitutional conventions that are written and not left to interpretation as obtains under 
the Westminster model 
5) The entrenchment of constitutional articles that further diminishes the legislative 
supremacy of Parliament.593 
 
The issue of the practice of the doctrine of separation of powers is questionable.  Some believe 
in the independence of the judiciary given its supposed immunity from the executive [read: 
political pressure] through the buffer provided by the Judicial and Legal Services 
Commission.594  Illustrative at this point is an examination of how the various appointments are 
made.   
 
Figure 5.3 Appointments to the Judicial and Legal Services Commission 
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 Ghany, “Parliament in Trinidad and Tobago 1962-1987”, pp. 175-176. 
594
 See for example Selwyn Ryan, The Judiciary and Governance in the Caribbean (St. Augustine, 
Trinidad: Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies, UWI, 2001), pp. 7-11 and Ghany, 
“Parliament in Trinidad and Tobago 1962-1987”, p. 183. 
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This simple diagram traces the appointments made to the Judicial and Legal Service 
Commission (“the JLSC”).  As the members of the JLSC are all appointed by the President, it is 
important to examine how the President is appointed.  At the very top of Figure 5.3 is a box 
showing the Electoral College.  It is this unit that is responsible for appointing the President.  
What constitutes the Electoral College?  According to Section 28(1) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (Chap. 1:01) (“the Constitution”) the Electoral College is a 
unicameral body consisting of all the members of both Houses of Parliament: 31 Senators in the 
Upper House and 36 Members of Parliament in the Lower House.  The President appoints all 
31 Senators;595 however, 16 are appointed on the Prime Minister’s recommendations, 6 are 
appointed on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, and 9 ‘Independent Senators’ are 
appointed at the President’s discretion.  As for the Members of Parliament, it is generally the 
ruling party that has more members.596  In any event, it is clear that the majority of the Members 
of Parliament are affiliated with the ruling party and it is these Members that make up the 
Electoral College which appoints the President.  Further, both the Prime Minister and the Leader 
of the Opposition make recommendations for presidential nominees; needless to say, 
throughout the history of Independent TT, the recommendation of the latter has never 
successfully prevailed in the Electoral College.  It also goes without saying the post of Prime 
Minister is incontrovertibly political.  It should be clear from this that the appointment of 
President is in fact a political appointment and that any appointments made by the President will 
necessarily also be political.597  
                                               
595
 See Section 40 of the Constitution. 
596
 Except in cases of deadlock, where the President has the discretion to choose which party shall 
govern. 
597
 In Director of Personnel Adminstration and the Police Service Commission v Eusebio Cooper and 
Others, Civ. App. No. 10 of 2004 (TT), Chief Justice Sharma also outlined the relationship between the 
Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary asking “What can be more political than that?” at paragraph 
34, stating at the same time, however, that there must be a presumed integrity of holders of high office 
or the Constitution would be rendered unworkable.  See paragraphs 33-39.  In Kangaloo JA’s 
judgment of the same case, he admits at paragraph 20 that “the potential for interference must exist 
once there is the overlap of powers” but emphasises that the real issue is the degree of influence or 
interference that is permissible in any given situation.  Conversely, in the Dominican case of The 
Constituency Boundaries Commission and the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Dominica v 
Urban Baron, Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1998 (DM), Singh JA believes that Commissions borne from the 
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As mentioned above, all members of the JLSC are appointed by the President (Section 110).  
The Chief Justice and the Chairman of the Public Service Commission (“the PSC”) are 
appointed directly by the President after consultation with the leaders of both parties.598  The 
three other members are appointed through the JLSC in the same manner, with the Chief 
Justice who acts as Chairman and the Chairman of the PSC who were previously appointed as 
the core members.  Effectively, therefore, the Executive is ever present in these appointments 
causing the notion of a separation of powers to be more cosmetic than actual. 
 
5.2.2 Sources of Law 
5.2.2.1 The Constitution 
 
Returning to the Constitution, it is not surprising that it is the supreme law of the land.  Section 2 
of the Constitution states, “This Constitution is the supreme law of Trinidad and Tobago, and 
any other law that is inconsistent with this Constitution is void to the extent of that 
inconsistency”.599  It is from this supreme law that laws dealing with the establishment, 
composition and functions of Parliament are derived.  (There is no such document for the 
Westminster model.)  Ramlogan and Persadie succinctly summarise the objectives of the 
Constitution.600  The Constitution of TT establishes the highest political office of the land, the 
office of the President, and governs his behaviour and his election to office.  The Constitution 
also provides for the regulation of electoral activities.  It governs the executive powers to be 
exercised by all Ministers of Cabinet as well as the functions, appointment and behaviour of 
other public officers.  Financial provisions are an important part of the Constitution as it provides 
                                                                                                                                                   
Constitution “will lean more towards political loyalty than constitutional integrity” due to the same 
political relationship existing between the three bodies. 
598
 See Sections 102 and 120 of the Constitution respectively. 
599
 Section 2, The Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Ch. 1:01 (Revised Laws of 
Trinidad and Tobago, 1980) 
600
 See Ramlogan and Persadie, Commonwealth Caribbean Business Law, p. 9. 
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for the establishment and use of the Consolidated Fund which comprises monies to be used for 
Government expenditure.  The legal basis for the establishment and functioning of the 
judicature is also to be found in the Constitution.  The Constitution is, therefore, an important 
source of law with respect to the establishment and regulation of government. 
 
5.2.2.2 Common Law  
 
Another item of inheritance resulting from the colonial experience is the common law legal 
tradition.  Common law was born at the end of the Norman Conquest in 1066 A.D.601  With 
common law’s origination in England, it is not surprising that it found its way to the former 
conquered territories of the Commonwealth, such as TT.  As Lord Diplock noted in 
Kodeeswaran v. Attorney-General of Ceylon, [1970] A.C. 1111 at page 1116: “In the case of 
most former British colonies which were acquired by conquest or cession, the English common 
law is incorporated as part of the domestic law of the now independent State because it was 
imposed upon the colony…”, but this was to be done "subject to such qualifications as local 
circumstances render necessary”.602  In the case of TT, Section 12 of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act, Ch. 4:01, provides for the reception603 of English law into the local legislation,  
 
“Subject to the provisions of any written law in operation on 1st March 1848, and 
to any written law passed after that date, the Common Law, Doctrines of Equity, 
and Statutes of general application in the Parliament of the United Kingdom that 
were in force in England on that date shall be deemed to have been enacted 
and to have been in force in Trinidad as from that date and in Tobago as from 
1st January 1889”.   
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 John Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe 
and Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), p. 3. 
602
 Emphasis added.  See Lord Denning’s judgement in Nyali Ld. v Attorney-General, [1956] 1 Q.B. 1 
at page 16-17.  The imposition of foreign laws without regard to the needs of the population also 
occurred in colonial Africa.  See Terri Nderitu [online], “Balancing Pill and Patients: Intellectual 
Property and the HIV/AIDS Crisis”, paragraphs 27-32.  [cited 12 January 2007].  Last updated 
September 2001.  Available from Internet: 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v8n3/nderitu83nf.html.  
603
 On the “reception of laws” doctrine, see Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean Law 
and Legal Systems (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1999), pp. 57-69. 
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This means that TT adopted the laws of England on these dates as its own, although not by 
choice; such laws are amended, repealed and replaced by the Legislature as it sees fit.   
 
Characteristic of the common law tradition is its reliance on precedents and judge-made law, 
distinct from civil law where legal principles and ideas are officially recorded in the form of a 
code.  Judicial discretion finds expression in common law countries where new law emerges 
frequently to deal with changing times and needs.604   
 
5.2.2.3 Statutory Law 
 
Complementing common law is statute law which is created by Parliament in the form of 
legislation.605  In the Commonwealth, legal systems are based on common law and courts are 
quite important in interpreting statutes; nevertheless, legislation has become the principal 
means of law making.606 
 
5.3 Assessing Gender Laws in the Framework of the Colonial Experience 
 
The analysis that follows will show that the laws made relating to gender in the post-colonial era 
are very much shaped by what obtained in the colonial period.  The colonial legal system was 
characterised by attributes that seemed to favour the ruling elite and exhibited elements of 
control, benevolence, inequality, and equality.  In the post-colonial era, this characterisation 
continues to apply, the only difference being that the class elitism of the colonial period is 
replaced by gender elitism.  The post-colonial legal response is largely a reflection of the 
colonial structure where the issues of gender and the position of women in society are closer to 
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1999 [2000]), p. 5. 
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 For more on the actual legislative process, see Slapper and Kelly, The English Legal System, pp. 
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that of the non-whites / non-elites during colonialism with men replacing the colonial elite who 
continue to exercise control.   
 
5.3.1 The Shaping of the Law: The Role of Colonialism 
 
Colonialism has in fact left quite an impression on the legal landscape of TT and continues to do 
so.  As Sharma JA, as he then was, stated, 
 
…even after independence, our courts have continued to develop law very 
much in accordance with English jurisprudence…  The inherent danger and 
pitfall to this approach is that, since independence our society has developed 
differently from the English and now requires a robust examination in order to 
render our constitution and common law more meaningful.607 
 
Even though many call for legal reform to reflect the uniqueness of this post-colonial society, 
Meighoo makes the point that society in TT is in a continual state of flux608 and as such a more 
suitable form of governance would be difficult to model. 
 
Important, too, is not just the form of legal governance imposed by the imperialists, but also the 
type of laws enacted under the guise of attempting to maintain social order.  Many authors are 
of the view that the historical function of law in Caribbean society was to legitimise the 
exploitative nature of plantation society.609  While law is meant to be an instrument of social 
control and public order, it was used very specifically in colonial societies such as TT by a 
dominant elite minority to shape and enact certain laws and use them to serve its own ends, 
ostensibly with the interest of the public at heart.  Knafla and Binnie state, “English law was 
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 Boodram v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, (1994) 47 WIR 459 at 470, paragraphs e-f. 
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 Kirk Meighoo, Politics in a ‘Half-Made Society’: Trinidad and Tobago, 1925-2001 (Kingston: Ian 
Randle Publishers, 2003), p. xxiii. 
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 Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal, p. 12. 
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developed partly to further the interests of an elite white settler minority drawn to the island by 
the lure of profits from sugar cultivation”.610 
 
The colonial legal system was characterised by attributes that seemed to favour the ruling elite.  
The laws exhibited elements of: 
 Control (laws granting dominance by elite over non-elite group),  
 Benevolence,611 (laws designed to show the non-elite group that the law-making elite 
are considerate and conscious of their condition and can be entrusted to ensure their 
well-being),  
 Inequality, which can be further sub-categorised into positive and negative  
 Positive: laws that vested rights in the elite, but not to the non-elite;  
 Negative: laws that create liabilities applicable only to the non-elite group,  
 Equality, which can be further sub-categorised into false, inverse and restorative  
 False: laws giving the appearance of equality, but on further examination, are 
elitist;   
 Inverse: laws conveying rights to the non-elite that are not enjoyed by the elite; 
 Restorative: laws conveying rights to achieve neutrality between the elite and 
non-elite. 
 
5.3.1.1 Control 
 
After the abolition of slavery, East Indians were brought as indentured workers to labour on 
sugar plantations and laws were enacted to discourage any possible social cohesion between 
the different ethnic groups.  Haraksingh makes the point that in post-emancipation Trinidad 
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 Louis Knafla and Susan Binnie, “Beyond the State: Law and Legal Pluralism in the Making of 
Modern Societies”, in Louis Knafla and Susan Binnie (eds), Law, Society and the State: Essays in 
Modern Legal History (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1995), p. 14. 
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“[t]he force of the general law was directed in the first place at maintaining control: the strategy 
was to prevent the two major groups at the bottom of the social and economic system - the 
descendents of black ex-slaves and of Indian indentured workers - from establishing any 
common front”.612  This was a largely successful enterprise and continues to apply today, 
although the current socioeconomic and political climate offers new mitigating circumstances. 
 
Control by the elite extended as well to other aspects of life.  A significant characteristic of 
colonial legislation was the presence of laws that promoted the ruling elite.  It is acknowledged 
that religion is a critical tool in controlling a non-ruling majority.    Armed with this knowledge, the 
colonial masters ensured that their elitist control over religious indoctrination was well-
entrenched in the law.  The Alien Missionaries and Teachers Ordinance, No. 22 of 1917 created 
a statutory preference for the elite, giving only to them free reign to engage in religious or 
educational work - important tools of social control - in the Colony without written permission 
from the Governor.  This was clearly elitist, as non-natural born or naturalised British subjects 
were required to obtain prior written permission before engaging in such activities.  In prohibiting 
non-sanctioned religious or educational work, this Ordinance at the same time created negative 
unequal rights by establishing clear liability for the non-British found in breach. 
 
5.3.1.2 Benevolence 
 
The British colonialists recognised that a system founded on control and repression would have 
continuously created conditions of dissonance with the ever present threat of civil unrest from 
the colonised.  It was therefore important for the ruling elite to appear to govern with a sense of 
benevolence that would accomplish the critical objective of demonstrating that they cared and 
could be entrusted to seek the interest of the colonised.  This attitude was exemplified in the 
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laws dealing with education at the secondary school level.  The Secondary Education 
Ordinance, No. 13 of 1909 provided for the granting of three exhibitions (scholarships) per year 
to students who were successful in the secondary school entrance examination and were 
placed at the Queen’s Royal College.  While this seems benevolent enough, the hypocrisy of 
this piece of legislation reveals itself in section 5.3.1.3.1 below. 
 
5.3.1.3 Inequality 
5.3.1.3.1 Positive Inequality  
 
The elite ensured that certain rights were well entrenched in the laws to perpetuate their well 
being and future control through their children.  The public service in colonial times was largely 
the domain of the white settlers and non-white residents of TT that were supportive of the white 
settlers.  The son or sons of any deceased public servant could have been lawfully granted 
admission to the Queen’s Royal College without writing the same examination pursuant to the 
Secondary Education Ordinance.  Moreover, not only were they eligible for entry, but their fees 
were paid out of the general revenues.  These privileges could possibly have been justified on 
the basis that as a public servant, the parent contributed to the building of the nation; therefore, 
it was only fair that the son’s education be paid out of the public coffers.  
 
In continuing to vest rights in the elite, laws were passed that ensured that the non-elite were 
placed at a distinct disadvantage in the power structure of the colony.  Even when democracy 
was being ostensibly promoted for the colony, the legal requirements in 1925, according to the 
Legislative Council (Elections) Ordinance, Ch. 2 No. 2, to become a member of the Legislative 
Council ensured that only members of the elite would qualify.613  These requirements included 
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 Singh states that “[t]he sugar planters enjoyed a dominant influence in the Legislative Council 
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sat on this Council.  Kelvin Singh, Race and Class Struggles in a Colonial State: Trinidad 1917-1945 
(Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1994), p. 2. 
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the ability to read and write English in a society where a large segment of the population 
comprised East Indian indentures who were in the main part English illiterates.  In addition, 
there was an ownership of real estate stipulation in the district in which one sought to be elected 
to qualify as a candidate for election as a member of the Legislative Council.  There was the 
added obstacle of having to ensure that the real estate owned in the electoral district in which 
one sought election produced a minimum level of clear annual income.  The net result of this 
type of legislation ensured that the majority of the non-elites were kept out of the governing 
political structure of the society. 
 
5.3.1.3.2 Negative Inequality 
 
The colonial period was also characterised by laws that created liabilities in the non-elite.  
Williams states that as the black slave population grew, “the resident planters, apprehensive of 
the growing disproportion between whites and blacks, passed Deficiency Laws to compel 
absentees, under penalty of fines, to keep white servants”.614  In the immediate post-
emancipation era, laws such as the Tenancy Acts and Vagrancy Acts, imported from England, 
sought to force ‘idle’, jobless ex-slaves, devoid of land, money or opportunity, back to the 
plantations.615  The Vagrancy Act entered the statute books as the Habitual Idlers Ordinance, 
No. 7 of 1918 and defined a habitual idler as “any male person who has no visible means of 
subsistence, and who, being able to work, habitually abstains from work”, and who “has not 
worked for a period of four hours during each of three days or for a period of 14 hours during 
such period of 7 days” of the week before his arrest.616  Haraksingh sardonically notes that “[i]t 
was not clear what constituted visible means or the ability to work, or even what magic lay in the 
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four-hour stipulation”.617  In any event, Section 5 dealt with the issue of the burden of proof 
which unfairly lay on the ‘idler’ (non-elite) to prove that he was not in fact a habitual idler.  
Inferred in section 9 of the Ordinance is the fact that “detention in settlement” effectively led the 
‘idler’ back to a plantation as part of his punishment.  It is clear that the liabilities created by the 
Habitual Idlers Ordinance had as its primary target the non-elite. 
 
5.3.1.4 Equality 
5.3.1.4.1 False Equality 
 
Additionally, the colonial elite were very good at promoting legislation that, prima facie, would 
appear to offer equality to all but which on closer examination in fact worked against the 
interests of the non-elite while favouring the elite.  The part of the Education Ordinance, Ch. 14 
No. 1 of 1935 dealing with religion in schools seemed to try to accommodate the cosmopolitan 
nature of the society.  At first glance, the provision in question appeared to show appreciation 
for the need to remain secular in such a society by stating very clearly that “Religious teaching 
shall not form part of the instruction required to be given at any Government school by any 
teacher”; yet, it simultaneously gives authority to any Minister of religion to provide “religious 
instruction to the children of the religious denomination to which the Minister belongs, at such 
times and places as may be agreed upon between him and the Director”.  The Director would 
presumably have been one of the elite who would have practiced Christianity and who would 
only have known Ministers (Christian) who were of the same class.  This necessarily and 
immediately reduced the possibility of the Minister being of a religion other than that of what the 
Director practised or believed in, thereby nullifying the ostensible attempt of accommodating 
and respecting the religious beliefs of all. 
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5.3.1.4.2 Inverse Equality 
 
Laws that conferred rights on the non-elite that are not enjoyed by the elite are referred to as 
conferring “inverse equality”, as it presumed here that rights enjoyed by the elite are the 
standard by which enjoyment of equality of rights will be measured and any rights conferred on 
the non-elite only will be necessarily inverse.  These are, of course, rare; however, the Truck 
Ordinance, No. 34 of 1918 provided that labourers be paid only in money (as they were known 
to be paid sometimes partially in kind) and created offences for employers attempting to 
compensate labourers by other means.  According to Haraksingh, though, this measure was 
meant to divert the labour supply from small contractors and emerging middlemen with limited 
cash to large planters who were able to manage a money payroll, 618 again ensuring a labour 
supply to the elite-owned plantations. 
 
5.3.1.4.3 Restorative Equality 
 
Laws seeming to remove class differences exhibit the characteristic of restorative equality.  One 
such ordinance was the Hindu Marriage Ordinance, No. 13 of 1945.  Even though Indians lived 
in TT for some one hundred years, it took that long for some of their cultural practices to be 
legally recognised.  Section 5(1) of this Ordinance conferred on the Governor the right to 
authorise Hindu priests to officiate marriage ceremonies while Section 9(d) allowed the Hindu 
priest to do so under Hindu rites.  This must have represented a major cultural victory as British 
practices were always imposed on the various immigrant groups. 
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5.3.2 Law, Colonialism and Gender in the Post-Colonial Era  
 
There are just about 150 laws, inclusive of the Constitution and constitutionally derived 
legislation, which deal with gender issues either directly or indirectly in a significant manner.619  
According to figure 5.4 below, which lists the legislation in alphabetical order, there are two main 
categories: the Constitution and constitutionally derived subsidiary legislation and general 
statutes and subsidiary instruments.  The Constitution referred to here is the one drawn up 
when TT became a Republic in 1976.  The second category consists of acts (post-1962) and 
ordinances (pre-1962), some of which continued to have effect even after TT gained 
independence in 1962 and began writing its own laws. 
 
The elements that existed as part of the colonial legal system would appear to have been 
replicated in the subsequent post-colonial system, where the colonial elite were replaced by the 
local male elite and the population of former slaves and indentures by women.  This means 
therefore that elitism and sexism amount to one and the same.  The analysis which follows 
below will show that the post-colonial legal response is largely a reflection of the colonial 
structure where the issues of gender and the position of women in society are closer to that of 
the non-whites / non-elites during colonialism with men replacing the colonial elite who continue 
to exercise control.   
 
                                               
619
 The author examined all the laws (ordinances, statutes) of TT to determine which laws were 
relevant.  This information is correct as at 31 December 2006.  See Appendix A at page 280 for the 
text of relevant laws. 
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Figure 5.4 List of Legislation relating to Gender in Trinidad and Tobago 
 
The Constitution and Constitutionally-Derived Subsidiary Legislation 
1) The Constitution  (Chap. 1:01) 
2) Public Service Commission Regulations, deemed to be made under section 129 of the 
Constitution 
3) Police Service Commission Regulations, deemed to be made under section 129 of the 
Constitution 
 
Legislation and Subsidiary Legislation of Trinidad and Tobago  
1) Administration of Estates Ordinance (CAP.8/1), 1950 Rev., as amended by the Distribution of 
Estates Act, No. 28 of 2000 
2) Airports Authority Act (Chap. 49:02) 
3) Assisted Secondary School Teachers’ Pensions Act (Chap. 39:03)  
4) Assisted Secondary School Teachers’ Pensions Regulations, deemed to be made pursuant to 
section 15(1) of the Assisted Secondary School Teachers’ Pensions Act 
5) Auxiliary Fire Service Act (Chap. 35:54) 
6) Bankruptcy Act (Chap. 9:70) 
7) Births and Deaths Registration Act (Chap. 44:01), 1980 Rev. 
8) Caribbean Aviation Training Institute (Chap. 39:52), 1980 Rev. 
9) Caribbean Community Act, No. 3 of 2005 
10) Children Act (Chap. 46:01), as amended by Acts No. 19 of 1994 and 68 of 2000 
11) Children’s Authority Act, No. 64 of 2000 
12) Citizenship of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Act (Chap. 1:50) 
13) Civil Aviation Act, No. 11 of 2001 
14) Civil Service Act (Chap. 23:01) 
15) Civil Service (Amendment) Regulations, LN No. 217 of 1996, made pursuant to section 28 of the 
Civil Service Act 
16) Civil Service (External Affairs) Regulations, made pursuant to section 28 of the Civil Service Act  
17) Civil Service Regulations, made pursuant to section 28 of the Civil Service Act 
18) Cohabitational Relationships Act, No. 30 of 1998 
19) Compensation for Injuries Act (Chap. 8:05), 1980 Rev. 
20) College of Science, Technology and Applied Arts of Trinidad and Tobago Act, No. 77 of 2000 
21) Conveyancing and Law of Property Ordinance (CAP.27/12) ) 
22) Corporal Punishment (Offenders not over 16) Act (Chap. 13:03) 
23) Corporal Punishment (Offenders Over 18) Act (Chap. 13:04), as amended by Acts No. 66 of 2000 
and 18 of 2005 
24) Counting Unremunerated Work Act, No. 29 of 1996 
25) Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, No. 21 of 1999 
26) Criminal Law Act (Chap. 10:04) 
27) Criminal Procedure Act (Chap. 12:02) 
28) Criminal Procedure (Plea Discussion and Plea Agreement) Act, No. 11 of 1999 
29) Customs Act (Chap. 78:01) 
30) Deceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act (Chap. 45:54) 
31) Defence Act (Chap. 14:01) 
32) Defence (Pensions, Terminal and Other Grants) Regulations, LN No. 38 of 1968 
33) Defence (Short Service Commissions) Regulations, LN No. 104 of 1987 
34) Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Identification Act, No. 27 of 2000 
35) Distribution of Estates Act, No. 28 of 2000 
36) Domestic Violence Act, No. 27 of 1999  
37) Education (Teaching Service) Regulations, as amended by LN No. 184 of 2000, made pursuant 
to section 85(11) of the Education Act (Chap. 39:01) 
38) Equal Opportunity Act, No. 69 of 2000 
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Figure 5.4 List of Legislation relating to Gender in Trinidad and Tobago (continued) 
39) Extradition (Commonwealth and Foreign Territories) Act, No. 36 of 1985 
40) Family Law (Guardianship of Minors, Domicile and Maintenance) Act 1981 (Chap. 46:08) 
41) Financial Institution (Non-Banking) Act (Chap. 83:01), 1980 Rev. 
42) Fire Service Act (Chap. 35:50) 
43) Fire Service (Terms and Conditions of Employment) Regulations, LN No. 267 of 1998 made 
pursuant to section 34 of the Fire Service Act 
44) Food and Drugs Regulations, made pursuant to section 25 of the Food and Drugs Act (Chap. 
30:01) 
45) Friendly Societies Act (Chap. 32:50) 
46) Friendly Societies Housing Corporation Regulations, deemed to be made pursuant to section 66 
of the Friendly Societies Housing Corporation Act (Chap. 33:05) 
47) Genocide Act (Chap. 11:20)   
48) Guidelines for Contract Employment in the Tobago House of Assembly, LN No. 148 of 2000 
49) Hindu Marriage Act (Chap. 45:03) 
50) Human Tissue Transplant Act, No. 13 of 2000 
51) Immigration Act (Chap. 18:01), 1980 Rev. 
52) Immigration (Caribbean Community Skilled Nationals) Act, No. 26 of 1996, as amended by Act 
No. 6 of 2001 
53) Income Tax Act (Chap. 75:01) 
54) Indictable Offences (Preliminary Enquiry) Act (Chap. 12:01) 
55) Industrial Training Act (Chap. 39:54) 
56) Infants Act (Chap. 46:02)  
57) Insurance Act (Chap. 84:01), 1980 Rev. 
58) Integrity in Public Life Act, No. 83 of 2000 
59) International Criminal Court Act, No. 4 of 2006 
60) International War Crimes Tribunal Act, No. 24 of 1998 
61) Interpretation Act (Chap. 3:01) 
62) Judges Salaries and Pensions Act (Chap. 6:02) 
63) Judicial Review Act, No. 60 of 2000 
64) Jury Act (Chap. 6:53)  
65) Justice Protection Act, No. 78 of 2000 
66) Land Law and Conveyancing Act, No. 20 of 1981 
67) Land Registration Act, No. 24 of 1981 
68) Legal Aid and Advice Act (Chap. 7:07), as amended by Act No. 18 of 1999 
69) Liquor Licences Act (Chap. 84:10) 
70) Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act, No. 12 of 2000 
71) Management Development Centre Act (Chap. 85:51) 
72) Married Persons Act (Chap. 45:50) 
73) Maternity Protection Act, No. 4 of 1998 
74) Matrimonial Causes Rules, made pursuant to sections 77-81 of the Supreme Court of Judicature 
Act (Chap. 4:01) 
75) Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act (Chap. 45:51) 
76) Military Training (Prohibition) Act, No. 14 of 1996 
77) Minimum Wages (Catering Industry) Order, LN No. 158 of 1991, made pursuant to section 3 of 
the Minimum Wages Act (Chap. 88:04) 
78) Minimum Wages (Household Assistants) Order, LN No. 160 of 1991, made pursuant to section 3 
of the Minimum Wages Act (Chap. 88:04) 
79) Minimum Wages (Security Industry Employees) Order, LN No. 231 of 1994, made pursuant to 
section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act (Chap. 88:04)  
80) Minimum Wages (Shop Assistants) Order, LN No. 159 of 1991, made pursuant to section 3 of the 
Minimum Wages Act (Chap. 88:04) 
81) “MIZPEH” Half Way House (Incorporation) Act, No. 3 of 1990  
82) Municipal Corporations (Pensions) Act (Chap. 25:05) 
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Figure 5.4 List of Legislation relating to Gender in Trinidad and Tobago (continued) 
83) Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (Chap. 45:02) 
84) Muslim Marriage and Divorce Regulations, made pursuant to section 30 of the Muslim Marriage 
and Divorce Act (Chap. 45:02) 
85) National Carnival Commission of Trinidad and Tobago Act, No. 9 of 1991 
86) National Insurance Act (Chap. 32:01), as amended by Act Nos. 9 of 1999 and 2004 
87) National Insurance (Benefits) Regulations, made pursuant to section 55 of the National Insurance 
Act as amended by LN Nos. 73 of 1999 and 66 of 2004 
88) National Insurance (Contributions) Regulations, made pursuant to section 44 of the National 
Insurance Act 
89) National Library and Information System Act, No. 18 of 1998 
90) National Museum and Art Gallery Act, No. 5 of 2000 
91) Occupational Safety and Health Act, No. 1 of 2004 
92) Offences Against the Person Act (Chap. 11:08), as amended by Act No. 11 of 2005 
93) Old Age Pensions Act (Chap. 32:02), 1980 Rev. 
94) Orisa Marriage Act, No. 22 of 1999   
95) Partnership Act (Chap. 81:02) 
96) Pensions Act (Chap. 23:52) 
97) Pensions Regulations, deemed to be made pursuant to section 7(4) of the Pensions Act, as 
amended by the Law Reform (Pensions) Act, No. 20 of 1997 
98) Petty Civil Courts Rules made pursuant to section 53 of the Petty Civil Courts Act 
99) Police Service Act (Chap. 15:01)  
100) Police Service Act, No. 7 of 2006 
101) Post Office Savings Bank Act (Chap. 79:04) 
102) Post Office Savings Bank Regulations, deemed to be made pursuant to section 13 of the Post 
Office Savings Bank Act 
103) President’s Emoluments Act (Chap. 2:50) 
104) Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 11 of 1987 
105) Prime Minister’s Pension Act (Chap. 2:51) 
106) Private Hospital Regulations, made pursuant to section 21 of the Private Hospitals Act (Chap. 
29:03)  
107) Privileges and Immunities (Diplomatic, Consular and International Organisations) Act (Chap. 
17:01) 
108) Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 55 of 2000 
109) Provident Fund Act (Chap. 23:57) 
110) Public Assistance Act (Chap. 32:03) 
111) Public Health Ordinance (CAP.12/4), 1950 Rev. 
112) Public Service Transport Act (Chap. 48:02) 
113) Purchase, Sweepstake, Departure and Airline Ticket Taxes Act (Chap. 77:01) 
114) Real Property Ordinance (CAP.27/11) 
115) Regional Health Authorities Act, No. 5 of 1994 
116) Regional Health Authorities (Contracting for Goods and Services) Regulations, LN No. 225 of 
1994 made pursuant to section 35(b) of the Regional Health Authorities Act 
117) Registration of Clubs (Amendment) Act, No. 14 of 1997 
118) Regulated Industries Commission Act, No. 26 of 1998 
119) Remedies of Creditors Act (Chap. 8:09) 
120) Retiring Allowances (Diplomatic Service) Act (Chap. 17:04) 
121) Retiring Allowances (Legislative Service) Act (Chap. 2:03)  
122) Securities Industries Act, No. 32 of 1995 
123) Sexual Offences Act, No. 27 of 1986, as amended by Act No. 31 of 2000  
124) Shop (Hours of Opening and Employment) Act (Chap. 84:02) 
125) Slum Clearance and Housing Act (Chap. 33:02)   
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Figure 5.4 List of Legislation relating to Gender in Trinidad and Tobago (continued) 
126) Socially Displaced Persons Act, No. 59 of 2000 
127) Special Reserve Police Act (Chap. 15:03) 
128) Statistics (Surveys of Industrial or Business Undertakings) Regulations, made pursuant to section 
13 of the Statistics Act 
129) Statutory Authorities’ Service Commission Regulations, made pursuant to section 6 of the 
Statutory Authorities Act (Chap. 24:01) 
130) Summary Courts Act (Chap. 4:20) 
131) Summary Offences Act (Chap. 11:02) 
132) Supplemental Police Regulations, made pursuant to section 12 of the Supplemental Police Act 
(Chap. 15:02) 
133) Teachers’ Pensions Act (Chap. 39:02) 
134) Teachers’ Pensions Regulations, deemed to be made pursuant to section 4 of the Teachers’ 
Pensions Act (Chap. 39:02) 
135) Theatres and Dance Halls (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 1997 
136) The Community Service Regulations, LN No. 138 of 2000, made pursuant to section 27(1) of the 
Community Service Orders Act, 1997 
137) The Defence (Rates of Pay and Allowances) Regulations, LN No. 84 of 1989, made pursuant to 
section 244 of the Defence Act  
138) The Judges (Conditions of Service and Allowances) Regulations (No. 1) made pursuant to 
section 16 of the Judges Salaries and Pensions Act 
139) The Judges (Conditions of Service and Allowances) Regulations (No. 2) made pursuant to 
section 16 of the Judges Salaries and Pensions Act, as amended by LN No. 190 of 1997 
140) The Police Service Regulations, made pursuant to section 65 of the Police Service Act as 
amended by LN No. 235 of 1999 
141) The Prison Service (Pension and Gratuity) Rules, as amended by Act No. 17 of 2000 
142) The Public Assistance Regulations, No. 182 of 1997 made pursuant to section 16 of the Public 
Assistance Act (Chap. 32:03) 
143) The State Land (Regularisation of Tenure) (Certificate of Comfort) Regulations, LN No. 36 of 
2000, made pursuant to section 34(2) of the State Land (Regularisation of Tenure) Act, 1998 
144) Trinidad and Tobago Civil Aviation Authority Act, No. 33 of 2000 
145) Trinidad and Tobago Housing Development Corporation Act, No. 24 of 2005 
146) Water and Sewerage Act (Chap. 54:40) 
147) Widows’ and Orphans’ Pensions Act (Chap. 23:54)  
148) Wills and Probate Ordinance (CAP.8/2) 1950 Rev., as amended by the Distribution of Estates 
Act, No. 28 of 2000 
149) Workmen’s Compensation Act (Chap. 88:05)  
150) Young Offenders Detention Act (Chap. 13:05) 
 
Appendix A below provides the text of the Constitution and statutes as they relate to gender.  
Two acts highlighted in red and bold in figure 5.4 are the only pieces of legislation that make 
specific reference to gender equality with respect to discrimination on the basis of gender.  
Having reviewed the constitutional and statutory provisions as they relate to gender, it is 
generally possible to categorise the legal provisions into the same broad categories as were 
provided above for the analysis of the colonial legal system. 
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Main Categories Sub-Categories 
 Control  
 
None  
 Benevolence 
 
None  
 Inequality 
 
Positive Inequality; Negative Inequality   
 
 Equality 
 
False Equality; Inverse Equality; Restorative Equality, 
Constitutional Equality 
 
  
 
Just as the colonial legal system was characterised by attributes that seemed to favour the 
ruling elite, so too is the post-colonial legal system.  In addition to exhibiting elements of control, 
benevolence, inequality, and equality, there are in fact areas which seem to favour the non-elite.  
In the post-colonial era, this latter category of equality assumed two different characteristics.  
While it retains the sub-category of restorative equality, the meaning of it here refers to laws 
creating rights for women where they were previously non-existent [such as maternity benefits], 
and conveying rights to achieve gender sameness [such as formalising the rights of the 
common law wife] or non-gender distinctiveness [such as illustrated by the Domestic Violence 
Act].  Moreover, this period saw the enactment of a Constitution which was not part of the 
colonial legislative framework.  Being the supreme law of the land, it guarantees equal rights to 
all. 
 
5.3.2.1 Control 
 
Unlike law under the colonial system, there are not that many pieces of legislation in the post-
colonial period that attempt to exert control over the non-elite.  The Jury Act and the Post Office 
Savings Bank Act, however, are two pieces that blatantly control women’s behaviour.  Under 
the Jury Act, a person is only qualified to be a juror if he is over eighteen years of age, is a 
resident of TT for at least two years or is born in TT, is English literate, and other conditions 
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relating to the ownership of land and minimum clear annual net income.  A married woman, 
notwithstanding these qualification requirements, shall be eligible to be a juror first if her 
husband is qualified to be one and then if she is over eighteen and English literate.  The 
husband is not subject to these restrictions: he qualifies on his own merit.  The intent and 
rationale behind this piece of legislation is not quite clear but is certainly prejudiced.  Why is her 
capacity dependent upon her husband’s? 
 
The Post Office Savings Bank Act provides for the passing of regulations geared towards 
regulating deposits and withdrawals by minors and married women.  Again, there is no such 
restriction on men, married or unmarried.  It is important to note at this point the similar 
classification of minors and women.  This occurs in many pieces of legislation and also lumps 
into the category those of sub-normal mental capacity bringing into question the capacity of 
women to act as full adults. 
 
5.3.2.2 Benevolence 
 
Laws falling into this category seem to seek to protect women’s physical integrity and maternity 
rights or ensure that they are provided for financially in the event of the death or physical 
incapacitation of the male breadwinner.  The Offences Against the Person Act and the Sexual 
Offences Act are both meant to protect the sexual integrity of women and young girls.  The first 
seeks to protect against the carnal knowledge of a minor, incest, prostitution, rape (including 
marital rape), and wilful miscarriage.  In addition to dealing with rape, incest and prostitution, the 
Sexual Offences Act is of particular interest as it attempts to criminalise sex with minors outside 
of a marital relationship as opposed to simply referring to it as unlawful carnal knowledge as is 
done under the Offences Against the Person Act .   
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Some laws ensure that where a female must physically interact with another that that other will 
be female.  The Customs Act and the Military Training (Prohibition) Act both state that a female 
shall not be searched except by a female.  The Police Service Regulations make special 
provisions for female prisoners – they are only to be entrusted into the custody of a Police 
Matron, kept in women only cells, and searched by the Police Matron or a woman police officer. 
 
Labour laws tend to be quite protective of women and pay special attention to maternity issues.  
The Maternity Protection Act was passed in 1998 to deal with employers’ abuses of pregnant 
employees.  It specifically provides in Section 7 that, subject to certain conditions, an employee 
is entitled to (a) leave of absence for the purpose of maternity leave; (b) pay while on maternity 
leave; (c) resume work after such leave on terms no less favourable than were enjoyed by her 
immediately prior to her leave.  Certain state bodies, such as the civil service (Civil Service 
Regulations, teaching service (Education (Teaching Service) Regulations), fire service (Fire 
Service (Terms and Conditions of Employment) Regulations), and police service (The Police 
Service Regulations), provide for maternity issues.  The government also decided to protect the 
maternity rights of certain minimum wage earners through industry specific legislation: Minimum 
Wages (Catering Industry) Order, Minimum Wages (Household Assistants) Order, Minimum 
Wages (Security Industry Employees) Order, and Minimum Wages (Shop Assistants) Order. 
 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act ensures that pregnant women do not expose their 
unborn children to any unnecessary harm at the workplace.  The Act also ensures a pregnant 
woman’s employer shall offer her suitable, alternative employment on terms and conditions that 
are no less favourable than her ordinary terms and conditions of work where she is required to 
perform work that poses a danger to her safety or health or that of her child.  Employers are 
also required to establish separate washing facilities, sanitary conveniences and locker rooms 
for both sexes.  The Shop (Hours of Opening and Employment) Act ensures that female shop 
assistants are provided with seats.  The Workmen’s Compensation Act makes financial 
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provisions for any dependant female, married or unmarried, in the event of her husband’s 
incapacitation or death.  The Private Hospital Regulations state that where male and female 
patients are accommodated on the same floor of the hospital, there shall be separate water 
closets and wash basins for both sexes. 
 
There are many pieces of legislation that seek to ensure that women are well taken care of in 
the event of her husband’s incapacitation or death.  The Airports Authority Act, Chaguaramas 
Development Authority Act, Management Development Centre Act, National Carnival 
Commission of Trinidad and Tobago Act all state that pension schemes will “grant gratuities, 
pensions or superannuation allowances to, or to the widows, families or dependants” of its 
officers and employees.  The Pensions Act, Teachers’ Pensions Act, Police Service Act, Fire 
Service Act all make pension provisions for widows on condition that she is “unmarried and of 
good character”.  This is important to note as there are no pension provisions for widowers as it 
would appear that he was assumed to be the provider in any event.  While the Interpretation Act 
states that references to persons or male persons include references to male and female 
persons, it is not clear that these pieces of legislation necessarily or primarily catered for adult 
male dependants.  Given the historical evolution of society, it would be easy to infer that such 
legislative clauses were meant to ensure that female dependants and families would be taken 
care of in the event of the untimely passing of the male income earner.  This is further and 
specifically exemplified by the Widows’ and Orphans’ Pensions Act.  Provisions are made for 
women and children but there is no corresponding act for widowers and orphans, as it is 
understood that men can provide for themselves and their dependants.  This, of course, also 
reflects the way that society evolved, where women tended to be the homemaker and the 
husbands the breadwinners.  While this situation does not apply as strictly today, there is no 
corresponding evolution of or amendments to the laws in force.   
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The Supplemental Police Regulations, made pursuant to Section 12 of the Supplemental Police 
Act states that”[f]emales, lunatics and young children shall never be handcuffed”.  As mentioned 
in section 5.3.2.1, this brings into question the ability of women to act in their full capacity as 
adults.  While is it all well and good that women are not perceived as enough of a threat to have 
to be handcuffed and can therefore be treated with greater leniency than men, this certainly is 
an undesirable way of classifying women. 
 
5.3.2.3 Inequality 
5.3.2.3.1 Positive Inequality 
 
Laws reflecting positive inequality vest rights in the elite.  Issues of paternity are covered by this 
category.  The Births and Deaths Registration Act vests the right in a father of a child born out of 
wedlock not to have his name entered as the father unless he so desires.  The Industrial 
Training Act vests a preferential right in fathers over mothers to decide whether their child 
between the ages of thirteen and eighteen may be taken in as an apprentice.  Paternity leave 
has now been legislated by two state bodies: the fire service (Fire Service (Terms and 
Conditions of Employment) Regulations), and the police service (The Police Service 
Regulations).  If the officer can prove that the child was born to him, he will be allowed three 
days paternity leave. 
 
The Deceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act and the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 
provide other examples of the elitist nature of some of the laws.  The first law validates the 
marriage between a man and his sister-in-law but there is no corresponding provision or 
separate law to validate the marriage between a woman and her brother-in-law.  Why this law 
was necessary in the first instance is unclear, as the degrees of familial separation are 
delineated by blood relationships.  The second law renders a marriage voidable where at the 
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time of the marriage the respondent was pregnant by some other than the petitioner.  Again, 
there is no corresponding provision or separate law making marriage voidable on the part of a 
woman where her husband has had children in previous relationships or is having a child with 
another. 
 
5.3.2.3.2 Negative Inequality 
 
Legislation in this category creates liabilities in the non-elite.  There are three pieces of 
legislation which legalise earlier ages at which members of the respective faiths shall be 
capable of contracting marriage.  Under the Hindu Marriage Act the girl can be fourteen and the 
boy eighteen; under the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act the girl can be as young as twelve 
and the boy sixteen; and the Orisas, under the Orisa Marriage Act, allow girls of sixteen and 
boys of eighteen to marry.  This means that young girls may be taken out of school and 
generally be disallowed to fully mature before entering into a marriage while boys are allowed to 
finish school.   
 
Women risk having their appointments terminated in cases where they are married and their 
family obligations are deemed to be affecting their performance at work pursuant to the Public 
Service Commission Regulations and the Police Service Commission Regulations.  It is 
important to note here that these regulations are made pursuant to the Constitution which, while 
conferring equal rights on all,620 seems at the same time to place a disproportionate burden on 
women to perform at work and in the home.  It would therefore appear unseemly that the 
supreme law of the land should create unequal rights between the sexes for whatever reason.  
The Statutory Authorities’ Service Commission Regulations, though not a constitutional 
derivative, also contains a similar provision. 
 
                                               
620
 See more below in section 5.3.2.4.4 on the Constitution. 
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5.3.2.4 Equality 
5.3.2.4.1 False Equality 
 
False equality is a characteristic of legislation that appears to confer equality on both sexes but 
on closer examination is elitist.  The Socially Displaced Persons Act, No. 59 of 2000 is one such 
act.  This Act is meant to provide for the assessment, care and rehabilitation of socially 
displaced persons specifically through the establishment of a Socially Displaced Persons 
Unit.  While this is commendable in itself, the Act does not take into account the specific 
social and security needs of women.  Lumping women together with men in this instance can 
have the potential of not only creating unsafe situations but providing inappropriate or ill-
equipped facilities for women.  Moreover, Section 8 provides for the establishment of a 
Social Displacement Board of 12 members but there is no requirement that any of these 
members be female.  It is questionable whether a board comprising only men would be 
sensitive to the needs of the socially displaced woman. 
 
5.3.2.4.2 Inverse Equality 
 
This section is meant to deal with laws that confer rights on the non-elite that are not enjoyed by 
the elite, hence the term “inverse equality”.  It is presumed here that rights enjoyed by men are 
the standard by which enjoyment of equality of rights will be measured and any rights conferred 
on women only will be necessarily inverse.  Admittedly, these are few but deserving of mention. 
 
The Criminal Law Act allows women to claim as a defence for any offence apart from treason 
and murder that she committed said offence in the presence of and under the coercion of her 
husband.  Similarly, under the Criminal Procedure Act a woman can claim diminished capacity 
where she wilfully causes the death of her child under twelve months old.  She will be found 
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guilty of the lesser charge of infanticide and not murder.  Under the Matrimonial Proceedings 
and Property Act the Court may order costs against the wife only if she owns separate property.  
These are not rights similarly enjoyed by men.  
 
5.3.2.4.3 Restorative Equality 
 
Restorative equality creates equal rights for men and women through three main means.  Such 
laws create rights for women where women did not previously enjoy such rights or have such 
rights conferred on them (maternity benefits);  they convey rights to achieve gender neutrality 
(such as seen in the Cohabitational Relationships Act); and non-gender distinctiveness 
(Domestic Violence Act). 
 
i. General Equality 
The Registration of Clubs (Amendment) Act and the Theatres and Dance Halls (Amendment) 
Act both specifically prohibit, inter alia, gender discrimination on the premises by the owner or 
occupier and are the only two pieces of legislation to do so.  The Equal Opportunity Act deals 
with discrimination in employment but makes distinctions with respect to the physical biological 
differences between men and women.  Very importantly, though, it does not seem to construe 
rights associated with childbirth to be differential rights or ones for which men should be 
accorded any special reciprocal rights.  As per Section 20, “It is not a contravention of this Act 
for a person to grant to a woman rights or privileges in connection with pregnancy or childbirth”. 
 
Other pieces of legislation retain in married women their capacity as equal legal individuals to 
execute deeds (Conveyancing and Law of Property Ordinance and Real Property Ordinance); 
to determine settlement issues (Income Tax Act); to enter into contracts, own and sell property, 
sue and be sued and be subject to the law relating to bankruptcy and to the enforcement of 
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judgments and orders (Married Persons Act); and to have their property used as collateral 
against them (Remedies of Creditors Act), as would any man. 
 
ii. Newly Conferred Rights 
Maternity benefits have been legislated to ensure that pregnant women and new mothers are 
not taken advantage of by their employers.  As with the Equal Opportunity Act, conferring 
maternity benefits should not be seen as a right to be reciprocated to men as the physical 
biological/reproductive differences between men and women are real.  The importance of 
legislating maternity benefits should not be trivialised through attempting to confer a reciprocal 
right on men, basic paternity benefits aside.   
 
iii. Gender neutrality 
Equality here deals not only with inter-gender equality but also intra-gender equality.  Intra-
gender equality implies that there is inequality between women.  Many couples in TT have not 
formally legalised their relationships and live in “common law marriages”.  This meant that 
women who practiced this type of relationship had no recourse in law when her significant other 
died or the relationship ended, as rights to property and maintenance required that there be a 
legal relationship instituted between them.  It was only a married woman who could successfully 
(and legally) claim title to her husband’s property.  The enactment of the Cohabitational 
Relationships Act, No. 30 of 1998 changed this, where a cohabitational relationship means “the 
relationship between cohabitants, who not being married to each other are living or have lived 
together as husband and wife on a bona fide domestic basis”.  While a woman in a 
cohabitational relationship may make a claim with regard to property, this right was fettered by 
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the right, title, interest or claim of a legal spouse.  This Act now gives women in cohabitational 
relationships entitlement to estate and the right to contest wills.621 
 
Some laws written or amended in the last ten to fifteen years tend towards the use of gender 
neutral terms such as “spouse” and in defining “relative” include husband and wife.  The Judges 
Salaries and Pensions Act, Prime Minister’s Pension Act, President’s Emoluments Act, are the 
only three acts that make very clear that any reference to “widow” includes a reference to 
“widower” thereby ensuring that men receive financial entitlements as well.  The Administration 
of Estates Ordinance, as amended by the Distribution of Estates Act, No. 28 of 2000 makes 
provision for either spouse to inherit property from his/her deceased spouse.  The National 
Insurance Act and National Insurance (Benefits) Regulations both make provisions for either 
spouse.  These are in direct opposition to the various pension acts discussed in section 5.3.2.2 
above where only women were the intended beneficiaries.   
 
Laws such as the Caribbean Aviation Training Institute, Caribbean Community Act, Immigration 
(Caribbean Community Skilled Nationals) Act confer diplomatic privileges on its employees and 
by extension, spouses and families of such employees during travel and work abroad.   
 
Some pieces of legislation deal with the collection of information through surveys.  One such act 
is the Counting Unremunerated Work Act which is meant to provide for the execution of surveys 
of people performing unremunerated work.  Housework and childcare, inter alia, are generally 
unremunerated and it is primarily women who have the responsibility for providing these 
services.  The Statistics (Surveys of Industrial or Business Undertakings) Regulations requires 
that persons engaged in business or industrial undertakings record information such as wages 
and salaries paid distinguishing amounts paid to males and females separately. 
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 See Rohandra John [online], “How common-law wives came into their own”, Sunday Express, 22 
January 2006. [cited 21 August 2006].  Available from Internet at: 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=130196924 
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iv. Non-gender distinctiveness 
The Domestic Violence Act, which was passed in 1999, recognised the grave social problems 
facing couples and families and added a new component to regulating male-female and parent-
child relationships.  The various facets of domestic violence are covered by the Act and include 
not only physical abuse, but also emotional or psychological abuse, financial abuse and sexual 
abuse.  The objects of this Act are to provide immediate injunctive relief to victims of domestic 
violence; and ensure a prompt and just legal remedy for victims of domestic violence.  In 
addition, this Act seems to have taken on a gender neutral character which does not take 
into account the fact that many of the victims are actually women.  This is not to say that men 
are not victims as well, but the majority of victims are women and this Act was perhaps 
intended to address the abuse suffered by women.  In writing the Act in this way, it perhaps 
detracts from the original intent of the Act. 
 
5.3.2.4.4 Constitutional Equality 
The Constitution introduces a new sub-category under equality as there was no Constitution 
during the colonial era.  It is interesting to note what obtains internationally as Constitutions and 
Bills of Rights confer equality and a variety of special rights to women in various permutations.  
Figure 5.5 below shows eight different categories of rights that affect women either directly or 
indirectly.622  Of just over 190 instruments reviewed, 155 guaranteed women equality before the 
law while 154 offered gender equality, creating two separate categories of equality.  The former 
recognises men and women as equal legal subjects before the law while the latter specifically 
states that women shall have equal rights with men (using men as the standard) or that men 
and women shall have equal rights.  Women have the constitutional right to equality at work in 
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 Appendix B at page 344 provides a full table showing the rights that various countries confer on 
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38 countries and equal pay for equal work in 67.  Maternity rights are constitutionally 
guaranteed in 44 countries and women have the right to be considered for promotion in 6.  In 
just 13 countries, women are afforded the protection of the constitution against domestic 
violence while 35 instruments provide for affirmative action.  
 
Figure 5.5 International Constitutional/Bill of Rights Provisions relating to Equality and Specific 
Women’s Rights  
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The Constitution of TT is one of the 155 that confers on women the right of equality before the 
law - it is the only one of the eight constitutional rights mentioned that it confers.  It enshrines the 
notion of sexual equality with regard to the four fundamental rights it confers on the citizenry of 
TT.  Section 4(a), in particular, guarantees the right of the individual to life, liberty and security of 
the person, while Sections 4(b) and (d) ensure the right of the individual to equality before the 
law and equality of treatment from any public authority in the exercise of its functions in such a 
capacity.  It is interesting to note that these stated rights to equality do not guarantee general 
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sexual equality, such as equality between men and women at the workplace.  Inferring general 
gender equality from the Constitution may prove tricky, given the specifics of Section 4.   
 
It should follow, therefore, that, even though sexual equality at the workplace is not specifically 
guaranteed by the Constitution, women will be treated fairly, in terms of being considered for 
managerial positions and paid the same salary as male counterparts who are similarly qualified.  
This is certainly not what obtains in TT, as professional women in industry face patent 
discrimination with regard to both promotions and salaries.  There has been no response from 
the State in this regard, but this may also be partly due to the fact that these women tend to 
remain quiet about this discrimination for fear of further discrimination in an already hostile and 
male-dominated environment. 
 
Equally, women should not have to live in fear for their lives of their violent partners, as they are 
afforded the constitutional guarantee of protection by the State not only from external threats but 
also from abuse by public authorities or other citizens.623  The right to security of person can 
only be understood in conjunction with the rights to life and liberty.  TT does not offer an explicit 
constitutional guarantee of protection against domestic violence; however, according to the 
argument made by the Human Rights Commission of New Zealand, the scourge of domestic 
violence is clearly unconstitutional, as the right to life, liberty and security of person should 
necessarily encompass domestic violence.  Domestic violence deprives women of their right to 
security of person and life when they are battered and killed.  Section 4(a) is clearly breached 
on a regular basis largely by unconstrained violent male partners with little or no real response 
from the State.  The State in fact recognises the apathy that is met by victims of domestic 
violence who attempt to seek help from those with the legal responsibility to do so.   
Unfortunately, many of these cases end in the gruesome death of the female partner and in the 
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 Human Rights Commission [online], “Human Rights in New Zealand Today”. [accessed 12 
February 2006].  Available from Internet: http://www.hrc.co.nz/report/chapters/chapter07/life01.html.  
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presence of their children.  There are also instances where women react violently and take the 
life of the abuser. 
 
During the period May 2006 – January 2007, three women, all victims of sustained domestic 
violence, were found guilty of the manslaughter of their husbands.  Hillary Narine (03 May 
2006), Cecilia Brown-Bedeau (05 May 2006), and Stephanie Bailey (17 January 2007) were all 
found to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome, the Court thereby recognising the 
scourge of domestic violence and the fact that it seems to be worsening with women taking 
matters into their own hands.  It is interesting to note that all these cases were heard before the 
same judge, Anthony Carmona, who in each instance made the statement that while “women 
are under siege in T&T”,624 “violent behaviour should not be an avenue open to women…to 
empower themselves”.625  He also recognised the institutional deficiencies through their officials 
who acted as abettors to the crime.  He admitted that the Police Service sometimes ignores 
women’s calls for help when they are abused and said, “The police are far too laid back and this 
could lead to mayhem in the home”.626 
 
5.3.3 Case Law and Gender in the Post-Colonial Era  
 
While this chapter deals largely with the bias found in statutory law, it is instructive to note what 
obtains in case law.  Decisions seem generally to be taken on the basis of the facts presented 
before the Court and therefore there appears to be little or no bias as decisions vary according 
to the peculiar circumstances surrounding each case.  A review of relevant cases from 1983 to 
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2007 revealed six major cases in which women committed the offence of murder and attempted 
to enter the specific plea of diminished responsibility due to “Battered Woman Syndrome” as a 
defence.  In 1999, in the landmark case of Indravani Ramjattan v The State, CrA. No. 59 of 
1995, the Appellant, Indravani Ramjattan, was able to successfully claim Battered Woman 
Syndrome as a defence for having arranged to have her common-law husband killed, reflecting 
the characteristic of inverse equality as discussed above given that men cannot claim this.  
Battered Woman Syndrome was only five years prior classified as a mental disease in England 
(and as much as nine years in Canada) although it was recognised as early as the early 
seventies as a possible effect of prolonged physical abuse in the context of domestic killings.627  
It would appear that Indravani was a victim of physical abuse from childhood and was forced 
into a marriage at age seventeen with a man eighteen years her senior who began abusing her 
three years into the relationship when he discovered that she visited her mother against his will.  
The abuse became increasingly worse with threats to her life and those of her children.  She 
eventually left to live with another man but was forcibly taken back home where she was beaten 
unconscious.  It was this man and his friend who eventually carried out the killing of her 
husband. 
 
In the cases of Angela Ramdeen v The State, CrA. No. 33 of 1997 and Kenrick London and 
Chandrouti London v The State, Cr. App. Nos. 31 & 32 of 2002 both women, accused of 
murder, attempted to enter the plea of diminished responsibility due to battered woman 
syndrome. While they both failed, each woman had her death sentence commuted to one of life 
imprisonment due to a Privy Council ruling in Charles Matthew v The State, Privy Council 
Appeal No. 12 of 2004 which ordered that “the sentence of death imposed on those persons 
awaiting execution pending the determination of Matthew be set aside and, in its place, their 
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 See Warner J.A., Indravani Ramjattan vs The State, CrA. No. 59 of 1995 at p. 4. 
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Lordships directed that a sentence of life imprisonment be imposed on such persons”.628  In 
Giselle Stafford and Dave Carter v The State, Cr. App. No. 88 & 91 of 1996, both Appellants 
were guilty of murder and sentenced to death.  There was no claim of diminished responsibility 
and in this case Stafford was sentenced in the same manner as Carter. 
 
Men seem to have it much easier than women in claiming diminished responsibility for the 
murder of their significant female other.  It would appear that the defence of diminished 
responsibility in the form of “provocation” is less difficult to prove than battered woman 
syndrome.  There are many instances of men found guilty of the murder of their wives/common-
law wives and were able to successfully claim provocation and receive a more lenient sentence.  
In Junior Colin Nicome v The State, CrA. No. 83 of 1999, Ashton Lee v The State, CrA. No. 73 
of 2001, Foster Serrette v The State, CrA. No 40 of 2001 and Ramnath Harrilal v The State, 
CrA. No. 46 of 1996, all four men were found guilty of the murder of their common-law wives, 
the first three claiming provocation and the last one claiming diminished responsibility as a 
defence.  In the provocation cases, all men were jilted (in their minds, perhaps, cuckolded) 
lovers and appeared to react in this fatal manner.  Important here is the fact that in TT, many 
men have multiple female partners while it is less common for women to behave in the same 
way.  In any event, women tend to be accepting of this state of affairs and accommodate men’s 
behaviour.  Men, on the other hand, seem to always jealously safeguard their women and seem 
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unable to exercise restraint on rejection and perhaps, as an issue of pride, react violently.629  
This is in no way meant to justify their behaviour regardless of the provocation claimed but 
remains a sad reality of the socio-cultural evolution of this society.  The judges make it very 
clear that this type of behaviour is unacceptable,630 yet still take into account the extenuating 
circumstances and allow the plea of diminished responsibility.  Unfortunately, while it is 
expected that men would behave in this atrocious manner, women are expected to be tolerant.  
Why this seeming leniency?  Is it that the elite are privy to positive inequality features even in 
case law? 
 
An interesting development in case law deals with the issue of the common-law wife.  While the 
Cohabitational Relationships Act formally vests the right in a woman to make a claim for 
maintenance or with regard to a man’s estate on his death, it would appear that, prior to the 
passing of this Act, judges have recognised the legal plight of the common-law wife and saw it 
fit to recognise that they too have rights.  Sharma J., as he then was, recognised the common-
law relationship as “a voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others” and in so doing acknowledged “the role of the common law wife in society” and the fact 
that “she too, like the married woman also has rights”,631 thereby conferring intra-gender 
equality on the two classes of women.  This point was taken up in Marjorie Gould v Lenore 
Bridgelal, H.C.A. No. S-142 of 1982 where the Defendant attempted to claim her right as the 
common-law wife against the rights of the lawful wife.  Although edifying in its explanations, the 
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judge found that, according to the facts, the Defendant did not meet the criteria of being a 
common-law wife but that of a mistress and therefore not entitled to her claims.   
 
There are many cases of the common-law wife seeking money and property from her husband 
and in many cases it was found that, again, decisions were based on the facts presented, 
eligibility requirements depending on the statute(s) used to seek redress, and any perceived 
intention to build a life together / jointly own property in question.  Women were generally the 
petitioner, they were generally financially dependent on their husbands, and awards were 
generally made based on the impecunious state of the women and the fact of her contribution to 
home-making and/or any financial contributions she may have made.632  In cases where the 
facts of the case indicate that there was no intention to share property or that contributions on 
the part of the petitioner were inadequate, her claim would be unsuccessful.633 
 
Much like murder charges, claims for maintenance between legally married couples abound.  
Yet again, the decisions taken appear to be based on the facts presented, truthfulness of the 
accounts presented, statutory eligibility requirements, quality of life to which the spouses are 
accustomed, and contributions by both parties to the life shared.634  The awards seem to be fair 
and also take into account periods of pre-marital cohabitation.635 
 
In what must be another landmark case, Josine Johnson and Yuclan Balwant v The Attorney 
General of Trinidad and Tobago, H.C.A. No. S-2142 of 2004, the Appellants attempted to argue 
that the regulations dealing with married women, their family obligations and the effect of these 
on their performance at work in both the Police Service Commission Regulations (made 
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pursuant to the Constitution) and the Statutory Authorities’ Service Commission Regulations are 
not only unconstitutional in their discrimination against women but also “failed to give equal 
treatment in law of against married and unmarried female public servants”.636  This case brings 
into question the issue of intra-gender equality as these regulations obviously do not take into 
consideration the common-law wife with family obligations.  Unfortunately, the action failed and 
the Appellants were unable to make their claim of constitutional discrimination against women. 
 
5.4 Domestic Legislation: A Simple Case of Replacement of the Elite? 
 
The statutory legal framework for gender seems very much to reflect an elitist attitude on the 
part of those responsible for creating and enacting the various pieces of legislation.  This is 
certainly in keeping with what obtained during the colonial period where laws were enacted to 
serve the interest of the elite in one way or another.  Some 150 pieces of legislation have been 
cited as having some significant reference to gender; yet, when analysed, they do not lend 
themselves to the creation of a legal framework that accommodates gender equality in a real 
manner.  This is directly attributable to the fact that the male elite responsible for enacting 
legislation does not take into account the particular needs of women.  Even specific attempts to 
create equality in law seem to work against women, as laws written with gender neutrality in 
mind, such as the Domestic Violence Act, seem to detract from the importance of the scourge it 
is attempting to prevent.  One important and positive effect, however, was the creation of 
legislation to protect women’s maternity rights.  Moreover, conferring maternity rights has not 
appeared to create a desire by men to have an equal and reciprocal right, which, if done, would 
perhaps trivialise the importance of biological and reproductive differences between men and 
women. 
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In order to fully appreciate the place of gender in national legislation in Trinidad and Tobago, it is 
necessary to identify a specific area of gender concern and review its treatment within the 
analytical framework of feminist legal theory.  Chapter six will examine domestic violence and its 
specific treatment in statutory law as a case study to illustrate TT’s domestic commitment 
towards promoting women’s human rights, namely the right of a woman to equal protection of 
the law and security of person.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.0 Trinidad and Tobago and Domestic Violence: The Specific Legislative Response 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Prevention of domestic violence is in fact specifically legislated in TT by the Domestic Violence 
Act.  As part of the empirical analysis of gender bias in the law, chapter five examined generally 
the place of gender and gender equality in the legal regime of Trinidad and Tobago.  The 
findings of chapter five suggest that in contemporary TT the bias in favour of the colonial elite 
has now been replaced by a male elite where women constitute the prejudiced portion of the 
population.  It is necessary to examine this principle against the backdrop of a specific area of 
gender concern, that is, domestic violence.     
 
Domestic violence is the area chosen for an examination of gender bias in TT, thus the case 
study starts with a review of the primary piece of legislation that underpins the legal regime for 
addressing domestic violence, namely the Domestic Violence Act, No. 27 of 1999 (“Domestic 
Violence Act”). 
 
6.2 Effectiveness of the Domestic Violence Act  
 
Hailed by many as a comprehensive piece of legislation, the Domestic Violence Act appears to 
work better in theory than in practice and seems to have many gaps that hinder its effectiveness 
as a mechanism for safeguarding women from domestic violence.  This analysis takes the 
format of an excerpt from the Domestic Violence Act followed by a commentary. 
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Preamble “Whereas incidents of domestic violence continue to occur with alarming 
frequency and deadly consequences” 
 
The Domestic Violence Act starts with a clear recognition by the Government of TT that 
domestic violence is a major social ill.  The preamble of the Domestic Violence Act fully 
illustrates the perception of the State as to the seriousness of domestic violence. 
 
6.2.1 The Prompt and Equitable Response   
 
Preamble: “And Whereas the Government is of the view that one way to achieve these 
goals is to strengthen legislation to ensure a prompt and equitable legal remedy for 
victims of domestic violence…”  
 
2. The objects of the Act are inter alia to – 
 (a) provide immediate injunctive relief to victims of domestic violence; and 
 (b) ensure a prompt and just legal remedy for victims of domestic violence. 
 
With respect to the “promptness” of the legal remedy, while women637 can in fact obtain 
immediate injunctive relief in the form of a protection order, this piece of paper cannot in reality 
stop the abuser from abusing.  A protection order can even further inflame the situation and, 
unless the woman has somewhere she can seek refuge, her life may be in imminent danger.  
There needs to be some sort of State response to provide shelter to these women and their 
children as many of the shelters that do provide a haven for victims of domestic violence have 
restrictions on the age and sex of children that can stay as described in chapter seven.  
 
The “equitableness” of the legal remedy creates another issue.  While the Domestic Violence 
Act is meant to protect the abused, caution must be exercised in terms of the remedies offered 
against the abuser.  The Domestic Violence Act fails to address the psychological fallout of the 
protection orders on the psyche of the fragile male ego which probably led to the situation in the 
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first place.  He may feel emasculated and seek to intentionally hurt or kill the one who is meant 
to be protected.   
 
6.2.2 The Domestic Violence Act and Women’s Constitutional Right  
 
1.(2) “The Act shall have effect even though inconsistent with sections 4 and 5 of the 
Constitution”.  
 
Section 4(c) of the Constitution recognises the right of the individual to respect for his private 
and family life while section 5 deals with the abrogation, abridgment or infringement by any 
other law of any rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The right to respect for 
private and family life forms the crux of the public/private divide and, as seen here, even forms 
part of the supreme law of the land.  In the case of male violence against women, does this 
mean therefore that the State reserves the right to ignore what takes place in private simply 
because it occurs in private?  This cannot be as section 4(a) of the Constitution confers upon an 
individual the right to “life, liberty and security of the person”.  Women facing domestic violence 
in the home do not appear to enjoy the benefit of this right nor do they seem to have this right 
enforced.  Why, therefore, should the Domestic Violence Act be seen as inconsistent with 
section 4 of the Constitution?  Why should it be seen to “abrogate, abridge or infringe” the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of those (abusers) who take the liberty to 
adversely affect the Constitutional rights of others (abused)?  The Domestic Violence Act, of 
necessity, enters the realm of the private.  Is it that section 4(c) is seen to take precedence over 
section 4(a)?  Such an interpretation would be ludicrous and unacceptable.  Women, as 
individuals under the Constitution, should be entitled to feel safe in their homes and have the 
protection of the State where their homes (metaphorically speaking, as domestic violence takes 
place in public as well) become the site violence against them.  Protection against domestic 
 199
violence should therefore be an inferred constitutional guarantee for individuals so threatened, 
as they are in fact guaranteed the right to “life, liberty and security of the person” by the State. 
 
6.2.3 Responsibility of Independent Parties to Seek Protection Orders On Behalf of 
Victims  
 
4. (4) A police officer, probation officer or approved social worker may apply for a 
Protection Order on behalf of -  
(a) any person referred to in subsection (2); or 
(b) a person or child who is in a residential institution. 
 
In many instances, the victims themselves are unwilling to take the matter any further and 
according to the construction of this section, there is no obligation on the police officer, 
probation officer or social worker to apply for the order as the Domestic Violence Act employs 
discretionary language with respect to Section 4(4).  While the section was not meant to be 
interpreted this way but simply to add to the list of people eligible to apply for a protection order, 
should there, in fact, be an obligation on the part of someone in such a position to do so, 
especially in a case of clear and present danger?  While they can refer the victim to a shelter as 
a temporary safety measure, is that enough?  Should proactivity dictate that more be done?  
There is nothing in section four as a whole that suggests that orders must always be voluntary 
on the part of the victim.  Allowance should be made of involuntary orders as well. 
 
6.2.4 Legislative Discretion to Grant Protection Orders 
 
5. (1) Where, on an application made by a person described in section 4, the Court 
determines, on a balance of probabilities, that domestic violence has occurred, it may 
issue a Protection Order containing any or all of the prohibitions or directions referred to 
in section 6. 
(2) The Court shall grant a Protection Order where it is satisfied that the respondent— 
(a) is engaging in or has engaged in domestic violence against the applicant; or 
(b) is likely to engage in conduct that would constitute domestic violence, 
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and in either case, having regard to all the circumstances, the Order is necessary for the 
protection of the applicant. 
 
Sub-section 1 suggests that the Court need not issue a protection order even where it 
determines that domestic violence has occurred, but why should it not?  The Court should adopt 
a pre-emptive approach to domestic violence given the recognition above of the “alarming 
frequency and deadly consequences” with which domestic violence occurs.  Moreover, there 
appears to be a conflict between this section and subsection (2)(b) as they both seem to point to 
the need to prevent the abusive situation and should not be dealt with separately and neither 
should one be based on discretion.  To avoid uncertainty in the exercise of any judicial 
discretion, the Domestic Violence Act should have clearly stated the circumstances under which 
domestic violence can be established on a balance of probabilities and yet no Protection Order 
is granted by the Court.  
 
6.2.5 Counselling under the Domestic Violence Act 
 
6. (1) A Protection Order may - 
(c) direct that the respondent - 
(iv) immediately vacate any place or residence for a specified period, whether or not the 
residence is jointly owned or leased by the respondent and the applicant, or solely 
owned or leased by the respondent or the applicant; 
See above on equitableness of legal remedy. 
 
(viii) or applicant or both, receive professional counselling or therapy from any person or 
agency or from a programme which is approved by the Minister in writing. 
25. (3) Where a bond of good behaviour has been entered into under subsection (2) the 
Court may prescribe such additional conditions as follows: 
(a) that the parties receive professional counselling, including family counseling… 
 
Where Section 6(1)(viii) of the Domestic Violence Act says “applicant or both”, does this refer to 
individual sessions, or joint marriage counselling type sessions?  In TT, professional therapy is 
mainly provided by the private sector and this is usually a paid service.  Most victims of 
domestic violence who seek redress under the Domestic Violence Act cannot afford this service 
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and the Domestic Violence Act fails to provide the mechanism for facilitating such access.  The 
Domestic Violence Act does provide for access to programs for counselling approved by the 
Government, but these programs are usually staffed by trained specialists who are trained 
generally in social work and/or psychology.    
 
(4) Where the Court makes an Order which, inter alia, directs the payment of 
compensation under subsection (1)(c)(ii), such compensation shall include, but not be 
limited to - 
 (b) medical and dental expenses… 
 
Where professional counselling or therapy is required, medical expenses here could be 
expanded to include this so that the respondent will be required to pay this cost.  
 
6.2.6 Duration of Protection Orders 
 
(9) A Protection Order may be made for such period as the Court considers necessary 
but shall not exceed three years. 
 
What happens after three years or whatever timeframe the Magistrate sees fit?  Is it that the 
abuser is supposed to have been rehabilitated during this time?  If the abuser was ordered to 
immediately vacate the place, will the abuser now be allowed to return to his home after all this 
time?  If counselling is not ordered for the respondent and/or the applicant, the psychological 
fallout could serve to nullify the original effect and intent of the protection order. 
 
(10) Where the Order contains any prohibitions or directions, the Court may specify 
different periods, none of which shall exceed three years as the period for which each 
prohibition or direction shall remain in force. 
 
Can the abuser then recommence the formerly prohibited action after the period is ended?  
Does the process then recommence, that is, applying for a protection order and obtaining a new 
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order?  The Domestic Violence Act should have provided for the seamless extension of a 
Protection Order beyond the initial three year period where it can be established on a balance of 
probabilities that the acts of domestic violence has continued or is likely to continue after the 
expiration of the Protection Order. 
 
9. (1) In proceedings under this Act the Court may at any time before the taking of 
evidence, accept an Undertaking from the respondent given under oath, that the 
respondent shall not engage in conduct specified in the application or any other conduct 
that constitutes domestic violence. 
(4) An Undertaking remains in force for the period stated in the Undertaking, but shall 
not exceed three years. 
 
Related to the duration of Protection Orders is the duration of Undertakings which is based on 
the three year principle without any indication as to the appropriate course of action after the 
expiration of the three year period. 
  
6.2.7 Hardship under the Domestic Violence Act 
 
7. In determining whether or not to impose one or more of the prohibitions or directions 
specified under section 6, the Court shall have regard to the following: 
(e) the hardship that may be caused as a result of making of the Order; 
 
What hardship, and for whom?  The Domestic Violence Act identifies hardship as a factor to be 
considered in the making of a Protection Order but fails to define how this factor ought to 
operate.  Conceivably, the hardship to the abuser may be considered in terms of exclusion from 
the family home which may be the place of abuse.  Such consideration is perverse as that 
hardship cannot be a factor in the making of a Protection Order to safeguard the lives of those 
at risk.  Another manifestation of the hardship argument is that a woman could be forced into 
accepting a Protection Order that is limited in scope because her financial hardship precludes a 
full Protection Order. 
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6.2.8 The Preservation and Protection of the Institution of Marriage and Other 
Relationships 
 
(g) the need to preserve and protect the institution of marriage and other relationships 
whilst affording protection and assistance to the family as a unit; 
 
How can the need to preserve and protect the institution of marriage and other relationships 
outweigh the need to protect people from domestic violence?  If the domestic violence continues 
and escalates to a fatal end, there will be no marriage to protect or preserve!   
 
6.2.9 In Camera Proceedings  
 
10. Proceedings in respect of an application for a Protection Order shall be held in 
camera unless the Court directs otherwise. 
 
In what instances would it be permissible to hear proceedings for a Protection Order other than 
in camera?  There is a need for guidelines to determine under what circumstances this will be 
allowed. 
 
6.2.10 Date of Hearing of Application for Protection Orders 
 
11. The Clerk shall fix a date for the hearing of the application which shall be no more 
than seven days after the date on which the application is filed. 
 
While there is no provision for hearing life-threatening matters immediately, the clerk has the 
discretion to list the matter for hearing on the same day that the application is filed.  This 
discretion is not always exercised and women who have complained of being in fear for their 
lives still have to wait seven days before the matter is heard.  It would have been of much 
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benefit if the Domestic Violence Act had provided for immediate access to an Interim Protection 
Order on a 24 hour basis. 
 
6.2.11 Non-Service of Summons  
 
(6) Where the hearing of an application is adjourned because the application and the 
notice of proceedings have not been served on the respondent, the time and place fixed 
by the Court for the adjourned hearing, shall be the date, time and place stated in the 
new notice of proceedings. 
 
Service of the application, deemed also to be a summons by subsection (4), seems to be an 
issue.  Pursuant to Section 43(1) of the Summary Courts Act, notice of proceedings for a 
Protection Order is deemed to be a summons and summonses are to be served by police 
officers.  One applicant attended Court on the set date with police escort only to learn that the 
respondent was absent because he never received the summons.  This was not because he 
could not be found but simply because the person to serve it never did so and had no reason for 
not having served it.  Moreover, when such a case is adjourned, the new date is usually two 
weeks from the original date, showing little regard for the welfare of the applicant.  There should 
be a punitive clause to deal with such acts of negligence by those in whose hands women’s 
hope lie. 
 
6.2.12 Dismissal of Application for Protection Order due to Non-Appearance of Applicant 
 
14. If, on the date of the hearing of an application for a Protection Order, the respondent 
appears in Court, but neither the applicant nor the person on whose behalf the 
application is made appears either in person or represented by his attorney-at-law, the 
Court may: 
(b) having received a reasonable excuse for the non-appearance of the applicant or 
other person, adjourn the hearing upon such terms as it deems just; 
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The nature of domestic violence is such that it may not be possible for the applicant to send 
notice of her reasonable excuse for non-appearance.  What happens in the event that on 
presentation of the summons, the applicant is beaten so severely that she has to be 
hospitalised and no one is aware of the situation?  She will be unable to attend Court or give 
notice of her absence.  The right to dismiss a matter for non-appearance should have been 
more carefully circumscribed to cater for situations that are natural to cases of domestic 
violence. 
 
6.2.13 Time of Effect of Protection Order 
 
15. Where the Court proposes to make a Protection Order or an Interim Order, and the 
respondent is before the Court, the Court shall explain to the respondent - 
(a) the purpose, terms and effect of the Order; 
(b) the consequences of failing to comply with the Order; and 
(c) the means by which the Order may be varied or revoked. 
 
It should be clearly stated that upon explanation of the order to the respondent that it takes 
immediate effect.  There is no section that deals with the time of effect of the order and it cannot 
be that the order is only of effect when served on the respondent in hard copy. 
 
16. Where a Protection Order or Interim Order is made or varied by the Court - 
(b) the Court shall cause a copy of the Order to be served on - 
(i) the respondent; 
(ii) any other person to whom the Order is to apply whether or not the person is a party 
to the proceedings; and 
(iii) the police officer in charge of the station located nearest to the area where the 
respondent or applicant resides. 
 
When the Magistrate actually hears the matter, the order of the court is stated in the presence of 
both parties and then reduced to writing.  Accordingly, the time of effect of the Protection Order 
can be deemed to be when stated to the parties; however, the situation is rendered somewhat 
complicated when it is an Interim Protection Order that is being sought.  It would appear that the 
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Interim Protection Order can only be effected on the time of service on the respondent.  Failure 
to serve the order on the respondent renders the order unenforceable.  Moreover, in the event 
of a breach of the order, the police will have no power to arrest the offender.   
 
17. (1) Where, the Court has not been able to serve notice of proceedings or the Order, 
as the case may be, upon the respondent personally, it may make an Order for 
substituted service of the notice of proceedings or Order, as the case may be. 
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1)(b) “substituted service” means— 
(c) service by advertisement in two daily newspapers which service is deemed to have 
been effected at midnight on the date of the later advertisement, the cost to be borne by 
the applicant… 
 
By virtue of section 17, the Court has wide powers to have substituted service which can be as 
simple as leaving it at the last address of the Respondent.  Under these circumstances, the time 
of effect of the order is not when personally received by the Respondent but when service has 
been made in such manner as deemed appropriate by the Court.   
 
18. A respondent shall not be bound by a Protection Order or Interim Order- 
(a) where he was not present at the time of the making of the Order; or 
(b) where the Order has not been served on him personally or in accordance with 
section 17 (deals with substituted service). 
 
It would appear that Section 18 contradicts Section 8(2) and Section 17 in as much as it would 
appear to only provide for an order to be effective when personally served or when a 
respondent was present at the time of the making of the order.  What, then, is the purpose of 
section 8(2), which allows the Court to make an Interim Order in the respondent’s absence, or 
section 8(5) which allows the Court to extend the period of the Interim Order or substitute such 
an Order with a Protection Order in the respondent’s absence?  Moreover, what is the purpose 
of section 13(a) which allows the Court to “proceed to hear and determine the matter in the 
respondent’s absence”?  In this last instance, however, he must have been served with the 
summons before the Court can proceed.  It is certainly expected that the respondent will be 
served with the Order, but given the difficulty with service, it perhaps makes more sense to have 
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the respondent present in Court when this decision is being made.  There is the possibility that 
the respondent could never be properly served but this must not lead to a defeat of the intent of 
the Act.  There must be some way of ensuring the respondent’s presence or proper service on 
him.  This appears to be covered by section 17 dealing with substituted service which does not 
require personal service.  Fault can therefore actually lie with the Court for unenforceability of an 
order due to not having served the order or having made an order for substituted notice.  What 
remedies exist in the event that an applicant wishes to take action against the Court for 
negligence? 
 
6.2.14 Variation or Revocation of Orders 
 
19. (1) Where an Order is in force, a party to the proceedings in respect of whom the 
Order was made may apply to Court on the Form described as “Form 5” in the Second 
Schedule, for an Order varying or revoking the original Order. 
(2) On an application under subsection (1), the Court may, by Order, vary or revoke the 
Order.  
(3) A copy of an application under this section shall be served on each person who was 
a party to the proceedings in respect of which the original Order was made. 
(4) In determining whether to vary or revoke an Order the Court shall have regard to the 
matters specified in section 7. 
 
There are no guidelines as to the procedure for this.  Should it be inferred that the procedure for 
applying for an order will apply to variation, duration and revocation of orders? 
 
6.2.15 Fines and Penalties 
 
20. (1) Subject to subsection (2) a person against whom an Order has been made and 
who - 
(a) has had notice of the Order; and 
(b) contravenes any provision of the Order or fails to comply with any direction of the 
Court, commits an offence and is liable - 
(i) on a first conviction to a fine not exceeding nine thousand dollars or imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding three months; 
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(ii) on a second conviction to a fine not exceeding fifteen thousand dollars or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding twenty-four months or both; 
(iii) on any subsequent conviction to a period of imprisonment not exceeding five years. 
 
Would/do these fines/penalties have the desired effect of curbing the unwanted behaviour? 
In addition, there should not be standard fines applicable to all offences.  Someone liable for not 
paying maintenance as a first or even recurring offence should not necessarily face the same 
fine as someone causing damage to the applicant’s property.  There should be a schedule 
depending on the severity of the offence with a tiered fine and imprisonment system.  
 
6.2.16 Police Intervention 
 
22. Where a Magistrate is satisfied, by information on oath, that - 
(a) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person on premises has suffered or 
is in imminent danger of physical injury at the hands of another person in a situation 
amounting to domestic violence and needs assistance to deal with or prevent the injury; 
and 
(b) a police officer has been refused permission to enter the premises for the purpose of 
giving assistance to the first mentioned person in paragraph (a), 
the Magistrate may issue a warrant in writing authorising a police officer to enter the 
premises specified in the warrant at any time within twenty-four hours after the issue of 
the warrant and subject to any conditions specified in the warrant, to take such action as 
is necessary to prevent the commission or repetition of the offence or a breach of the 
peace or to protect life or property. 
 
23. (1) For the avoidance of doubt, a police officer may act in accordance with the 
provisions of the Criminal Law Act where he has reasonable cause to believe that a 
person is engaging in or attempting to engage in conduct which amounts to physical 
violence and failure to act immediately may result in serious physical injury or death.  
(3) Where a police officer exercises a power of entry under subsection (1) he shall 
immediately submit a written report to the Commissioner of Police, through the Head of 
the Division where the incident occurred, such report to contain the following 
information: 
(a) the reasons for entering the premises without a warrant; 
(b) the offence being committed or about to be committed; and 
(c) the manner in which the investigation was conducted and the measures taken to 
ensure the protection and safety of the person at risk. 
(4) The report referred to in subsection (3) shall be submitted to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions by the Commissioner of Police within seven days of receiving the report. 
(5) Where a complaint is made against a police officer by a person resident in premises 
alleging that the officer’s entry onto the premises under subsection (1) was unwarranted, 
the Police Complaints Authority shall investigate the complaint and submit a copy of its 
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report to the Commissioner of Police and the Director of Public Prosecutions within 
fourteen days of the complaint having been made. 
(6) Where the investigation of the Police Complaints Authority finds that the entry under 
subsection (1) was unwarranted, the Police Complaints Authority shall also submit the 
report to the Police Service Commission and such report may form the basis of 
disciplinary action against the police officer. 
 
24. Where an Order is in force and a police officer believes on reasonable grounds that 
a person has committed or is committing a breach of the Order he may detain and arrest 
that person without a warrant. 
 
While it is understandable that the time lag in getting the warrant could possibly lead to death of 
the complainant if she does not seek shelter elsewhere, this provision could possibly lead to 
abuse of power despite the series of post-entry protocols that could ultimately lead to 
disciplinary action against the police officer if his actions were found to be unwarranted.  The 
Domestic Violence Act provides an excess of checks and balances to police intervention where 
there is the breach of a Protection Order and this may weigh against the police officer exercising 
discretion to enter premises to protect someone in the absence of a warrant.   
 
6.2.17 Conditions of Bail  
 
27. (2) Notwithstanding the Bail Act, the Court in granting bail, may order that the 
recognisance be subject to such of the following conditions as the Court considers 
appropriate:  
(d) where the defendant continues to reside with the victim that the defendant not enter 
or remain in the place or residence while under the influence of alcohol or a drug. 
 
This section is of particular interest, as many situations involving domestic violence are fuelled 
or enflamed by alcohol and drug use.  This is evidenced by the increase in attendance at the 
various shelters across the country during the festive seasons of Christmas and Carnival 
(generally the period between November/December to February) when drinking to enhance 
merriment and celebrate the seasons is at its greatest.  However, while the aims of the section 
may have been commendable, it may prove difficult to implement.  There are issues such as the 
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level of influence of alcohol which triggers the exclusion from the house.  Is it that the 
respondent must become a teetotaller to be allowed to remain in the house?  What about the 
use of prescriptive and non-prescriptive drugs that can modify behaviour? 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
Gender equality and domestic violence are unwitting partners as women cannot achieve the 
former without first addressing the latter.  With this in mind, domestic violence is dealt with as a 
subset of gender and its treatment in the law provides an indication as to how seriously it is 
taken.  In TT, domestic violence is largely dominated by the abuse of women.  Although data 
with respect to domestic violence is not sex disaggregated, anecdotal evidence and interviews 
(see chapter seven) indicated that the vast majority of orders sought pursuant to the Domestic 
Violence Act are by women.  Legislating a system to deal with domestic violence, therefore, 
should necessarily take these facts into consideration to provide real and effective relief for 
those whom the act was intended to serve.   
 
The Domestic Violence Act was passed with much fanfare.  Heralded as a potent weapon to 
combat abuse of women, it has not quite lived up to such lofty expectations.  The Domestic 
Violence Act contains many deficiencies that undermine its effectiveness.   Looking at the 
Domestic Violence Act through gender lenses, it is clear that TT has created a relatively 
ineffective statutory scheme to combat domestic violence.  Perhaps understandably so, 
considering that the Parliament agenda is controlled by the male governing elite.   
 
Having reviewed the defects in the statutory regime for protection of women from acts of 
domestic violence, it is necessary to examine the institutional framework that also serves as an 
equally important and complementary mechanism for protecting women from abuse.    
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7.0 Trinidad and Tobago and Domestic Violence: The Institutional Response 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Legislatively, there appears to be numerous provisions for women and women’s issues 
generally although there is the overarching issue of the elitist character of the laws favouring 
men and the fact that laws are not always designed to take into account gender specific needs.  
Chapter six explored the specific piece of legislation dealing with domestic violence which 
constitutes the area of concern for the case study on gender and the law in TT.   
 
Despite inadequacies in the legal regime for dealing with domestic violence, the overall 
treatment of the problem of domestic violence at the national level cannot be assessed without 
first understanding the institutional framework within which it must operate.  This chapter 
examines this institutional framework, governmental and non-governmental, focussing on the 
executive and state authorities which illustrate government’s commitment to dealing with 
domestic violence as a reflection of the more general treatment of the gender agenda.   
 
7.2 State Commitment  
 
The commitment of the State to any issue can be measured in terms of budgetary allocations, 
policy formulation, and ministerial responsibilities.  This section illustrates government’s 
commitment to domestic violence using these measures. 
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7.2.1 Financial Investment in Dealing with Domestic Violence 
 
The Public Sector Investment Programme (“PSIP”) is an integral part of the government’s major 
policy documents illustrating its intentions with respect to resource allocation to achieve 
strategic national goals and objectives aimed at stimulating further economic growth, promoting 
sustainable development and enhancing the quality of life for all citizens.638  It is a 
comprehensive instrument of government policy representing its public investment thrust across 
sectors and is meant to deal with high priority investments projects.  Government’s financial 
investment under the PSIP targets areas deemed to be of critical concern.639  If this is indeed 
the case, then reviewing the thrust of government’s financial investment would be of interest to 
help illustrate its commitment to dealing with domestic violence.   
 
As a preliminary point, there is no separate itemisation of Government spending under the 
rubric domestic violence.  Government expenditure on addressing domestic violence is 
generally lumped into expenditure dedicated to community development and social, cultural and 
recreational activities.  Again, it must be noted that even when lumped into expenditure 
dedicated to community development and social, cultural and recreational activities, this is done 
within the broader category of gender.  This situation has arisen because of the fact that gender 
issues are dealt with by a ministry whose portfolio does not deal solely with gender.  The 
following shows government’s commitment to gender through its PSIP for the period 1998-
2006.  
 
In 1998-1999, a total of USD$13.4 million, representing 7.7% of total sectoral allocations, was 
allocated to the Ministries of Social Development and Community Development, Culture and 
                                               
638
 See Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Sector Investment Programme 2005 (Port of Spain, 
Trinidad: Ministry of Planning and Development and Ministry of Finance, 2004), p. 1. 
639
 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Sector Investment Programme 2002 (Port of Spain, 
Trinidad: Ministry of Finance, 2001), p. 3. 
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Women’s Affairs out of a total of USD$62.6 million allocated to the development of social 
infrastructure.640  Expenditure here was dedicated to community centres, halfway houses and 
rehabilitation centres, refurbishment of cultural centres, and upgrading of library services.  There 
is no gender specific expenditure save for projected expenditure of USD$121,000 to complete 
training and outreach programmes in gender affairs and to purchase equipment, furniture, and 
promotional materials.  This was a four year programme and only USD$75,000 for the whole 
programme was financed by the government of Trinidad and Tobago while external funding in 
the sum of USD$400,000 was sourced.641 
 
For 1999-2000, out of USD$113.7 million allocated to the development of social infrastructure, 
the Ministry of Culture and Gender Affairs was allocated USD$2.9 million, a mere 1% of total 
sectoral allocations, half of which was dedicated to the upgrade of library services.642  The 
remaining money was dedicated to the establishment and continuation of refurbishment of 
cultural centres, training for museum staff, and the establishment of a Domestic Violence Unit.  
The government provided USD$167,000 for a Non Traditional Training programme for women 
with an extra USD$357,000 coming from external sources.643 
 
The 2001 PSIP states that a total of USD$2.7 million was allocated to the Ministry of Culture 
and Gender Affairs which was dedicated to the renovation and upgrade of several cultural 
facilities.644  The Non Traditional Training for Women project was allocated USD$158,730 for its 
continuation, representing less than 0.1% of total sectoral allocations for the year on gender 
related expenditure. 
                                               
640
 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Sector Investment Programme 1998/1999 (Port of Spain, 
Trinidad: Ministry of Finance, 1998), pp. 33 and 74. 
641
 See Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Sector Investment Programme 1998/1999, p. 53. 
642
 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Sector Investment Programme 1999/2000 (Port of Spain, 
Trinidad: Ministry of Finance, 1999), p. 39. 
643
 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Sector Investment Programme 1999/2000, p. 57. 
644
 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Sector Investment Programme 2001 (Port of Spain, 
Trinidad: Ministry of Finance, 2000), p. 40. 
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In 2002, the Non Traditional Training for Women project received USD$190,000 for its 
continuation “[i]n keeping with government’s commitment to gender equality and the 
development/empowerment of women in society”.645  In this year, USD$47,619 was allocated to 
the establishment of a centre for the empowerment of young women at risk.646  This expenditure 
amounted to slightly over 0.1% of total sectoral allocations and 0.2% of money allocated to the 
development of social infrastructure. 
 
“The 2003 PSIP has been designed to reflect Government’s effort at initiating the process of 
transforming Trinidad and Tobago into a developed country by 2020”.647  Whether gender 
figures into this development thrust continues to be of interest.  It would appear that the trend 
remains the same.   The Non Traditional Training for Women project was continued, but a dollar 
amount was not specified and was placed under the Community Development Fund 
Programme.  The Ministry of Community Development and Gender Affairs received an 
allocation of USD$634,920 to focus on its programme of construction and refurbishment of 
community centres.648 
 
The Non Traditional Training for Women project was continued in 2004, but again, a dollar 
amount was not specified.649  The Ministry of Community Development and Gender Affairs was 
allocated USD$2.22 million for the construction and refurbishment of community centres across 
                                               
645
 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Sector Investment Programme 2002, p. 41. 
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 It is not clear “at risk” of what. 
647
 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Sector Investment Programme 2003 (Port of Spain, 
Trinidad: Ministry of Planning and Development, 2002), p. 1. 
648
 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Sector Investment Programme 2003, p. 43. 
649
 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Sector Investment Programme 2004 (Port of Spain, 
Trinidad: Ministry of Planning and Development, 2003), pp. 54-55. 
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the country.  Tobago saw the dedication of resources for the construction of a facility for the 
Women’s Federation Headquarters building, but a dollar amount was not specified.650 
 
For 2005, the Ministry of Community Development, Culture and Gender Affairs was allocated 
USD$2.2 million for the preservation of the “national cultural heritage”.651  No specific allocations 
were made for gender related activities.  USD$285,000 was provided for the reconstruction of a 
children’s home and renovation of the Salvation Army Hostel – Josephine Shaw House for 
women.652  It should be noted, however, that under the Community Development Fund, projects 
are implemented under the NGO and CBO Grants Window Programme which focus on women, 
youth, skills training, employment creation and persons with disabilities.653  The specified focus 
including women dates back to 2002.  Projects and programmes recommended for priority 
funding (not funded under core PSIP) for 2005 included major energy industry-related projects, 
industrial development, electricity, and housing.654 
 
“As the Government continues its efforts towards the attainment of developed country status by 
the year 2020, significant resources of USD$51.1 million has been provided to continue the 
upgrade of recreational, community, sport and youth facilities, enhancement of social services 
delivery, and the promotion and conservation of our national culture”.655  This notwithstanding, 
there is no expenditure on gender affairs apart from the Community Development Programme 
project for 2006.  The Social Sector Investment Programme 2007, used to gauge the overall 
annual performance of social sector ministries against the benchmark of the Millennium 
Development Goals since 2003, however, states that USD$317,460 was allocated to the 
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Women in Harmony/Domestic Violence Programme where more than USD$129.7 million in 
total was dedicated to developmental programmes.656 
 
Having reviewed these PSIPs, expenditure is heavily focussed on education, health, roads and 
bridges and administration.  Expenditure in these areas generally account for more than 50% of 
total allocations: 1998/99 - 48.3%; 1999/00 - 52.8%; 2001 - 57.3%; 2002 - 57.6%; 2003 - 56.2%; 
2004 - 59.8%; 2005 - 48.4%; 2006 - 46.7%.  While the focus on health and education are 
welcome, a well balanced population requires emphasis on gender differentials as well.  Even 
where government dedicates resources to gender specific activities, such as the Non Traditional 
Training Programme for Women, it would appear that the project would not have unfolded 
without the assistance of external funding.  This particular project was funded 31.9% by 
government and 68.1% by an IDB Grant. 
 
It is clear that the government expenditure in the area of gender remains miniscule and from the 
spending pattern, expenditure on domestic violence is a small percentage of the already small 
percentage spent on gender.  It is therefore hardly surprising that NGOs, as seen later in this 
chapter, have highlighted the paucity of state funding as a serious obstacle to dealing with 
domestic violence especially with regard to the establishment of the support network to facilitate 
women who may have availed themselves of legislative protection.  Further, chapter six 
identified the absence of adequate legal provisions in the Domestic Violence Act to ensure 
effective and quality psychological assistance to both victims and perpetrators of domestic 
violence, and this no doubt has to do with the lack of financial commitment by the State to 
funding the proper response to incidents of domestic violence.  
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 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Social Sector Investment Programme 2007 (Port of Spain, 
Trinidad: Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 2006), pp. 9 and 67. 
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7.2.2 Gender Policy 
 
The Draft National Gender Policy and Action Plan (“the draft policy”) is the “culmination of three 
decades of planning”.657  The draft policy seeks to “promote gender equity, equality, social 
justice and sustainable human development” through improving the quality of life at all levels of 
society, improving relations between the sexes, and facilitating social and domestic peace and 
reducing levels of violence in society.658  It also seeks to transform inequitable gender relations 
in order to improve women’s status relative to that of men by identifying strategies to facilitate 
new and equitable relations between men and women.  The draft policy is meant to provide 
written commitment by government to guarantee equality of status between the sexes.  It looks 
specifically at prevention and protection in situations of domestic violence by examining briefly 
the passage and use of the 1991 Domestic Violence Act and the situation of shelters.  It also 
briefly looks at the relationship between domestic violence and the judicial process and 
women’s reluctance to avail themselves of it.659  Additionally, the draft policy visits the issue of 
other gender based violence, such as rape/other sexual offences and incest/child abuse.660  
Generally, the draft policy highlights the issue of gender equity, equality, social justice and the 
reduction of violence in society which certainly contemplates domestic violence.   
 
In 2003, the Minister in the Ministry of Community Development, Culture and Gender Affairs 
recognised the importance of formulating a policy on gender.  She recognised the issue of 
discrimination and stated that in line with long term national development there is a “need to 
harness all the resources and…give each person an equal chance and, therefore, the national 
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gender policy is…extremely important”.661  The Honourable Eulalie James also recognised the 
importance of the gender policy as a “major instrument for managing gender relations”.662 
 
 
This policy has still not, however, been approved by government, even though it figures very 
prominently in government’s Draft National Strategic Plan under Gender and Development.663  It 
has proven to be a contentious document due to its recommendation to “review all issues (for 
example legal, medical, religious and/or cultural) relating to the termination of pregnancy” and its 
recognition of people who subscribe to relationships which “appear antithetical to proscribed 
rules of religion and culture”.664  Notwithstanding the apparent favourable position of the ruling 
People’s National Movement on the draft policy, the matter culminated in a major 
pronouncement by the Prime Minister as part of his budget presentation in 2005 that effectively 
dismissed the draft policy.  To quote: 
The Government recognises the need to develop a Gender Policy.  The draft 
Gender Policy Document currently being circulated was not issued by the 
Government and does not reflect Government policy.  In fact, there are certain 
recommendations in the document to which the Government does not and will 
not subscribe.  The Government is therefore requesting that the document 
which purports to be official Government policy be withdrawn from circulation.665 
 
The position of the draft policy as it now exists fully exemplifies the attitude of the male elite that 
has dominated the governance of TT from the colonial period through to the post-independence 
era.  The government has effectively dismantled a policy developed by the Centre for Gender 
and Development Studies with the input of all the major stakeholders and with extensive public 
consultations because of the personal disapprobation of the Prime Minister to the deliberate 
termination of pregnancies and same sex relationships. 
                                               
661
 Senator The Honourable Joan Yuille-Williams, Appropriation Bill (Budget), Senate, Thursday 
October 23, 2003, p. 334. 
662
 The Honourable Eulalie James, Appropriation Bill (Budget), Senate, Friday October 15, 2004, p. 
582. 
663
 See Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Vision 2020: Draft National Strategic 
Plan, pp. 168-172. 
664
 Ministry of Community Development, Draft National Gender Policy, pp. 94 and 81.  
665
 The Honourable Prime Minister Patrick Manning, Budget Presentation 2006, Wednesday 28 
September 2005, p. 25.  Emphasis added. 
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7.2.3 Ministry of Community Development, Culture and Gender Affairs 
 
At the Ministerial level, gender issues fall under the purview of the Gender Affairs Division of the 
Ministry of Community Development, Culture and Gender Affairs.  It would appear that this 
division “has been subject to significant shifts in approach and priorities with changes in 
ministerial location and political administration”.666  The division saw its beginnings in 1974 when 
a National Commission on the Status of Women was appointed.667  In 1986, the Commission 
was replaced by the assignment of ministerial responsibility for Women’s Affairs.668  Later, a 
Women’s Bureau within the then Ministry of Community Development, Culture and Women’s 
Affairs was also established.  The Government signed and ratified the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1991, which mandated the 
Government to develop a National Gender Policy.669  A national focal point for Gender and 
Development, the Women’s Affairs Division (now the Gender Affairs Division) was established 
in 1991 and institutionally strengthened between 1994-1997 with the help of the Inter-American 
Development Bank.  Government sought during this period to expand the Policy Statement on 
Women to a National Gender Policy.     
 
In the post-Beijing period, the name of the division was changed.  In many ways this change 
reflected a heightened emphasis on relational aspects of gender in addition to its original focus 
on women.  Although its activities expanded and entered new areas, the quest to mainstream 
                                               
666
 Ministry of Community Development, Draft National Gender Policy, p. 21. 
667
 Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs, Initial, Second and Third Periodic Report of the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (Port of Spain, Trinidad: Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal 
Affairs, 2000), CEDAW/C/TTO/1-3, p. 25. 
668
 Brief history of the Division taken from Ministry of Community Development, Draft National Gender 
Policy, pp. 17-18. 
669
 Ministry of Community Development, Culture and Gender Affairs [online], “National Gender Policy 
and Action Plan”, 2006. [cited 02 April 2007].  Available from Internet: 
http://www.cdcga.gov.tt/progs/genderpolicy.php. 
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gender within government programming and policy and to develop a clear framework for the 
national intervention did not materialise.  
 
Cabinet agreed in 2000 and a Committee was appointed to develop a National Gender Policy 
which could not be done in the face of limited time and resources.  In 2002, with the support of 
the United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”), and the Canadian International 
Development Agency (“CIDA”), the Government agreed to the development of a National 
Gender Policy and Plan of Action and to execute the strategies identified therein. 
 
The now Gender Affairs Division is meant “to effectively promote gender equity and gender 
equality through the process of gender mainstreaming in all government policies, programmes 
and projects”.670  The division’s strategic objectives are to: 
 Advance the status and rights of women and men.  
 Develop policies/projects relevant to gender specific issues including the elimination of 
all forms of violence against women, the elimination of poverty and the education 
system as it affects males and females.  
 Research and disseminate information on gender specific issues.  
 Change gender discriminatory social consciousness and traditions.  
 Assist in the strengthening of local communities and families.  
 Foster participation of women and men in policy formulating processes.  
 
The Gender Affairs Division has ten main programmes and initiatives designed to address key 
issues:671 
                                               
670
 Ministry of Community Development, Culture and Gender Affairs [online], “About the Gender Affairs 
Division”, 2006. [cited 02 April 2007].  Available from Internet: 
http://www.cdcga.gov.tt/ga/aboutgender.php. 
671
 All taken from Ministry of Community Development, Culture and Gender Affairs [online], “Programmes 
and Initiatives”, 2006. [cited 02 April 2007].  Available from Internet: 
http://www.cdcga.gov.tt/ga/genderprog.php.  
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 The Male Support Programme 
 Defining Masculine Excellence Programme 
 Domestic Violence Unit 
 Domestic Violence Hotline (800-SAVE) 
 Drop In Centres 
 Maloney Resource Drop In Centre 
 Non-Traditional Skills Training Programme For Women 
 Women In Harmony Programme 
 Vision 2020 Through A Gender Lens 
 National Gender Policy and Action Plan Brief 
 
It is necessary now to examine how some of the individual programmes specifically treat with 
domestic violence. 
 
The Male Support Programme  
Although in 1999 the preamble of the Domestic Violence Act recognised the scourge of 
domestic violence, it was only in 2004 that the Male Support Programme was only expanded to 
address the high incidence of domestic violence, including family disputes, incest, behavioural 
problems and other acts of violence against men, women and children. 
 
The Male Programme is critically important to any gender thrust as it engages men in the 
process of creating gender respect and the reduction of domestic violence. 
 
Defining Masculine Excellence Programme 
Many men in society have come to equate masculinity with violence, irresponsibility, 
underachievement as well as physical and emotional absence from the home.  Some men, 
unfortunately seem to have made masculinity synonymous with deviance, violence and abuse 
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of alcohol and drugs, others are often paralyzed by the fear of not measuring up to mainstream 
perceptions of masculinity. 
 
The Defining Masculine Excellence Programme was developed as a means of stemming the 
tide of the societal problems associated with the concept and perceptions of masculinity.  The 
Programme sought to train a cadre of men to support a wider initiative that would involve the 
establishment of support groups for men and the promotion of other initiatives which would be 
used to address the issues previously identified. 
 
The Gender Affairs Division has recognised the need to enhance the strategies to retrain and 
re-educate men through society and to help them to explore the effects that initialised definitions 
of masculinity have had on their emotional and spiritual well-being and the ways in which this 
has impacted the roles they play within the workplace and in their social situations. 
 
Domestic Violence Unit 
The Unit was established in May 1997.  Programmes offered by this Unit include counselling to 
victims of domestic violence, including victims of rape and incest.  The programme also 
provides information and referral services to persons who require assistance to deal with other 
personal and family issues such as drug abuse, anger management, conflict management and 
teenage pregnancy.  In addition, outreach programmes are conducted as a means of preventing 
violence and encouraging the establishment of support groups within the communities. 
 
In conjunction with the domestic violence hotline and the drop-in centres, these programmes are 
meant to: 
 Reduce the levels of gender-based violence in Trinidad and Tobago.  
 Provide a 24 hour toll free Hotline Listening and Referral Service for victims/perpetrators 
of Domestic Violence.  
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 Provide community-based facilities where men, women and children can access help in 
situations of domestic violence.  
 Reduce gender-based violence through the promotion of non-violent forms of conflict 
resolution and active public awareness campaigns.  
 Provide extensive and on-going training for the staff of the Unit, safe-houses, shelters, 
the police, community and church organisations.  
 Actively collect and analyse data and monitor trends in domestic violence.  
 
Domestic Violence Hotline (800-SAVE) 
In August 1996, in response to the escalating incidences of domestic violence, the Government 
of Trinidad and Tobago established the National Domestic Violence Hotline.  This service is a 
twenty four (24) hour toll free hotline service to persons experiencing or affected by domestic 
violence.  The line operates seven days per week and can be accessed by phoning the number 
800-SAVE (7283).  The services provided by the hotline include safe and confidential listening; 
crisis intervention/counselling; referral to appropriate agencies, such as the police, shelters; and 
advocacy. 
 
Data for the period 01 October 2005 to 30 September 2006 revealed that a total of 1,867 clients 
benefited from the national domestic violence hotline, of which 1503 were female and 364 were 
male.672 
 
Drop In Centres 
The Drop-in Centre programme offers counselling to victims of domestic violence including 
victims of rape and incest.  The programme also provides information and referral services to 
                                               
672
 Ministry of Community Development, Culture and Gender Affairs, “National Domestic Violence 
Hotline: Report for the period 01.10.05 to 30.09.06”.  Data for other years were unavailable to the 
public as they are not in an acceptable format, such as the 2005 data, and not available for public 
distribution.  
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persons who require assistance to deal with other personal and family issues such as drug 
abuse, anger management, conflict management and teenage pregnancy.  Outreach 
programmes are also conducted as a means of preventing violence and encouraging the 
establishment of support groups within the communities. 
 
The drop-in Centres are primarily located in Community Centres and Complexes.  Each Centre 
is staffed by a trained social worker (contracted through the Domestic Violence Unit) who works 
as part of a service delivery team.   In addition to Secretary/Warden or Manager of the 
Community Centre or Complex, a police officer; a representative from the Ministry of 
Community Development, Culture and Gender Affairs; and volunteers from within the 
community are also members of the team.    
 
The above description of the work of the Gender Affairs Division in integrating domestic violence 
in most of its programmes, may lead to a perception that domestic violence is receiving priority 
treatment.  This would appear to be far from the reality that currently exists as field research 
paints a different picture.  For example, the NGOs openly scoff at the Drop In centres claiming 
that there are largely non-functional.  Further, the impressive description of Drop-In centres with 
the high level of skilled staffing only applies to one Drop-In centre in Maloney in north Trinidad.  
Finally, the abysmal level of funding identified in the section on government funding above for 
community development, social, recreational and cultural is further exacerbated by the fact that 
gender is a subset of these larger components.   For example, based on the Social Sector 
Investment Programme 2007, only 0.2% of monies are allocated for social sector programmes 
and were dedicated to the Women in Harmony/Domestic Violence Programme.  Moreover, the 
0.2% expenditure is divided between two programmes of which domestic violence is one.   
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7.2.4 Ministry of Social Services 
 
While gender issues are dealt specifically by the Ministry of Community Development, Culture 
and Gender Affairs, family and other social issues fall under the purview of the Ministry of Social 
Development.  This ministry is responsible for disbursing funds among NGOs that deal with 
women’s issues as well as subventions to women’s halfway houses and shelters.  Two other 
very important services offered by the Ministry of Social Development are provided by the 
National Family Services Division and the Probation Department. 
 
National Family Services Division 
Services related to domestic violence are only one aspect of the services available through the 
ten regional offices of the National Family Services Division.673  It also addresses abuse/incest, 
marital problems, depression, parenting, family life, foster care, drug abuse and life crises.674  
The division was established in 1991 and its mission is to promote healthy family functioning 
through the provision of preventative, developmental and remedial programmes and services.  It 
realises its mandate through counselling, advice, rehabilitation, consultation, networking, 
mediation, advocacy, research, lectures/workshops and placement.  Victims and offenders in 
domestic violence situations access the services of this department mainly through court 
referrals.  A Magistrate, during court proceedings, may request an interim report based on a 
recommendation of counselling for the parties involved.  Friends or other agencies usually refer 
walk-in and telephone clients to the department.  Clients that telephone are asked to visit the 
office and/or if necessary they are referred to another department or are visited at home. 
                                               
673
 Taken from Domestic Violence Unit, Division of Gender Affairs, Ministry of Community 
Development, Culture and Gender Affairs, Report on Policy Round Table on Domestic Violence in 
Trinidad and Tobago, 26 February 1999, p. 5; Ministry of Social Development, A Guide to Social 
Programmes and Services (Port of Spain, Trinidad: Ministry of Social Development, 2005), p. 66.  
Attempts to arrange interviews were repeatedly cancelled so dated information was all that was 
available and the links on the ministry’s website return error pages. 
674
 Information taken from a brochure prepared by the Ministry of Social Development about the 
National Family Services Division. 
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Data is collected by the use of intake forms to record the type of case and the categories of 
abuse for walk-in and court referrals.  Recording of data is difficult since confidentiality is 
important to the client and the department.  Poor recording as well as the need for confidentiality 
sometimes lead to the duplication of service, since two officers may end up managing the same 
client. 
 
The Probation Department 
The Probation Department has its head office in Port of Spain and nine district offices located 
throughout the country.675  The department and its officers are mandated to promote the 
rehabilitation of clients through counselling and education, and to promote a healthy lifestyle 
through proactive intervention.  The official system of data collection on domestic violence 
began with the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act, 1991.  Under this Act, the Probation 
Department is one of two agencies identified for intervention in such cases.  Clients are referred 
to the department by the court and other agencies, such as the Community Policing Unit, 800-
SAVE, Justices of the Peace, and walk-ins. 
 
Data are collected and recorded through several methods.  During the confidential interview, the 
probation officers use registration forms for each specific case that give demographic 
information as well as descriptions of the issues and incidents of domestic violence against the 
client.  The officers also maintain a domestic violence register in which official requests by the 
court for reports are recorded.  This register contains basic data on the complainant and 
respondent involved in the court proceeding.  The officers collate their domestic violence case 
data from the register and send them to the head office for submission and inclusion in the 
                                               
675
 Taken from Domestic Violence Unit, Report on Policy Round Table on Domestic Violence in 
Trinidad and Tobago, pp. 6-7; Ministry of Social Development, A Guide to Social Programmes and 
Services, p. 68 
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Monthly Returns.  Special registers are created in specific regions where there is a high 
incidence of abuse. 
 
The Ministry of Social Development has a major role in information dissemination on domestic 
violence; yet, it is difficult to even directly obtain information in person on the ministry.  
Moreover, a review of the budgetary allocations for the social and community services which fall 
under the Ministry of Social Development suggests that provisions are not made for either of the 
National Family Services Division or the Probation Department, of which assistance to victims of 
domestic violence forms an important component.  For 2006, while expenditure on social and 
community services accounted for 8.5% of total budgetary allocations, most of this was 
dedicated to the upgrade or construction of recreational, cultural, sporting and even 
cemetery/cremation facilities with no mention of these two important services.676  This low level 
of funding seriously undermines an effort on the part of the Ministry of Social Development to 
project itself as an important and effective player in the national effort to address domestic 
violence. 
 
7.2.5 Gender Affairs Division, Tobago House of Assembly 
 
In 1999, a Gender Affairs Unit was established within the Health and Social Services Division of 
the Tobago House of Assembly.677  With limited human and social resources, the unit 
established a 24-hour Tobago Crisis hotline, an information and resource centre and provided 
counselling services to survivors and perpetrators of gender-based violence as well as to 
persons who were suicidal, addicted, homeless and abandoned and subject to other forms of 
abuse. 
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 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Sector Investment Programme 2006, Appendix III, p. 132. 
677
 Taken from Ministry of Community Development, Draft National Gender Policy, p. 22. 
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The framework for the formulation and implementation of a Tobago Gender Policy is expressly 
stated in the Tobago Development Plan Report No. 4.  The Plan identified the following gender 
specific activities for implementation in the period 1998-2013: 
 To support and participate in the development of a national gender policy 
 To increase the sensitising of the population to gender issues 
 To combat domestic violence in all forms, including rape and incest. 
 
Despite the impressive sounding agenda of the Gender Affairs Division of the Tobago House of 
Assembly, anecdotal evidence from an interview with a member of staff suggests that the 
division is effectively non-functional because of a recent change in directorship. 
 
7.3 State Authorities 
 
7.3.1 Magistracy 
 
Applications made under the Domestic Violence Act are to be made specifically to a “Court of 
Summary Jurisdiction” and the Magistrate’s Court is such a court.678  The Magistracy plays an 
important role in supporting the battle against domestic violence in its capacity as facilitator of 
the Domestic Violence Act.  The Magistracy exercises original jurisdiction in relation to summary 
criminal matters.679  The Magistrate’s Courts also facilitate preliminary inquiries in serious 
criminal matters to determine whether a prima facie case has been established against an 
accused person before he/she can be indicted for trial at the High Court.  TT is divided into 
                                               
678
 According to section 2 of the Summary Courts Act (Chap. 4:20), a ““Court” or “Summary Court”, or 
“Court of summary jurisdiction”, unless the same is expressly or by implication qualified, means any 
Magistrate or Justice when sitting in open Court to hear and determine any matters within his power 
and jurisdiction, either under this Act or any other written law, and such Magistrate or Justice when so 
sitting aforesaid shall be and be deemed  a “Court” or “Summary Court” or “Court of summary 
jurisdiction” within the meaning of this Act”. 
679
 Judiciary of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Annual Report 2005-2006 (Port of Spain, 
Trinidad: Judiciary of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 2006), p. 4. 
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thirteen magisterial districts, with some districts having more than one Magistrate’s court.680  
The Magistracy is comprised of a Chief Magistrate, a Deputy Chief Magistrate, twelve senior 
Magistrates, twenty-nine Magistrates and six temporary Magistrates. 
 
Statistics on the various matters heard in the Magistrate’s Courts are made available to the 
Statistical Office of the Judiciary and are compiled according to district and year for its annual 
report.  The figure and table below illustrate and compile data for domestic violence over the 
period 1998-2006. 
 
                                               
680
 Judiciary, Annual Report 2005-2006, p. 5. 
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Figure 7.1 Domestic Violence Statistics collected by the Magistrate’s Courts for the Period 
1998-2006 
 
Magistrate's Courts Domestic Violence Statistics for the Period 1998-
2006
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The statistics in the graph and the table show what appears to be proportional distribution in the 
number of cases across the districts according to population density.  St. George West and San 
Fernando are both heavily populated areas; conversely, Mayaro and Rio Claro are sparsely 
populated areas and the numbers of applications filed under the Domestic Violence Act reflect 
this demographic distribution.   
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Table 7.1. Domestic Violence Statistics collected by the Magistrate’s Courts for the Period 1998-
2006681 
 
DISTRICT YEAR 
 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 
Arima 647 804 979 998 942 1041 1378 1215 
Chaguanas 601 736 911 951 1178 1059 1187 1404 
Couva 277 389 493 594 618 581 652 539 
Mayaro 61 0 75 109 122 128 152 105 
Point Fortin 144 161 214 202 276 289 319 347 
Princes Town 290 337 467 576 659 552 616 635 
Rio Claro 69 54 91 139 79 120 91 159 
San Fernando 540 840 834 986 1024 941 874 1469 
Sangre Grande 249 386 512 542 649 723 643 690 
Siparia 559 500 381 491 534 639 801 900 
St. George West 890 1626 1677 2105 1791 1768 1566 1512 
Tunapuna 537 494 715 744 673 677 665 653 
Tobago 178 227 246 327 390 422 386 322 
TOTAL 5042 6554 7595 8764 8935 8940 9330 9950 
 
While the number of applications under the Domestic Violence Act to the Magistrate’s Courts 
would appear to be high, any optimism that the legislation is being well employed must be 
tempered with the fact that there are no credible statistics on the number of incidents of 
domestic violence in TT.  Moreover, it should be noted that many cases are disposed of without 
even being heard.  While yearly totals for disposals are available, the information is not 
disaggregated into reasons for disposal of cases.  Anecdotal evidence would suggest that many 
cases are disposed of at various stages and generally before having been brought to 
completion. 
 
                                               
681
 Statistics obtained from the Annual Reports of the Judiciary of Trinidad and Tobago for the period 
1998-2006. 
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It is important to assess the role of the Magistracy in the implementation of the Domestic 
Violence Act.  In chapter six, a review of the Domestic Violence Act demonstrated promptness 
as a requirement of the legislation.  Yet, interviews with stakeholders would suggest that the 
relief provided is anything but summary.  Matters tend to drag on too long and are constantly 
adjourned.  Adjournments can be due to the Magistrate not having time to hear the matter (on 
any given day, criminal matters are heard first, then followed by family matters), or the absence 
of the served party.  While the Magistrate has the power to issue a warrant for the (absent) 
respondent’s arrest, this is rarely done; a notice with a new date of hearing is served.  This 
process can be repeated until the order is discharged or the applicant becomes weary by the 
process and ceases to follow up. 
 
Simple administrative blunders also frustrate the process.  In one instance, an applicant, fearing 
for her safety, who already had an Interim Order in effect, went to the Magistrate’s Court to 
request an expedited hearing before the Magistrate for the final Protection Order.  It can take 
two weeks before the matter is listed to be heard.  The Clerk gave the applicant the (expedited) 
date and, after having shown up and waited on said date, the applicant was told that there was 
no record of her application for a hearing.  As mentioned above, family matters are heard only 
after all the criminal matters are heard, but the applicants and respondents are required to be in 
Court from 9:00 a.m. until such time as the matter is called.  In this instance, she waited from 
8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. in the company of the respondent.  Ordinarily, all the listed matters are 
read at the beginning of the day’s proceedings; it is not clear whether this occurred.  Moreover, 
she had to apply for a day off work to attend Court.  This does not take into account the time 
she had to take off work to file the application. 
 
Another failing by the Magistracy has been a lack of strictness in dealing with court attendance 
for hearings under the Domestic Violence Act.   The Court can proceed to hear a domestic 
violence matter in the absence of a respondent that has been served or the Court can issue a 
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warrant for the respondent’s arrest.  From various interviews conducted by the author, it would 
appear that these options are hardly ever used and Magistrates tend simply to schedule a new 
date even though this option only applies to respondents who have not actually received 
summons.  The constant rescheduling without using the provisions of this section can frustrate 
the applicant and cause her to drop the case.  In other instances, due to the time limits set in the 
Act, the case is discharged without even being heard. 
 
In some cases, Magistrates have shown an eagerness to dismiss matters when the applicant is 
believed to be absent from the Court.  Applicants have complained that cases have been 
dismissed even though they are present.  Because of the noise level in the courthouse, it is 
sometimes difficult to hear when the case is called and it can be dismissed as easily as that due 
to the large volume of cases to be heard on any given day.  Further, the absence of the 
applicant may be justifiable and the dismissal of the case harsh where no excuse has been 
proffered by the applicant.  The nature of domestic violence is such that it may not be possible 
for the applicant to send notice of her reasonable excuse for non-appearance.  What happens in 
the event that on presentation of the summons, the applicant is beaten so severely that she has 
to be hospitalised and no one is aware of the situation?  She will be unable to attend court or 
give notice of her absence. 
 
In the case of one woman, she was taken to a shelter out of fear for her life after repeated death 
threats by her husband and applied for a protection order.  When the respondent was finally 
served with the notice of proceedings (he was not served in time for the first hearing), he 
appeared at the hearing with a counter summons stating that the applicant was in fact the 
dangerous one, threatening to kill her children and him.  The matter then had to be investigated 
before any relief could be given.  This matter is still ongoing.  It is quite possible that the 
respondent can file proceedings against the applicant in her absence causing a protection order 
to be taken out against her, creating a veritable perversion of justice. 
 234
 
It would appear that “the law fell victim to patriarchal “cultural habits” present everywhere in 
Trinidad and Tobago, including the courtrooms and the clerk offices.  As a result, “the vast 
majority of applications for protection orders do not result in restraining orders”.682  This is 
compounded by the fact that the institutional support from the Magistracy required to make the 
piece of legislation effective seems to defeat the purpose of the Domestic Violence Act which 
was meant to provide summary relief.  The magisterial process seems to preserve and promote 
gender hierarchies, disempowers complainants, and has even been described as 
punishment.683  According to the statistics, women tend to prefer the magisterial route to the 
police service, however, the magisterial process leaves much to be desired as matters tend to 
drag on too long and are constantly adjourned. 
 
7.3.2 Family Court 
 
The Family Court of Trinidad and Tobago hears a variety of family issues and domestic violence 
as it relates to them but does not hear domestic violence matters as a primary issue.684  It is a 
pilot project that commenced operations in May 2004 and is of interest due to the scope of 
services it offers.  In addition to adjudicating family matters, the Family Court offers Children 
Services, to look after and occupy children while parents deal with legal issues; Probation 
Services, where specially trained social workers monitor and assist families with respect to 
compliance orders, resolution of issues and investigation of family problems; Mediation 
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 Michèle Alexandre, “Dance Halls, Masquerades, Body Protest and the Law: The Female Body as a 
Redemptive Tool against Trinidad’s Gender-Biased Laws”, Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy 13 
(2006), p. 192. 
683
 See Lazarus-Black, “The Rite of Domination”, pp. 4, 13, 27. 
684
 Judiciary of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Annual Report 2004-2005 (Port of Spain, 
Trinidad: Judiciary of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 2005), pp. 12-13. 
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Services, where mediators help couples discuss issues and come to an agreement; and 
Counselling Services, where both family and individual counselling is available.685   
 
This post-order service is what is missing from the magisterial process where couples are 
required to deal with the psychological fallout of orders of the court on their own.  The process of 
the Magistrate’s Court does not take into account the psychological fallout of the protection 
orders on the psyche of the fragile male ego which probably led to the situation in the first place 
(or on the applicant or children).  He may feel emasculated and seek to intentionally hurt or kill 
the one who is meant to be protected.  The Family Court offers a different type of process, 
where the abused and the victim can be taken for immediate counselling which is available on 
the premises if so ordered.  The Family Court assists couples in dealing with the emotional 
distress resulting from its decision, helping them to sort through the pain of family disintegration 
or assist in maintaining the family unit where possible.  In addition to counselling, the Family 
Court offers an intake service, children’s services, probation services, mediation service, and 
judicial services.  It provides a one-stop shop for all family needs.  This may be an approach to 
dealing with the post-order problems that may arise. 
 
A key goal of the pilot was to continuously test the effectiveness and efficiency of the various 
innovations and approaches used.686  The project has been deemed a success and will 
therefore be continued and expanded.  There is currently only one such Court but it is intended 
to expand to five other areas in the country. 
 
                                               
685
 Information taken from brochure prepared by the Family Court of Trinidad and Tobago. 
686
 Family Court of Trinidad and Tobago, Family Court Evaluation: First Year Report (Port of Spain, 
Trinidad: Family Court of Trinidad and Tobago, 2005), p. 1. 
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7.3.3 Police Service 
 
The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (“TTPS”) is a division of the Ministry of National 
Security.  Prior to 1996, there was a Welfare Section of the TTPS which dealt not only with the 
welfare of police officers but also of the community.687  Based on information received from 
foreign training, the Commissioner of Police in 1996, Noor Mohammed, established the 
Community Policing Section.  There was a perception that police officers were alienated from 
the clients that they served and this was evidenced by client complaints of unwarranted police 
hostility.  With respect to domestic violence reporting, there was a perception that police officers 
do not treat with such reports with the necessary degree of seriousness.  The establishment of 
the Community Policing Section, therefore, was meant to deal with this distance and bridge the 
gap, helping the officers to become more socially aware.  The Community Policing Section saw 
“The police and the community working together to help solve mutually defined problems 
through deliberate effort aimed at reducing crime, violence, fear, insecurity and community 
decay”.688   
 
Police officers from mainstream policing, previously engaged in the Welfare Section, were 
selected to be a part of this section and trained.  Officers from the Community Policing Section 
would visit communities forging alliances and relationships.  These alliances were strategically 
used to gain information on criminal activity.  This section was responsible for the creation of 
neighbourhood watches; police youth clubs that infused discipline among young people; 
consultative groups; and carrying out lectures in schools with respect to crime awareness, drug 
abuse awareness and other topics of that nature.  The section also engaged in networking with 
other agencies, such as joint police-NGO activities.  Some people were trained in counselling 
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 Inspector Glen Hackett, Interview with author, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 16 March 2007. 
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 Ramesh Deosaran, The Dynamics of Community Policing: Theory, Practice and Evaluation (St. 
Augustine, Trinidad: Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, 2000), p. 32. 
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with respect to domestic violence situations and assisted in referrals to NGOs that could provide 
the necessary interventions. 
 
In 2000, the Trinidad and Tobago National Quality Council commissioned a report on the 
effectiveness of the Community Policing Section which had the effect of “disbanding” the section 
as reservations were raised about the creation of a parallel police service that seemed to create 
a different ethos between the two entities.689  There was the issue of which service should 
respond to which matter, with the adverse consequence of undue delays.  It was suggested that 
the Community Policing Section be reintegrated into the main police service even though “[t]his 
integration within the service should not mean that the sustained focus on community policing 
will or should be lost or absorbed beyond recognition”.690  This was, however, the ultimate 
effect.  The public perception is that the Community Policing Section has been disbanded 
although they are not sure when or why.  It was suggested that all police officers be “equally 
and properly trained in both tracks of public service”,691 even though the requisite training was 
not forthcoming to make this transition.  
 
Domestic violence matters are now, therefore, dealt with by mainstream policing.  It is therefore 
not surprising that there is continuing strong denunciation of the attitude of the police to 
domestic violence complaints.  In a series of recent judgements on the defence of “battered 
women syndrome”, Justice Carmona endorsed the widely held view of the unresponsiveness of 
the police to domestic violence complaints.692 
 
The police service plays a critical role in the legal regime for dealing with domestic violence.  
Section 21 of the Domestic Violence Act requires the police to respond to complaints and 
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 Deosaran, The Dynamics of Community Policing, p. 204. 
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 Deosaran, The Dynamics of Community Policing, p. 204. 
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 See Seuraj, “Carmona: Women under siege in this country”.  Quoted in Chapter 5. 
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maintain reports on domestic violence which are to be contained in a National Domestic 
Violence Register.  The Modus Operandi and Records Bureau of the TTPS collects and collates 
this data from all police stations across the country.   Anecdotal evidence gleaned from 
interviews suggests that domestic violence recording and reporting is not done faithfully.  The 
figure and table below illustrate and compile data for domestic violence over the period 1997-
2006. 
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Figure 7.2 Domestic Violence Statistics collected by the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service for the Period 1997-2006 
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Table 7.2. Domestic Violence Statistics collected by the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service for the Period 1997-2006693 
 
OFFENCE YEAR 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Murders/Homicides 18 23 15 24 17 17 22 18 21 30 
Sexual Abuse 21 19 17 92 37 24 3 15 4 5 
Wounding with Intent 12 14 11 48 42 37 9 29 7 12 
Malicious Damage 2 1 2 0 2 0 5 10 1 1 
Assault by Beating 317 287 271 775 907 560 406 470 211 123 
Threats 6 5 7 214 217 133 227 245 50 98 
Verbal Abuse 18 15 11 94 60 91 40 60 18 15 
Emotional / Psychological 
Abuse 3 1 1 59 61 55 37 49 5 2 
Financial Abuse 1 2 0 4 0 1 4 12 0 0 
Child Abuse & Abandonment 13 17 12 4 25 9 0 28 31 5 
Breach of Protection Order  26 19 21 16 26 30 38 26 19 13 
TOTAL 437 403 368 1330 1394 957 791 962 367 304 
 
                                                
693
 Statistics obtained from the Modus Operandi and Records Bureau. 
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When the number of complaints filed with the Police is compared to the number of applications 
made for Protection Orders at the Magistrates’ Court, a great disparity is quite apparent.  In 
2006, for example, 9950 persons sought orders under the Domestic Violence Act but only 304 
complaints were registered with the police.  The number of complaints on domestic violence 
would suggest that the police are either not recording all the complaints made with respect to 
domestic violence or persons are in fact not availing themselves of the services of the police in 
light of the historically poor attitude of the police to domestic violence complaints.  Perhaps the 
truth lies between both assumptions.  
 
Police officers generally have a duty to deal with domestic violence as part of its mandate to 
protect and serve and this general duty is specifically contemplated by Section 21(1) of the 
Domestic Violence Act.  Perceptions of police response have been mixed with some stating that 
the police respond positively and quickly while others state that they dismiss the matter 
nonchalantly saying that that is an issue between husband and wife and should be sorted out at 
home.  In some cases, the police officers seem apathetic.  A possible explanation for this 
apathy stems from the fact that in many instances where they do respond to a complaint, the 
complainant eventually wants to return to the abuser.  The complainant would file a report, be 
escorted to a shelter, and either run away from the shelter, disclose her location to the abuser, 
or beg to be allowed to go back to the abuser.694  This is a regular occurrence and frustrates not 
only police officers, but shelter management as well.  Police officers seem indifferent and even 
wary/weary of domestic violence reports.  Yes, wary as women seeking assistance seem to 
return to the situation once the crisis point is passed and consequently weary because of this.  
This should not, however, have the effect of diminishing the police officers’ responsibility to 
respond, or numbing their response.   
                                               
694
 See for example, Keino Swamber [online], “Wife pleads but husband lands in jail”.  Saturday Express, 
04 February 2006.  [cited 11 April 2007].  Available from Internet: 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=133510992. “A woman's pleas to a High Court 
Judge to spare her common-law husband a jail term failed on Thursday after she said the man was 
physically and verbally abusive to her during their seven-year relationship”.  
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The police by their conduct also create circumstances that render the victim of domestic 
violence fearful of using their services.  There was one instance where the victim, whose life 
was not under immediate threat, had a police escort to her home so that she could retrieve 
some personal items.  There was a male and a female officer present and, out of earshot of the 
female police officer, the male police officer started making unsolicited advances on the woman.  
Even though she was scared and had no one else whom she could trust, she did not give in to 
his advances and he immediately and henceforth became particularly hostile towards her.  The 
complainant was extremely grateful for the presence of the female officer and was safely 
delivered to a shelter.     
 
Additionally, the role of the police in the effective implementation of the Domestic Violence Act 
extends to their attitude towards service of documents pertaining to applications for protection 
orders.  Section 12(5) of the Domestic Violence Act provides for service of documents by the 
applicant or the applicant’s agent.  The primary method of service under the Domestic Violence 
Act is by the police as noted in Section 12(4).  The common practice, however, is for the 
applicant to be encouraged to effect service directly rather than depend on the police.  This 
practice has emerged because of the perception by the Clerk of the Courts that the police tend 
to be dilatory in the service of summons as issued under the Domestic Violence Act.   It is 
unacceptable that it should even be contemplated that the applicant can serve notice on the 
respondent.  Service should be strictly effected by the police or court marshals as service by the 
applicant can create a situation of further abuse and even death.   
 
One applicant had the experience of having to serve the summons herself.  She went to the 
Court to make the initial application and was given all the paperwork to serve on the respondent 
and deliver one copy to the police station in her area.  Out of fear of a violent reaction, she 
served the summons by leaving it on the dresser where the respondent would see it the 
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morning before the actual date and spent that night with her daughter at a friend’s.  At the 
courthouse, the clerk advised her to serve it herself as the general trend is that the police station 
does not make the necessary arrangements for service and the matter would have to be 
constantly adjourned until perhaps finally discharged.  The copy she took to the police station 
was misplaced; so when she went to make a report of breach of the Interim Order, they had 
nothing on file to corroborate her complaint.  Moreover, on the date for obtaining a final Order 
she was told that there was no record of her application and the Interim Order had lapsed.  
Frustrated, she simply never bothered to follow up and now there is no order against the 
perpetrator. 
 
The police play a critical role in dealing directly with incidents of domestic violence.  Pursuant to 
Section 22 of the Domestic Violence Act, the police can act by means of a warrant to deal with 
situations of domestic violence, while under Section 23 of the Domestic Violence Act the police 
can act in the absence of a warrant.  The power to act without a warrant is an important one as 
very often the acts giving rise to the need to act without a warrant can lead to physical harm or 
death.  Yet, the power to so act is heavily regulated that has created disincentives for the police 
to move without a warrant to prevent domestic violence. 
 
It must nevertheless be borne in mind that the rules governing the actions of the police to act 
without warrant in situations involving domestic violence has arisen because of the conduct of 
the police.  Many interviewees stated that police officers abuse their positions of authority and 
trust and prey on victims of domestic violence.  In one particular case, a woman reported an 
incident of domestic violence against her husband and she and the officer eventually entered 
into a relationship.  A Protection Order was taken out against the husband and the police officer 
falsely reported a breach of the Order and the respondent was jailed.  Fortunately, the matter 
was investigated and the man was released. 
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7.3.4 Legal Aid and Advisory Authority 
 
The Legal Aid and Advisory Authority was established some thirty-one years ago as a division 
of the Ministry of Legal Affairs and has nine branches throughout the country.695  It is meant to 
provide affordable legal advice and assistance in a variety of matters to members of the public 
who are of small or moderate means.  Applicants for legal aid must not possess disposal capital 
exceeding a maximum of USD$794.00 nor must their net disposable income exceed 
USD$1,111.00 per year.696  Victims of domestic violence seek assistance from Legal Aid 
generally to get advice on obtaining a protection or an exclusion order.  Others come in just to 
have a confidential discussion even though the legal officers are not trained as counsellors.  As 
many as one hundred such people can visit a single office in a day.   
 
The process for applying for legal aid involves filling out a form and the legal aid officer 
instructing the Justice of the Peace at the relevant court.  This form is then left with the 
Magistrate to determine eligibility of the applicant for legal aid.  Once the applicant is eligible, the 
Magistrate grants aid and refers the matter back to the Legal Aid and Advisory Authority for 
assignment of counsel.  Once the matter is complete, the Legal Aid and Advisory Authority pays 
all legal expenses which are generally nominal.  In cases where it is determined that the 
applicant is in imminent danger, the Justice of the Peace or Clerk can list the matter to be heard 
by the Magistrate on the same day.  The Magistrate then takes evidence ex parte and grants an 
interim protection order, not to exceed twenty-one days, advising that counsel be present at the 
hearing.  Under section 14 of the Legal Aid and Advice (Amendment) Act, No. 18 of 1999, the 
                                               
695
 Natalie Diop, Legal Officer, Interview with author, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 12 February 2007.  
Further information also available from pamphlet prepared by the Ministry of Legal Affairs on the Legal 
Aid and Advisory Authority.  Currently, at the Tobago office, domestic violence matters are without 
Legal Aid representation as Attorneys at Law are refusing to accept legal aid matters. 
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 These figures are slightly higher than what is found in the Legal Aid and Advice Act (Chap. 7:07) 
where both the disposable capital and income are not to exceed USD$714.00.  The definition of 
disposable income was amended by the Legal Aid and Advice (Amendment) Act, No. 18 of 1999 but 
does not offer a ceiling under which disposable income must stay for eligibility. 
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Legal Aid and Advisory Authority can also prepare an emergency certificate in support of the 
applicant in relation to the Domestic Violence Act without reference to the Court or the Legal Aid 
and Advisory Authority to be forwarded to the Court and an attorney will be provided forthwith.  
 
It would seem from interviews that obtaining legal aid has not been problematic with the defining 
issues being the post-legal aid scenarios as discussed in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.3 dealing with 
the magistracy and the police respectively. 
 
7.4 Non-Governmental Organisations 
 
NGOs are integral to the process of change.  As discussed in chapter four, NGOs perhaps 
provide the impetus for action and, depending on the nature of the work undertaken by the 
organisation, can bring real and immediate relief to those who need it most.  This section 
divides the NGOs in TT into three types: Research and Advocacy, Support Services, and 
Shelters.  While this section is as exhaustive as possible, there are a couple that are not noted 
here as interviews were not possible and information was not otherwise available.697  For 
descriptions of the various NGOs, see Appendix C. 
 
7.4.1 Research and Advocacy Groups 
 
There are five main groups that engage in advocacy and research on domestic violence issues.  
These are the Trinidad and Tobago Coalition Against Domestic Violence (“the Coalition”); the 
Centre for Gender and Development Studies (part of the University of the West Indies, St. 
Augustine Campus), which also has a Women Development Studies Group; Caribbean 
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 This is due to non-response from unwillingness to be interviewed so the information used is dated 
(true in the case of one NGO) and where literature on the organisation was not available and therefore 
not included at all (true in the case of one NGO). 
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Association for Feminist Research and Action (“CAFRA”); Network of NGOs of Trinidad and 
Tobago for the Advancement of Women; and Women Working for Social Progress.698 
 
These groups have lobbied for legislative change, such as seen with the amended Domestic 
Violence Act and Sexual Offences Act, and the introduction of legislation with particular 
reference to children’s issues.  Major changes to the Domestic Violence Act included:  
 the introduction of definitions of the various types of abuse that can be suffered 
(emotional/psychological, financial, physical, sexual) (section 3);  
 a change to only prohibitions being placed in a protection order to now include directions 
concerning interim compensation for monetary loss incurred, monetary relief, 
relinquishment of firearms, and making or continuation of rent or mortgage payments 
(section 6(c));  
 the need to preserve the family unit (section 7(g));  
 the ability of any member of the household to apply for an order (section 4(b)); 
 admissibility of views expressed by a child or dependent on whose behalf the application 
for an order is made having regard to the child’s age and maturity (section 10(5));  
 the introduction of the legal duty of police officers to respond to every complaint or report 
alleging domestic violence (section 21(1)), to file a report (section 21(3), and to assist 
victims when power of entry is used (section 23A); 
 the admissibility of a recorded statement where the complainant refuses to be sworn as 
a witness or gives oral evidence inconsistent or contradictory to the statement forming 
part of the police record (section 26); 
 the introduction of a greater range of offences (First Schedule); 
 an increase in the duration of an interim order from 14 days to 21 days (section 8(3)); 
 an increase in the duration of a protection order from a maximum of one year to a 
maximum of three years (section 6(a)); and  
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 See Appendix C, section C.1 at page 352 for descriptions of the research and advocacy groups. 
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 an increase in fines for breaches of orders from USD$794/imprisonment not exceeding 
six months to a tiered system: first conviction USD$1429/imprisonment not exceeding 
three months; second conviction USD$2381/imprisonment not exceeding 24 months; 
any subsequent conviction would result in imprisonment not exceeding five years. 
 
These latter two changes, meant to truly keep the offender in check, were lauded as the 
greatest achievements in lobbying for legislative amendments for this particular Act by these 
NGOs; Justice Carmona, however, has noted that “the sentencing regime employed by the 
courts appears not to be having the desired impact. The killing goes on callously and 
unabated”.699  Even lawyers representing murder clients recognise that “these offences are far 
too common in society today”.700  The Sexual Offences Act of 1986 was amended to have 
marital rape included as an offence which was finally done in 2000 after much opposition by the 
government.701  The original act only acknowledged sexual offences against a wife if the 
husband had intercourse with her without her consent or by force of fear where there was some 
degree of legal separation or an order by the court for the husband not to molest his wife.  
Moreover, proceedings for an offence under this section could only have been instituted by or 
with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.   
 
Research and advocacy NGOs also partake in training sessions, seminars and workshops 
(usually by invitation), such as training for members of the police service to apprise them of legal 
changes, as with the amendment to the Domestic Violence Act and their role under the Act, as 
well as sensitisation sessions on domestic and gender-based violence and treating victims who 
report such instances.  A major training workshop was held in 2004 by the Coalition for 
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members of the judiciary on dealing with domestic violence matters.  While research, training 
and legislative lobbying are high on the agenda of these types of organisations, some also 
provide drop-in and scheduled counselling services to both victims and perpetrators of domestic 
violence.  As the foremost organisation in TT that deals with domestic violence, the Coalition 
also provides legal advice through its legal clinic to victims of domestic violence. 
 
7.4.2 Support Service Groups 
 
There are a variety of groups that provide varying degrees of support services to victims of 
domestic violence.  These include Lifeline, Families In Action, Rape Crisis Society of Trinidad 
and Tobago, Flaming Word Ministry (while it is recognised that all religious organisations would 
be required to provide this type of support if necessary, this one was included as it is a member 
of the Coalition), Men Against Violence Against Women (“MAVAW”), and Women Against 
Abuse and Violent Encounters (Women’s Support Group) (“WAAVE”).702 
 
Support groups provide services ranging from listening (where the person is not allowed to 
counsel or offer advice), counselling, outreach (usually by invitation), referrals to other 
organisations such as shelters or the domestic violence hotline, skills training to assist women in 
achieving financial security, and sensitisation programmes.  The skills training programmes are 
designed to provide women with a marketable skill such as in agro-processing.  Sensitisation 
programmes and outreach range from publications (pamphlets, brochures, posters, booklets) to 
giving talks at various venues. 
 
There are two organisations in this group of particular interest.  MAVAW, the only male group 
specifically engaged in domestic violence, offers a long term approach to dealing with the 
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problem as opposed to the various short term solutions currently used, such as overnighting at 
a shelter and obtaining a protection order.703  MAVAW’s philosophical approach allows it to view 
domestic violence as resulting from dysfunctional relationships and does not believe in terms 
such as “abuser” and “victim”.  Its “BSD Syndrome Concept” focuses on identifying belief, 
behavioural, and biological “deficits” with a view to developing them appropriately, such as the 
belief that men are superior or the behaviour that allows hitting to be acceptable.  The concept 
also includes a “baggage system dependency” which requires the individual to completely 
resolve previous relationships before entering another.  The concept is meant to scientifically 
place the violence in relationship issue into a medium that takes away the stigma and gender 
polarisation previously associated with it, at the same time recognising the social roots of the 
problem.  MAVAW anticipates resistance to the concept by some women, “primarily because 
every statistic, which lists one person being hurt, will also have to list the other person causing 
pain, as being hurt too”.704 
 
The other group of interest is WAAVE, a unique support group started by actual victims of 
domestic violence.705  They came together to provide support to one another that no 
organisation, shelter, or counselling session could provide.  In speaking with various members 
of this group as well as other battered women, it becomes clear that even though women’s 
shelters are run by women, these latter still have little understanding or empathy for those 
seeking refuge.  Some matrons complain that the women who come to the shelters are lazy; 
while this may be the case for some, it must be that others simply need a resting period before 
embarking on the rostered tasks at a shelter.  These women come to the shelters battered and 
afraid, should they all be expected to immediately commence chores?  Should a small but 
reasonable recovery period not be allowed?  While it is certain that a recovery period is allowed, 
perhaps discretion would dictate whether a longer period can be granted depending on the 
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individual.  There have been instances, however, where women simply refuse to do anything 
and the reasons for this remain unclear. 
 
7.4.3 Shelters 
 
There are some ten shelters or halfway houses in TT that take in women victims of domestic 
violence.706  Shelters, located all around the country, include The Shelter, MIZPEH Halfway 
House, the Business and Professional Women’s Club Halfway House, Goshen Halfway House 
for Battered Wives and Teenage Pregnancies, Vision of Hope Halfway House, Madinah House, 
Hope Shelter for Battered Women and Children, National Home for Family Reconciliation, Our 
Lady of the Wayside Shelter and Tobago Women’s Enterprise for Empowerment and 
Rehabilitation Towards Self-Sufficiency.   
 
All shelters provide meals, clothing, toiletries, and bedding as most women who seek refuge at 
shelters have with them only what they wore to get there.  Counselling services are provided by 
most shelters as an integral part of the emergency services offered.  Duration of stay and 
number and sex of children allowed differ from shelter to shelter.  The timeframe seems to be 
flexible depending on the nature of individual cases.  What is clear is that all shelters have 
restrictions on entry of boys of various ages into the shelter.  This means that the mother must 
either decide to seek refuge elsewhere, be faced with the decision to split her family further 
during a time of crisis, or remain at home with the abuser.  The women of WAAVE have 
recognised this problem and hope one day to run a shelter with facilities to accommodate boys.  
All the shelters have cited reasons of uncontrollability and curiosity of the female sex, whether 
innocent or not, as reasons for restricting entry of older boys into the shelters.  While the need to 
preserve feminine modesty is foremost, what about the integrity of the family unit?  Even this 
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need is legislated (see the Domestic Violence Act).  Surely splitting the family will have further 
adverse effects on the psyches of all involved and requires extensive reconsideration. 
 
Most of the shelters offer skills training programmes aimed at empowering women to be self-
sufficient.  Programmes and courses in etiquette, crafts, sewing, needlework, gardening, animal 
husbandry, food preparation, pastry-making, flower-making, childcare, parenting, housekeeping, 
hairdressing, lay counselling, adult literacy, computer literacy and nursing are among the many 
to which women have access while at the shelters.  In some cases, where the shelter does not 
actually provide the programmes or courses, they may locate venues where they are offered 
and pay for the women to attend once money is available. 
 
Most of the shelters interviewed receive no government assistance but rely on corporate and 
individual contributions to meet their expenses.  These funds are supplemented by various fund 
raising activities.  Shelters which do receive a government subvention complain that it is very 
little and certainly not enough to run the homes.  While this is the case, all the homes visited had 
quite a bit of spare capacity at the time, so that expenses should be less during such times.  
This also raises the question as to why women are not using the facilities available to them.  Not 
wanting to split the family, hoping the abuser would eventually change, the fact that the children 
are clothed and fed at home, socialised to believe that violence against women is part of family 
life may all be reasons why women do not use the facilities offered by the shelters. 
 
Women are referred to shelters either by the police, Court, or the domestic violence hotline.  
There are few walk-in victims.  Shelters prefer referrals so as to have official records of the 
women’s presence there.  Many shelters report having positive relationships with the area police 
station but often complain that their response time to situations is too long.  There was one 
shelter in particular that stated that when they call the area police station they do not receive full 
cooperation and are told that they cannot help.  They have to rely on a police station many miles 
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away to provide assistance.  In some cases, the police officers disclose the women’s locations 
(the location of the shelters is generally unknown) thereby destroying the confidence and 
security of the victim.  
 
Several trends were observed at the various shelters and can be said to be generally applicable 
to women victims of domestic violence.  Women: 
 
 Stay one week to one month 
 Are generally of East Indian or African descent 
 Are young mothers up to age forty 
 Are of all religious backgrounds 
 Bring at least two children 
 Are in a common-law relationship 
 Are unemployed and/or unskilled 
 Have a history of abuse 
 
There also tend to be more women seeking shelter between November and February.  This 
increase is directly related to the seasons of Christmas and Carnival when excessive alcoholic 
intake and expenditure takes place. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
The level of financing for gender issues generally, and domestic violence specifically, reflects 
the failure of the State to treat meaningfully with women’s rights.  The poor level of funding is 
exacerbated by the fact of government’s recognition of the problem of domestic violence.  State 
institutions meant to support the battle against domestic violence can be accused of not being 
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sufficiently sensitive to the issue.  While, to some extent, the magistracy is hindered by 
legislation that reflects the bias of the male elite that was responsible for its passage in 
Parliament, much more can be done to make the existing legal regime more workable. 
 
The police service, the other major state institution, is also male dominated and the attitude of 
the police exemplifies the male bias.  Police officers are known to abuse their spouses as well.  
It is difficult for such a victim to make a report as the matter tends to be immediately reported to 
the abuser which translates into more abuse for her.  How then should she seek assistance?  In 
other instances, the police response tends to be poor as they feel that the women waste their 
time given that the majority of women eventually plead on the men’s behalf to have them 
released or leave the shelters to which they were police escorted to return to them.  When 
women come to the station the police officers repeatedly ask whether they are sure they want to 
file the report for fear of what they feel would be the inevitable response from the complainant 
which would result in a waste of time and effort.  There was one anomalous instance of an 
upper class woman who filed a report at the police station and when her father found out, he 
“had the file destroyed” by a friend at the station. 
 
Another problem is the fact that police officers seem to take advantage of female victims of 
domestic violence.  Some people interviewed stated that women get involved with the officers to 
expedite matters.  In one particular case, a battered woman, after going to the police station, 
was escorted home by two officers to collect some personal belongings and the male police 
officer made unsolicited advances towards her.  With no one else to turn to, this put the woman 
in a very difficult situation.  She was able to keep him at bay but he became very hostile. 
 
That aside, the apathy and hesitancy on the part of police officers point to something serious – 
not simply dismissal of domestic violence as between husband and wife.  The women 
themselves appear to be confused.  They flee for their lives and then beg for the men not to be 
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harmed and to be released.  It is understandable why the officers would take the approach that 
they do, but certainly does not justify it.  They have a duty to serve and to protect and should 
take that seriously. 
 
The non-State actors, namely the NGOs, have also suffered due to their reliance on the State 
for driving the forces necessary to address domestic violence.  There remains very little 
evidence of these groups seeking to take control of the domestic violence agenda to ensure 
meaningful change in society to how the issue is addressed.  The dominant role played by 
research and advocacy groups remains the effort towards legislative reform.  Having regard to 
the fact that the legislative agenda is controlled by the male elite, it is hardly surprising that the 
legal regime for addressing domestic violence is of limited effect.  Chapter six discussed many 
of the deficiencies in the Domestic Violence Act and discussions on the magistracy and the 
police contained in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.3 respectively of this chapter further illustrate the 
problems inherent in the legal regime for addressing domestic violence. 
 
It has been noted that many of the women who seek help in fact fall within the lower 
socioeconomic bracket.  Domestic violence, however, knows no class or race boundaries.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that even up to the ministerial level and in affluent 
neighbourhoods abuse occurs.  This information is, therefore, quite telling.  Moreover, there are 
male victims of domestic violence, but the reported numbers are few.  One interviewee 
observed that male battering appears to be a new trend, but shame and pride prevent reports 
from being made.  The NGOs that provide support services are limited by the availability of 
financial resources.  These NGOs by and large depend on external sources for financial 
resources and the male dominated State governance apparatus has not shown any great 
inclination to treat domestic violence with the seriousness it deserves, as illustrated in Section 
7.2 of this chapter, by the level of funding directed to gender issues generally, and domestic 
violence, specifically.  One issue that illustrates the limitations of support services provided by 
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NGOs pertains to the provision of counselling.  It was raised several times in interviews that 
many of the counsellors available at the various NGOs are not properly trained in the field of 
counselling.  They are trained in psychology and/or social work and are allowed to provide 
‘counselling’ services to the abused.  This is not to diminish in any way the services they 
provide, as social work provides a different but equally important form of assistance.  
Counselling specifically requires special training and skills which are not necessarily provided by 
the courses taken in psychology or social work.  There are in fact some professional therapists 
that volunteer their time to some of the NGOs once to twice a week.  There are many 
professionals in private practice who are eminently qualified in counselling, but this is a paid 
service and not readily accessed.  The male elite driven State has not seen it fit (yet) to place 
some of these counsellors on a retainer to counsel a certain number of victims per month who 
are unable to pay for the service but need it. 
 
It would appear that leaving an abuser is not as easy as deciding to leave after the first instance 
of abuse.  Some stay for the benefit of the children who are clothed and fed; others stay 
because they believe that abuse in a relationship is acceptable; while yet others stay because 
they were there during the tough times and helped make him a success and do not wish for 
someone else to benefit from that sacrifice.  Some interviewees cited the “male dependency 
syndrome” where women believe that they need a man to define them or simply feel that they 
cannot live without him.  Apart from emotional dependency, there is financial dependency either 
because she is unskilled and cannot find employment or, surprisingly, because she is lazy and 
does not wish to work and desires to maintain a certain lifestyle.  One woman from an affluent 
home decided to take the abuse because, if she left, she would no longer be able to drive the 
Mercedes Benz her abusive husband bought for her.  These tough choices…  
 
The fact remains that the NGOs that provide shelters are in need of proper funding not just to 
house persons that are the victims of domestic violence but also entire families.  Moreover, 
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women who elect to leave situations of domestic violence need expert psychological assistance 
and job training to develop the means to be independent of the abuser.  For a shelter to fulfil 
these needs they either turn to the State where funding is derisory or to private corporate 
citizens that are also managed by the male elite.  In both instances, the true needs of the victims 
are not met and this is perhaps why the available shelters would appear to be underutilised.  In 
addition, an important point was made that when women seek shelter, they sometimes have no 
where to go when they leave, mostly due to financial problems.  This issue of post-shelter 
housing and a support system to help monitor women’s progress or simply provide assistance 
along the way seems to be lacking. 
 
The emerging picture of an institutional framework for addressing domestic violence in TT is not 
pretty.  The State institutions are poorly equipped and funded to deal with domestic violence 
and this is a mere reflection of TT’s lack of concern with the “softer” issues, such as protection 
of women.  Further, the reliance of the non-state institutions on state largesse to achieve their 
objectives of protection of women from domestic violence would appear to be misguided.  The 
situation in TT necessarily points to the need for women to seek to understand their peculiar 
role in protecting their vulnerable sisters from domestic violence and to seek to find the solutions 
from within their sphere of power rather than rely on a male post-colonial elite.   
 
Having examined the domestic attitude of TT to domestic violence both legally and 
institutionally, it is important to review the behaviour of TT at the international and regional levels 
with respect to the issue of domestic violence so as to ascertain whether there is consistency of 
behaviour or whether TT expounds one set of principles at the international stage but practices 
another at the domestic level. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
8.0 Trinidad and Tobago and Domestic Violence: The International Response 
 
8.1 Introduction: International Context 
 
Trinidad and Tobago has illustrated some degree of commitment in dealing with the issue of 
violence against women, especially with respect to the passage and amendment of legislation 
and discussions on accepting a national policy on gender.  Nevertheless, these legislative 
changes seemed only to come about after extensive and unwavering lobbying by various 
interest groups and the policy remains a working, yet-to-be finalised and unaccepted document 
reflecting the true intent of those in authority.  Furthermore, the financial commitment seems to 
be sorely lacking on the part of government and is reflective of the priority given to the issue at 
hand.  This chapter will examine what TT has committed to internationally and regionally with 
respect to dealing with domestic violence to gauge the consistency of its international attitude 
with its domestic agenda. 
 
8.2 International Law 
 
8.2.1 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women  
 
One of the most important international conventions on women’s issues was the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) held in 1979.  TT 
signed the convention in 1985 and ratified it in 1990.  As a party to the convention, TT was 
expected to submit to the Secretary-General of the UN, pursuant to Article 18, “a report on the 
legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures” adopted to give effect to the provisions of 
the convention and this was meant to be submitted within one year after the entry into force for 
TT.  Particular reference is made by the Committee to the inclusion of information and data on 
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violence against women.  As mentioned in chapter three above, TT is, regrettably, one of those 
delinquent states and only submitted its combined initial, second and third periodic report in 
January 2001,707 even though it ratified the convention 11 years earlier.708  Its fourth periodic 
report was due on 11 February 2003 but has not yet been submitted.709  The government 
representative stated as the reason for the delay in submitting the report that “no mechanism 
existed to deal with reporting under international human rights treaties and insufficient resources 
had been allocated for that purpose”.710  Insufficient resources result in inaction at many levels 
on many issues and are certainly reflective of government’s position with respect to violence 
against women.   Important, however, was one of the Committee’s many concerns that “despite 
innovative legislation, policies and programmes, violence against women remains a serious 
reality that is being perpetuated by deeply rooted traditional patriarchal attitudes, apparently 
tolerated by society” and also that these “constitute obstacles to the full implementation of the 
Convention”.711 
 
Admittedly, CEDAW does not once mention the word “violence” in the text of the document.  
Nevertheless, at its eleventh session in 1992, the Committee made clear the connection 
between discrimination against women and gender-based violence and recognised that the 
former can only be eliminated in tandem with eradication of the latter as the definition of 
discrimination implicitly includes gender-based violence.712  The Committee also recognised that 
“family violence is one of the most insidious forms of violence against women”.713  With this in 
mind, the Committee urged TT in its report  
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“to place a high priority on measures to address violence against women in the 
family and in society in accordance with the Committee’s general 
recommendation 19 and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women. The Committee recommends that the State party introduce further 
measures to raise public awareness about violence against women and urges 
the State party to strengthen its activities and programmes to focus on sexual 
violence, incest and prostitution”.714 
 
The Gender Affairs Division is currently715 working on the combined fourth and fifth periodic 
report for submission to the Committee which were due on 11 February 2003 and 11 February 
2007 respectively. 
 
With respect to the Optional Protocol, TT indicated that it was not considering accession to it.716 
 
8.2.2 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women  
 
As stated in chapter three, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
(“DEVAW”) was adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1993.  According to the 
draft Gender Policy, TT signed/adopted the declaration in 1994.  There is very little in the way of 
national policy, legal or administrative action to suggest that TT has done anything major in line 
with this declaration.  Steps were taken to amend the Domestic Violence Act and the Sexual 
Offences Act to afford greater power to women but this was not accompanied by the necessary 
institutional capacity building to make them effective enough.  Selected members of the police 
service and the judiciary received training to increase their awareness of the issue but this, too, 
did not seem to have had the desired effect as chapter seven above clearly illustrated.  
Moreover, it would appear that it was the local NGO movement that made these advances 
possible and was not necessarily directly attributable to the declaration. 
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8.2.3 The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action  
 
In 1995, the Women Affairs Division, as it was then, prepared a report for the Fourth World 
Conference on Women.  It again recognised the problem of domestic violence and reported that 
steps were being taken to address the issue, such as the increase in the number of support 
services for both victims and perpetrators and the commencement of male outreach 
programmes.717  The report recognised the need for increased research on the relationship 
between gender-based violence and male dominance in the national context; sensitisation of 
the judiciary, police, health and other professionals with whom victims of domestic violence 
have contact; and greater and strengthened support services and outreach programmes 
specifically targeting men and boys.718  It also noted that domestic violence has the tacit 
acceptance of society as a part of life.719  Legislative changes did not seem to have the intended 
effect of curbing the problem and support services, even though increasing in number, were still 
insufficient.720 
 
The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was adopted unanimously by all countries that 
took part, TT included.  In June 2000, the then Minister of Culture and Gender Affairs, Senator 
the Honourable Daphne Phillips, presented a progress report on TT’s actions and initiatives 
post-Beijing.721  She reported on ten areas in which action was taken, one of them being 
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violence against women.  She spoke of amendments to legislation, the establishment of the 
Domestic Violence Unit and other work undertaken by the Gender Affairs Division.  She ended 
the statement by speaking of the challenges involved in realising the goals of the Beijing 
Platform for Action which included inadequate human and financial resources.  In TT’s response 
to a questionnaire on the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action, more specific 
constraints included:722  
 Financial resources: the budgetary allocation of the Gender Affairs Division is 
inadequate to ideally implement and execute projects and programmes. 
 Human resources: extra technical and administrative staff are needed to ideally carry 
out the increased work load of the division. 
 Limited information sharing: in terms of intra-agency information. 
 Lack of disaggregated data: data from most sectors are not disaggregated. 
 The absence of a fully operationalised Inter-Ministerial Committee: the current 
membership is positioned at varying levels of authority in their respective ministries and 
this affects their ability to influence policy. 
 Ineffective ways of collaboration: there is a need to develop more effective ways of 
collaboration with NGOs intersectorally. 
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8.3 Regional Instruments 
 
8.3.1 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women   
 
The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence 
Against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará) was adopted in June 1994 and signed and 
ratified by TT in November 1995 and May 1996 respectively.  This was an initiative of the Inter-
American Commission of Women (“CIM”), a specialised organisation of the Organization of 
American States, which is the principal forum for generating hemispheric policy to advance 
women's rights and gender equality.723  Established in 1928 at the Sixth International 
Conference of American States (Havana, Cuba), the CIM was the first official intergovernmental 
agency in the world created expressly to ensure recognition of the civil and political rights of 
women.  As such, it has played a crucial role in making the participation and support of women 
a legitimate and indispensable part of governance and international consensus building in the 
Americas.  
  
In 1986, the CIM began an analysis of violence against women which was followed by the 1990 
Inter-American Consultation on Women and Violence, at which it thoroughly examined the topic 
of violence against women and the feasibility of drafting an inter-American convention on the 
subject.724  Emerging from this was the 1994 Convention of Belém do Pará, the first ever treaty 
instrument dealing with violence against women, and a subsequent strategic plan of action 
presented at Beijing which dealt with violence against women as one of ten major areas.   
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In 2001, the CIM commissioned a report on violence in the Americas which examined national 
programs of ten Caribbean countries designed to deal with implementation of the convention.  
With respect to TT, it mentioned government initiatives taken since ratification of the convention.  
This included the strengthening of the National Domestic Violence Unit, support services and 
legislative provisions as well as data collection (including the commencement of gender 
disaggregated data) and sensitisation training for those in direct contact with victims of domestic 
violence.725  The report questioned the institutional capacity to properly support legislative 
changes, such as the ability of the court to enforce protection orders.726  This is a problem which 
continues today.  The authors of the report note quite correctly that  
 
“the implementation of the Convention of Belém do Pará has progressed very 
slowly in all of the Caribbean countries reviewed.  Efforts to prevent, punish and 
eradicate violence against women in the Caribbean have concentrated on 
piecemeal legal reform, initiatives to raise public awareness of the issue, and 
initiatives to sensitise and train local officials.  The provision of emergency 
services to victims of domestic violence, such as a hotline or some form of crisis 
intervention, and the establishment of shelters for women threatened by 
domestic violence were responsibilities largely left to the private and volunteer 
sectors… Some emphasis has been placed on offering training and education 
to the officials and professionals on whom victims of gender-based violence 
must rely for protection, help, information, financial assistance, and redress.  
These initiatives, unfortunately, were rarely sustained… 
 
Social attitudes and cultural practices have also created powerful obstacles that 
have tended to be ignored at least as often as they were confronted.  
Governments have relied very heavily on nongovernmental organizations and 
women’s groups to offer the most basic level of support and assistance to 
women victims of violence.  However, they have done so in ways that often 
ignore the fact that these organizations are themselves relying totally on their 
limited ability to raise their own funding and to recruit volunteers”.727 
 
As a member of the Organization of American States, TT submitted its third national biennial 
report to the Inter-American Commission of Women in August 2006 dealing with seven areas of 
relevance, one of which dealt with violence against women.  This section mentioned the 
establishment of the domestic violence unit, the 24 hour hotline and the development of a 
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systematic format for domestic violence data collection.728  Unfortunately, the above analysis of 
the status of the implementation of the Convention of Belém do Pará remains true still. 
 
8.3.2 Charter of Civil Society for the Caribbean Community 
 
At a Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community at their Special Meeting 
in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, in October 1992, the various governments adopted the 
recommendation of the West Indian Commission that a Charter of Civil Society for the 
Caribbean Community be subscribed to by Member States of the Community.729  This “oft-
forgotten Regional instrument”730 was adopted on 19 February 1997731 by member countries of 
Caricom, Trinidad and Tobago included, and seeks “to ensure continuing respect for 
internationally recognised civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights” as well as to 
“respect the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual without distinction as to 
age, colour, creed, disability, ethnicity, gender, language, place of birth or origin, political 
opinion, race, religion or social class”.  Article XII, in particular, deals with the “promotion of 
policies and measures aimed at strengthening gender equality” and states categorically that 
“all women have equal rights with men in the political, civil, economic, social and cultural 
spheres”.  Sub-article (d) provides for “legal protection including just and effective remedies 
against domestic violence, sexual abuse and sexual harassment”.  
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While specific mention is made of the right of women to legal protection and effective remedies 
against domestic violence, it would appear that the existence of the Charter is not well known, 
therefore, application of the principles by signatory countries is unlikely.  Moreover, there is no 
documentation to suggest that it has been taken into account. 
 
8.4 Conclusion  
 
Several observations can be made about the conduct of TT at the international level, three of 
which are important here.  TT takes a long time to officially accept international law addressing 
gender issues, such as reflected in its taking eleven years to ratify CEDAW, which is the primary 
international legal instrument seeking to address gender issues.  It must be noted, however, that 
TT showed a greater sense of alacrity in ratifying the Convention of Belém do Pará and 
adopting the Charter of Civil Society for the Caribbean Community.  After accepting its 
international obligations by ratification of the international instrument, it lags behind in its 
reporting duties, as again illustrated by its conduct towards the implementation of CEDAW.  The 
first report was due in 1991 and was submitted in 2002 as a combined initial, second and third 
where the second two were due in 1995 and 1999.  No further reports have yet been submitted 
by TT.  At the national level, no real attempt has been made to enact the international 
obligations contained in CEDAW in domestic law thereby denying women the benefit of having 
those provisions enacted.  CEDAW remains of no legal effect as it must be incorporated into 
national statutory law.  It is a fair conclusion that the malaise displayed by TT at the domestic 
level is certainly mirrored in its international behaviour and vice versa.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
9.0 Conclusion 
 
This thesis sought to examine the effectiveness of law as a tool to achieve gender equality and 
address the problem of domestic violence in TT.  Research has shown that passing legislation 
alone is clearly not enough, but must be complemented by an effective institutional framework 
and well trained human resource component to make implementation and enforcement of the 
law workable.  In the absence of government commitment to provide a comprehensive 
framework for achieving gender equality and protection of women against domestic violence, 
there would appear to be very little else that can forge positive change. 
 
9.1 Gender Equality and the Law in TT 
 
The legislative framework of TT ostensibly provides for gender equality.  The supreme law, the 
Constitution, provides women a circumscribed right to equality.  As mentioned in chapter five, 
sections 4(b) and (d) ensure the right of the individual to equality before the law and equality of 
treatment from any public authority in the exercise of its functions in such a capacity.  These 
rights to equality are with specific reference to treatment of individuals by the state and its 
representatives and do not guarantee general sexual equality, such as equality between men 
and women at the workplace.  Attempting to infer general gender equality from the Constitution 
may prove tricky, given the specifics of Section 4.  Constitution aside, the general legal 
framework seems controlling and patronising and lacks the ability to promote gender equality on 
a broad level.  The statutory legal framework for gender seems very much to reflect an elitist 
attitude on the part of those responsible for creating and enacting the various pieces of 
legislation.  This mirrors what obtained during the colonial period where laws were enacted to 
serve the interest of the elite in one way or another.  Even current attempts to create equality in 
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law seem to work against women, as laws written with gender neutrality in mind, such as the 
Domestic Violence Act, seem to detract from the importance of the scourge it is attempting to 
prevent.   
 
9.2 The Role of NGOs in TT 
 
The challenges of the legal framework notwithstanding, the role of NGOs in providing 
assistance to and promoting the protection of women against domestic violence must be 
recognised.  NGOs in TT consist of three major types.  The support service groups provide 
emotional support for dealing with post-violence experiences, although the quality of the support 
provided has been brought into question.  This is certainly not to decry the support that is 
provided, but perhaps with assistance from the state, it could be improved.  The second group 
consists of NGOs that provide shelter to those in fear of their lives from domestic violence.  This 
is an essential facility, which in TT, is largely funded by private individuals.  Proper funding from 
the state would assist in many ways, one of which is housing not only persons who are the 
victims of domestic violence but also entire families if necessary.  Moreover, women who elect 
to leave situations of domestic violence need expert psychological assistance and job training to 
develop the means to be independent of the abuser.  While shelters do provide these, it may not 
be enough.  For a shelter to fulfil these needs, they either turn to the state where funding is 
derisory or to private corporations.  In both instances, the true needs of the victims are not met 
and this is perhaps why the available shelters would appear to be underutilised.  In addition, 
when women seek shelter, it would appear that they sometimes have no where to go when they 
leave, mostly due to financial problems.  This issue of post-shelter housing and a support 
system to help monitor women’s progress or simply provide assistance along the way seems to 
be lacking. 
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The research and advocacy groups have had some success in raising awareness of the 
problem of domestic violence among the population and in effecting legislative changes in 
favour of women.  These changes were viewed as real victories because they went to the root 
of male-female relationships to have marital rape and domestic violence officially recognised as 
problems by the legislature, thereby traversing the public-private divide into the previously-
protected realm of the family.  In chapter eight, it was noted that TT indicated that it was not 
considering accession to the Optional Protocol to CEDAW.  Perhaps the research and 
advocacy groups could lobby the TT government to accede to the Protocol.  However, would 
accession to the Protocol assist women in their struggle against gender inequality and domestic 
violence?  It most likely would not, given the government’s general response to CEDAW itself.  
TT is a signatory but has taken no positive steps towards implementing the convention or 
incorporating it into domestic law.  Why would it then take steps to implement the Protocol which 
provides for specificity with respect to the main convention?  Government commitment with 
respect to women’s issues seems to be severely lacking. 
 
It has become obvious that where the state falls short with respect to promoting women’s 
interests, such as seen with the protection of women against domestic violence, that NGOs 
have featured prominently in filling in these gaps.   A study by Alvarez on several Latin 
American countries revealed a trend by states of “sub-contracting” their responsibilities to 
NGOs, from policy assessment to service delivery.732  This points to an effective abdication of 
state responsibility, but the claim of limited or even no resources has given rise to this 
development.  Nevertheless, in TT, NGOs are not even sub-contracted for the roles they play.  It 
simply falls to the NGOs to effect service delivery without recompense.  While this has its 
advantages (such as not being seen as a state pawn and allowing NGOs to be more effective 
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political actors), it means that NGOs perform these services with limited resources, and more 
specifically, without state support. 
 
9.3 The Colonial Legacy of Legal Elitism   
 
The actual national legal and institutional response reflects this lack of commitment despite the 
government rhetoric espoused at various forums.  Legislative changes at the national level in 
favour of women’s rights seemed only to have come about due to the unwavering efforts of 
support and advocacy groups.  Moreover, the general statutory legal framework for gender 
seems very much to reflect an elitist attitude on the part of those responsible for creating and 
enacting the various pieces of legislation.  This is due in large part to TT’s colonial legal heritage 
that witnessed the enactment of laws during the colonial period that served the interest of the 
ruling elite in one way or another.  This elitism has been perpetuated in the post-independence 
era by replacing class elitism of the former era with gender elitism in the current one.  As 
mentioned earlier, current attempts to create equality in law seem to work against women, as 
laws written with gender neutrality in mind, such as the Domestic Violence Act, seem to detract 
from the importance of the scourge it is attempting to prevent.  Even though the Domestic 
Violence Act was passed with much fanfare and heralded as a potent weapon to combat abuse 
of women, it has not quite lived up to such lofty expectations, as it contains many deficiencies 
that undermine its effectiveness.  In addition, the concomitant institutional framework to render 
the law effective was not put in place.  TT seems to have created a relatively ineffective 
statutory scheme to combat domestic violence.     
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9.4 The Institutional Response  
 
Institutionally, as mentioned previously, the response seems equally poor.  State institutions, 
such as the Magistracy and the Police Service, are poorly equipped and funded to deal with 
domestic violence and this is a mere reflection of TT’s lack of concern with the “softer” issues, 
such as protection of women.  Government’s alleged commitment to dealing with domestic 
violence is not reflected in the amount of funding made available to state institutions to address 
the problem in a real way.  The necessary human resource training for those who deal directly 
with women victims of domestic violence has been sporadic at best causing women to appear 
to prefer the least possible personally interactive route to protection - applying for a protection 
order.  Insensitivity and apathy on the part of government officials have been general 
responses, however, this would be due to their experience in dealing with family situations.  
Unfortunately, women are partially at fault with respect to the institutional response as they have 
been known to suffer changes of heart when sentencing and/or jail time comes around for the 
abuser.  While this should in no way negatively affect the institutional response to victims of 
domestic violence, it certainly presents a real complication.  With respect to NGOs, as 
mentioned earlier, they provide an array of services designed to assist women; however, they 
too are poorly funded and sometimes insensitive to the abused who seek their help.  Their 
reliance on state largesse to achieve their objectives of protection of women from domestic 
violence would appear to be misguided.  The situation in TT necessarily points to the need for 
women to seek to understand their peculiar role in protecting their vulnerable sisters from 
domestic violence and to seek to find the solutions from within their sphere of power rather than 
rely on a male post-colonial elite.   
 
These issues appear to permeate all levels.  The international legal and institutional response is 
similar, if not worse than what obtains nationally given the very nature of the international 
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system of governance.  Law created at this level is not binding in the strict sense and 
implementation and enforcement present their own difficulties.  Even gaining consensus on 
articles for inclusion in treaties is complicated, as participating countries bring their own 
prejudices to the table.  As noted with CEDAW, it has the largest number of reservations 
entered, reflecting States Parties’ unwillingness to accept the full scope of obligations stated in 
the instrument.  How, therefore, can international law be deemed a serious means of promoting 
change at the national level? 
 
Once again, it would appear that even at the international level, NGOs are largely responsible 
for the “legal successes” in international law-making with respect to the advancement of 
women’s concerns.  In chapter three, it was noted that DEVAW owed its genesis chiefly to the 
advocacy activities of NGOs.  BPFA, a successor to CEDAW, highlighted the growing 
significance of NGOs as an agent of change in the international attitude to women’s rights.  The 
unprecedented gathering of over 30,000 NGO representatives in the unofficial NGO Forum 
provided a powerful voice that resonated throughout the official meeting.  The institutional efforts 
of NGOs reflect the “bottom-up” approach as it includes grass roots NGOs and NGO networks.  
The very nature of NGOs, where membership is generally exclusive of states, ensures that 
issues can be ventilated without the constraining influence of states.     
 
While NGOs do have the power to effect change at the international and national levels, the 
individual domestic context can significantly contribute to or impede the success of such efforts.   
Risse and Sikkink’s model of socialisation, dealt with in chapter four above, seems to offer a 
possible way around the inherent ineffectiveness of international law with respect to human 
rights abuses and issues at the national level.  Global civil society has been known to effectively 
play the naming and shaming game to provoke positive responses at the level of the state.  It is 
important to note, however, that this model applies to highly oppressive and abusive regimes 
and may not, therefore, be applicable to countries under democratic rule.   
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TT seems to be one of those countries which will be left unaffected as it has never been under 
authoritarian rule.  As a developing country, it prioritises the issues placed on the national 
agenda and human rights / women’s rights certainly do not fare well in this regard.  Measures 
have, in fact, been taken to sign and ratify human rights conventions and women-specific 
conventions and have even been incorporated into domestic law in one way or another.  The 
problem lies with the lack of political will which translates into inadequate resources for 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement procedures.  Current political and economic 
events in TT may be conspiring to work against the fortification of this political will to deal with 
‘softer’ legal issues, although, this could be said to be true of TT throughout its post-
independence history.  TT has a hydrocarbon based economy and is at this time one of the 
countries benefiting from record oil prices and the economy is booming.   Government attention 
is, and has always been, therefore, on developing the hydrocarbon sector as well as the 
upstream and downstream industries and associated economic growth with little focus on 
issues that do not have adverse effects on such growth.  Women’s rights and domestic violence 
are not seen as directly relevant to TT’s current growth spurt and will therefore continue to be 
marginalised as a policy issue.  These reasons all contribute to the inefficacy of international law 
and even domestic law to forge positive and sustained changes in women’s quest for equal 
treatment and protection against domestic violence. 
 
9.5 Challenges at the Level of the UN 
 
The actual UN institutional structure for advancement of women’s rights is affected by major 
obstacles that undermine its ability to foster real and meaningful change.  The analysis of the 
UN system points to the lack of enforcement capabilities regarding state compliance with 
international legal obligations, such as reporting under CEDAW.  Inability to enforce coupled 
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with budgetary and procedural restrictions severely fetters UN bodies’ capacity for 
effectiveness.  In the absence of the UN’s ability to perform enforcement and monitoring 
functions, however, NGOs have an extremely important role to play here as they can remind 
states of their obligations under international law and continue to ‘persuade’ them to give effect 
to these obligations at the national level.  As noted in chapter four, this has been done with 
positive effects in many states. 
 
9.6 TT’s Response to Its International Law Commitments  
 
TT’s response to international law instruments and its commitment to adhering to such 
instruments are telling.  TT takes a long time to officially accept international law instruments 
addressing gender issues, such as evidenced by an eleven year delay in ratifying CEDAW, 
which is the primary international legal instrument seeking to address gender issues.  It 
seemed, however, to show a greater sense of alacrity in ratifying and adopting regional 
instruments, such as the Convention of Belém do Pará and the Charter of Civil Society for the 
Caribbean Community, although nothing came of these either.  Even when TT accepted its 
international obligations by ratification of CEDAW, it showed little real commitment in its 
reporting duties.  The first report was due in 1991 and was submitted in 2002 as a combined 
initial, second and third report where the second two were due in 1995 and 1999 respectively.  
No further reports have yet been submitted by TT.  At the national level, no real attempt has 
been made to enact the international obligations contained in CEDAW in domestic law thereby 
denying women the benefit of having those provisions enacted.  CEDAW continues to remain of 
no legal effect as it must first be incorporated into national statutory law.  It is a fair conclusion 
that the malaise displayed by TT at the domestic level is certainly mirrored in its international 
behaviour and vice versa.  
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9.7 Limitations of International Law to Effect Change at the National Level: The Problem 
of Male Bias 
 
The analysis of the international legal and institutional response to women’s rights shows limited 
success.  The “top-down” approach which promotes the use of international law as a 
mechanism for promoting national behaviour would appear to find little support for 
revolutionising the women’s rights agenda.  The weaknesses of the “top-down” approach must 
be properly understood if the international community is going to play a meaningful role in 
promoting and facilitating women’s rights.    
 
These poor legal and institutional responses are exacerbated by the fact that an examination of 
the systems of governance at the international and national levels illustrate that they are both 
inherently masculine in nature.  Naturally, legislative frameworks created from within such 
systems reflect this bias and would also account for the lack of political will in promoting 
women’s issues.  While international human rights conventions have evolved over time and are 
indeed becoming increasingly inclusive, human rights are not necessarily synonymous with 
women’s rights and have not included the notion of gender; human rights would seem to be the 
human rights of men.  At the international level, this is perhaps because early international law 
was predicated on Western theological notions and the role of women was accorded little or no 
significance.  That notwithstanding, the situation did not change perceptibly in the Renaissance 
period when international law assumed a more secular character.  This period emphasised the 
notion of sovereignty and rights, but rights as applicable to men.  Continued bias at the level of 
the state in international law has circumscribed the inclusion of women’s rights as part of 
general human rights discussions.  At the national level in TT, such male bias seems to be a 
direct result of its colonial legal heritage which bestowed on the legal system an entrenched 
sense of elitism with gender representing the new category for discrimination. 
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Within this peculiar post-colonial context, the male elite emerges as the defining influence in the 
development of the national legal system.  The relationship between political representation, 
power and lack of political will has been borne out by the research conducted.  Women in TT 
are poorly represented in the power structure and limited support is derived from the State in 
women’s attempt to deal with gender issues.  In the specific study of domestic violence in TT as 
a breach of women’s fundamental right and ability to achieve equal treatment before the law, 
the male bias infuses the legal and institutional regime for addressing this aspect of women’s 
fundamental rights and is translated into the system’s inefficient and inadequate nature.  It 
would appear, however, that when women occupy a meaningful place in governance structure, 
they can certainly strike significant blows against gender inequality.733  This, however, may not 
necessarily be the case when women have power in the context of such power being based on 
strong male support.  Indira Gandhi ruled India for many years but did little for promoting the 
equality of women in India.  This is due largely to the fact that she understood the religious and 
social forces that underlay her power and she was unwilling to threaten such bases as it would 
have resulted in her political demise.734     
 
9.9 Efficacy of Law as an Agent of Change 
 
Law as an agent of change has not proven quite effective in promoting gender equality or in 
protecting women against domestic violence in Trinidad and Tobago, either from efforts at the 
level of the state or from the regional and international levels.  While legislation seems to have 
been passed and amended largely through the unwavering efforts of NGOs, the concomitant 
                                               
733
 See the case of Finland, for example.  See Parliament of Finland [online], “Women Members of 
Finland’s Parliament”.  Last updated 08 March 2006. [cited 25 May 2007].  Available from Internet: 
http://www.parliament.fi/efakta/opas/tiedotus/naisede.htm. 
734
 See for example also Amrita Basu, “Introduction”, in A. Basu (ed), The Challenge of Local 
Feminisms: Women’s Movements in Global Perspectives (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1995), p. 15 
where she states that politicians make platform promises but ultimately bow to pressures from 
conservative and religious groups. 
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institutional capacity building and/or strengthening was not forthcoming, thereby nullifying the 
positive potential of the law; nevertheless, the role of NGOs in effecting change and in providing 
support should in no way be understated, despite the constraints they face.  Trinidad and 
Tobago’s colonial heritage, however, further exacerbated the problem, as it bequeathed a legal 
legacy of entrenched class elitism which provided a ready framework in the post-independence 
era for the perpetuation of this elitism, this time with a gender slant, where laws tend to be 
written by and for the elite with little real reference to a gender perspective.  This reflects 
unequal power relationships at various levels and has translated into a patent lack of political 
will, creating even more obstacles in women’s struggle for gender equality and protection 
against domestic violence.  
 
The statutory legal framework for gender in TT seems very much to reflect an elitist attitude on 
the part of those responsible for creating and enacting the various pieces of legislation.  This is 
certainly in keeping with what obtained during the colonial period where laws were enacted to 
serve the interest of the elite in one way or another.  Some 150 pieces of legislation in the post-
colonial era have been cited as having some significant reference to gender; yet, when 
analysed, they do not lend themselves to the creation of a legal framework that accommodates 
gender equality in a real manner.  This is directly attributable to the fact that the male elite 
responsible for enacting legislation does not take into account the particular needs of women.  
Feminist legal theory and feminist critical theory were used to expose the masculine nature of 
law and practice which create inherent difficulties in trying to achieve gender equality especially 
in the absence of legal and institutional reform as well as offer possible ways of addressing the 
situation.   
 
More specifically, domestic violence was dealt with as a subset of gender and its treatment in 
the law provided an important indicator.  In TT, domestic violence is largely dominated by the 
abuse of women.  Although data with respect to domestic violence is not sex disaggregated, 
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anecdotal evidence and interviews indicated that the vast majority of orders sought pursuant to 
the Domestic Violence Act are by women.  Legislating a system to deal with domestic violence, 
therefore, should necessarily take these facts into consideration to provide real and effective 
relief for those whom the act was intended to serve.   
 
Various NGOs were quick to highlight the problems arising from male elitism and male 
domination.  They invariably cited the insensitivity of state personnel who interacted with victims 
of domestic violence and their inability to be more accommodating.  One NGO in particular 
formed support groups to accompany victims to court as the administration of justice in 
domestic violence cases seems to have the effect of preserving and promoting gender 
hierarchies, disempowering complainants, and has even been described as punishment.735  The 
Magisterial Court process is very user-unfriendly to women victims of domestic violence.  The 
Family Court, however, offers a service that might prove much less traumatic if the court were to 
allow hearings primarily on domestic violence and not as incidental to family relations. 
 
Nevertheless, the politics of emancipation depends on a legal framework geared towards 
gender equality supported by the inclusion of women’s voices from within the governance 
structure.  Activists play an equally important, if not greater, role from without in realising the true 
emancipatory potential of law.  Once activists are able to use their power of ‘persuasion’ and 
Keck and Sikkink’s “accountability politics”736 to effect legislative change at the national level, 
they can be said to have partially realised the emancipatory potential of law.  Partially, since 
legislative change requires an effective concomitant institutional framework to give effect to the 
new legal provisions.   
 
                                               
735
 See Lazarus-Black, “The Rite of Domination”, pp. 4, 13, 27. 
736
 See Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, pp. 24-25.   
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9.10 Effecting Change 
 
The effectiveness of international law depends on understanding the dynamics of the issue 
which is the subject of international law.  To ensure an international law regime that can deal 
with a specific problem, it is necessary to understand the elements that may undermine its 
effectiveness.  The attitude of TT, with particular reference to its lack of political will coloured by 
patent male bias and its focus on the hydrocarbon sector to the detriment of ‘softer’ (non-
economic [read: gender]) issues, amply illustrates why international law may not always have 
the desired effect at the national level.  In understanding such a domestic contextual 
background, international law makers can anticipate and, possibly, address obstacles to effect 
successful international law regimes.  Moreover, this study also illustrated the very inherently 
gendered nature of both international relations and international (and domestic) law which 
compounds the ability of the international community and domestic governments to even 
recognise the problem and therefore be able to deal with it. 
 
In light of the government’s unwillingness to take up the cause on behalf of women, it stands to 
reason, therefore, that gender equality and protection against domestic violence as fundamental 
human rights must flow in no small part from the struggle of women.  Women, particularly from 
the developing world, must be wary of the “top-down” approach in relying on the international 
community to provide the necessary impetus for the achievement of gender equality.  
International conventions have proven to be somewhat myopic.  These legal instruments have 
remained rather restrained in their ability to improve, or even affect, the condition of women and 
are criticised as representing little more than statements of good intentions on behalf of the 
parties to the international conventions.737  Yet, the international trends are predictable as the 
majority of nations are developing countries and the real power structure is held in most cases 
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 Reanda, “Human Rights and Women’s Rights”, p. 21. 
 279
by the male elite even where there are female Heads of State.738  Women cannot wholly 
depend on the international community to gain gender equality and the analysis of the 
international legal regime and the UN readily demonstrates how limited such reliance can be. 
 
There must be no fear of dealing with the issue of gender even where it may delve into the 
realm of the personal relations between men and women.  The difficulty of interfering in an area 
which has traditionally been outside the scope of state intervention must be overcome.  States 
must take responsibility domestically and internationally for the actions and human rights 
abuses of private citizens within this private realm.739  Failing to do so would sanction an 
approach to gender relations that perpetuates violence towards women, as illustrated by 
domestic violence. 
 
The situation is admittedly bleak.  How to break the cycle of gender inequality and domestic 
violence?  Important to the process are education to change traditional and (often) 
discriminatory attitudes, training, legal literacy, adequate gender representation in top policy 
making positions and the provision of resources, financial and otherwise, which, if provided, 
would indicate political will at the level of the state.  This political will can be forced through the 
application of pressure from above and below.  The role of NGOs again comes to the fore here 
as they have an important role in fostering change and making sure that it is sustainable. 
   
                                               
738
 Steans, Gender and International Relations: An Introduction, p. 5. 
739
 Deutz, “Gender and International Human Rights”, p. 36. 
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APPENDIX A  
Existing Legislative Framework Relating to Gender in Trinidad and Tobago 
 
A.1 CONTROL 
 
Jury Act (Chap. 6:53), 1980 Rev. 
4. (2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), a married woman shall be qualified to be a juror if -  
(a) her husband is qualified to be a juror; and 
(b) she possesses the qualifications specified in subsection (1)(a) and (d). 
 
8.  (2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), a married woman who is qualified to serve as a juror 
under section 4(2), shall be liable to serve as a special juror, if her husband is qualified and 
liable to serve as such a juror. 
 
22. (1) Notwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary any Judge before whom any 
cause is called on for trial may, in his discretion, on an application made by or on behalf of the 
parties…or any of them, or at his own instance, make an order that the jury shall be composed 
of men only, or may, on an application made by a woman to be exempted from service on a jury 
in respect of any case by reason of the nature of the evidence likely to be given or of the issues 
to be tried, grant such exemption. 
 
Post Office Savings Bank Act (Chap. 79:04), 1980 Rev. 
13. (1) The Minister may make regulations for the management of the Savings Bank. …the 
regulations may -  
(e) regulate deposits by minors,…married women… 
(f) prescribe conditions for the withdrawal of moneys by minors,…married women… 
 
 
A.2 BENEVOLENCE  
 
Airports Authority Act (Chap. 49:02), 1980 Rev. 
11. Without prejudice to the generality of section 10, the Pension Scheme may enable the 
Authority to –  
(a) grant gratuities, pensions or superannuation allowances to, or to the widows, 
families or dependants of, its officers and employees… 
(c) enter into and carry into effect agreements with any insurance company or other 
association or company for securing to any such officer or employee, or his widow, 
family or dependant such gratuities, pensions or allowances as are by this section 
authorised to be granted… 
 
34. (2) With respect to any search made pursuant to subsection (1) -  
(b) except where the search is made by means of a mechanical or electrical or 
electronic or other similar device, no person shall be searched except by another 
person of the same sex. 
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Assisted Secondary School Teachers’ Pensions Act (Chap. 39:03), 1980 Rev. 
14. (2) Where a teacher in the teaching service in an assisted secondary school dies as a 
result of injuries received -  
 …the President may, in addition to the grant, if any made under section 13 to the legal 
personal representative of the deceased teacher or to his dependants, grant a pension to the 
dependants of the deceased teacher… 
 (3) The following pensions at the rates specified are authorised under this section: 
(a) when the deceased teacher leaves a widow, a pension may be granted to her while 
she is unmarried and of good character at a rate not exceeding ten-sixtieths of his 
salary…at the date of the injury… 
(e) when the deceased teacher does not leave a widow, or if no pension is granted to 
his widow, and if his mother was wholly or mainly dependant on him for her 
support, a pension may be granted to the mother, while she is of good character 
and without  adequate means of support… 
(4) Notwithstanding subsection (3) –  
(b) in the case of a pension granted under subsection (3)(e) - 
 (i) if the mother is a widow at the time of the grant of the pension and 
subsequently remarries the pension shall cease as from the date of re-
marriage; and  
 (ii) if it appears to the President at any time that the mother is adequately 
provided with other means of support, the pension shall cease as from such 
date as the President may determine; 
(c) a pension granted in respect of a female child under subsection (3) shall cease 
upon the marriage of the child under the age of eighteen years. 
 
Assisted Secondary School Teachers’ Pensions Regulations, deemed to be made pursuant to 
section 15(1) of the Assisted Secondary School Teachers’ Pensions Act 
5. (1) Where a female teacher in teaching service in Trinidad and Tobago, having 
completed not less than five years teaching service retires from the service for the reason that 
she has married or is about to marry, and is not eligible for the grant of any pension or otherwise 
eligible for a gratuity under these Regulations, she may be granted on production within six 
months after her retirement…of satisfactory evidence of her marriage, a gratuity… 
 
Auxiliary Fire Service Act (Chap. 35:54), 1980 Rev. 
15. (1) The Minister may make such regulations as he considers necessary…- 
(h) the grant…of a pension or gratuity to the widow, children or other dependants of 
any member who dies from injuries received as a result and in the course of the 
performance of his duties without his own neglect… 
 
Chaguaramas Development Authority Act (Chap. 35:02), 1980 Rev. 
11. Without prejudice to the generality of section 10, the Pension Scheme may enable the 
Authority to –  
(a) grant gratuities, pensions or superannuation allowances to, or to the widows, 
families or dependants of, their employees… 
(c) enter into and carry into effect agreements with any insurance company or other 
association or company for securing to any such employee, widow, family or 
dependant such gratuities, pensions or allowances as are by this section 
authorised to be granted… 
 
Children Act (Chap. 46:01), as amended by Acts No. 19 of 1994 and 68 of 2000 
8. (1) If any person having the custody, charge, or care of a child or young person under 
the age of sixteen years causes or encourages the seduction or prostitution or unlawful carnal of 
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that child or young person, he is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for five 
years. 
(2) For the purpose of this section, a person is deemed to have caused or encouraged the 
seduction or prostitution or unlawful carnal knowledge (as the case may be) of a girl who has 
been seduced or has become a prostitute or has been unlawfully carnally known, if he 
knowingly allowed the girl to consort with, or to enter or continue in the employment of, any 
prostitute or person of known immoral character. 
 
9. (1) Where it is shown to the satisfaction of a Magistrate, on the complaint of any person, that 
a child or young person under the age of eighteen years is, with the knowledge of her parent or 
guardian, exposed to the risk of seduction or prostitution or of being unlawfully carnally known or 
living a life of prostitution, the Magistrate may adjudge her parent or guardian to enter into a 
recognisance to exercise due care and supervision in respect of the child or young person. 
 
44. (1) Any person may, without a warrant, bring before a Magistrate any person apparently 
under the age of eighteen who - … 
(f) is the child of a person who has been convicted of an offence under section 6 or 12 
of the Sexual Offences Act in respect of any of his children;… 
(h) is…living in circumstances calculated to cause, encourage, or favour the seduction 
or prostitution of the child… 
 
Civil Aviation Act, No. 11 of 2001 
31. (1) When an employee of the Authority who had exercised the option referred to in 
section 26(1)(b) dies, retires, is retrenched or his post in the Authority is abolished and he was a 
member of the pension fund plan, he or his estate shall be paid superannuation benefits by the 
pension fund plan at an amount which when combined with the superannuation benefits 
payable under section 29 is equivalent to the benefits based on his pensionable service in the 
Public Service combined with his service in the Authority and calculated at his salary applicable 
to him on the date of his death, retirement, abolition of his office or retrenchment. 
 
Civil Service Act (Chap. 23:01), 1980 Rev. 
32. Whenever a public officer dies the Minister shall order that a month’s salary of the officer, 
from the date of his death, shall be paid to his widow or to his children or other next of kin. 
 
Civil Service (Amendment) Regulations, LN No. 217 of 1996, made pursuant to section 28 of 
the Civil Service Act 
149. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subregulation (1), an officer who -  
(e) commits any immoral, obscene or disorderly conduct in the office… 
commits an act of misconduct. 
 
Civil Service Regulations, made pursuant to section 28 of the Civil Service Act 
14. (1) Married women may be recruited on a permanent basis into the Civil Service and 
female officers shall not be required to resign their appointment on marriage. 
 
53. For the purposes of this Part, “family” shall be taken to mean an officer’s wife and children, 
his mother, father, brothers, sisters, who are living with and are dependent on him. 
 
88. (1) Maternity leave consisting of leave with full pay for one month followed by leave with 
half pay for two months shall be granted to female officers… 
 (2) This regulation also applies to acting and temporary officers subject to the following 
provisions: 
(a) the officer must complete twelve (12) months of service before she can become 
eligible for maternity leave… 
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(4) The grant of maternity leave or of no-pay leave on account of pregnancy shall not be a 
consideration for the termination of the services of any temporary or acting officer… 
 
College of Science, Technology and Applied Arts of Trinidad and Tobago Act, No. 77 of 2000 
34. (1) Where an employee who…dies or retires or is retrenched or his post in the College is 
abolished prior to the establishment of the pension fund plan and at the date of his death, 
retirement, retrenchment or the abolition of his post, he was in receipt of a higher salary than the 
pay, pensionable emoluments or salary referred to in section 33, the superannuation benefits 
payable to the employee or his estate shall be based on the higher salary. 
 
35. (1) When an employee who had exercised the option under section 29(5)(a) or who had 
transferred in accordance with the provisions of section 30 and who is eligible for 
superannuation benefits under a pension law and is a member of the pension fund plan dies, 
retires or is retrenched or his post in the College is abolished, he or his estate shall be paid 
superannuation benefits by the pension fund plan at an amount which when combined with the 
superannuation benefits payable under section 33 is equivalent to the benefits based on his 
pensionable service in the College and calculated at the final salary applicable to him on the 
date of his death, retirement, retrenchment or the abolition of his office. 
 
Corporal Punishment (Offenders Over 18) Act (Chap. 13:04), as amended by Acts No. 66 of 
2000 and 18 of 2005740 
2. Any male offender, above the age of eighteen years, on being convicted before the High 
Court of any of the offences mentioned in the Schedule, may be ordered by the Court to be 
flogged in addition to any other punishment to which he is liable. 
 
Schedule. Offences for which an Offender may be Ordered to be Flogged. 
2. Any offence wherein the offender committed or attempted to commit an assault involving 
the use of any corrosive fluid or any destructive or explosive substance with intent to disfigure or 
do any grievous bodily harm to any person or had in his possession such fluid or substance with 
the intention and for the purposes aforesaid. 
 4. Rape. 
 5. Any attempt to commit the offences specified in paragraphs 3 and 4. 
 6. Incest. 
 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, No. 21 of 1999 
3. In this Act -  
“criminal injury” or “injury” includes any harm or damage done to a person’s physical or mental 
condition as a result of a crime listed in the First Schedule, any disease deliberately, 
recklessly or negligently inflicted on another person and pregnancy arising out of rape; 
“dependant” means -  
(a) a spouse or former spouse who was being maintained by the victim at the time of 
the victim’s death; 
(b) a person who was living in a cohabitational relationship with the victim for not less 
than three years before his death; 
(d) a person who at the time of the victim’s death was financially dependant on him; 
 
First Schedule 
Crimes to which this Act Applies 
(h) Offences under the Sexual Offences Act. 
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 Corporal Punishment (Offenders not over 16) Act (Chap. 13:03), 1980 Rev. was repealed by Act No. 
66 of 2000. 
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Criminal Procedure Act (Chap. 12:02), 1980 Rev. 
62. (1) Where a woman convicted of an offence punishable with death is found in 
accordance with this section to be pregnant, the sentence to be passed on her shall be a 
sentence of imprisonment for life instead of sentence of death. 
 
Customs Act (Chap. 78:01), 1980 Rev. 
66. A female shall not be searched except by a female. 
 
Defence Act (Chap. 14:01), 1980 Rev. 
167. (1) Where a court has made an order against any person…for the payment of any 
periodical or other sums specified in the order for or in respect of -  
(a) the maintenance of his wife or child or of any illegitimate child of whom he is the 
putative father… 
 
168. (1) Where the Chief of Defence Staff or an officer authorised by him is satisfied that an 
officer or other rank is neglecting without reasonable cause to maintain his wife or any child of 
his under the age of sixteen, the Chief of Defence Staff or officer may order such sum to be 
deducted from his pay and appropriated towards the maintenance of his wife or child as the 
Chief of Defence Staff or officer thinks fit. 
 
Defence (Pensions, Terminal and Other Grants) Regulations, LN No. 38 of 1968 
11. (1) Where an officer or other rank dies while in the service of the Force and at the date 
of his death has completed ten years qualifying service, there shall be paid -  
(a) if he is survived only by a widow, to that widow, the terminal grant to which such 
officer or other rank would have been entitled had he retired at the date of his death 
and a pension while she remains unmarried… 
 
Defence (Short Service Commissions) Regulations, LN No. 104 of 1987 
19. Where an officer dies while in the service of the Force and at the date of his death he has 
completed ten years reckonable service, the gratuity and pension for which he would have been 
eligible had he retired at the date of his death shall be paid in accordance with regulation 11 of 
the 1968 Regulations. 
 
20. (1) Where an officer dies while in the service of the Force but before he has completed 
ten years reckonable service, there shall be paid to his widow or orphans or to both such widow 
and orphans or where appropriate, to his legal personal representative, a special gratuity… 
 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Identification Act, No. 27 of 2000741 
34. A qualified person who takes a tissue sample or bodily substance from another person - 
(a) shall ensure that -  
 (i) it is taken in circumstances affording reasonable privacy to that other person; 
 (ii) it is taken in the presence or view of a person who is of the same sex as that 
other person; 
 (iii) it is not taken in the presence or view of a person whose presence is not 
necessary for the purpose of taking the tissue sample or bodily substance; 
 (iv) the taking does not involve the removal of more clothing than is necessary; 
and 
 (v) the taking does not involve more visual inspection than is necessary; 
(b) shall ensure that the procedure -  
 (i) is carried out in a manner consistent with appropriate medical or other 
relevant professional standards; 
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 (ii) is not carried out in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner… 
 
Education (Teaching Service) Regulations, as amended by LN No. 184 of 2000, made pursuant 
to section 85(11) of the Education Act (Chap. 39:01) 
32. In these Regulations “family” shall be taken to mean a teacher’s wife and children, his 
mother, father, brothers, sisters, who are living with and are dependant on him. 
 
48. Three months’ maternity leave, the first month on full-pay and the succeeding two months 
on half-pay commencing approximately one month before the expected date of confinement 
shall be granted and must be taken by married female teachers who become pregnant. 
 
Extradition (Commonwealth and Foreign Territories) Act, No. 36 of 1985 
First Schedule. Description of Extraditable Offences. 
 
1. Murder. 
2. Manslaughter. 
3. Rape. 
4. Abduction, kidnapping, false imprisonment or dealing in slaves. 
5. Assault occasioning actual bodily harm. 
6. Child stealing. 
7. Abortion. 
8. Unlawful sexual intercourse with a female. 
9. Indecent assault. 
10. Bigamy… 
 
Equal Opportunity Act, No. 69 of 2000 
20. It is not a contravention of this Act for a person to grant to a woman rights or 
privileges in connection with pregnancy or childbirth. 
 
Fire Service Act (Chap. 35:50), 1980 Rev. 
Fifth Schedule. Pensions and Gratuities Payable to Fire Officers in the First and Second 
Divisions. 
9. (1) If a fire officer dies as a result of injuries received…while in the service of the Fire 
Service, the President…may grant…- 
(d) if the deceased fire officer leaves a widow, a pension to her, while unmarried and of 
good character… 
(h) if the deceased fire officer does not leave a widow…and if his mother was wholly or 
mainly dependant on him for her support, a pension to the mother, while of good 
character and without adequate means of support… 
(3) In the case of a pension granted under subparagraph (1)(h), if the mother is a widow at 
the time of the grant of the pension and subsequently remarries, the pension shall cease as 
from the date of the remarriage… 
(4) A pension granted to a female child under subparagraph (1) shall cease upon the 
marriage of the child under the age of eighteen years. 
(7) If a fire officer dies while in the Fire Service, the President may grant to his widow or to 
his children…a gratuity… 
 
Fire Service (Terms and Conditions of Employment) Regulations, LN No. 267 of 1998 made 
pursuant to section 34 of the Fire Service Act 
86. (1) Subject to this Regulation, maternity leave of one month with full pay and two months 
with half pay shall be granted to a pregnant officer. 
 (2) In order to be granted maternity leave – 
(a) the pregnant officer as of the date of commencement of such leave, shall have 
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served for a period of not less than twelve continuous months in the Service; 
(b) the pregnant officer shall proceed on maternity leave at least one month before the 
expected date of delivery of the child as certified by an approved medical 
practitioner; and 
(c) the pregnant officer shall furnish the certificate referred to in paragraph (b) to the 
Chief Fire Officer six weeks before the expected date of delivery. 
(6) A pregnant officer who has not completed twelve months continuous service prior to the 
date on which she would have proceeded on maternity leave had she so served, shall not 
qualify for the grant of maternity leave but shall be permitted to proceed on leave of absence of 
up to three months without pay on account of pregnancy provided the officer complies with the 
conditions in subregulation 2(b) and (c). 
 
88. The Chief Fire Officer may direct that an officer who is pregnant be given light duties prior to 
her departure on maternity leave granted under regulation 86 and for such period as the 
circumstances of the officer’s case may justify and may permit or require such officer to attend 
work out of uniform. 
 
Food and Drugs Regulations, made pursuant to section 25 of the Food and Drugs Act (Chap. 
30:01) 
16A. (1) Every manufacturer or distributor of a breast-milk substitute shall display on the outer 
label of the container: 
(a)  a statement headed “Important Notice” proclaiming the superiority of breast-feeding 
over other methods of infant feeding and advising that such substitute should be 
used only on proper medical advice having been obtained as to the need for, and 
the proper methods of its use; 
(b) directions for use and a warning of the consequences of failure to follow those 
directions. 
(3) The manufacturer or distributor of every food product which is not a breast-milk 
substitute but which is capable of being modified to become one, shall include on the label a 
warning that the product is not to be used as the sole source of nourishment for babies. 
 
Genocide Act (Chap. 11:20), 1980 Rev.742 
Schedule. Article II of the Genocide Convention 
In the present Convention genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group… 
  
Guidelines for Contract Employment in the Tobago House of Assembly, LN No. 148 of 2000 
Maternity Leave  
 Provision shall be made for all female appointees to be granted maternity leave as 
follows: 
 1. Person engaged shall be eligible for maternity leave comprising one month with full 
pay and two months with half pay on the following conditions: 
(a) as of the date of commencement of such leave, she shall have served the 
government for a period of not less than twelve continuous months… 
(b) she shall proceed on maternity leave at least one month before the expected date 
of delivery of the child… 
                                               
742
 While this Act has been repealed by the International Criminal Court Act, No. 4 of 2006, any action 
commenced under the Genocide Act shall continue as if it had been brought under the International 
Criminal Court Act. 
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2. Where the half pay to which the person engaged is entitled during maternity leave 
together with the Maternity Benefits payable under the National Insurance Act amounts to less 
than her full pay, the difference shall be paid to the person engaged. 
3. Where the person engaged has not completed twelve months continuous service she 
shall not qualify for the grant of maternity leave but shall be permitted to proceed on leave of 
absence without pay on grounds of pregnancy. 
5. The taking of maternity leave shall not prejudice or affect the eligibility of the person 
engaged for vacation leave. 
 
Income Tax Act (Chap. 75:01), 1980 Rev. 
8. (1) There shall be exempt from the tax -  
(a) …the pension received by…the widow of a President or retired President… 
  
20. (1) Subject to subsection (2), an individual to whom section 17 applies who, in the year 
of income has paid -  
(a) a maintenance or separation allowance… 
(b) alimony to a former spouse from whom he or she is divorced… 
shall be entitled to a deduction equal to the amount of the such allowance or alimony. 
 
26. (4) In this section “dependent relative” means, in relation to an individual, a person who -  
(a) whether incapacitated or not is the mother of the individual or of his wife and is 
unmarried, divorced, widowed or separated… 
 
27. (1) An individual to whom section 17 applies who -  
(c) has made a contribution under the Widows’ and Orphans’ Pensions Act… 
(d) being an insured person within the meaning of the National Insurance Act… 
shall be allowed such deduction of the premiums paid by him… 
 
First Schedule. 
18. If, in any year of income, and in the case of a woman who in that year of income is a married 
woman living with her husband the man disposes of an asset to the wife, or the wife disposes of 
an asset to the man, both shall be treated as if the asset was acquired from the one making the 
disposal for a consideration of such amount as would secure that on the disposal neither a gain 
nor loss would accrue to the one making the disposal. 
 
International Criminal Court Act, No. 4 of 2006743 
9. (2) For the purposes of this section, “genocide” means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, 
as such: 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group… 
 
10. (2) For the purposes of this section, a “crime against humanity” means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
(g) rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, 
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
(h) persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3 of Article 7 of the 
Statute, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any 
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 The Schedule to this Act is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998. 
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crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC… 
 
International War Crimes Tribunal Act, No. 24 of 1998 
Schedule One. Article 4. 
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group… 
  
Management Development Centre Act (Chap. 85:51), 1980 Rev. 
17. Without prejudice to the generality of section 16, the Pension Scheme may enable the 
Centre to –  
(a) grant gratuities, pensions or superannuation allowances, to, or to the widows, 
families or dependants of, its employees  
(c) enter into and carry into effect agreements with any insurance company or other 
association or company for securing to any such employee, widow, family or 
dependant such gratuities, pensions or allowances as are by this section 
authorised to be granted… 
 
Maternity Protection Act, No. 4 of 1998 
4. In this Act –  
“confinement” means, in relation to a female employee who has become pregnant, labour 
resulting in the issue of a child or labour after twenty-six weeks of pregnancy resulting in 
the issue of a child whether dead or alive… 
 
7. (1) Subject to this Act, an employee is entitled to -  
(a) leave of absence for the purpose of maternity leave; 
(b) pay while on maternity leave; 
(c) resume work after such leave on terms no less favourable than were enjoyed by 
her immediately prior to her leave. 
(2) Where an employee has proceeded on maternity leave and the child of the employee 
dies at birth or within the period of the maternity leave, the employee shall be entitled to the 
remaining period of maternity leave with pay. 
(3) Where an employee has not proceeded on maternity leave and –  
(a) a premature birth occurs and the child lives, the employee is entitled to the full 
period of maternity leave with pay; or 
(b) a premature birth occurs and the child dies at birth or at any time within the thirteen 
weeks thereafter, the employee is entitled to the full or remaining period of 
maternity leave with pay, as the case may be. 
(4) An employee who is pregnant and who has, on the written advice of a qualified person, 
made an appointment to attend at any place for the purpose of receiving prenatal medical care 
shall…have the right not to be unreasonably refused time off during her working hours to enable 
her to keep the appointment. 
(5) An employee who is permitted to take time off during her working hours, in accordance 
with subsection (4), shall be entitled to receive pay from her employer for the period of absence. 
 
8. (1) An employee is not entitled to the rights referred to in section 7 unless: 
(a) as of the expected date of confinement as certified by a qualified person, she has 
been continuously employed by that employer for a period of not less than twelve 
months; 
(b) she informs her employer, in writing, no later than eight weeks before the expected 
date of her confinement that she will require leave of absence due to pregnancy; 
(c) she submits to her employer a medical certificate from a qualified person stating 
the probable date of confinement; and 
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(d) she informs her employer in writing of her intention to return to work at the expiry of 
her maternity leave. 
 
9. (1) An employee is entitled to thirteen weeks maternity leave and may proceed on such 
leave six weeks prior to the probable date of confinement…and is required to return to work, 
subject to section 10, no later than thirteen weeks from the date she proceeded on leave. 
 (2) During the period of maternity leave, an employee is entitled to receive pay from her 
employer to an amount equivalent to one month’s leave with full pay and two month’s leave with 
half pay. 
 (3) Where the sum of the amount paid to the employee under subclause (2) and the 
maternity benefits payable to her under the National Insurance Act is less than her full pay 
during the period, the employer shall pay the difference to the employee. 
 
10. (1) Where an employee is unable to return to work on the required date, she shall 
submit to her employer a certificate from a registered medical practitioner stating that by reason 
of disease or bodily or mental disablement, whether to herself or her baby, she will be incapable 
of returning to work on the required date and stating her intended date of return. 
 (2) An employee who extends her absence from work for medical reasons under 
subsection (1) may do so for a period not exceeding 12 weeks after the required date of return 
and shall inform her employer in writing of her intended date of return. 
 (3) Subject to an employee’s right to sick or vacation leave with pay under any other 
written law, industrial award or collective agreement, an employee under subsection (2) shall be 
paid half pay for the first six weeks and no pay for the next six weeks. 
 (4) An employee may postpone her return to work for non-medical reasons until a date 
not exceeding four weeks after the required date of return of, within ten working days, before the 
required date, she gives the employer written notice, stating the reason why she is unable to 
return to work and stating and intended date of return. 
 (5) Subject to an employee’s right to sick or vacation leave with pay under any other 
written law, industrial award or collective agreement, an employer is not liable to pay an 
employee in respect of leave for the period between the required date of return to work under 
section 9(1) and the intended date of return under subsection (4). 
 
12. (1) Where an employee or employer alleges non compliance with the provisions of this 
Act, or an employee’s employment is terminated on the ground of pregnancy or on any ground 
relating to pregnancy, or there is a difference of opinion as the reasonableness or otherwise of 
any action taken or not taken by an employer or employee, the employee, trade union or the 
employer may report the matter to the Minister and the matter shall be deemed to be a trade 
dispute and shall be dealt as such with under the Industrial Relations Act. 
 
18. (1) Subject to subsection (2), there is no limit to an employee’s right to maternity leave 
under section 7(1)(a) and her right to return to work under section 7(1)(c). 
 (2) An employee’s right to pay for maternity leave under section 7(1)(b) is limited to one 
payment during each twenty-four months commencing at the beginning of such leave. 
 
19. Where an employee is entitled to maternity leave…that leave shall be in addition to any 
vacation leave and sick leave to which that employee is eligible. 
 
20. An employee on maternity leave shall not be deprived of an opportunity to be considered for 
promotion for which she is eligible and which may arise during her period of leave. 
 
21. Notwithstanding any other written law to the contrary, the period of maternity leave shall be 
included in the computation of an employee’s pension or other terminal benefits. 
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Married Persons Act (Chap. 45:50), 1980 Rev. 
11. (1) A married woman may effect a policy upon her own life or the life of her husband for 
her own benefit… 
 
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act (Chap. 45:51), 1980 Rev. 
18. (1) In the case of any petition for divorce or for nullity of marriage or for presumption of 
death and dissolution of marriage -  
(c) the Court may order the costs or any part thereof arising from such intervention to 
be paid by any of the parties, including a wife if she has separate property… 
 
Matrimonial Causes Rules, made pursuant to sections 77-81 of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act (Chap. 4:01), 1980 Rev. 
90. (2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, allow to the wife against the husband solicitor and client 
costs to be taxed. 
 
Military Training (Prohibition) Act, No. 14 of 1996 
7. (3) Every search of a female person under this section shall be conducted by a female 
officer. 
 
Minimum Wages (Catering Industry) Order, LN No. 158 of 1991, made pursuant to section 3 of 
the Minimum Wages Act (Chap. 88:04) 
8. (1) A pregnant worker shall be entitled to maternity leave and to resume work after such 
leave. 
 
Minimum Wages (Household Assistants) Order, LN No. 160 of 1991, made pursuant to section 
3 of the Minimum Wages Act (Chap. 88:04) 
9. (1) A household assistant shall be entitled to maternity leave and to resume work after 
such leave. 
 
Minimum Wages (Security Industry Employees) Order, LN No. 231 of 1994, made pursuant to 
section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act (Chap. 88:04) 
9. (1) A pregnant employee shall be entitled to maternity leave with pay and to resume 
work after such leave. 
 
Minimum Wages (Shop Assistants) Order, LN No. 159 of 1991, made pursuant to section 3 of 
the Minimum Wages Act (Chap. 88:04) 
8. (1) A pregnant shop assistant shall be granted maternity leave with pay… 
 
“MIZPEH” Half Way House (Incorporation) Act, No. 3 of 1990 
3. The aims and objects of “MIZPEH” are to -  
(a) provide a programme of counselling, re-education and therapy for troubled young 
adults and women generally… 
(d) foster, feed, clothe or otherwise care and provide for poor, underprivileged, 
destitute, abandoned and abused young adults and women generally… 
(i) organise and conduct seminars to educate young adult and women generally… 
 
Municipal Corporations (Pensions) Act (Chap. 25:05), 1980 Rev. 
19. (2) Where a female officer, having completed not less than five years’ service in the 
Corporation, resigns from the service on or with a view to marriage, or is required to retire from 
the service on account of her marriage, she may be granted on production within six 
months…of satisfactory evidence of her marriage, a gratuity… 
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24. (2) Where any person to whom a pension has been granted has left Trinidad and 
Tobago and deserted and left his wife or child within Trinidad and Tobago without sufficient 
means of support, the Council… may from time to time deduct from the moneys payable to such 
person by way of pension…and may apply the same for the maintenance and support of the 
wife or child. 
 
25. (2) In any case where a pension or allowance ceases by reason of the bankruptcy or 
insolvency of the pensioner, the Council may…cause all or any part of the moneys to which the 
pensioner would have been entitled by way of pension or allowance…to be paid to or applied 
for the maintenance and personal support or benefit…of…the pensioner and any wife, child or 
children of his… 
 
26. (2) Where a pension or allowance ceases under subsection (1), the Council may cause 
all or any part of the moneys to which the pensioner would have been entitled by way of pension 
or allowance to be paid to or applied for the benefit of any wife, child or children of the 
pensioner… 
 
National Carnival Commission of Trinidad and Tobago Act, No. 9 of 1991 
11. (1) The Commission shall…provide for the establishment and maintenance of a pension 
scheme for the benefit of its officers and employees. 
(5) The pension scheme may enable the Commission to –  
(a) grant gratuities, pensions or superannuation allowances to, or to the widows, 
families or dependants of, its officers and employees… 
(c) enter into and carry into effect agreements with any insurance company or other 
association or company for securing gratuities, pensions or allowances to any such 
officer or employee or his widow, family or dependant… 
 
National Insurance Act (Chap. 32:01), as amended by Act Nos. 9 of 1999 and 2004 
46. (1) From the appointed day the benefits payable to or in respect of persons insured 
under section 36(1), shall be -  
(a) maternity benefit, that is to say, periodical payments in the case of the pregnancy 
or confinement of an employed woman… 
(bb) maternity grant that is to say, a payment in the case of the pregnancy or 
confinement of an insured woman… 
 
National Insurance (Benefits) Regulations, made pursuant to section 55 of the National 
Insurance Act as amended by LN Nos. 73 of 1999 and 66 of 2004 
22. (2) Maternity benefit shall be paid if the insured person, during the period of thirteen 
contribution weeks immediately preceding the contribution week calculated as the sixth week 
before the expected week of her delivery -  
(a) was in insurable employment for a period of not less than ten contribution weeks; or 
(b) was in receipt of sickness benefit for any period and either resumed insurable 
employment thereafter or continued receiving sickness benefit during the last 
contribution week in the period of thirteen contribution weeks. 
22A. Subject to the provisions of these regulations a maternity grant shall be payable where 
confinement results in the birth of a living child or where confinement does not so result, the 
pregnancy lasted not less than twenty-six weeks, provided always that the insured satisfied the 
requirements set out in regulation 22(2)(a) or (b). 
 
23. An insured person shall be disqualified from receiving maternity benefit, if during the period 
when such benefit is payable she engages in any work for which remuneration is or would 
ordinarily be payable. 
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27A. Maternity benefit shall be – 
(a) payable for a period starting not earlier than six weeks before the expected date of 
delivery and continuing until the expiration of thirteen weeks… 
(b) paid in a lump sum. 
 
42. (2) Where a person in receipt of widow’s allowance remarries, there shall be paid to that 
person a remarriage grant equal in amount to the unpaid portion of widow’s allowance which 
would have been payable to her but for her remarriage. 
 
National Insurance (Contributions) Regulations, made pursuant to section 44 of the National 
Insurance Act 
14. No contribution shall be payable in respect of a person for any week in which such person is 
in receipt of sickness, maternity or employment injury benefit… 
 
National Library and Information System Act, No. 18 of 1998 
22. (1) Subject to subsection (2), NALIS shall provide for the establishment and 
maintenance of a pension scheme or arrange for membership in a scheme for such of its 
employees as are recruited by NALIS in accordance with section 18. 
 (4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), NALIS may, under the pension 
scheme –  
(a) establish contributory superannuation schemes and establish and contribute to 
superannuation funds for the benefit of the employees; 
(b) grant gratuities, pensions or superannuation allowances to the widows, families or 
dependants of its employees; 
(c) enter into and carry into effect arrangements with any insurance company or other 
association or company for securing for any of its employees or their widows, 
families or dependants, such gratuities, pensions or allowances and benefits as are 
authorised by this section. 
 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, No. 1 of 2004 
4. (1) In this Act, except where otherwise expressly provided - 
“woman” means a female person who has attained the age of eighteen years… 
 
6. (9) An employer shall, after being notified by a female employee that she is pregnant 
and upon production of a medical certificate to that effect, adapt the working conditions of the 
female employee to ensure that she is not - 
(a) involved in the use of, or exposed to, chemicals, substances or anything dangerous 
to the health of the unborn child; or 
(b) subjected to working conditions dangerous to the health of the unborn child, and 
where appropriate, the employer may assign alternative work, where available, to 
her without prejudice to her right to return to her previous job. 
(11) No employer shall require or permit a pregnant employee or an employee who is 
nursing her child to perform work that is hazardous to her health or the health of the child. 
(12) Notwithstanding any other law, during an employee’s pregnancy, and for a period of 
six months after birth of her child, her employer shall offer her suitable, alternative employment 
on terms and conditions that are no less favourable than her ordinary terms and conditions of 
work, where the employee is required to perform work that poses a danger to her safety or 
health or that of her child, unless there is no other available suitable alternative employment or 
that in doing so the employer will incur costs greater than ordinary administrative costs.  
 
40. The occupier of every factory shall provide and maintain separately for men and women 
employed therein, adequate, clean and easily accessible washing facilities which are provided 
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with soap and suitable hand drying materials or devices and such other provisions as are 
prescribed. 
 
41. The occupier of every factory shall - 
(a) provide and maintain separately for men and women employed therein adequate, 
clean and easily accessible sanitary conveniences; 
(b) provide and maintain suitable receptacles or disposal units for use by women… 
 
42. In every factory, there shall be provided and maintained, distinct and apart from any sanitary 
convenience or lunchroom and separately for the use of men and women, adequate and 
suitable changing rooms with locks on the inside and accommodation for their clothing not worn 
during working hours.  
 
87. Where a young person is employed in contravention of this Act, the parent of the young 
person, as the case may be, commits an offence and is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine 
of five thousand dollars, unless it appears to the Court that the contravention occurred without 
the consent, connivance, or wilful default of the parent. 
 
Offences Against the Person Act (Chap. 11:08), as amended by Act No. 11 of 2005, 1980 Rev. 
4B. Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person 
charged was provoked…to lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation was 
enough to make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury… 
 
30A. (1) For the purpose of this section - 
(a) “harassment” of a person includes alarming the person or causing the person 
distress by engaging in a course of conduct such as - 
 (i) following, making visual recordings of, stopping or accosting the person; 
 (ii) watching, loitering near or hindering or preventing access to or from the 
person’s place of residence, workplace or any other place frequented by the 
person; 
 (iii) entering property or interfering with property in the possession of the person; 
 (iv) making contact with the person, whether by gesture, directly, verbally, by 
telephone, computer, post or in any other way;  
 (v) giving offensive material to the person, or leaving it where it will be found by, 
given to, or brought to the attention of the person; 
 (vi) acting in any manner described in subparagraphs (i) to (v) towards someone 
with a familial or close personal relationship to the person; or 
 (vii) acting in any other way that could reasonably be expected to alarm or cause 
the person distress… 
 
31. (1) Any person who is convicted of the crime of rape is liable to imprisonment for life or 
for any term of years. 
 (2) Every person who induces a married woman to permit him to have connection with 
her by personating her husband shall be deemed to be guilty of rape. 
 
32. (1) A man who has sexual intercourse with a woman whom he knows to be his grand-
daughter, daughter, sister or mother is guilty of the offence of incest… 
 (2) A woman of the age of eighteen years of over who permits a man whom she knows 
to be her grand-father, father, brother or son to have sexual intercourse with her with her 
consent is guilty of the offence of incest… 
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33. (1) On a man’s conviction of an offence under section 32 against a girl under the age of 
eighteen, or of attempting to commit such an offence, the court may by order divest him of all 
authority over her. 
 
34.  (1) Any person who unlawfully and carnally knows any girl under the age of fourteen 
years is liable to imprisonment for life or for any term of years. 
 (2) Any person who attempts to have unlawful carnal knowledge of any girl under the 
age of fourteen is liable to imprisonment for four years. 
 
35. (1) Any person who unlawfully and carnally knows or attempts to have unlawful carnal 
knowledge of any mentally subnormal female under circumstances which do not amount to rape 
but which prove that the offender knew at the time of the commission of the offence that the 
female was mentally subnormal is liable to imprisonment for four years. 
 
36. (1) Any person who, being the owner or occupier of any premises or having, or acting or 
assisting in the management or control thereof, induces or knowingly suffers any girl under the 
age of fourteen years to resort to or be in or upon such premises for the purpose of being 
unlawfully and carnally known by any man, whether such carnal knowledge is intended to be 
with any particular man or generally, is liable to imprisonment for five years. 
 
37. (1) Any person who -  
(a) procures or attempts to procure any girl or woman under eighteen years of age, not 
being a common prostitute, or of known immoral character, to have unlawful carnal 
connection… 
(b) procures or attempts to procure any woman or girl to become…a common 
prostitute; 
(c) procures or attempts to procure any woman or girl to leave Trinidad and Tobago, 
with intent that she may become an inmate of or frequent a brothel elsewhere; 
(d) procures or attempts to procure any woman or girl to leave her usual place of 
abode in Trinidad and Tobago (such place not being a brothel), with intent that she 
may, for the purposes of prostitution become an inmate of or frequent a brothel 
within or without Trinidad and Tobago, 
is liable to imprisonment for two years. 
 
38. (1) Any person who -  
(a) by threats or intimidation, procures or attempts to procure any woman or girl to 
have any unlawful carnal connection… 
(b) by false pretences or false representations, procures any woman or girl, not being a 
common prostitute or of known immoral character, to have any unlawful carnal 
connection… 
(c) applies, administers to or causes to be taken by, any woman or girl any drug, 
matter or thing, with intent to stupefy or overpower so as thereby to enable any 
person to have unlawful carnal connection with such woman or girl, 
is liable to imprisonment for two years. 
 
39. (1) Any person who, with intent that any unmarried girl under the age of sixteen years 
should be unlawfully and carnally known by any man…takes or causes to be taken the girl out 
of the possession and against the will of her father or mother or any other person having the 
lawful care or charge of her is liable to imprisonment for two years. 
 
40. (1) Any person who detains any woman or girl against her will -  
(a) in or upon any premises with intent that she may be unlawfully and carnally known 
by any man, whether any particular man or generally; or 
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(b) in any brothel, 
is liable to imprisonment for two years. 
 (2) Where a woman or girl is in or upon any premises for the purpose of having any 
unlawful carnal connection, or is in any brothel, a person shall be deemed to detain the woman 
or girl in or upon the premises or in the brothel, if, with intent to compel or induce her to remain 
in or upon the premises or in the brothel, that person withholds from the woman or girl any 
wearing apparel or other property belonging to her, or, where wearing apparel has been lent or 
otherwise supplied to the woman or girl by or by the direction of the person, the person 
threatens the woman or girl with legal proceedings if she takes away with her the wearing 
apparel so lent or supplied. 
 (3) No legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal, shall be taken against any such 
woman or girl for taking away or being found in possession of any such wearing apparel as was 
necessary to enable her to leave the premises or brothel. 
 
43. (1) If it appears to any Justice, on complaint made before him on oath by any parent, 
relative, or guardian of any woman or girl…that there is reasonable cause to suspect that the 
woman or girl is unlawfully detained for immoral purposes by any person in any place within 
Trinidad and Tobago, the Justice may issue a warrant authorising any person named therein to 
search for, and, when found, to take to and detain in a place of safety the woman or girl until she 
can be brought before a Magistrate, and the Magistrate before whom the woman or girl is 
brought may cause her to be delivered up to her parents or guardians, or otherwise dealt with 
as circumstances may permit and require. 
 (2) The Justice issuing such warrant may…cause any person accused of so unlawfully 
detaining the woman or girl to be apprehended and brought before a Magistrate, and 
proceedings to be taken for punishing that person according to law. 
 (3) A woman or girl shall be deemed to be unlawfully detained for immoral purposes if 
she is so detained for the purpose of being unlawfully and carnally known by any man…and 
(a) either is under the age of fourteen years; or 
(b) if of or over the age of fourteen years, and under the age of sixteen years, if so 
detained against her will, or against the will of her father or mother… 
(c) if of or above the age of sixteen years is so detained against her will. 
(4) Any person authorised by warrant under this section to search for any woman or girl so 
detained as above may enter…any house, building or other place specified in the warrant, and 
may remove the woman or girl therefrom. 
 
44. Where, on the trial of any offence under this Act, it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court 
that the seduction or prostitution of a girl under the age of thirteen has been caused, 
encouraged, or favoured by her father, mother, guardian, master or mistress, it is in the power 
of the Court to divest the father, mother, guardian, master or mistress of all authority over her… 
 
45. (1) Any person who is convicted of any indecent assault upon any female is liable to 
imprisonment for three years. 
 
46. Where any woman of any age has any interest…in any real or personal estate, or is an 
heiress or presumptive next of kin to any one having such interest, any person who, from 
motives of lucre, takes away or detains the woman against her will, with intent to marry or 
carnally know her, or causes her to be married or carnally known by any other person, and any 
person who fraudulently allures, takes away, or detains the woman, being under the age of 
eighteen years, out of the possession and against the will of her father or mother, or of any 
person having the lawful care or charge of her, with intent to marry or carnally know her, or 
causes her to be married or carnally known by any other person is liable to imprisonment for 
four years. 
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47. Any person who, by force, takes away or detains against her will any woman of any age, 
with intent to marry or carnally know her, or causes her to be married or carnally known by any 
other person is liable to imprisonment for four years. 
 
48. Any person who unlawfully takes, or causes to be taken, any unmarried girl, being under the 
age of fourteen years, out of the possession and against the will of her father or mother, or of 
any other person having the lawful care or charge of her, is liable to imprisonment for two years. 
 
49. Any person who –  
(a) keeps or manages or acts or assists in the management of a brothel; 
(b) being the tenant, lessee, occupier, or person in charge of any premises, knowingly 
permits the premises…to be used as a brothel or for the purposes of habitual 
prostitution; or 
(c) being the lessor or landlord of any premises, or the agent of the lessor or landlord, 
lets the same or any part thereof with the knowledge that the premises or some 
part thereof are is it to be used as a brothel, or is wilfully a party to the continued 
use of the premises or any part thereof as a brothel, 
is liable on summary conviction… 
 
51. (1) Every male person who - 
(a) knowingly lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution, or 
(b) in any public place persistently solicits or importunes for immoral purposes, 
is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for six months. 
 
52. Every female person who is proved to have, for the purposes of gain, exercised control, 
direction, or influence over the movements of a prostitute in such a manner as to show that she 
is aiding, abetting, or compelling her prostitution with any person or generally, is liable, on 
summary conviction to imprisonment for six months. 
 
59.  (1) Any person who is convicted of the abominable crime of buggery…is liable to 
imprisonment for five years. 
 
64. Whenever, upon the trial for any offence punishable under this Act, it may be necessary to 
prove carnal knowledge, it shall not be necessary to prove the actual emission of seed in order 
to constitute a carnal knowledge, but the carnal knowledge shall be deemed complete upon 
proof of penetration only. 
 
Partnership Act (Chap. 81:02), 1980 Rev. 
4. In determining whether a partnership does or does not exist, regard shall be had to the 
following rules: 
(c) the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie 
evidence that he is a partner in the business, but the receipt of such a share, or of a 
payment contingent on or varying with the profits of a business, does not of itself 
make him a partner in the business; and in particular –  
 (v) a person being a widow or child of a deceased partner and receiving by way 
of annuity a portion of the profits made in the business in which the deceased 
person was a partner, is not, by reason only of the receipt, a partner in the 
business or liable as such… 
 
24. Where land or any heritable interest therein has become partnership property, it shall, 
unless the contrary intention appears, be treated as between the partners…and also as 
between the next of kin of a deceased partner and his executors or administrators, as personal 
and not real or heritable estate. 
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Pensions Act (Chap. 23:52), 1980 Rev. 
15. (6) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section a gratuity may be granted to 
a female officer, in accordance with this Act, who retires for the reason that she is married or is 
about to be marry, notwithstanding that she is not otherwise eligible under the section for the 
grant of any pension, gratuity or other allowance. 
 
22. (1) Where an officer holding either a pensionable or a non-pensionable office dies as a 
result of injuries received…while in the service of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, the 
President may grant…to his legal personal representative or to his dependants under section 21 
-  
 (i) if the deceased officer leaves a widow, a pension to her, while unmarried and 
of good character… 
 (v) if the deceased officer does not leave a widow, or if no pension is granted to 
his widow, and if his mother was wholly or mainly dependant on him for her 
support, a pension to the mother, while of good character and without 
adequate means of support… 
 
except that –  
 
 (B) in the case of a pension granted under paragraph (v), if the mother is a widow 
at the time of the grant of the pension and subsequently remarries the 
pension shall cease as from the date of re-marriage… 
 (C) a pension granted to a female child under this section shall cease upon the 
marriage of such child under the age of eighteen years.  
 
24. (2) Where any person to whom a pension has been granted has left Trinidad and 
Tobago and deserted and left his wife or child within Trinidad and Tobago without sufficient 
means of support, the President…may from time to time deduct from the moneys payable to 
such person by way of pension such sum or sums as the President may think expedient, and 
may apply the same for the maintenance and support of the wife or child. 
 
25. If any officer to whom a pension or other allowance has been granted under this Act is 
adjudicated a bankrupt or is declared insolvent by judgement of the Court, then the pension or 
allowance shall forthwith cease except that in the case where a pension or allowance ceases by 
reason of the bankruptcy or insolvency of the pensioner, the President may…cause all or any 
part of the moneys to which the pensioner would have been entitled…to be paid to or applied for 
the maintenance and personal support or benefit of all or any…namely, the pensioner and any 
wife, child or children… 
 
26. If any officer to whom a pension or other allowance has been granted under this Act is 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment…the President may direct that the pension or allowance 
shall forthwith cease but –  
(b) where a pension or allowance ceases for the reason mentioned above the 
President may cause all or any part of the moneys…to be paid to or applied for the 
benefit of the wife, child or children of the pensioner… 
 
Pensions Regulations, deemed to be made pursuant to section 7(4) of the Pensions Act, as 
amended by the Law Reform (Pensions) Act, No. 20 of 1997 
4.  (1) Subject to subregulation (2), where a female officer having held a pensionable 
office…for not less than five years, retires from the service of the Government for the reason 
that she has married or is about to marry, and is not eligible for a gratuity under this Part, she 
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may be granted upon production within six months after her retirement…of satisfactory 
evidence of her marriage –  
(a) a gratuity… 
 
23. A female officer who has been transferred to or from the service of Trinidad and Tobago and 
who retires for the reason that she has married, or is about to marry…may be granted a gratuity 
which bears to the gratuity for which she would be eligible if her public service had been wholly 
in the service in which she is last employed… 
 
Police Service Act (Chap. 15:01), 1980 Rev. 
54. The Award Fund established under the former Ordinance shall continue to be kept by the 
Commissioner and administered in the manner directed by this Act, and shall be appropriated to 
the payment of -  
(b) such compassionate gratuities to the widows and orphans, being legitimate, of 
police officers as, in exceptional circumstances, the President may allow… 
 
64. (1) The President may make regulations for carrying out or giving effect to this Act… 
(a) for prescribing classifications for officers in the police service, including 
qualifications, duties and remunerations;… 
(f) for regulating the hours of attendance of police officers…; 
(g) for regulating the duties to be performed by police officers; 
(h) for regulating the granting of leave to police officers;… 
(j) the enlistment, training and discipline of the Police Service; 
(k) the description and issue of arms, ammunition, accoutrements, uniform and 
necessaries to be supplied to the Police Service;… 
(2) Regulations made under subsection (1) may provide that any of the Regulations -  
(a) shall not apply to all or any female officers; or 
(b) shall apply only to female police officers or to such of them as may be specified. 
 
Sixth Schedule, Pensions and Gratuities Rules 
 
4. (13) The President may, where a pension ceases for the reasons set out in subrule (11), 
cause all or part of the moneys to which the pensioner would have been entitled by way of 
pension to be paid to or applied for the benefit of any wife, child or children of the pensioner… 
 
5. (2) Where any person to whom a pension has been granted hereunder has left Trinidad 
and Tobago and has deserted and left his wife or child in Trinidad and Tobago without sufficient 
means of support is, by reason of such person’s absence from Trinidad and Tobago, unable 
and would but for such absence be able to obtain an order or maintenance, may from time to 
time cause to be deducted from the moneys payable to such person by way of pension such 
sum or sums as the President may consider expedient and apply the same for the maintenance 
and support of such wife or child. 
 
10. (1) If a police officer dies as a result of injuries received…while in the service of the 
Police Service, the President…may grant, in addition to the grant, if any, made under subrule 
(3) -  
 (i) if the deceased police officer leaves a widow, a pension to her, while 
unmarried and of good character… 
 (v) if the deceased police officer does not leave a widow, or if no pension is 
granted to his widow and if his mother was wholly or mainly dependant on 
him for her support, a pension to the mother, while of good character and 
without adequate means of support… 
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(3) In the case of a pension granted under subrule (1)(v), if the mother is a widow at the 
time of the grant of such pension and subsequently remarries, such pension shall cease as from 
the date of the remarriage; and if it appears to the President at any time that the mother is 
adequately provided with other means of support, such pension shall cease… 
(4) A pension granted to a female child under subrule (1) shall cease upon the marriage of 
such child under the age of eighteen years.  
  (7) (a) If a police officer dies while in the Police Service, the President may grant to his 
widow or to his children…a gratuity… 
 (b) Where a police officer…dies after retirement from the Police Service…the 
President may grant to his widow or to his children…a gratuity. 
 
Provident Fund Act (Chap. 23:57), 1980 Rev.  
17. (1) An employee on transfer from a pensionable office…to an office…which carries 
greater wages than those received by him immediately prior to his transfer may elect at his 
option to become a depositor - 
(b) on the basis of the difference only between the wages of his new appointment and 
the wages of the pensionable office from which he is transferred and to be paid on 
his final retirement…except that if the employee is a contributor to the Widows’ and 
Orphans’ Pension Scheme under the provision of the Widows’ and Orphans’ 
Pension Act, he is required to contribute to the scheme on the basis of the wages 
of the office from which he has been transferred. 
 
18. (1) Where an employee holding a non-pensionable post…is appointed to an office 
specified in Part A of the Schedule he may at his option elect to become a depositor -  
(b) on the basis of the difference only between the wages of his new employment and 
the wages previously drawn by him and to be paid on his final retirement…except 
that if the employee is a contributor to the Widows’ and Orphans’ Pension Scheme 
under the Widows’ and Orphans’ Pension Act, he shall be required to contribute to 
the scheme on the basis of the wages of the office from which he has been 
transferred. 
 
21. (2) Bonuses may be paid as mentioned below -  
(a) full bonus –  
 (iii) to the nominee or legal personal representative of a depositor who dies while 
in the service… 
 
22. (1) A gratuity…may be paid -  
(d) to the nominee of legal personal representative of a depositor who dies while in the 
service of Trinidad and Tobago and who has at least five years’ service… 
 
41. (4) Such pensions as are provided for under this Act shall be payable only if the award 
thereof would…be more advantageous to the dependants of the deceased depositor than the 
payment of full bonus. 
 
Public Service Transport Act (Chap. 48:02), 1980 Rev. 
19. Without prejudice to the generality of section 18, the Pension Scheme may enable the 
Corporation to –  
(a) grant gratuities, pensions or superannuation allowances to, or to the widows, 
families or dependants of, its employees… 
(c) enter into and carry into effect agreements with any insurance company or other 
association or company for securing to any such employee, widow, family or 
dependant such gratuities, pensions or allowances as are by this section 
authorised to be granted… 
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Retiring Allowances (Diplomatic Service) Act (Chap. 17:04), 1980 Rev. 
10. (1) Subject to this Act, where a person who…dies leaving a widow, there shall be paid to 
the widow during her lifetime and while unmarried, a widow’s allowance… 
 
11. (5) Notwithstanding subsection (1), a female child who marries while under the age of 
eighteen years shall cease to be entitled to a children’s allowance. 
 
Retiring Allowances (Legislative Service) Act (Chap. 2:03), 1980 Rev. 
9. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, where a person…dies leaving a widow, there 
shall be paid to the widow during her lifetime and while unmarried, a widow’s allowance at an 
annual rate equivalent to one-half of the retiring allowance… 
 
10. (5) Notwithstanding subsection (1), a female child who marries while under the age of 
twenty-one years shall cease to be entitled to a children’s allowance. 
 
13. Any award payable under this Act shall not be assignable or transferable except for the 
purpose of satisfying  -  
(b) an order of any court for the payment of periodical sums of money towards the 
maintenance of the wife, former wife or child… 
 
Sexual Offences Act, No. 27 of 1986, as amended by Act No. 31 of 2000 
2. In this Act - 
‘cohabitant’ means a person in a cohabitational relationship in accordance with the 
Cohabitational Relationships Act, 1998; 
 
4. (1) Subject to subsection (2), a person (“the accused”) commits the offence of rape 
when he has sexual intercourse with another person (‘the complainant’) - 
(a) without the consent of the complainant where he knows that the complainant does 
not consent to the intercourse or he is reckless as to whether the complainant 
consents; or 
(b) with the consent of the complainant where the consent - 
 (i) is extorted by threat or fear of bodily harm to the complainant or to another; 
 (ii) is obtained by personating someone else; 
 (iii) is obtained by false or fraudulent representations as to the nature of the 
intercourse; or 
 (iv) is obtained by unlawfully detaining the complainant. 
(2) A person who commits the offence of rape is liable on conviction to imprisonment for life 
and any other punishment which may be imposed by law, except that if - 
(a) the complainant is under the age of twelve years; 
(b) the offence is committed by two or more persons acting in concert or with the 
assistance or in the presence, of a third person; 
(c) the offence is committed in particularly heinous circumstances; 
(d) the complainant was pregnant at the time of the offence and the accused knew that 
the complainant was pregnant; or 
(e) the accused has previously been convicted of the offence of rape, he shall be liable 
to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life. 
(5) This section also applies to a husband in relation to the commission of the offence of 
rape on his wife. 
 
4A. (1) Subject to subsection (2), a person (‘the accused’) commits the offence of grievous 
sexual assault when he commits the act on another person (‘the complainant’) - 
(a) without the consent of the complainant where he knows that the complainant does 
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not consent to the act or he is reckless as to whether the complainant consents; or 
(b) with the consent of the complainant where the consent - 
 (i) is extorted by threat or fear of bodily harm to the complainant or to another; 
 (ii) is obtained by personating someone else; 
 (iii) is obtained by false and fraudulent representations as to the nature of the act; 
 (iv) is obtained by unlawfully detaining the complainant. 
(3) This section also applies to a husband in relation to the commission of the offence of 
grievous sexual assault on his wife. 
 
6. (1) Where a male person has sexual intercourse with a female person who is not his 
wife and who is under the age of fourteen years, he is guilty of an offence…and is liable on 
conviction to imprisonment for life. 
 
7. (1) Where a male person has sexual intercourse with a female person who is not his 
wife with her consent and who has attained the age of fourteen years but has not yet obtained 
the age of sixteen years he is guilty of an offence, and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for 
twelve years for a first offence and to imprisonment for fifteen years for a subsequent offence. 
 
11. (1) An adult who has sexual intercourse with a minor who -  
(b) is in the adult’s employment; or 
(c) is in respect of any employment or work under or in any way subject to the adult’s 
control or direction; or 
(d) receives his or her wages or salary directly or indirectly from the adult, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for twenty-five years. 
 
12. (1) Where a person under circumstances that do not amount to rape has sexual 
intercourse with another who is mentally subnormal and who is not the person’s spouse, that 
person is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for twenty-five years. 
 
15. (1) A person who indecently assaults another is guilty of an offence and is liable on 
conviction to imprisonment for five years for a first offence and to imprisonment for ten years for 
a subsequent offence. 
 
16. (1) A person who commits an act of serious indecency on or towards another is guilty of 
an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment… 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to an act of serious indecency committed in private 
between – 
(a) a husband and his wife… 
 
17. A person who –  
(a) procures a minor under sixteen years of age to have sexual intercourse… 
(b) procures another for prostitution… 
(c) procures another to become an inmate… 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for fifteen years. 
 
18. A person who –  
(a) by threats or intimidation procures another to have sexual intercourse… 
(b) by deception procures another to have sexual intercourse… 
(c) applies, administers to or causes to be taken by any person any drug, matter or 
thing with intent to stupefy or overpower that person so as thereby to enable any 
other person to sexual intercourse with that person, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for fifteen years. 
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19. (1) A person who detains another against that other’s will -  
(a) in or upon any premises with intent that the person detained may have sexual 
intercourse with any person; or 
(b) in any brothel, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for ten years. 
 
20. A person who takes away or detains a female person against her will with intent –  
(a) to marry her or to have sexual intercourse with her; or  
(b) to cause her to marry or to have sexual intercourse with a male person, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for ten years. 
 
22. A person who -  
(a) keeps or manages or acts or assists in the management of a brothel; 
(b) being the tenant, lessee, occupier, or person in charge of any premises, knowingly 
permits the premises…to be used as a brothel or for the purposes of habitual 
prostitution; or 
(c) being the lessor or landlord of any premises, or the agent of the lessor or landlord, 
lets the same or any part thereof with the knowledge that the premises or some 
part thereof are is it to be used as a brothel, or is wilfully a party to the continued 
use of the premises or any part thereof as a brothel, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for five years. 
 
23. (1) A person who -  
(a) knowingly lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution, or 
(b) in any place solicits for immoral purposes, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for five years. 
 
24. A person who for purposes of gain, exercises control, direction or influence over the 
movements of a prostitute in a way which shows that the person is aiding, abetting or 
compelling the prostitution is guilty of an offence and is liable in conviction to imprisonment for 
five years. 
 
31.  (1) Any person who - 
(a) is the parent or guardian of a minor; 
(b) has the actual custody, charge or control of a minor; 
(c) has the temporary custody, care, charge or control of a minor for a special purpose, 
as his attendant, employer or teacher, or in any other capacity; or 
(d) is a medical practitioner, or a registered nurse or midwife, and has performed a 
medical examination in respect of a minor, 
and who has reasonable grounds for believing that a sexual offence has been committed in 
respect of that minor, shall report the grounds for his belief to a police officer as soon as 
reasonably practicable. 
(2) Any person who without reasonable excuse fails to comply with the requirements of 
subsection (1), is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of fifteen 
thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term of seven years or to both such fine and 
imprisonment. 
 
34A. (1) A person shall be subject to the notification requirements of this Part where - 
(a) he has been convicted of a sexual offence to which this part applies and he has 
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment;  
(b) such sentence has been commuted; or 
(c) he has been convicted of such offence, but has not been dealt with for the offence. 
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34E. (4) Where it is found upon examination that the complainant has contracted HIV or any 
other communicable disease the court, upon application by the complainant and upon being 
satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the complainant contracted the disease as a result of 
the offence, may order the defendant to pay to the complainant compensation in addition to any 
amount ordered under section 3(5). 
  
Shop (Hours of Opening and Employment) Act (Chap. 84:02), 1980 Rev. 
17. (1) In all rooms of a shop where female shop assistants are employed the occupier of 
the shop shall provide seats…and such seats shall be in the proportion of not less than one seat 
to every three female shop assistants employed in each room… 
 (2) It shall be the duty of the occupier of the shop to permit the female shop assistants 
so employed to make reasonable use of such seats… 
 
Special Reserve Police Act (Chap. 15:03), 1980 Rev. 
22. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by subsection (1), 
regulations made under that subsection may provide for: 
(l) the grant…of a pension or gratuity to the widow and child or children, or dependent, 
of any member of the Special Reserve Police who dies as a result of injuries 
received… 
 
Summary Courts Act (Chap. 4:20), 1980 Rev. 
80. Where a person has been adjudged to pay a sum by a conviction or order of a Summary 
Court, or in proceedings for enforcing an order in any matter of affiliation, or an order which 
under weekly sums are made payable towards the maintenance of a wife, the Court may order 
him to be searched, and any money found on him on apprehension, or when so 
searched…may…be applied towards the payment of the sum so adjudged to be paid… 
 
Summary Offences Act (Chap. 11:02), 1980 Rev. 
5. (1) When any person is charged…with assault or battery upon…any female, or upon 
any old, infirm or sickly person…such person is liable… 
 
Supplemental Police Regulations, made pursuant to section 12 of the Supplemental Police Act 
(Chap. 15:02) 
9. …Females, lunatics and young children shall never be handcuffed. 
 
Teachers’ Pensions Act (Chap. 39:02), 1980 Rev. 
15. (1) Where a teacher in teaching service in Trinidad and Tobago dies as a result of 
injuries received -  
c. …the President may grant in addition to the grant, if any, made to his legal personal 
representative or to his dependants under section 14 –  
 (i) if the deceased teacher leaves a widow, a pension to her, while unmarried 
and of good character at a rate not exceeding ten-sixtieths of his salary at the 
date of the injury… 
 (v) if the deceased teacher does not leave a widow, or if no pension is granted to 
his widow, and if his mother was wholly or mainly dependant on him for her 
support, a pension to the mother, while of good character and without  
adequate means of support… 
Provided that –  
(B) in the case of a pension granted under subparagraph (v), if the mother is a widow at the time 
of the grant of the pension and subsequently remarries the pension shall cease as from the date 
of re-marriage; and if it appears to the President at any time that the mother is adequately 
provided with other means of support, the pension shall cease as from such date as the 
President may determine; 
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(C) a pension granted to a female child under this section shall cease upon the marriage of the 
child under the age of eighteen years. 
 
Teachers’ Pensions Regulations, deemed to be made pursuant to section 4 of the Teachers’ 
Pensions Act (Chap. 39:02) 
12. (1) Where a female teacher in teaching service in Trinidad and Tobago, having 
completed not less than five years teaching service retires from the service for the reason that 
she has married or is about to marry, and is not eligible for the grant of any pension or otherwise 
eligible for a gratuity under these Regulations, she may be granted on production within six 
months after her retirement…of such satisfactory evidence of her marriage, a gratuity… 
 
13. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Regulations, but subject to 
subregulation (2), a married female teacher who -  
(a) has resigned or resigns from the teaching service on or after 19th October 1956, for 
the reason that she is married or is about to become married; and 
(b) has been subsequently re-employed permanently in such service; 
shall, for the purpose of computing the amount of her pension, gratuity and allowance, be 
entitled to have taken into account as pensionable service both the period of service preceding 
the resignation from, and the period of subsequent employment in, the teaching service. 
 
The Community Service Regulations, LN No. 138 of 2000, made pursuant to section 27(1) of 
the Community Service Orders Act, 1997 
13. Where the offender is a female the officer shall be a female. 
 
The Constitution (Chap. 1:01), 1980 Rev. 
133. (7) This section applies to any benefits payable under any law providing for the grant of 
pensions, gratuities or compensation to persons who are or have been public officers in respect 
of their service in the public service, or to the widows, children, dependants… 
 
The Judges (Conditions of Service and Allowances) Regulations (No. 1) made pursuant to 
section 16 of the Judges Salaries and Pensions Act 
6. (1) The passage allowance payable to a Judge shall be the full actual cost of first class 
return passage (by air or sea…) for himself, his wife and children, if any, subject to a maximum 
of the equivalent of three adult first class return fares from Trinidad to the United Kingdom. 
 (2) The passage allowance shall be payable in a manner so as to enable the Judge’s 
wife or children or both his wife and children to precede him or follow him, if he so desires, on 
the outward or homebound journey, as the case may require. 
 
The Judges (Conditions of Service and Allowances) Regulations (No. 2) made pursuant to 
section 16 of the Judges Salaries and Pensions Act, as amended by LN No. 190 of 1997 
7. (1) In every second year a Judge shall be entitled to be paid a passage allowance to 
enable him and his family to go abroad during his vacation, the amount of which allowance shall 
be equivalent to the full cost of first-class return air fares from Trinidad to London by the most 
direct route for the Judge and his spouse, if any, and his children, if any, but shall not exceed 
the cost of three such adult fares. 
 
7A. (3) Passage allowance under this regulation shall cover first class travel, hotel 
accommodation and subsistence and shall be in respect of the judge, his spouse and not more 
than two of his children… 
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The Police Service Regulations, made pursuant to section 65 of the Police Service Act as 
amended by LN No. 235 of 1999 
32. A temporary lodging allowance at such rate as may be approved by the Minister of Finance 
shall be paid to a woman police officer when she is transferred to a Division or District where 
quarters are not available for her. 
 
36. For the purpose of regulation 35, “family” shall be taken to mean a police officer’s spouse 
and children, his mother, father, brothers, sisters who are living with and are solely dependent 
on him. 
 
94. (1) With effect from 1st October, 1997, maternity leave consisting of leave with full pay 
for one month followed by leave with half pay for two months shall be granted to women police 
officers on the following conditions: 
(a) that the expectant mother proceed on maternity leave at least one month before 
the expected date of birth of the child; 
(b) that the taking of maternity leave would not in any way prejudice or affect the 
eligibility of the officer for annual leave; 
(c) that the expectant mother would normally be required to furnish three months 
before the expected date of delivery a certificate from a registered medical 
practitioner of the expected date of delivery; and 
(d) that the officer has served for a period of not less than one year in the Police 
Service as at the date of commencement of such leave. 
 
95. In addition to the period of maternity leave provided for in regulation 94, a woman police 
officer may be granted any period of annual vacation leave due to her, to precede or follow her 
maternity leave. 
 
96. Any application for leave in excess of the periods provided for in regulations 94 and 95 shall 
be treated as an application for sick leave… 
 
97. The Commissioner in his discretion may direct that a women police officer qualifying for 
maternity leave be given light duties to perform at work prior to and following her period of 
maternity leave… 
 
102. A Police Matron shall be appointed to each Police Station and she shall be entrusted with 
the custody of female prisoners. 
 
103. The cells for female prisoners shall each be provided with two locks or padlocks fitted with 
different keys.  The key of one lock shall be kept by the police officer in charge of the Charge 
Room and the key of the other by the Police Matron.  A duplicate of the key kept by the Police 
Matron shall be kept in the Charge Room under the station seal.  Except in a case of 
emergency, no cell in which a female prisoner is confined shall be opened except by or in the 
presence of the Police Matron or woman police officer. 
 
105. …At the station…female prisoners [shall be searched] by the Police Matron or women 
police officers. 
 
The Prison Service (Pension and Gratuity) Rules, as amended by Act No. 17 of 2000 
4. (7) Where an officer is granted maternity leave in accordance with the Maternity 
Protection Act, 1998 the whole period of maternity leave shall be counted for the purpose of 
computing the amount of pension, gratuity or other allowance payable to the officer. 
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9. (1) Where an Order for maintenance is made against an officer to whom a pension has 
been granted in accordance with these Rules, the President may, upon proof to him that there is 
no reasonable probability of such Order being satisfied, cause to be deducted from the moneys 
payable to such person, such sum or sums as the President may consider expedient and may 
cause the same to be applied to satisfy the said Order, in whole or in part. 
(2) Where an officer to whom a pension has been granted in accordance with these Rules 
has left Trinidad and Tobago and has deserted, leaving his wife or child in Trinidad and Tobago 
without sufficient means of support and, by reason of such person’s absence from Trinidad and 
Tobago, the wife or child is unable to obtain an Order for maintenance, the President may cause 
to be deducted from the moneys payable to such officer by way of pension, such sum or sums 
as the President may consider expedient and apply the same for the maintenance and support 
of the wife or child. 
 
11. (1) Where an officer dies as a result of injuries received - 
(a) in the actual discharge of his duty; 
(b) without his own default; and 
(c) on account of circumstances specifically attributable to the nature of his duty, 
the President may, subject to subrule (2), award in addition to any allowances paid under rule 
10, the following benefits:  
 (i) where the deceased officer leaves a widow, a pension shall be paid to her 
while unmarried…  
 (v) where the deceased officer does not leave a widow, or where no pension is 
granted to the widow and his mother was wholly or mainly dependant on him 
for her support, a pension shall be paid to the mother, while without adequate 
means of support, of an amount not exceeding the pension which might have 
been granted to his widow. 
(3) In the case of a pension granted under subrule (1)(v), where the mother is a widow at 
the time of the grant of such pension and subsequently remarries, such pension shall cease as 
from the date of the remarriage, and if it appears to the President at any time that the mother is 
adequately provided with other means of support, such pension shall cease as from such date 
as the President may determine. 
(4) A pension granted to a female child under subrule (1), shall cease upon the marriage of 
such child under the age of eighteen years. 
(5) Where an officer dies while in the Service, the President may grant to his widow or to 
his children or to any of his dependants a gratuity of an amount not exceeding one year’s salary 
of such officer, or his commuted pension, gratuity, if any, whichever is the greater. 
(6) Where an officer to whom either an unreduced pension or gratuity and reduced pension 
has been granted, dies after retirement from the Service, and the sums paid or payable to him 
at his death on account of such unreduced pension or gratuity and reduced pension, as the 
case may be, are less than the amount of the annual salary enjoyed by him at the date of his 
retirement, the President may grant to his widow or to his children or to any of his dependants a 
gratuity equal to the deficiency. 
 
The Public Assistance Regulations, No. 182 of 1997 made pursuant to section 16 of the Public 
Assistance Act (Chap. 32:03) 
4. (3) …public assistance may be provided to meet the needs of a woman where she is a 
person referred to in subregulation (5)(a) or (b). 
 (5) For the purposes of this regulation –  
  “child of the family” means a child of both of the spouses or cohabitees… 
  “dependant” means – 
 (a) a spouse of the applicant; 
 (b) a person of the opposite sex to that of the applicant and who has been 
cohabiting with the applicant for a period of at least three years… 
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Trinidad and Tobago Civil Aviation Authority Act, No. 33 of 2000 
30. (1) Where an employee of the Authority who had exercised the option referred to in 
section 26(1)(b) dies, retires or his post in the Authority is abolished or he is retrenched prior to 
the establishment of the pension fund plan, and at the date of the death, retirement, abolition or 
retrenchment he was in receipt of a salary higher than that referred to in section 29, the 
superannuation benefits payable to the employee or his estate shall be based on the higher 
salary. 
 
Trinidad and Tobago Housing Development Corporation Act, No. 24 of 2005 
37. (1) Where an employee of the Corporation who exercises the option referred to in 
section 31(2)(b) or 32(2)(b) retires, dies or is retrenched prior to the establishment of the 
pension fund plan, and at the date of retirement, death, or retrenchment was in receipt of a 
salary higher than that referred to in section 36, the superannuation benefits payable to his 
estate or him shall be based on the higher salary. 
 
38. (1) Where an employee of the Corporation who exercises the option referred to in 
section 31(2)(b) or 32(2)(b) retires, dies or is retrenched and is a member of the pension fund 
plan, he or his estate shall be paid superannuation benefits by the pension fund plan at the 
amount, which when combined with the preserved superannuation benefits payable under 
section 37, the equivalent to the benefits based on his pensionable service in the public service 
combined with his service in the Corporation and calculated at the pensionable salary applicable 
to him on the date of his retirement, death or retrenchment.  
 
Water and Sewerage Act (Chap. 54:40), 1980 Rev. 
22. Without prejudice to the generality of section 21, the Pension Scheme may enable the 
Authority to –  
(a) grant gratuities, pensions or superannuation allowances to, or to the widows, 
families or dependants of, their employees… 
(c) enter into and carry into effect agreements with any insurance company or other 
association or company for securing to any such employee, widow, family or 
dependant such gratuities, pensions or allowances as are by this section 
authorised to be granted… 
 
Widows’ and Orphans’ Pensions Act (Chap. 23:54), 1980 Rev. 
2. In this Act –  
“pensionable age” as applied to children means, in the case of a male, that he is under the age 
of eighteen years and, in the case of a female, that she is under the age of eighteen 
years and has not been married… 
 
8. Pensions payable under this Act shall commence upon the death of the contributor in respect 
of whom they are payable… 
 
9. (1) The pension payable to the widow of a contributor shall cease on her death, 
bankruptcy or re-marriage… 
 (3) If on such pension to the widow ceasing as mentioned above there are such children 
or a child living and of pensionable age the pension shall be continued and paid to such children 
or child… 
 (4) The pension to the children of a deceased contributor shall cease in the case of 
males at eighteen years of age, and in the case of females at eighteen years of age or on 
marriage under that age.  However, where the President is satisfied that a child who has 
reached the pensionable age is by reason of infirmity of mind or body incapable of earning a 
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livelihood, and has no sufficient means of support, he may order that the whole or any portion of 
the pension…shall be paid to the child for such period as he may determine. 
 
17. In any case in which any person ceases to be a contributor or becomes a contributor to a 
reduced extent, the pension to his widow or children shall be reduced in the same proportion… 
 
33. (2) The widow of a contributor whose marriage with him is contracted after he has 
retired from the public service or subsequently to the time when the contributor ceased, or was 
not under obligation, to contribute to the scheme, shall not be entitled to any pension… 
 (3) No widow of a contributor whose husband dies within twelve calendar months of the 
marriage without issue of the marriage born in his lifetime or in due time after his death shall be 
entitled to any pension under this Act; but the Committee may, with the approval of the 
President, grant to the widow all or any part of the pension to which she would have been 
entitled but for this subsection. 
 
40. (1) When a contributor dies leaving a widow and children of pensionable age by the 
widow, the Committee may, either in the first instance or at any time while a pension is payable, 
pay to the widow the whole of the pension, or pay to the widow a part only of the pension, and 
pay or apply the balance of such pension for or towards the maintenance or education of the 
children… 
 
Wills and Probate Ordinance (CAP.8/2), 1950 Rev., as amended by the Distribution of Estates 
Act, No. 28 of 2000744 
90. (1) Where, after the commencement of this Ordinance, a person dies domiciled in the 
colony leaving -  
(a) wife or husband, 
(b) a daughter who has not been married, or who is by reason of some mental or 
physical disability incapable of maintaining herself, 
(c) an infant son, or 
(d) a son who is, be reason of some mental or physical disability incapable or 
maintaining herself, 
and leaving a will, then, if the Court on application by or on behalf of any such wife, husband, 
daughter or son as aforesaid (hereinafter referred to as a “dependant” of the testator) is of 
opinion that the will does not make reasonable provision for the maintainance of that dependant, 
the Court may order that such reasonable provision as the Court thinks fit shall, subject to such 
condition or restriction, if any, as the Court may impose, be made out of the testator’s net estate 
for the maintenance of that dependant: 
 Provided that no application shall be made to the Court by or on behalf of any person in 
any case where the testator has bequeathed not less than two-thirds of the income of the net 
estate to a surviving spouse and the only other dependant or dependants, if any, is or are a 
child or children of the surviving spouse. 
 (2) The provision for maintenance to be made by an order shall, subject to the 
provisions of subsection (4) of this section, be by way of periodical payments of income and the 
order shall provide for their termination not later than –  
(a) in the case of a wife or husband, her or his re-marriage; 
(b) in the case of a daughter who has not been married, or who is under disability, her 
marriage of the cesser of her disability, whichever is the later; 
(c) in the case of an infant son, his attaining the age of twenty-one years; 
(d) in the case of a son under disability, the cesser of his disability; 
or, in any case, his or her earlier death. 
                                               
744
 This Ordinance is repealed by Succession Act, No. 27 of 1981, but as this Act has not yet been 
brought into effect the Ordinance is still in force. 
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Workmen’s Compensation Act (Chap. 88:05), 1980 Rev. 
2. (1) In this Act -  
“dependants”…includes a dependant female and any other person whom the workman at the 
time of his death treated as under a duty by him to support in whole or in part… 
“dependant female” means a woman who, for not less than twelve months immediately before 
the date on which the workman died or was incapacitated as a result of the accident, 
although not legally married to him, lived with him as his wife and was dependant wholly 
or in part upon his earnings. 
 
5. (1) Subject to this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows: 
(a) where death results from the injury, a lump sum of an amount calculated as follows: 
 (i) if the workman leaves any dependants wholly dependant on his earnings, the 
lump sum shall be a sum equal to thirty-six months earnings… 
 
9. (1) Compensation payable where the death of a workman has resulted from an injury 
shall be deposited with the Registrar, and any sum so deposited shall be apportioned among 
the dependants of the deceased workman or any of them in such proportion as the 
Commissioner thinks fit… 
 
10. Save as provided by this Act, no lump sum or half-monthly payment payable under this Act 
shall be capable of being assigned, charged or attached or shall pass to any person other the 
workman by operation of law, nor shall any claim be set off against the same. 
 
12. (4) Where a workman whose right to compensation has been suspended under 
subsection (2) or subsection (3) dies without having submitted himself for medical examination 
as required by either of those subsections, the Commission may…direct the payment of 
compensation to the dependants of the deceased workman.  
 
Young Offenders Detention Act (Chap. 13:05), 1980 Rev. and Regulations made pursuant to 
the Act deal with male offenders only. 
 
 
A.3 INEQUALITY 
A.3.1 POSITIVE INEQUALITY (Rights vested in elite) 
 
Bankruptcy Act (Chap. 9:70), 1980 Rev. 
40. (2) Where the husband or a married woman has been adjudged bankrupt, any money or 
other estate of such woman lent or entrusted by her to her husband for the purpose of any trade 
or business carried on by him or otherwise, shall be treated as assets of his estate, and the wife 
shall not be entitled to claim any dividend as a creditor in respect of any such money or other 
estate until all claims of the other creditors of her husband for valuable consideration in money 
or money’s worth have been satisfied. 
 
Births and Deaths Registration Act (Chap. 44:01), 1980 Rev. 
21. (1) The Registrar shall not enter the name of any person as the father of a child born out of 
wedlock except –  
(a) at the joint request of the mother and the person acknowledging himself to be the 
father of the child…; or 
(b) at the request of the mother on production of – 
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 (i) a declaration in the prescribed form made by the mother stating that the said 
person is the father of the child; and 
 (ii) a statutory declaration made by that person acknowledging himself to be the 
father of the child… 
  
Citizenship of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Act (Chap. 1:50), 1980 Rev. 
2. (1) In this Act -  
“responsible parent” in relation to any child means the father but – 
(a) where the father is dead; or 
(b) where custody of the child has been awarded to the mother;  
(c) paternity of the child is not admitted or established in accordance with the Status of 
Children Act; 
the expression “responsible parent” means the mother… 
 
Conveyancing and Law of Property Ordinance (CAP.27/12), 1950 Rev.745 
27. (1)(F.)(3) Where a wife conveys and is expressed to convey as beneficial owner, and 
the husband also conveys and is expressed to convey as beneficial owner, then, within this 
section, the wife shall be deemed to convey and to be expressed to convey by direction of the 
husband as beneficial owner… 
 
Deceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act (Chap. 45:54), 1980 Rev. 
3. (1) Every marriage, otherwise lawful, contracted before or after the commencement of 
this Act, between a man and his deceased wife’s sister, within or outside Trinidad and Tobago, 
is deemed to be and to have been valid and of full force and effect. 
 
Fire Service (Terms and Conditions of Employment) Regulations, LN No. 267 of 1998 made 
pursuant to section 34 of the Fire Service Act 
89. (1) An officer is eligible for paternity leave of three working days at or about the time his 
spouse gives birth on furnishing a certificate to the Chief Fire Officer from a registered medical 
practitioner stating the expected date of birth. 
 (2) For the purposes of this regulation, a “spouse” includes a person with whom the 
officer lives as his spouse and whose name is registered accordingly with the Chief Fire Officer. 
 
Indictable Offences (Preliminary Enquiry) Act (Chap. 12:01), 1980 Rev. 
37. If an accused person who is admitted to bail is a married woman or infant, the recognisance 
of bail shall be taken only from the surety or sureties. 
 
Industrial Training Act (Chap. 39:54), 1980 Rev. 
11. (1) It shall be lawful for the father of any boy or girl above the age of thirteen and under 
the age of eighteen years, or, in case such boy or girl has no father, for the mother of such boy 
or girl…to bind such boy or girl…for any term not exceeding five years to be an apprentice… 
 
Land Law and Conveyancing Act, No. 20 of 1981746 
64. (1) Where, in any proceedings, there arises on the rule against perpetuities a question 
which turns on the ability of a person to have a child at some future time, then -  
(a) …it shall be presumed that a male can have a child at the age of fourteen years or 
over, but not under that age, and that a female can have a child at the age of 
twelve years or over, but not under that age or over the age of fifty-five years… 
 
                                               
745
 This Ordinance is repealed by Land Law and Conveyancing Act, No. 20 of 1981, but as this Act 
has not yet been brought into effect the Ordinance is still in force. 
746
 Not yet in force. 
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Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act (Chap. 45:51), 1980 Rev. 
13. (2) A marriage which takes place after the commencement of this Act shall be voidable 
on the following grounds only:… 
(f) that at the time of the marriage the respondent was pregnant by some person other 
than the petitioner. 
 
Matrimonial Causes Rules, made pursuant to sections 77-81 of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act (Chap. 4:01), 1980 Rev. 
26. (2) An application under subrule (1) shall not be made in an undefended cause -  
(a) where the husband is the petitioner; or 
(b) where the wife is the petitioner and –  
 (i) it appears from the petition that she was either a widow or divorced at the 
time of the marriage in question; or  
 (ii) it appears from the petition or otherwise that she has borne a child; or 
 (iii) a statement by the wife that she is not a virgin is filed, 
unless, in any such case, the petitioner is alleging his or her own incapacity. 
 
Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (Chap. 45:02), 1980 Rev. 
8. The age at which a person, being a member of the Muslim community, is capable of 
contracting marriage shall be sixteen in the case of males and twelve in the case of females. 
However, in the case of an intended marriage between persons either of whom is under 
eighteen years of age (not being a widower or widow), the consent to the marriage, of the father 
if living, or if the father is dead of the guardian or guardians lawfully appointed or of one of them, 
and in case there is no such guardian then of the mother of the person so under age, and if the 
mother is dead then of such other person as may be appointed for the purpose by the 
President… 
 
Muslim Marriage and Divorce Regulations, made pursuant to section 30 of the Muslim Marriage 
and Divorce Act (Chap. 45:02) 
6. (1) In any case in which separate applications for dissolution or annulment of marriage 
are filed by the husband and wife with different Muslim bodies the applications shall be 
determined according to the following order of priorities:… 
(d) if the applications were filed on the same day, by the Council of the body with which 
the husband’s application was filed. 
 
National Insurance Act (Chap. 32:01), as amended by Act Nos. 9 of 1999 and 2004 
29. (2) A person employed in any of the following employments shall be regarded as being 
engaged in uninsurable employment and shall not be registered for the purposes of this Act: 
(b) employment of a married woman by her husband… 
 
Purchase, Sweepstake, Departure and Airline Ticket Taxes Act (Chap. 77:01), 1980 Rev. 
27. Nothing in this Part shall require tax to be paid or accounted for in respect of –  
(c) the President, his wife and children… 
(e) the official representatives of the Government of any country, their wives and their 
children…when travelling with them; 
(f) representatives of the United Nations Organisation…and persons sent on missions 
on behalf of any such organisation, their wives and children… 
(h) members of the Armed Forces of the United States of America and their wives and 
children… 
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Real Property Ordinance (CAP.27/11), 1950 Rev.747 
2. (1) In this Ordinance -  
 “incapable person” includes any married woman who is under the law for the time being 
in force under any legal incapacity so far as she is under such incapacity… 
 
28. Whenever any notice is required by this Ordinance, or by any order made under this 
Ordinance by a Judge, to be given to any incapable person…it shall be lawful for a Judge to 
direct that such notice be served on any person as the guardian, committee, trustee, or 
representative of any other person, and in such case any notice served on such guardian, 
committee, trustee, or representative shall be as binding on such person as if he had been 
under no disability, and had been personally served therewith. 
 
The Defence (Rates of Pay and Allowances) Regulations, LN No. 84 of 1989, made pursuant to 
section 244 of the Defence Act 
6. (2) An officer is entitled to an unaccommodated rent allowance where he -  
(a) is maintaining his wife and his dependent children… 
(3) An other rank is entitled to an unaccommodated rent allowance where he -  
(a) is maintaining his wife and his dependent children… 
 
The Police Service Regulations, made pursuant to section 65 of the Police Service Act as 
amended by LN No. 235 of 1999 
31. (4) Where a police officer is married to another police officer only one house allowance 
shall be paid and that to the officer in receipt of the higher allowance or, if both officers are in 
receipt of an equal amount of house allowance, to the husband. 
 
97A. With effect from 1st October, 1997, a male officer shall be eligible for paternity leave of 
three working days in respect of each pregnancy of his spouse, whether a spouse by a 
marriage under the Marriage Act or a common-law spouse, to be granted at the time of delivery 
where: 
(a) he furnishes a medical certificate stating the expected date of delivery; and  
(b) he registers the name of his common-law spouse, where applicable, with the 
Commissioner of Police. 
 
Widows’ and Orphans’ Pensions Act (Chap. 23:54), 1980 Rev. 
2. In this Act –  
“pensionable age” as applied to children means, in the case of a male, that he is under the age 
of eighteen years and, in the case of a female, that she is under the age of eighteen 
years and has not been married… 
 
8. Pensions payable under this Act shall commence upon the death of the contributor in respect 
of whom they are payable… 
 
9. (1) The pension payable to the widow of a contributor shall cease on her death, 
bankruptcy or re-marriage… 
 (3) If on such pension to the widow ceasing as mentioned above there are such children 
or a child living and of pensionable age the pension shall be continued and paid to such children 
or child… 
 (4) The pension to the children of a deceased contributor shall cease in the case of 
males at eighteen years of age, and in the case of females at eighteen years of age or on 
                                               
747
 This Ordinance was repealed by the Land Registration Act, No. 24 of 1981, which was never 
brought into force; however, Act 16/2000 repealed the unenforced 1981 Act therefore the Ordinance is 
still in force. 
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marriage under that age.  However, where the President is satisfied that a child who has 
reached the pensionable age is by reason of infirmity of mind or body incapable of earning a 
livelihood, and has no sufficient means of support, he may order that the whole or any portion of 
the pension…shall be paid to the child for such period as he may determine. 
 
17. In any case in which any person ceases to be a contributor or becomes a contributor to a 
reduced extent, the pension to his widow or children shall be reduced in the same proportion… 
 
33. (2) The widow of a contributor whose marriage with him is contracted after he has 
retired from the public service or subsequently to the time when the contributor ceased, or was 
not under obligation, to contribute to the scheme, shall not be entitled to any pension… 
 (3) No widow of a contributor whose husband dies within twelve calendar months of the 
marriage without issue of the marriage born in his lifetime or in due time after his death shall be 
entitled to any pension under this Act; but the Committee may, with the approval of the 
President, grant to the widow all or any part of the pension to which she would have been 
entitled but for this subsection. 
 
40. (1) When a contributor dies leaving a widow and children of pensionable age by the 
widow, the Committee may, either in the first instance or at any time while a pension is payable, 
pay to the widow the whole of the pension, or pay to the widow a part only of the pension, and 
pay or apply the balance of such pension for or towards the maintenance or education of the 
children… 
 
 
A.3.2 NEGATIVE INEQUALITY (Liabilities in non-elite) 
 
Hindu Marriage Act (Chap. 45:03), 1980 Rev. 
11. (1) The age at which a person, being a member of the Hindu faith or religion, is capable 
of contracting marriage shall be eighteen years in the case of males and fourteen years in the 
case of females. 
 
Legal Aid and Advice Act (Chap. 7:07), as amended by Act No. 18 of 1999 
Second schedule, Part II, Excepted Proceedings 
1. Proceedings wholly or partly in respect of -  
(e) the loss of the services of a woman or girl in consequence of her rape or 
seduction… 
 
Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (Chap. 45:02), 1980 Rev. 
8. The age at which a person, being a member of the Muslim community, is capable of 
contracting marriage shall be sixteen in the case of males and twelve in the case of females. 
 
Orisa Marriage Act, No. 22 of 1999 
9. (1) The age at which a person, being a member of the Orisa faith or religion, is capable 
of contracting marriage shall be eighteen years in the case of males and sixteen years in the 
case of females.  
 
Public Service Commission Regulations, deemed to be made under section 129 of the 
Constitution 
57. The Commission may terminate the appointment of a female officer who is married on the 
grounds that her family obligations are affecting the efficient performance of her duties… 
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Police Service Commission Regulations, deemed to be made under section 129 of the 
Constitution 
52. The Commission may terminate the appointment of a female police officer who is married 
on the grounds that her family obligations are affecting the efficient performance of her duties… 
 
Statutory Authorities’ Service Commission Regulations, made pursuant to section 6 of the 
Statutory Authorities Act (Chap. 24:01) 
58. The Commission may terminate the appointment of a female officer who is married on the 
grounds that her family obligations are affecting the efficient performance of her duties… 
 
Summary Offences Act (Chap. 11:02), 1980 Rev. 
46. A person…who commits any of the offences mentioned below in this section…shall be liable 
to imprisonment –  
(j) any woman loitering about and soliciting passers-by for the purpose of prostitution. 
 
 
A.4 EQUALITY 
A.4.1 FALSE EQUALITY 
 
Socially Displaced Persons Act, No. 59 of 2000 
3. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires— 
“socially displaced person” means any idle person habitually found in a public place whether or 
not he is begging and who by reason of illness or otherwise is unable to maintain 
himself, or has no means of subsistence or place of residence, is unable to give a 
satisfactory account of himself and causes or is likely to cause annoyance or damage to 
persons frequenting that public place, or otherwise to create a nuisance. 
 
4. The Minister shall establish a Social Displacement Unit (hereinafter referred to as “the Unit”) 
for the assessment, relocation, care and rehabilitation of socially displaced persons. 
 
 
A.4.2 INVERSE EQUALITY (Conveying rights to non-elite that are not enjoyed by the elite) 
 
Criminal Law Act (Chap. 10:04), 1980 Rev. 
7. Any presumption of law that an offence committed by a wife in the presence of her husband 
is committed under the coercion of her husband is abolished, but on a charge against a wife for 
any offence other than treason or murder it shall be a good defence to prove that the offence 
was committed in the presence of, and under the coercion of, the husband. 
 
Criminal Procedure Act (Chap. 12:02), 1980 Rev. 
63. (1) Where a woman by any wilful act causes the death of her child, being a child under 
the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act the balance of her mind was disturbed by 
reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of 
the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then, notwithstanding that the 
circumstances were such that but for this section of the offence would have amounted to 
murder, she shall be guilty of infanticide… [RE: BWS] 
 
Friendly Societies Act (Chap. 32:50), 1980 Rev. 
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34. (3) The mother of an illegitimate child under sixteen years of age shall…exercise on 
behalf of the child any powers in this section expressly or impliedly contained. 
 
Liquor Licences Act (Chap. 84:10), 1980 Rev. 
35. (1) The authority given to any person by any licence in respect of any premises shall 
extend, in respect of such premises, to his servant, or his wife or a member of his family 
resident with him. 
 
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act (Chap. 45:51), 1980 Rev. 
18. (1) In the case of any petition for divorce or for nullity of marriage or for presumption of 
death and dissolution of marriage -  
(c) the Court may order the costs or any part thereof arising from such intervention to 
be paid by any of the parties, including a wife if she has separate property… 
 
28. (1) Either party to a marriage may apply to the Court for an order under this section on 
the ground that the other party to the marriage (in this section referred to as “the respondent”) -  
(a) being the husband, has willfully neglected –  
 (i) to provide reasonable maintenance for the applicant; or 
 (ii) to provide, or to make a proper contribution towards, reasonable maintenance 
for any child of the family to whom this section applies; 
(b) being the wife, has willfully neglected to provide, or to make a proper contribution 
towards, reasonable maintenance - 
 (i)  for the applicant in a case where, by reason of the impairment of the 
applicant’s earning capacity through age, illness or disability of mind or body, 
and having regard to any resources of the applicant and the respondent 
respectively which are, or should properly be made, available for the purpose, 
it is reasonable in all the circumstances to expect the respondent so to 
provide or contribute… 
 
Workmen’s Compensation Act (Chap. 88:05), 1980 Rev. 
2. (1) In this Act -  
“dependants”…includes a dependant female and any other person whom the workman at the 
time of his death treated as under a duty by him to support in whole or in part… 
“dependant female” means a woman who, for not less than twelve months immediately before 
the date on which the workman died or was incapacitated as a result of the accident, 
although not legally married to him, lived with him as his wife and was dependant wholly 
or in part upon his earnings. 
 
5. (1) Subject to this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows: 
(a) where death results from the injury, a lump sum of an amount calculated as follows: 
 (i) if the workman leaves any dependants wholly dependant on his earnings, the 
lump sum shall be a sum equal to thirty-six months earnings… 
 
9. (1) Compensation payable where the death of a workman has resulted from an injury 
shall be deposited with the Registrar, and any sum so deposited shall be apportioned among 
the dependants of the deceased workman or any of them in such proportion as the 
Commissioner thinks fit… 
 
10. Save as provided by this Act, no lump sum or half-monthly payment payable under this Act 
shall be capable of being assigned, charged or attached or shall pass to any person other the 
workman by operation of law, nor shall any claim be set off against the same. 
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12. (4) Where a workman whose right to compensation has been suspended under 
subsection (2) or subsection (3) dies without having submitted himself for medical examination 
as required by either of those subsections, the Commission may…direct the payment of 
compensation to the dependants of the deceased workman.  
 
 
A.4.3 RESTORATIVE EQUALITY (Conveying rights to achieve gender neutrality [eg. 
cohabitational relationships act] or non-gender distinctiveness [maternity benefits]) 
 
Administration of Estates Ordinance (CAP.8/1), 1950 Rev., as amended by the Distribution of 
Estates Act, No. 28 of 2000748 
2. In this Ordinance -  
“cohabitant” means a person of the opposite sex who, while not married to the intestate, 
continuously cohabited in a bona fide domestic relationship with the intestate for a 
period of not less than five years immediately preceding the death of the intestate… 
 
24. (1) Where an intestate dies leaving a surviving spouse but no issue, his estate shall be 
distributed to or held on trust for the surviving spouse absolutely. 
(3) Where an intestate dies leaving a spouse and one child, the surviving spouse shall take 
one-half of the estate absolutely and the other half shall be distributed to or held on trust for the 
child. 
(4) Where the intestate dies leaving a spouse and more than one child, the surviving 
spouse shall take one-half the estate absolutely and the remaining one half shall be distributed 
to or held on trust for the children. 
 
25. (1) Notwithstanding section 24, where an intestate dies leaving no surviving spouse, but 
dies leaving a surviving cohabitant, the cohabitant shall be treated for the purposes of this 
Ordinance as if he or she were a surviving spouse of the intestate. 
(2) Notwithstanding section 24, where an intestate dies leaving a spouse and a cohabitant 
and the intestate and his spouse were at the time of his death living separate and apart from 
one another, only such part of the estate as was acquired during the period of cohabitation shall 
be distributed to the cohabitant, subject to the rights of a surviving spouse and any issue of the 
intestate. 
 
Caribbean Aviation Training Institute (Chap. 39:52), 1980 Rev. 
Second Schedule. Privileges and Immunities. 
1. The personnel of the Institute employed in Trinidad and Tobago shall have the right to the 
following -  
(c) immunity together with their spouses and relatives dependent on them from 
immigration restrictions; 
(e) the same repatriation facilities for themselves and their spouse and relatives who 
are dependent on them as are accorded diplomatic envoys in the event of 
international crises. 
 
Caribbean Community Act, No. 3 of 2005 
Article 34 
In performing its tasks set out in Article 33, COTED shall, inter alia: 
(d) establish measures to ensure the removal of restrictions on the right of 
establishment in respect of activities accorded priority treatment pursuant to 
                                               
748
 This Ordinance is repealed by the Succession Act, No. 27 of 1981, but as this Act has not yet been 
brought into operation the Ordinance is still in force. 
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paragraph (a) of this Article as they relate to: 
 (i) the conditions governing the entry of managerial, technical or supervisory 
personnel employed in such agencies, branches and subsidiaries, including 
the spouses and immediate dependant family members of such personnel… 
 
Article 37 
3. In establishing the programme mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article, COTED shall: 
(c) establish measures to ensure the abolition of restrictions on the right to provide 
services in respect of activities accorded priority treatment in accordance with sub-
paragraph (a) of this paragraph, both in terms of conditions for the provision of 
services in the territories of Member States as well as the conditions governing the 
entry of personnel, including their spouses and immediate dependant family 
members, for the provision of services… 
 
Children’s Authority Act, No. 64 of 2000 
6. (1) It shall be the duty of the Authority to – … 
(2) When determining what is in the best interest of a child the Authority shall take into 
consideration -  
(h) domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or 
witnessed by the child… 
 
19.  (1) The Authority shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of pension 
schemes or arrange for membership in a scheme for its employees… 
(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1), the Authority may, under a pension scheme -  
(a) grant gratuities, pensions or superannuation allowances to the surviving spouse, 
families or dependants of its employees; 
(b) enter into and carry into effect, arrangements with any insurance company or other 
association or company for securing for any employee or surviving spouse or 
dependant, such gratuities, pensions or allowances authorised by this section… 
 
Civil Aviation Act, No. 11 of 2001 
14. (1) A member of the Board who was in any way, whether directly or indirectly, interested 
in a contract or proposed contract with or in any other matter concerning an entity regulated by 
the Authority, or any body corporate carrying on business with the Authority, shall, as soon as 
possible after the relevant facts have come to his knowledge, disclose the nature of his interest. 
(2) A disclosure under subsection (1), shall be recorded in the minutes of the Board, and 
the member - 
(a) shall not take part after the disclosure in any deliberation or decision of the Board 
with respect to that contract; and 
(b) shall be disregarded for the purpose of constituting a quorum of the Board. 
(3) For the purpose of this section, a person who or any nominee or relative of whom is a 
Director, a shareholder or partner in a company or other body of persons other than a statutory 
authority or who is an employee thereof shall be treated as having indirectly, a pecuniary 
interest in a contract or proposed contract or such other body of persons is a party to the 
contract or proposed contract or has a pecuniary interest in such other matter under 
consideration 
(5) In subsection (3), “relative” means spouse, common-law spouse, father, mother, 
brother, sister, son or daughter of a person and includes the spouse of a son or daughter of 
such person. 
 
Civil Service (External Affairs) Regulations, made pursuant to section 28 of the Civil Service Act 
9. (3) The Government shall also pay the cost of passages, of transportation and of 
insurance against loss or damage of the personal baggage of…: 
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 (a) (i) the officer’s spouse… 
 
28. (1) Where an officer posted at a Mission travels to Trinidad and Tobago because of the 
terminal illness or death occurring there of his spouse, parent, or child, he shall…be paid a 
compassionate travel allowance… 
 
43. The spouse of a Foreign Service Officer may take up such mode of employment in the host 
country as is approved by the Head of Mission. 
 
Civil Service Regulations, made pursuant to section 28 of the Civil Service Act 
88. (1) Maternity leave consisting of leave with full pay for one month followed by leave with 
half pay for two months shall be granted to female officers… 
 (2) This regulation also applies to acting and temporary officers subject to the following 
provisions: 
(a) the officer must complete twelve (12) months of service before she can become 
eligible for maternity leave… 
(4) The grant of maternity leave or of no-pay leave on account of pregnancy shall not be a 
consideration for the termination of the services of any temporary or acting officer… 
 
Cohabitational Relationships Act, No. 30 of 1998 
2.  (1) In this Act -  
“cohabitant” means –  
(a) in relation to a man, a woman who is living or has lived with a man as his wife in a 
cohabitational relationship; and 
(b) in relation to a woman, a man who is living with or has lived with a woman as her 
husband in a cohabitational relationship; 
 “cohabitational relationship” means the relationship between cohabitants, who not being 
married to each other are living or have lived together as husband and wife on a bona 
fide domestic basis… 
 
6. Under this Part, a cohabitant may apply - 
(a) to the High Court for the granting of an adjustment order or for the granting of a 
maintenance order; or  
(b) to the Magistrate’s Court for the granting of a maintenance order. 
 
8. (1) Where cohabitants have ceased to live together as husband and wife on a bona fide 
domestic basis, an application under this Part shall be made within two years after the day on 
which they so ceased to live. 
 
10.  (1) On an application for an adjustment order, the High Court may make any such order 
as is just and equitable, having regard to -  
(a) the financial contributions made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of the 
cohabitants to the acquisition or improvement of the property and the financial 
resources of the partners; and  
(b) any other contributions, including any contribution made in the capacity of 
homemaker or parent, made by either of the cohabitants to the welfare of the family 
constituted by them; 
(c) the right, title, interest or claim of a legal spouse in the property. 
 
11. (2) In forming an opinion as to whether there is likely to be a significant change in the 
financial circumstances of either or both the cohabitants the court may have regard to any 
change in the financial circumstances of a cohabitant that may occur by reason that the 
cohabitant -  
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(a) is a contributor to a deferred annuity plan or pension fund plan or participates in 
any plan or arrangement that is in the nature of an annuity; 
(b) may become entitled to a superannuation benefit; or 
(c) may become entitled to property, as the result of the exercise in his favour, by the 
trustee of a discretionary trust, of a power to distribute trust properties. 
 
15. (1) A court may make a maintenance order, where it is satisfied as to one or more of the 
following matters: 
(a) that the applicant is unable to support himself adequately by reason of having the 
care and control of a child of the cohabitational relationship… 
(b) that the applicant’s earning capacity has been adversely affected by the 
circumstances of the relationship, and in the opinion of the court a maintenance 
order would increase the applicant’s earning capacity by enabling the applicant to 
undertake a course or programme of training or education; and 
(c) having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable to make the 
order. 
(2) In determining whether to make a maintenance order and in fixing the amount to be 
paid pursuant to such an order, the court shall have regard to - 
(a) the age and state of health of each of the cohabitants including the physical and 
mental disability of each cohabitant; 
(b) the income, property and financial resources of each cohabitant; 
(c) the financial needs and obligations of each cohabitant; 
(d) the responsibilities of either cohabitant to support any other person; 
(e) the terms of any order made under section 10 with respect to the property of the 
cohabitants; 
(f) the duration of the relationship; 
(g) a standard of living, that in all the circumstances is reasonable; 
(h) the extent to which the applicant has contributed to the income, earning capacity, 
property and financial resources of the other cohabitant; 
(i) the terms of any order made by a court in respect of the maintenance of a child or 
children in the care and control of the applicant; 
(j) any fact or circumstance that, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case 
requires to be taken into account. 
 
17.  (1) The court may not make a maintenance order in favour of a cohabitant who has 
entered into a subsequent cohabitational relationship or has married or remarried. 
(2) A maintenance order shall cease to have effect on the marriage or remarriage of the 
cohabitant in whose favour the order was made. 
 
24.  (1) A man and a woman who are not married to each other may enter into a  
cohabitation agreement or a separation agreement for the purpose of facilitating their affairs 
under this Act. 
 
25.  (1) A man and a woman who intend to cohabit or who are cohabiting partners, may 
enter into an agreement in which they agree on their respective rights and obligations during the 
period of cohabitation, or ceasing to cohabit, or on death, including -  
(a) their interests in or division of property; 
(b) their maintenance obligations;… 
(d) any other matter in the settlement of their affairs. 
(2) If the parties to a cohabitation agreement marry each other, the agreement shall be 
unenforceable. 
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26. A man and a woman who are cohabitants or who were in a cohabitational relationship and 
are subsequently living separate and apart may enter into an agreement in which they agree on 
their respective rights and obligations, including - 
(a) their interests in or division of property; 
(b) their maintenance obligations;… 
(d) any other matter in the settlement of their affairs. 
 
College of Science, Technology and Applied Arts of Trinidad and Tobago Act, No. 77 of 2000 
11. (2) A member who has a pecuniary interest in a matter being considered by the Board 
shall, as soon as possible after the relevant facts come to his knowledge, disclose the nature of 
this interest before the Board’s deliberation on the matter. 
(3) A disclosure under subsection (2) shall be recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the 
Board and after such disclosure the member shall neither be present during any deliberation of 
the Board nor take part in any decision of the Board, with respect to that matter. 
(4) For the purposes of this section, a person who, or a nominee or relative of whom, is a 
shareholder who owns shares in excess of five per cent or is a partner in a company or other 
body of persons other than a statutory authority or who is an employee thereof, shall be treated 
as having a pecuniary interest. 
 (5) In this section “relative” means spouse, cohabitant within the meaning of the 
Cohabitational Relationships Act, father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter of a person. 
 
Compensation for Injuries Act (Chap. 8:05), 1980 Rev. 
2. (1) In this Act, “dependant” means wife, husband… 
 
Conveyancing and Law of Property Ordinance (CAP.27/12), 1950 Rev.749 
76. (1) A married women, whether an infant or not, has power, as if she were unmarried and 
of full age, by deed, to appoint an attorney on her behalf for the purpose of executing any deed 
of doing any other act which she might herself execute or do… 
 
Counting Unremunerated Work Act, No. 29 of 1996 
2. The Director of the Central Statistical Office shall - 
(a) conduct periodic household surveys, at least once every three years to assess 
household incomes and breakdown of expenditures; 
(b) conduct surveys of unremunerated work performed in Trinidad and Tobago 
including –  
 (i) work performed in and around dwelling places; 
 (ii) work related to the care of children, the handicapped, the elderly and other 
care services; 
 (iii) agricultural work and work related to food production; 
 (iv) family businesses; and  
 (v) volunteer and community work in both the formal and informal sectors of 
society; 
(c) calculate the monetary value of such unremunerated work separately for men and 
women… 
 
Criminal Procedure (Plea Discussion and Plea Agreement) Act, No. 11 of 1999 
2. In this Act -  
“relative” means the spouse (including a common law spouse)… 
 
 
                                               
749
 This Ordinance is repealed by Land Law and Conveyancing Act, No. 20 of 1981, but as this Act 
has not yet been brought into effect the Ordinance is still in force. 
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Distribution of Estates Act, No. 28 of 2000 
2. (1) In this Part - 
“cohabitant” or “cohabiting partner” means - 
(a) in relation to a man, a woman who has been living with or who has lived together 
with a man in a bona fide domestic relationship for a period of not less than five 
years immediately preceding the date of his death; 
(b) in relation to a woman, a man who has been living with or has lived together with a 
woman in a bona fide domestic relationship for a period of not less than five years 
immediately preceding the date of her death, but only one such relationship shall 
be taken into account for the purposes of this Part; 
“cohabitational relationship” means the relationship between cohabitants, who not being married 
to each other, have lived together in a bona fide domestic relationship for a period of not 
less than five years immediately preceding the death of either cohabitant; 
 “spouse” means a husband or wife and in relation to a deceased person a widow or widower… 
 
Domestic Violence Act, No. 27 of 1999 
2. The objects of the Act are inter alia to - 
(a) provide immediate injunctive relief to victims of domestic violence; and 
(b) ensure a prompt and just legal remedy for victims of domestic violence. 
 
3. In this Act –  
“cohabitant” means a person who has lived with or is living with a person of the opposite sex as 
a husband or wife although not legally married to that person; 
“domestic violence” includes physical, sexual, emotional or psychological or financial abuse 
committed by a person against a spouse, child, any other person who is a member of 
the household or dependant; 
“emotional or psychological abuse” means a pattern of behaviour of any kind, the purpose of 
which is to undermine the emotional or mental well-being of a person including: 
(a) persistent intimidation by the use of abusive or threatening language; 
(b) persistent following of the person from place to place; 
(c) depriving that person of the use of his property; 
(d) the watching or besetting of the place where the person resides, works, carries on 
business or happens to be; 
(e) interfering with or damaging the property of the person; 
(f) the forced confinement of the person; 
(g) persistent telephoning of the person at the person’s place of residence or work; and 
(h) making unwelcome and repeated or intimidatory contact with a child or elderly 
relative of the person; 
 “financial abuse” means a pattern of behaviour of a kind, the purpose of which is to exercise 
coercive control over, or exploit or limit a person’s access to financial resources so as to 
ensure financial dependence; 
“physical abuse” means any act or omission which causes physical injury… 
“sexual abuse” includes sexual contact of any kind that is coerced by force or threat of force and 
the commission of or an attempt to commit any of the offences listed under the Sexual 
Offences Act in the First Schedule; 
“spouse” includes a former spouse, a cohabitant or former cohabitant; 
“visiting relationship” means a noncohabitational relationship which is otherwise similar to the 
relationship between husband and wife. 
 
5.  (2) The Court shall grant a Protection Order where it is satisfied that the respondent - 
(a) is engaging in or has engaged in domestic violence against the applicant; or 
(b) is likely to engage in conduct that would constitute domestic violence… 
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6.  (1) A Protection Order may -  
(a) prohibit the respondent from -  
 (i) engaging or threatening to engage in conduct which would constitute 
domestic violence towards the applicant; 
 (ii) being on premises specified in the Order, that are premises frequented by 
the applicant including any residence, property, business, school or place of 
employment; 
 (iii) being in a locality specified in the Order; 
 (iv) engaging in direct or indirect communication with the applicant; 
 (v) taking possession of, damaging, converting or otherwise dealing with 
property that the applicant may have an interest in, or is reasonably used by 
the applicant, as the case may be; 
 (vi) approaching the applicant within a specified distance; 
 (vii) causing or encouraging another person to engage in conduct referred to in 
paragraphs (i) to (vi); 
(c) direct that the respondent - 
 (i) return to the applicant specified property that is in his possession or under 
his control; 
 (ii) pay compensation for monetary loss incurred by an applicant as a direct 
result of conduct that amounted to domestic violence; 
 (iii) pay interim monetary relief to the applicant for the benefit of the applicant 
and any child, where there is no existing order relating to maintenance until 
such time as an obligation for support is determined, pursuant to any other 
written law; 
 (iv) immediately vacate any place or residence for a specified period, whether or 
not the residence is jointly owned or leased by the respondent and the 
applicant, or solely owned or leased by the respondent or the applicant; 
 (v) relinquish to the police any firearm licence, firearm or other weapon which he 
may have in his possession or control and which may or may not have been 
used; 
 (vi) make or continue to make payments in respect of rent or mortgage 
payments for premises occupied by the applicant; 
 (vii) ensure that reasonable care is provided in respect of a child or dependant 
person; 
 (viii) or applicant or both, receive professional counselling or therapy from any 
person or agency or from a programme which is approved by the Minister in 
writing. 
(4) Where the Court makes an Order which, inter alia, directs the payment of compensation 
under subsection (1)(c)(ii), such compensation shall include, but not be limited to -  
(a) loss of earnings; 
(b) medical and dental expenses; 
(c) moving and accommodation expenses; 
(d) reasonable legal costs, including the cost of an application pursuant to this Act. 
(6) Where the Court makes an Order which inter alia - 
(a) directs that the respondent vacate any place or residence; or 
(b) directs the respondent to return to the applicant specified property that is in his 
possession or control,  
the Court may…direct the police to remove the respondent either immediately or within a 
specified time from the said place or residence, or to accompany the applicant, as the case may 
be, either immediately or within a specified time to specified premises in order to supervise the 
removal of property belonging to the applicant and to ensure the protection of that person. 
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7. In determining whether or not to impose one or more of the prohibitions or directions specified 
under section 6, the Court shall have regard to the following: 
(a) the nature, history or pattern of the violence that has occurred and whether a 
previous Protection Order or Interim Order has been issued; 
(b) the need to protect the applicant and any other person for whose benefit the 
Protection Order has been granted from further domestic violence… 
 
9.  (1) In proceedings under this Act the Court may at any time before the taking of 
evidence, accept an Undertaking from the respondent given under oath, that the respondent 
shall not engage in conduct specified in the application or any other conduct that constitutes 
domestic violence. 
 
21.  (1) A police officer shall respond to every complaint or report alleging domestic violence 
whether or not the person making the complaint or the report is the victim. 
 
22. Where a Magistrate is satisfied, by information on oath, that - 
(a) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person on premises has suffered or 
is in imminent danger of physical injury at the hands of another person in a situation 
amounting to domestic violence and needs assistance to deal with or prevent the 
injury; and 
(b) a police officer has been refused permission to enter the premises for the purpose 
of giving assistance to the first mentioned person in paragraph (a), 
the Magistrate may issue a warrant in writing authorising a police officer to enter the premises 
specified in the warrant at any time within twenty-four hours after the issue of the warrant and 
subject to any conditions specified in the warrant, to take such action as is necessary to prevent 
the commission or repetition of the offence or a breach of the peace or to protect life or property. 
 
23. (1) For the avoidance of doubt, a police officer may act in accordance with the provisions 
of the Criminal Law Act where he has reasonable cause to believe that a person is engaging in 
or attempting to engage in conduct which amounts to physical violence and failure to act 
immediately may result in serious physical injury or death. 
 
27. (1) Notwithstanding the Bail Act, where the Court is required to determine whether to 
grant bail in respect of an offence under this Act, the Court shall consider -  
(a) the need to protect the applicant from domestic violence; 
(b) the welfare of a child where the defendant or victim of the alleged offence has 
custody of that child; 
(c) the welfare of any child being a member of the household; and 
(d) any hardship that may be caused to the defendant or other members of the family if 
bail is not granted. 
(2) Notwithstanding the Bail Act, the Court in granting bail, may order that the recognisance 
be subject to such of the following conditions as the Court considers appropriate: 
(a) that the defendant not harass or molest or cause another person to harass or 
molest the victim of the alleged offence; 
(b) that the defendant not be on the premises in which the victim resides or works; 
(c) that the defendant not be in a locality in which are situated the premises in which 
the victim resides or works; and 
(d) where the defendant continues to reside with the victim that the defendant not enter 
or remain in the place or residence while under the influence of alcohol or a drug. 
  
First Schedule 
SUMMARY OFFENCES ACT, CHAP. 11:02 
Assault and Battery, Section 4  
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Assault upon children, women and old, infirmed, sickly persons, Section 5 
Aggravated assaults causing wound or harm, Section 5 
Violent or obscene language or disturbance of the peace, Section 49 
Possession of weapons intended for crime, Section 62 
Throwing stones or other missiles, Section 69 
Inciting animals to attack, Section 75 
Misuse of telephone facilities and false telegrams, Section 106. 
 
MALICIOUS DAMAGE ACT, CHAP. 11:06 
Setting fire to a dwelling house, any person being therein, Section 4 
Conspiracy to set fire, Section 10 
Destroying or damaging a house with gunpowder, any person being therein, Section 11 
Attempting to destroy buildings with gunpowder, Section 12 
  
OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT, CHAP. 11:08 
Conspiring or soliciting to commit murder, Section 5 
Attempted murder, Section 9 
Sending letters threatening to murder, Section 10 
Shooting or wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm, Section 12 
Inflicting injury with or without weapon, Section 14 
Attempting to choke, etc., in order to commit any indictable offence, Section 15 
Using drugs, etc., with intent to commit offence, Section 16 
Administering poison, etc., so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm, Section 17 
Administering poison, etc., with intent to injure or annoy, Section 18 
Exposing children so that life endangered, Section 21 
Causing bodily injury by explosive substance, Section 22 
Use of explosive substance or other noxious thing with intent to do grievous bodily harm, 
Section 23 
Attempting to blow up buildings, Section 26 
Drivers of vehicles injuring person by furious driving, Section 26 
Procuring abortion, Section 56 
Procuring drugs to cause abortion, Section 57 
 
CHILDREN ACT, CHAP. 46:01 
Punishment for cruelty to children and young persons, Section 3 
Suffocation of infants, Section 4 
Begging, Section 5 
Exposing children to risk of burning, Section 6 
Allowing children or young persons to be in brothels, Section 7 
Causing, encouraging or favoring seduction or prostitution of young girls, Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
and 8 
 
SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT, 1986 
Rape, Section 4 
Sexual assault by a husband in certain circumstances, Section 5 
Sexual intercourse with a female under fourteen, Section 6 
Sexual intercourse with a female between fourteen and sixteen, Section 7 
Sexual intercourse with a male under sixteen, Section 8 
Incest, Section 9 
Sexual intercourse with adopted minor, Section 10 
Sexual intercourse with mentally subnormal person, Section 12 
Buggery, Section 13 
Serious indecency, Section 16 
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Procuration, Section 17 
Procuring defilement of a person, Section 18 
Detention of a person, Section 19 
Abduction of a female, Section 20 
 
Education (Teaching Service) Regulations, as amended by LN No. 184 of 2000, made pursuant 
to section 85(11) of the Education Act (Chap. 39:01) 
48. Three months’ maternity leave, the first month on full-pay and the succeeding two months 
on half-pay commencing approximately one month before the expected date of confinement 
shall be granted and must be taken by married female teachers who become pregnant. 
 
Equal Opportunity Act, No. 69 of 2000 
4. This Act applies to - 
(a) discrimination in relation to employment… 
 
7. (1) A person shall not otherwise than in private, do any act which - 
(b) is done because of the gender…of the other person or of some or all of the persons 
in the group; 
 
9. An employer shall not discriminate against a person employed by him… 
 
11.  (1) Sections 8 to 9 shall not apply in respect of discrimination on the grounds of sex in a 
case where being of a particular sex is a genuine occupational qualification for employment, 
promotion, transfer or training. 
 
19. Nothing in this Act shall, in relation to any sport, game or other activity of a competitive 
nature where the physical strength, stamina or physique of the average woman puts her at a 
disadvantage to the average man, prohibit any act related to the participation of a person as a 
competitor in events involving that activity which are not confined to competitors of one sex. 
 
Family Law (Guardianship of Minors, Domicile and Maintenance) Act 1981 (Chap. 46:08), 1980 
Rev. 
4. (1) In relation to the custody or upbringing of a minor, and in relation to the 
administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for a minor or the application of 
income of any such property, a mother shall have the same rights and authority as the law 
allows to the father, and the rights and authority of mother and father shall be equal and be 
exercisable by either without the other. 
 
6. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the mother of a minor born out of wedlock shall 
be the sole guardian of the minor unless and until the paternity of the minor has been 
registered… 
 
13. (13) A Magistrate’s Court may also on the application of the father of a minor born out of 
wedlock make an order that the custody of such minor be committed to the father.  
 
37. (1) The domicile of a married woman, shall, instead of being the same as her husband’s 
by virtue only of marriage, be determined as if she were unmarried and by reference to the 
same factors as in the case of any other individual capable of having an independant domicile 
and (if she is a minor) as if she were of full age; and the rule of law whereby upon marriage a 
woman acquires her husband’s domicile and is thereafter during the subsistence of the 
marriage incapable of having any other domicile is abolished. 
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Financial Institution (Non-Banking) Act (Chap. 83:01), 1980 Rev. 
13. (1) No director of a financial institution shall be present, or shall vote on a resolution of 
the Board of Directors of that institution when a loan or an advance to or by -  
(a) him or his associate; or 
(b) a company of which he or his associate is an employee, or in which he or his 
associate owns not less than ten per cent of the paid up share capital; 
is being considered. 
 
 (2) In this section “associate”, in relation to a director of a financial institution means –  
(a) the wife, husband, son or daughter of that director… 
 
Fire Service (Terms and Conditions of Employment) Regulations, LN No. 267 of 1998 made 
pursuant to section 34 of the Fire Service Act 
86. (1) Subject to this Regulation, maternity leave of one month with full pay and two months 
with half pay shall be granted to a pregnant officer. 
 (2) In order to be granted maternity leave – 
(a) the pregnant officer as of the date of commencement of such leave, shall have 
served for a period of not less than twelve continuous months in the Service; 
(b) the pregnant officer shall proceed on maternity leave at least one month before the 
expected date of delivery of the child as certified by an approved medical 
practitioner; and 
(c) the pregnant officer shall furnish the certificate referred to in paragraph (b) to the 
Chief Fire Officer six weeks before the expected date of delivery. 
(6) A pregnant officer who has not completed twelve months continuous service prior to the 
date on which she would have proceeded on maternity leave had she so served, shall not 
qualify for the grant of maternity leave but shall be permitted to proceed on leave of absence of 
up to three months without pay on account of pregnancy provided the officer complies with the 
conditions in subregulation 2(b) and (c). 
 
88. The Chief Fire Officer may direct that an officer who is pregnant be given light duties prior to 
her departure on maternity leave granted under regulation 86 and for such period as the 
circumstances of the officer’s case may justify and may permit or require such officer to attend 
work out of uniform. 
 
Friendly Societies Housing Corporation Regulations, deemed to be made pursuant to section 66 
of the Friendly Societies Housing Corporation Act (Chap. 33:05), 1980 Rev. 
6. …no loan shall be made to an individual for the purpose of acquiring a house from his or her 
husband or wife, as the case may be, or, for the purpose of acquiring a house if he or his wife, 
or, she or her husband, already owns a house.  
 
Guidelines for Contract Employment in the Tobago House of Assembly, LN No. 148 of 2000 
Maternity Leave  
 Provision shall be made for all female appointees to be granted maternity leave as 
follows: 
 Provision shall be made for all female appointees to be granted maternity leave as 
follows: 
 1. Person engaged shall be eligible for maternity leave comprising one month with full 
pay and two months with half pay on the following conditions: 
(a) as of the date of commencement of such leave, she shall have served the 
government for a period of not less than twelve continuous months… 
(b) she shall proceed on maternity leave at least one month before the expected date 
of delivery of the child… 
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2. Where the half pay to which the person engaged is entitled during maternity leave 
together with the Maternity Benefits payable under the National Insurance Act amounts to less 
than her full pay, the difference shall be paid to the person engaged. 
3. Where the person engaged has not completed twelve months continuous service she 
shall not qualify for the grant of maternity leave but shall be permitted to proceed on leave of 
absence without pay on grounds of pregnancy. 
5. The taking of maternity leave shall not prejudice or affect the eligibility of the person 
engaged for vacation leave. 
 
Human Tissue Transplant Act, No. 13 of 2000 
2. In this Act - 
“spouse” means a partner by a subsisting legal marriage or a cohabitant as defined in the 
Cohabitational Relationships Act… 
 
Immigration Act (Chap. 18:01), 1980 Rev. 
6. (1) Subject to this Act and the regulations, persons who come within the following 
classes may…be granted permission by the Minister if he thinks it fit, to become residents, that 
is to say -  
(c) the spouse of a citizen or resident of Trinidad and Tobago… 
 
Immigration (Caribbean Community Skilled Nationals) Act, No. 26 of 1996, as amended by 6 of 
2001 
10. (1) For the period of the duration of a permission under section 3(1), the spouse and 
dependant members of the family of a person to whom section 3 applies shall…not be subject 
to any restriction on freedom of movement… 
 
Income Tax Act (Chap. 75:01), 1980 Rev. 
69. (3) For the purposes of this section, a settlement shall be deemed to be revocable if 
under its terms the settlor -  
(c) has power…to revoke or otherwise determine the settlement and, in the event of 
the exercise of such power, the settlor or the wife or husband of the settlor will or 
may become beneficially entitled to the whole or any part of the property comprised 
in the settlement or to the income from the whole or any part of such property… 
 
Infants Act (Chap. 46:02), 1980 Rev. 
21. (1) Every female infant may upon or in contemplation of her marriage…make a valid and 
binding settlement or contract for a settlement of all or any part of her property… 
 
Insurance Act (Chap. 84:01), 1980 Rev. 
48. (1) A local company shall not after the commencement of this Act directly or indirectly -  
(b) lend any of its funds to a director or an officer of the company or to the spouse or a 
child of a director…; nor shall a company registered under this Act lend any of its 
funds to another company where more than one-third of the shares of that other 
company is owned either jointly or severally by a director or an officer of the 
company or by the spouse or a child of a director… 
 
106. Nothing in sections 104 and 105 shall affect any payment by way of dividend, bonus, profit 
or savings which is provided for by the policy or shall be construed so as to prevent an insurer 
from compensating a bona fide salaried employee of its head or branch office or the spouse or a 
child of such employee, in respect of insurance issued by the employing insurer upon the life or 
property of such person or so as to require such employee to be registered as an agent under 
this part to effect such insurance. 
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124. (1) An insurable interest shall be deemed to be had by -  
(a) a parent of a child under eighteen years of age or a person in loco parentis to such 
a child, in the life of the child; 
(b) a husband, in the life of his wife; 
(c) a wife, in the life of her husband… 
 
Integrity in Public Life Act, No. 83 of 2000 
2. In this Act - 
“spouse” in relation to a person in public life means a person to whom the person in public life is 
married or living with in a conjugal relationship outside of marriage… 
 
12. (1) A declaration required under this Act, shall include such particulars as are known to 
the declarant, of the income, assets and liabilities of himself, his spouse and his dependant 
children. 
 
Judges Salaries and Pensions Act (Chap. 6:02), 1980 Rev. 
12. (1) Where a person dies while he is entitled to receive a pension in respect of his service 
as Chief Justice and he leaves a widow, the widow shall be paid a pension… 
 (2) Where a person dies while holding the office of Chief Justice and he leaves a widow, 
the widow shall be paid –  
(a) a gratuity… 
(b) a pension… 
(3) A widow shall not be entitled to receive and shall not be paid a pension under this 
section in respect of any period after her remarriage. 
 (5) In this section a reference to “widow” includes a reference to “widower”. 
 
13.  (1) Where a person dies while he is entitled to a pension in respect of his service as a 
Judge and he leaves a widow, the widow shall be paid a pension… 
 (2) Where a person dies while holding the office of a Judge and he leaves a widow, the 
widow shall be paid –  
(a) a gratuity… 
(b) a pension… 
 (3) A widow shall not be entitled to receive and shall not be paid a pension under this 
section in respect of any period after her remarriage. 
 (6) In this section – … 
“widow” includes “widower”. 
 
Justice Protection Act, No. 78 of 2000 
First Schedule. Offences which may give rise to protection under the Justice Protection 
Programme 
…Any sexual offence… 
Any domestic violence offence 
 
Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act, No. 12 of 2000 
7. (2) Where a court has made a provisional order under section 5 consisting of or 
including a provision for periodic payments by a husband or wife and the order has been 
confirmed by a court in a reciprocating state, then, if after the making of the order, the marriage 
of the parties to the proceedings in which the order was made is dissolved or annulled but the 
order continues in force, the order, or as the case may be, the provision thereof in so far as it 
relates to the husband or wife, shall cease to have effect on the remarriage of the party in 
whose favour the order was made, except in relation to any arrears due under the order on the 
date of the remarriage, and such order or provision thereof shall not be capable of being 
revived.  
 329
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), where such periodical payments are made towards the 
maintenance of a minor or other dependant, such payment shall continue in respect of any 
period after the remarriage of the party in whose favour the order was made. 
 
Married Persons Act (Chap. 45:50), 1980 Rev. 
3. Subject to this Act, a married woman shall –  
(a)  be capable of acquiring, holding, and disposing of any property; 
(b) be capable of rendering herself, and being rendered, liable in respect of any tort, 
contract, debt or obligation; 
(c) be capable of suing and being sued, either in tort or in contract or otherwise; and 
(d) be subject to the law relating to bankruptcy and to the enforcement of judgments 
and orders,  
in all respects as if she were a feme sole. 
 
4. Subject to this Act, all property…belongs to her in all respects as if she were a feme sole may 
be disposed of accordingly. 
 
6. (1) Where a married woman would, if single, be the protector of a settlement in respect 
of a prior estate, then she alone shall, in respect of that estate, be the protector of the 
settlement. 
 
8. (1) This section applies where a husband or wife makes a contribution of a substantial 
nature in money or money’s worth to the improvement of property in which, or in the proceeds of 
sale of which, either or both of them has or have a beneficial interest. 
 (2) The contributing spouse shall be treated as having then acquired by virtue of his or 
her contribution a share, or an enlarged share, as the case may be, in that beneficial interest of 
such an extent –  
(a) as may have been agreed upon between them; or  
(b) in default of any such agreement as may seem, in all circumstances, just to any 
court before which the question of the existence or the extent of the beneficial 
interest of the husband or wife arises…  
 
14. (4) The wife or husband…shall not be compellable either to give evidence or, in giving 
evidence, to disclose any communication made to her or him during the marriage by the 
accused, and her or his failure to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment 
by the prosecution. 
 
16. Subject to this Act, the husband of a married woman shall not, by reason only of his being 
her husband, be liable –  
(a) in respect of any tort committed by her whether before or after the marriage, or in 
respect of any contract entered into, or debt or obligation incurred, by her before 
the marriage; or  
(b) to be sued, or made a party to any legal proceedings brought, in respect of any 
such tort, contract, debt, or obligation. 
 
Maternity Protection Act, No. 4 of 1998 
4. In this Act –  
“confinement” means, in relation to a female employee who has become pregnant, labour 
resulting in the issue of a child or labour after twenty-six weeks of pregnancy resulting in 
the issue of a child whether dead or alive… 
 
7. (1) Subject to this Act, an employee is entitled to -  
(a) leave of absence for the purpose of maternity leave; 
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(b) pay while on maternity leave; 
(c) resume work after such leave on terms no less favourable than were enjoyed by 
her immediately prior to her leave. 
(2) Where an employee has proceeded on maternity leave and the child of the employee 
dies at birth or within the period of the maternity leave, the employee shall be entitled to the 
remaining period of maternity leave with pay. 
(3) Where an employee has not proceeded on maternity leave and –  
(a) a premature birth occurs and the child lives, the employee is entitled to the full 
period of maternity leave with pay; or 
(b) a premature birth occurs and the child dies at birth or at any time within the thirteen 
weeks thereafter, the employee is entitled to the full or remaining period of 
maternity leave with pay, as the case may be. 
(4) An employee who is pregnant and who has, on the written advice of a qualified person, 
made an appointment to attend at any place for the purpose of receiving prenatal medical care 
shall…have the right not to be unreasonably refused time off during her working hours to enable 
her to keep the appointment. 
(5) An employee who is permitted to take time off during her working hours, in accordance 
with subsection (4), shall be entitled to receive pay from her employer for the period of absence. 
 
8. (1) An employee is not entitled to the rights referred to in section 7 unless: 
(a) as of the expected date of confinement as certified by a qualified person, she has 
been continuously employed by that employer for a period of not less than twelve 
months; 
(b) she informs her employer, in writing, no later than eight weeks before the expected 
date of her confinement that she will require leave of absence due to pregnancy; 
(c) she submits to her employer a medical certificate from a qualified person stating 
the probable date of confinement; and 
(d) she informs her employer in writing of her intention to return to work at the expiry of 
her maternity leave. 
 
9. (1) An employee is entitled to thirteen weeks maternity leave and may proceed on such 
leave six weeks prior to the probable date of confinement…and is required to return to work, 
subject to section 10, no later than thirteen weeks from the date she proceeded on leave. 
 (2) During the period of maternity leave, an employee is entitled to receive pay from her 
employer to an amount equivalent to one month’s leave with full pay and two month’s leave with 
half pay. 
 (3) Where the sum of the amount paid to the employee under subclause (2) and the 
maternity benefits payable to her under the National Insurance Act is less than her full pay 
during the period, the employer shall pay the difference to the employee. 
 
10. (1) Where an employee is unable to return to work on the required date, she shall 
submit to her employer a certificate from a registered medical practitioner stating that by reason 
of disease or bodily or mental disablement, whether to herself or her baby, she will be incapable 
of returning to work on the required date and stating her intended date of return. 
 (2) An employee who extends her absence from work for medical reasons under 
subsection (1) may do so for a period not exceeding 12 weeks after the required date of return 
and shall inform her employer in writing of her intended date of return. 
 (3) Subject to an employee’s right to sick or vacation leave with pay under any other 
written law, industrial award or collective agreement, an employee under subsection (2) shall be 
paid half pay for the first six weeks and no pay for the next six weeks. 
 (4) An employee may postpone her return to work for non-medical reasons until a date 
not exceeding four weeks after the required date of return of, within ten working days, before the 
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required date, she gives the employer written notice, stating the reason why she is unable to 
return to work and stating and intended date of return. 
 (5) Subject to an employee’s right to sick or vacation leave with pay under any other 
written law, industrial award or collective agreement, an employer is not liable to pay an 
employee in respect of leave for the period between the required date of return to work under 
section 9(1) and the intended date of return under subsection (4). 
 
12. (1) Where an employee or employer alleges non compliance with the provisions of this 
Act, or an employee’s employment is terminated on the ground of pregnancy or on any ground 
relating to pregnancy, or there is a difference of opinion as the reasonableness or otherwise of 
any action taken or not taken by an employer or employee, the employee, trade union or the 
employer may report the matter to the Minister and the matter shall be deemed to be a trade 
dispute and shall be dealt as such with under the Industrial Relations Act. 
 
18. (1) Subject to subsection (2), there is no limit to an employee’s right to maternity leave 
under section 7(1)(a) and her right to return to work under section 7(1)(c). 
 (2) An employee’s right to pay for maternity leave under section 7(1)(b) is limited to one 
payment during each twenty-four months commencing at the beginning of such leave. 
 
19. Where an employee is entitled to maternity leave…that leave shall be in addition to any 
vacation leave and sick leave to which that employee is eligible. 
 
20. An employee on maternity leave shall not be deprived of an opportunity to be considered for 
promotion for which she is eligible and which may arise during her period of leave. 
 
21. Notwithstanding any other written law to the contrary, the period of maternity leave shall be 
included in the computation of an employee’s pension or other terminal benefits. 
 
Minimum Wages (Catering Industry) Order, LN No. 158 of 1991, made pursuant to section 3 of 
the Minimum Wages Act (Chap. 88:04) 
8. (1) A pregnant worker shall be entitled to maternity leave and to resume work after such 
leave. 
 
Minimum Wages (Household Assistants) Order, LN No. 160 of 1991, made pursuant to section 
3 of the Minimum Wages Act (Chap. 88:04) 
9. (1) A household assistant shall be entitled to maternity leave and to resume work after 
such leave. 
 
Minimum Wages (Security Industry Employees) Order, LN No. 231 of 1994, made pursuant to 
section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act (Chap. 88:04) 
9. (1) A pregnant employee shall be entitled to maternity leave with pay and to resume 
work after such leave. 
 
Minimum Wages (Shop Assistants) Order, LN No. 159 of 1991, made pursuant to section 3 of 
the Minimum Wages Act (Chap. 88:04) 
8. (1) A pregnant shop assistant shall be granted maternity leave with pay… 
 
National Insurance Act (Chap. 32:01), as amended by Act Nos. 9 of 1999 and 2004 
2. (2) For the purposes of this Act and the regulations -  
(a) where it is a condition for title to benefit that – 
 (i) a woman is the widow of an insured person, the Executive Director may treat 
a single woman or widow who was living with a single man or widower as his 
wife at the date of his death as if she were in law his widow; or 
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 (ii) a man is the widower of an insured person, the Executive Director may treat a 
single man or widower who was living with a single woman or widow as her 
husband at the date of her death as if he were in law her widower, 
if the insured person nominated the women or the man as the case may be as beneficiary 
for the purpose of entitlement to benefit; 
(b) where the question of marriage or remarriage or of the date of marriage or 
remarriage arises in regard to the title or cessation of title to benefit, the Executive 
Director shall, in the absence of the subsistence of a lawful marriage or where there 
is any impediment to lawful marriage, decide whether or not the person concerned 
ought to be treated as if he were married or as if he had remarried… 
(c) unless the context otherwise requires the determination of the Executive Director 
under paragraph (a) and (aa)(i) or (b) shall have the effect of extending, as regards 
title or cessation of title to benefit payable to a man or woman, the meaning of the 
word “marriage” to include the association between a single woman or widow and a 
single man or widower as aforesaid; and the meaning of the words “wife”, 
“husband”, “widow”, “widower”, and “spouse” shall be extended accordingly. 
 
46. (1) From the appointed day the benefits payable to or in respect of persons insured 
under section 36(1), shall be -  
(a) maternity benefit, that is to say, periodical payments in the case of the pregnancy 
or confinement of an employed woman… 
(bb) maternity grant that is to say, a payment in the case of the pregnancy or 
confinement of an insured woman… 
 (g) survivor’s benefit, that is to say, a payment or periodical payments…made in 
respect of an insured person who dies… 
(2) In this section “survivor’s benefits” means –  
(a) widow’s pension payable to the widow of the deceased for life or until she 
remarries, whichever is sooner, and where the widow remarries, a grant is payable 
on the termination of the benefit, by reason of the widow’s remarriage; and 
(b) widower’s pension payable to the widower of the deceased for life or until he 
remarries, whichever is sooner, and where the widower remarries, a grant is 
payable on the termination of the benefit, by reason of the widower’s remarriage… 
(f) parent’s pension, payable to a parent of two deceased insured parents where at 
the date of death of two deceased insured parents such parent was being wholly or 
mainly maintained by him. 
(3) Subject to this Act, employment injury benefit shall be paid to or in respect of persons 
insured under section 37 and such benefit may be in the nature of –  
(cc) a death benefit payable where the insured person dies as a result of the injury, that 
is to say – 
 (i) widow’s pension payable as from the date of death of the insured person to 
his widow for life or until she remarries, whichever is sooner, and where the 
widow remarries, a grant is payable on the termination of the benefit, by 
reason of the widow’s remarriage;  
 (ii) widower’s pension payable as from the date of death of the insured person to 
her widower for life or until he remarries, whichever is sooner, and where the 
widower remarries, a grant is payable on the termination of the benefit, by 
reason of the widower’s remarriage; 
 (iv) parent’s benefit, payable to parents of an insured person where such parents 
were at the date of death of the insured person being wholly or mainly 
maintained by him. 
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National Insurance (Benefits) Regulations, made pursuant to section 55 of the National 
Insurance Act as amended by LN Nos. 73 of 1999 and 66 of 2004 
5. (1) In determining a claim for survivor benefit or death benefit in which the claimant is 
relying on being treated by the Executive Director as the spouse of the insured person…, in the 
absence of the subsistence of lawful marriage, or where there was any impediment to lawful 
marriage, the requirement of supporting the claim by a marriage certificate shall not apply. 
 (3) No benefit shall be paid in respect of a claim to which subregulation (1) refers unless 
such claim is advertised once a week for a period of three weeks…and no objection has been 
raised to such claim by any person who – 
(a) is the lawful spouse or either the insured person or the claimant… 
  
14. The maximum periods for which benefits payable by periodical payments shall be paid are 
as follows: 
(e) survivor benefit, that is to say -  
 (i) widow’s pension payable to a widow for life or until she remarries, whichever 
is sooner; 
 (ii) widower’s pension payable to a widower for life or until he remarries, 
whichever is sooner… 
 (iv) parent’s pension payable to the parent for life or until the parent remarries. 
(f) employment injury benefit, that is to say –  
 (iv) death benefits, that is to say –  
  (A) widow’s benefit payable to a widow for life or until she remarries, 
whichever is sooner; 
  (B) widower’s benefit payable to a widower for life or until he remarries… 
  (D) parent’s benefit payable to the parent for life or until the parent 
remarries, whichever is sooner. 
22. (2) Maternity benefit shall be paid if the insured person, during the period of thirteen 
contribution weeks immediately preceding the contribution week calculated as the sixth week 
before the expected week of her delivery -  
(a) was in insurable employment for a period of not less than ten contribution weeks; or 
(b) was in receipt of sickness benefit for any period and either resumed insurable 
employment thereafter or continued receiving sickness benefit during the last 
contribution week in the period of thirteen contribution weeks. 
 
22A. Subject to the provisions of these regulations a maternity grant shall be payable where 
confinement results in the birth of a living child or where confinement does not so result, the 
pregnancy lasted not less than twenty-six weeks, provided always that the insured satisfied the 
requirements set out in regulation 22(2)(a) or (b). 
 
23. An insured person shall be disqualified from receiving maternity benefit, if during the period 
when such benefit is payable she engages in any work for which remuneration is or would 
ordinarily be payable. 
 
27A. Maternity benefit shall be – 
(a) payable for a period starting not earlier than six weeks before the expected date of 
delivery and continuing until the expiration of thirteen weeks… 
(b) paid in a lump sum. 
 
42. (1) Where a person in receipt of widow’s benefit or pension or widower’s benefit 
remarries, there shall be paid to that person a remarriage grant… 
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National Insurance (Contributions) Regulations, made pursuant to section 44 of the National 
Insurance Act 
14. No contribution shall be payable in respect of a person for any week in which such person is 
in receipt of sickness, maternity or employment injury benefit… 
 
National Museum and Art Gallery Act, No. 5 of 2000  
23. (1) The Museum shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a pension 
scheme or arrange for membership in a scheme for its employees upon terms to be agreed 
upon between the Museum and the relevant representative association or trade union. 
(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1) the Museum may, under a pension scheme - 
(a) establish contributory superannuation schemes and establish and contribute to 
superannuation funds for the benefits of its employees; 
(b) grant gratuities, pensions or superannuation allowances to the surviving spouse, 
families or dependants of its employees; 
(c) enter into and carry into effect arrangements with any insurance company or other 
association or company for securing for any employee, or surviving spouse or 
dependant, such gratuities, pensions or allowances as are authorized by this 
section… 
 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, No. 1 of 2004 
4. (1) In this Act, except where otherwise expressly provided - 
“woman” means a female person who has attained the age of eighteen years… 
 
6. (9) An employer shall, after being notified by a female employee that she is pregnant 
and upon production of a medical certificate to that effect, adapt the working conditions of the 
female employee to ensure that she is not - 
(a) involved in the use of, or exposed to, chemicals, substances or anything dangerous 
to the health of the unborn child; or 
(b) subjected to working conditions dangerous to the health of the unborn child, and 
where appropriate, the employer may assign alternative work, where available, to 
her without prejudice to her right to return to her previous job. 
(11) No employer shall require or permit a pregnant employee or an employee who is 
nursing her child to perform work that is hazardous to her health or the health of the child. 
(12) Notwithstanding any other law, during an employee’s pregnancy, and for a period of 
six months after birth of her child, her employer shall offer her suitable, alternative employment 
on terms and conditions that are no less favourable than her ordinary terms and conditions of 
work, where the employee is required to perform work that poses a danger to her safety or 
health or that of her child, unless there is no other available suitable alternative employment or 
that in doing so the employer will incur costs greater than ordinary administrative costs.  
 
40. The occupier of every factory shall provide and maintain separately for men and women 
employed therein, adequate, clean and easily accessible washing facilities which are provided 
with soap and suitable hand drying materials or devices and such other provisions as are 
prescribed. 
 
41. The occupier of every factory shall - 
(a) provide and maintain separately for men and women employed therein adequate, 
clean and easily accessible sanitary conveniences; 
(b) provide and maintain suitable receptacles or disposal units for use by women… 
 
42. In every factory, there shall be provided and maintained, distinct and apart from any sanitary 
convenience or lunchroom and separately for the use of men and women, adequate and 
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suitable changing rooms with locks on the inside and accommodation for their clothing not worn 
during working hours.  
 
87. Where a young person is employed in contravention of this Act, the parent of the young 
person, as the case may be, commits an offence and is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine 
of five thousand dollars, unless it appears to the Court that the contravention occurred without 
the consent, connivance, or wilful default of the parent. 
 
Old Age Pensions Act (Chap. 32:02), 1980 Rev. 
5. (1) Where a person is living away from his spouse, any sum paid to him or her by way of 
maintenance shall be deducted in calculating his or her means. 
 
Petty Civil Courts Rules made pursuant to section 53 of the Petty Civil Courts Act 
14. Save in respect of default summonses, the service of which is to be governed exclusively by 
rule 7, the service of all summonses or other processes is subject to the following provisions –  
(c) where husband and wife are both defendants, either may be served unless the 
Judge shall otherwise order… 
 
Police Service Act, No. 7 of 2006750 
3. In this Act— 
“cohabitant” means –  
(a) in relation to a man, a woman who has been living with or has lived together with 
him in a bona fide domestic relationship for a period of not less than five years 
immediately preceding the date of his death; or  
(b) in relation to a woman, a man who has been living with or has lived together with 
her in a bona fide domestic relationship for a period of not less than five years 
immediately preceding the date of her death, 
but only one such relationship shall be taken into account for the purpose of this Act… 
 
65. The Award Fund continued under the former Act shall continue to be kept by the 
Commissioner and administered in accordance with this Act, and shall be appropriated to the 
payment of such— 
(b) compassionate gratuities to the spouse and children of a police officer as, in 
exceptional circumstances, the Commissioner may allow… 
 
76. When a police officer dies the Minister shall order that three months salary of the officer, 
from the date of his death, shall be paid to his spouse, children or other next of kin. 
 
Post Office Savings Bank Regulations, deemed to be made pursuant to section 13 of the Post 
Office Savings Bank Act 
14. It shall be lawful to pay any sum of money in respect of any deposit made by or on behalf of 
any married woman, whether made before or after her marriage, upon the receipt of the woman, 
which, notwithstanding her coverture, shall be a sufficient discharge without the concurrence of 
her husband. 
 
President’s Emoluments Act (Chap. 2:50), 1980 Rev. 
5. (1) Where a person dies while holding the office of President and he leaves a widow, the 
widow shall be paid -  
(a) a gratuity… 
(b) a pension… 
                                               
750
 On proclamation, this Act will repeal the Police Service Act (Chap. 15:01). 
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(2) Where a person dies after having retired from the office of President, there shall be 
granted to his widow an annual pension… 
(4) In this section a reference to “widow” includes a reference to “widower”. 
 
Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 11 of 1987 
9. (1) If a judge in Chambers is satisfied…that there is reasonable cause to believe that a 
person has committed an offence under this Act, the judge may make an order authorising any 
police officer not below the rank of inspector to enter and search any premises… 
(2) Where an order is made under subsection (1) and the judge is satisfied that there is 
reasonable cause for so doing, he may make a further order authorising the police officer to 
enter and search any premises named in the order…and to inspect and make copies -  
(a) of the relevant financial records of the spouse of the person against whom the 
order is made… 
 
Prime Minister’s Pension Act (Chap. 2:51), 1980 Rev. 
2. In this Act –  
“entitled child” means a person who, being a male has not attained the age of twenty-one years 
or being a female, has neither married while under the age of twenty-one years nor 
attained the age of twenty-one years… 
 
5. (1) Where a person dies while he is entitled to receive a Prime Minister’s pension and he 
leaves a widow, the widow shall…be paid a pension… 
 (3) A widow is not entitled to receive and may not be paid a pension under this section in 
respect of any period after her remarriage. 
 (4) Without prejudice to section 16(1) of the Interpretation Act, a reference in this Act to 
“widow” includes a reference to “widower”. 
 
8. Any pension payable under this Act shall not –  
(a) be assignable or transferable expect for the purpose of satisfying…an order of any 
court for the payment of periodical sums of money towards the maintenance of the 
wife, former wife, or child… 
 
Private Hospital Regulations, made pursuant to section 21 of the Private Hospitals Act (Chap. 
29:03) 
20. (2) Where male and female patients are accommodated on the same floor of the 
hospital, there shall be separate water closets and wash basins for both sexes… 
 
Privileges and Immunities (Diplomatic, Consular and International Organisations) Act (Chap. 
17:01) 
Fifth Schedule. 
Part IV Privileges and Immunities of Official Staffs and of High Officers’ Families 
2. Where any person is entitled to any such privileges and immunities as are mentioned in Part 
II of this Schedule as an officer of the organisation, that person’s wife or husband and children 
under the age of twenty-one shall also be entitled to those privileges and immunities… 
 
Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 55 of 2000 
32.  (12)(i) …“relative”, in relation to a person means - 
(a) spouse of the person or cohabitant of the person;  
(c) brother or sister of the spouse or cohabitant of the person; 
(e) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse or cohabitant of the person; 
(f) spouse or cohabitant of a person referred to in paragraph (b), (c), (d) or (e); 
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Public Health Ordinance (CAP.12/4), 1950 Rev. 
141. The local authority may…make bye-laws as to all or any of the following matters in relation 
to common lodging-houses, barracks, and barrack yards, that is to say –  
(a) the fixing and from time to time varying of the number of persons who may be 
received as lodgers in each common lodging-house and in each room thereof, and 
the separation of the sexes in such common lodging-houses… 
 
Real Property Ordinance (CAP.27/11), 1950 Rev.751 
77. A married woman, being a proprietor of land, shall be deemed to be entitled thereto for her 
sole benefit, and for the purposes of this Ordinance a married woman may deal with land under 
this Ordinance, and may execute and sign all instruments, and do all personal acts, without the 
concurrence of her husband as effectually as if she were a feme sole. 
 
Regional Health Authorities Act, No. 5 of 1994 
30. (1) An Authority shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a pension 
scheme… 
(3) Without prejudice to subsection (1) an Authority may, under a pension scheme -  
(b) grant gratuities, pensions or superannuation allowances to the surviving spouse, 
families or dependants of its employees… 
(c) enter into and carry into effect agreements with any insurance company or other 
association or company for securing for any employee or surviving spouse or 
dependant, such gratuities, pensions or allowances… 
 
Regional Health Authorities (Contracting for Goods and Services) Regulations, LN No. 225 of 
1994 made pursuant to section 35(b) of the Regional Health Authorities Act 
12. (1) A member of a Board or Tenders Committee who -  
(b) has a relative or whose spouse has a relative who is a member of or has a financial 
or other vested interest in a business entity, 
…shall disclose the fact and shall not be present at or take part in the consideration or 
discussion of, or vote on, any question relating thereto. 
 
Registration of Clubs (Amendment) Act, No. 14 of 1997 
14B. (1) Discrimination on premises of a club registered in pursuance of this Act by the 
owner or occupier…on the ground of race, colour, religion or sex is hereby prohibited. 
 
Regulated Industries Commission Act, No. 26 of 1998 
21. (1) The Commission shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a pension 
scheme or arrange for membership in a scheme for its employees… 
(3) Without prejudice to subsection (1), the Commission may, under the pension scheme –  
(a) establish contributory superannuation schemes and establish and contribute to 
superannuation funds for the benefit of its employees; 
(b) grant gratuities, pensions or superannuation allowances to the surviving spouse, 
families or dependants of its employees; 
(c) enter into and carry into effect arrangements with any insurance company or other 
association or company for securing for any employee or surviving spouse or 
dependant, such gratuities, pensions or allowances and benefits authorized by this 
section. 
 
 
                                               
751
 This Ordinance was repealed by the Land Registration Act, No. 24 of 1981, which was never 
brought into force; however, Act 16/2000 repealed the unenforced 1981 Act therefore the Ordinance is 
still in force. 
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Remedies of Creditors Act (Chap. 8:09), 1980 Rev. 
43. Any estate of a married woman debtor, legal or equitable, as to which she is under no 
present restraint on anticipation, may be made available by any creditor who has obtained 
judgment against her by proceedings under this Act in the same way as if she were a feme sole 
seised in her own right. 
 
Securities Industries Act, No. 32 of 1995 
18. (4) For the purposes of this section, a Commissioner shall be deemed to have an 
interest in a matter if he, or his spouse…is a shareholder or partner in, or an officer of, a 
company or other body of persons having an interest or being involved in a matter before the 
Commission. 
 
Sexual Offences Act, No. 27 of 1986, as amended by Act No. 31 of 2000 
2. In this Act - 
‘cohabitant’ means a person in a cohabitational relationship in accordance with the 
Cohabitational Relationships Act, 1998; 
 
4. (1) Subject to subsection (2), a person (“the accused”) commits the offence of rape 
when he has sexual intercourse with another person (‘the complainant’) - 
(a) without the consent of the complainant where he knows that the complainant does 
not consent to the intercourse or he is reckless as to whether the complainant 
consents; or 
(b) with the consent of the complainant where the consent - 
 (i) is extorted by threat or fear of bodily harm to the complainant or to another; 
 (ii) is obtained by personating someone else; 
 (iii) is obtained by false or fraudulent representations as to the nature of the 
intercourse; or 
 (iv) is obtained by unlawfully detaining the complainant. 
(2) A person who commits the offence of rape is liable on conviction to imprisonment for life 
and any other punishment which may be imposed by law, except that if - 
(a) the complainant is under the age of twelve years; 
(b) the offence is committed by two or more persons acting in concert or with the 
assistance or in the presence, of a third person; 
(c) the offence is committed in particularly heinous circumstances; 
(d) the complainant was pregnant at the time of the offence and the accused knew that 
the complainant was pregnant; or 
(e) the accused has previously been convicted of the offence of rape, he shall be liable 
to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life. 
(5) This section also applies to a husband in relation to the commission of the offence of 
rape on his wife. 
 
4A. (1) Subject to subsection (2), a person (‘the accused’) commits the offence of grievous 
sexual assault when he commits the act on another person (‘the complainant’) - 
(a) without the consent of the complainant where he knows that the complainant does 
not consent to the act or he is reckless as to whether the complainant consents; or 
(b) with the consent of the complainant where the consent - 
 (i) is extorted by threat or fear of bodily harm to the complainant or to another; 
 (ii) is obtained by personating someone else; 
 (iii) is obtained by false and fraudulent representations as to the nature of the act; 
 (iv) is obtained by unlawfully detaining the complainant. 
(3) This section also applies to a husband in relation to the commission of the offence of 
grievous sexual assault on his wife. 
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6. (1) Where a male person has sexual intercourse with a female person who is not his 
wife and who is under the age of fourteen years, he is guilty of an offence…and is liable on 
conviction to imprisonment for life. 
 
7. (1) Where a male person has sexual intercourse with a female person who is not his 
wife with her consent and who has attained the age of fourteen years but has not yet obtained 
the age of sixteen years he is guilty of an offence, and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for 
twelve years for a first offence and to imprisonment for fifteen years for a subsequent offence. 
 
8. (1) Where a female adult has sexual intercourse with a male person who is not her 
husband and who is under the age of sixteen years, she is guilty of an offence…and is liable on 
conviction to imprisonment for five years. 
 
9. (1) A person commits the offence of incest who, knowing that another person is by blood 
relationship, his or her parent, child, brother, sister, grandparent, grandchild, uncle, niece, aunt 
or nephew, as the case may be, has sexual intercourse with that person. 
 
11. (1) An adult who has sexual intercourse with a minor who -  
(b) is in the adult’s employment; or 
(c) is in respect of any employment or work under or in any way subject to the adult’s 
control or direction; or 
(d) receives his or her wages or salary directly or indirectly from the adult, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for twenty-five years. 
 
12. (1) Where a person under circumstances that do not amount to rape has sexual 
intercourse with another who is mentally subnormal and who is not the person’s spouse, that 
person is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for twenty-five years. 
 
13. (1) A person who commits buggery is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to 
imprisonment… 
 
14. (1) A person who commits bestiality is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to 
imprisonment of fifteen years. 
 
15. (1) A person who indecently assaults another is guilty of an offence and is liable on 
conviction to imprisonment for five years for a first offence and to imprisonment for ten years for 
a subsequent offence. 
 
16. (1) A person who commits an act of serious indecency on or towards another is guilty of 
an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment… 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to an act of serious indecency committed in private 
between – 
(a) a husband and his wife… 
 
17. A person who –  
(a) procures a minor under sixteen years of age to have sexual intercourse… 
(b) procures another for prostitution… 
(c) procures another to become an inmate… 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for fifteen years. 
 
18. A person who –  
(a) by threats or intimidation procures another to have sexual intercourse… 
(b) by deception procures another to have sexual intercourse… 
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(c) applies, administers to or causes to be taken by any person any drug, matter or 
thing with intent to stupefy or overpower that person so as thereby to enable any 
other person to sexual intercourse with that person, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for fifteen years. 
 
19. (1) A person who detains another against that other’s will -  
(a) in or upon any premises with intent that the person detained may have sexual 
intercourse with any person; or 
(b) in any brothel, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for ten years. 
 
20. A person who takes away or detains a female person against her will with intent –  
(a) to marry her or to have sexual intercourse with her; or  
(b) to cause her to marry or to have sexual intercourse with a male person, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for ten years. 
 
22. A person who -  
(a) keeps or manages or acts or assists in the management of a brothel; 
(b) being the tenant, lessee, occupier, or person in charge of any premises, knowingly 
permits the premises…to be used as a brothel or for the purposes of habitual 
prostitution; or 
(c) being the lessor or landlord of any premises, or the agent of the lessor or landlord, 
lets the same or any part thereof with the knowledge that the premises or some 
part thereof are is it to be used as a brothel, or is wilfully a party to the continued 
use of the premises or any part thereof as a brothel, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for five years. 
 
23. (1) A person who -  
(a) knowingly lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution, or 
(b) in any place solicits for immoral purposes, 
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for five years. 
 
24. A person who for purposes of gain, exercises control, direction or influence over the 
movements of a prostitute in a way which shows that the person is aiding, abetting or 
compelling the prostitution is guilty of an offence and is liable in conviction to imprisonment for 
five years. 
 
31.  (1) Any person who - 
(a) is the parent or guardian of a minor; 
(b) has the actual custody, charge or control of a minor; 
(c) has the temporary custody, care, charge or control of a minor for a special purpose, 
as his attendant, employer or teacher, or in any other capacity; or 
(d) is a medical practitioner, or a registered nurse or midwife, and has performed a 
medical examination in respect of a minor, 
and who has reasonable grounds for believing that a sexual offence has been committed in 
respect of that minor, shall report the grounds for his belief to a police officer as soon as 
reasonably practicable. 
(2) Any person who without reasonable excuse fails to comply with the requirements of 
subsection (1), is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of fifteen 
thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term of seven years or to both such fine and 
imprisonment. 
 
34A. (1) A person shall be subject to the notification requirements of this Part where - 
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(a) he has been convicted of a sexual offence to which this part applies and he has 
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment;  
(b) such sentence has been commuted; or 
(c) he has been convicted of such offence, but has not been dealt with for the offence. 
 
34E. (4) Where it is found upon examination that the complainant has contracted HIV or any 
other communicable disease the court, upon application by the complainant and upon being 
satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the complainant contracted the disease as a result of 
the offence, may order the defendant to pay to the complainant compensation in addition to any 
amount ordered under section 3(5). 
  
Slum Clearance and Housing Act (Chap. 33:02), 1980 Rev. 
4. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Authority may –  
(j) with the approval of the Minister make advances upon such securities as may 
likewise be approved to suitable social organisations for the purpose of assisting 
the erection of hostels for single men and single women of the working class… 
 
Statistics (Surveys of Industrial or Business Undertakings) Regulations, made pursuant to 
section 13 of the Statistics Act 
4. A person carrying on an industrial or business undertaking shall…make on the forms 
supplied…a return containing information on such of the following matters as may be 
prescribed…: 
(i) wages and salaries paid distinguishing –  
 (iii) amounts paid for overtime work; and showing amounts paid to males and 
females separately… 
 
Theatres and Dance Halls (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 1997 
4B. (1) Discrimination on premises by the owner or occupier…on the ground of race, 
colour, religion or sex is hereby prohibited. 
 
The Police Service Regulations, made pursuant to section 65 of the Police Service Act as 
amended by LN No. 235 of 1999 
94. (1) With effect from 1st October, 1997, maternity leave consisting of leave with full pay 
for one month followed by leave with half pay for two months shall be granted to women police 
officers on the following conditions: 
(a) that the expectant mother proceed on maternity leave at least one month before 
the expected date of birth of the child; 
(b) that the taking of maternity leave would not in any way prejudice or affect the 
eligibility of the officer for annual leave; 
(c) that the expectant mother would normally be required to furnish three months 
before the expected date of delivery a certificate from a registered medical 
practitioner of the expected date of delivery; and 
(d) that the officer has served for a period of not less than one year in the Police 
Service as at the date of commencement of such leave. 
 
95. In addition to the period of maternity leave provided for in regulation 94, a woman police 
officer may be granted any period of annual vacation leave due to her, to precede or follow her 
maternity leave. 
 
96. Any application for leave in excess of the periods provided for in regulations 94 and 95 shall 
be treated as an application for sick leave… 
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97. The Commissioner in his discretion may direct that a women police officer qualifying for 
maternity leave be given light duties to perform at work prior to and following her period of 
maternity leave… 
 
124. There shall be at least two prisoners’ cells provided at each police station – one for adult 
male prisoners and the other for adult female prisoners. 
 
The Prison Service (Pension and Gratuity) Rules, as amended by Act No. 17 of 2000 
4. (7) Where an officer is granted maternity leave in accordance with the Maternity 
Protection Act, 1998 the whole period of maternity leave shall be counted for the purpose of 
computing the amount of pension, gratuity or other allowance payable to the officer. 
 
The State Land (Regularisation of Tenure) (Certificate of Comfort) Regulations, LN No. 36 of 
2000, made pursuant to section 34(2) of the State Land (Regularisation of Tenure) Act, 1998 
7. (1) Where an applicant is legally married and living together with his spouse, the Agency 
shall advise the parties to make a joint application for the Certificate of Comfort, and where the 
parties so apply, the Certificate…shall be issued in the names of both parties. 
 (2) Where it is brought to the attention of the Agency that the applicant is living in the 
dwelling house with another person, as husband and wife on a bona fide domestic basis, and 
has continued to live in such a cohabitational relationship for a period of not less than five years, 
the Agency shall advise the parties to make a joint application for the Certificate of Comfort, and 
where the parties so apply, the Certificate…shall be issued in the names of both parties. 
 
Trinidad and Tobago Civil Aviation Authority Act, No. 33 of 2000 
14. (2) A member who has a pecuniary interest in a matter being considered by the Board 
shall, as soon as possible after the relevant facts come to his knowledge, disclose the nature of 
this interest before the Board’s deliberation on the matter. 
(3) A disclosure under subsection (2) shall be recorded in the minutes of a meeting of the 
Board and after such disclosure the member shall neither be present during any deliberation of 
the Board nor take part in any decision of the Board, with respect to that matter. 
(4) For the purposes of this section, a person who, or a nominee or relative of whom, is a 
shareholder who owns shares in excess of five per cent or is a partner in a company or other 
body of persons other than a statutory authority or who is an employee thereof, shall be treated 
as having a pecuniary interest. 
 (5) In this section “relative” means spouse, cohabitant within the meaning of the 
Cohabitational Relationships Act, father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter of a person. 
 
 
A.4.4 CONSTITUTION 
 
The Constitution (Chap. 1:01), 1980 Rev. 
4. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Trinidad and Tobago there have existed and shall 
continue to exist, without discrimination by reason of race, origin, colour, religion or sex, the 
following fundamental human rights and freedoms, namely –  
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of 
property and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law; 
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the law; 
(c) the right of the individual to respect for his private and family life; 
(d) the right of the individual to equality of treatment from any public authority in the 
exercise of any functions…  
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A.5 MISCELLANEOUS 
 
Interpretation Act (Chap. 3:01), 1980 Rev. 
16. (1) Words in a written law importing, whether in relation to an offence or not, persons or 
male persons include male and female persons…  
 
Judicial Review Act, No. 60 of 2000 
5. (2) The Court may, on an application for judicial review, grant relief in accordance with 
this Act - 
(a) to a person whose interests are adversely affected by a decision… 
(3) The grounds upon which the Court may grant relief to a person who filed an application 
for judicial review includes the following: 
(a) that the decision was in any way unauthorised or contrary to law; 
(b) excess of jurisdiction; 
(c) failure to satisfy or observe conditions or procedures required by law; 
(d) breach of the principles of natural justice; 
(e) unreasonable, irregular or improper exercise of discretion; 
(f) abuse of power; 
(g) fraud, bad faith, improper purpose or irrelevant consideration; 
(h) acting on instructions from an unauthorised person; 
(i) conflict with the policy of an Act; 
(j) error of law, whether or not apparent on the face of the record; 
(k) absence of evidence on which a finding or assumption of fact could reasonably be 
based;  
(l) breach of or omission to perform a duty; 
(m) deprivation of a legitimate expectation; 
(n) a defect in form or a technical irregularity resulting in a substantial wrong or 
miscarriage of justice; or 
(o) an exercise of a power in a manner that is so unreasonable that no reasonable 
person could have so exercised the power. 
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APPENDIX B  
International Constitutional/Bill of Rights Provisions dealing with Equality and Specific Women’s Rights 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL/BILL OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS752 
 Equality Labour Family 
 Before the 
law 
Gender Equality at 
work 
Equal pay for 
equal work753 
Maternity Promotion Domestic 
violence 
COUNTRY        
Afghanistan        
Albania        
Algeria        
Andorra        
Angola        
Antigua and Barbuda        
Argentina        
Armenia        
Australia        
Austria        
Azerbaijan        
Bahamas        
Bahrain        
Bangladesh        
Barbados        
Belarus        
Belgium        
Belize        
Benin        
                                                
752
 All constitutions were located using the Constitution Finder facility of the University of Richmond School of Law at http://confinder.richmond.edu with 
the exception of the constitutions of Brunei Darussalam, San Marino and United Arab Emirates which were located in G.H. Flanz and A.P. Blaustein 
(eds), Constitutions of the Countries of the World: a Series of Updated texts, Constitutional Chronologies and Annotated Bibliographies, (Dobbs Ferry, 
N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1971-).  Many of the African constitutions are available at Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria at 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/docs_country.html.  
Country names in bold have no relevant constitutional clauses;  indicates an explicit right;  indicates an inferred right;  indicates gender equality to 
be exercised in the performance of the function of a public body or public authority;  indicates that the country reserves the constitutional right to 
implement affirmative action measures in favour of women (explicit and inferred).  Information correct as at February 2006. 
753
 Also to be understood to mean “equal pay for work of equal value”. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL/BILL OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS 
 Equality Labour Family 
 Before the 
law 
Gender Equality at 
work 
Equal pay for 
equal work 
Maternity Promotion Domestic 
violence 
COUNTRY        
Bhutan        
Bolivia        
Bosnia and Herzegovina        
Botswana         
Brazil        
Brunei Darussalam        
Bulgaria        
Burkina Faso         
Burundi        
Cambodia        
Cameroon        
Canada        
Cape Verde        
Central African Republic        
Chad        
Chile        
China        
Colombia        
Comoros754        
Congo (Republic of)        
Costa Rica        
Côte d’Ivoire        
Croatia        
Cuba        
Cyprus        
Czech Republic        
DPR Korea        
Dem. Rep. of Congo        
Denmark        
Djibouti        
 
                                                
754
 These rights (and duties) are not found in clauses of the Constitution, but in the preamble which forms an integral part of the Constitution. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL/BILL OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS 
 Equality Labour Family 
 Before the 
law 
Gender Equality at 
work 
Equal pay for 
equal work 
Maternity Promotion Domestic 
violence 
COUNTRY        
Dominica        
Dominican Republic        
Ecuador        
Egypt  755      
El Salvador        
Equatorial Guinea        
Eritrea        
Estonia        
Ethiopia        
Fiji        
Finland        
France        
Gabon        
Gambia         
Georgia        
Germany        
Ghana        
Greece        
Grenada        
Guatemala        
Guinea        
Guinea-Bissau        
Guyana         
Haiti        
Honduras        
Hungary        
Iceland        
India        
Indonesia        
                                                
755
 Without prejudice to Sharia. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL/BILL OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS 
 Equality Labour Family 
 Before the 
law 
Gender Equality at 
work 
Equal pay for 
equal work 
Maternity Promotion Domestic 
violence 
COUNTRY        
Iran756        
Iraq        
Ireland        
Israel757        
Italy        
Jamaica        
Japan        
Jordan        
Kazakhstan        
Kenya         
Kiribati758        
Kuwait        
Kyrgyz Republic        
Lao        
Latvia        
Lebanon        
Lesotho         
Liberia        
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya        
Liechtenstein        
Lithuania        
Luxembourg        
Macedonia        
Madagascar        
Malawi        
Malaysia        
Maldives        
                                                
756
 In conformance with Islamic criteria. 
757
 No written constitution, but basic laws which would constitute such a document have no clauses on equality or women. 
758
 While there is a provision dealing with protection from discrimination, it does not include “sex” as a ground of discrimination. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL/BILL OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS 
 Equality Labour Family 
 Before the 
law 
Gender Equality at 
work 
Equal pay for 
equal work 
Maternity Promotion Domestic 
violence 
COUNTRY        
Mali        
Malta         
Marshall Islands        
Mauritania        
Mauritius        
Mexico        
Micronesia        
Moldova        
Monaco        
Mongolia        
Morocco        
Mozambique        
Myanmar759        
Namibia        
Nauru        
Nepal        
Netherlands        
New Zealand760        
Nicaragua        
Niger        
Nigeria         
Norway        
Oman        
Pakistan        
Palau        
Palestine        
Panama        
                                                
759
 This constitution has been suspended since 1988.  See Lucy Murray [online], “Myanmar's lesson in 'discipline democracy’”, Asia Times Online, 17 
February 2005.  [accessed 27 February 2006].  Available from internet: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GB17Ae01.html.  
760
 While the constitution of New Zealand has no relevant provisions, it has a separate Bill of Rights that deals with discrimination. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL/BILL OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS 
 Equality Labour Family 
 Before the 
law 
Gender Equality at 
work 
Equal pay for 
equal work 
Maternity Promotion Domestic 
violence 
COUNTRY        
Papua New Guinea        
Paraguay        
Peru        
Philippines        
Poland        
Portugal        
Qatar        
Republic of Korea (South)        
Romania        
Russia        
Rwanda        
St. Kitts and Nevis        
St. Lucia        
St. Vincent & the Grenadines        
Samoa        
San Marino        
São Tomé and Príncipe        
Saudi Arabia        
Senegal        
Serbia and Montenegro        
Seychelles        
Sierra Leone        
Singapore        
Slovakia        
Slovenia        
Solomon Islands         
Somalia761        
South Africa        
 
 
                                                
761
 Somalia does not have a constitution. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL/BILL OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS 
 Equality Labour Family 
 Before the 
law 
Gender Equality at 
work 
Equal pay for 
equal work 
Maternity Promotion Domestic 
violence 
COUNTRY         
Spain        
Sri Lanka        
Sudan        
Suriname        
Swaziland        
Sweden762        
Switzerland        
Syrian Arab Republic        
Taiwan        
Tajikistan        
Tanzania        
Thailand        
Timor-Leste        
Togo        
Tonga        
Trinidad and Tobago        
Tunisia        
Turkey        
Turkmenistan763        
Tuvalu        
Uganda        
Ukraine        
United Arab Emirates        
United Kingdom764        
                                                
762
 While Sweden has a written Constitution, it comprises of four fundamental laws which serve as a basis for how the country is ruled.  This right stated 
here comes from the document called “The Instrument of Government”.  See Sveriges Riksdag [online], “The Constitution”, [cited 14 April 2006].  
Available from Internet: http://www.riksdagen.se/templates/R_Page____6357.aspx. 
763
 The right to gender equality is specific to the enjoyment of civil rights only. 
764
 The UK does not have a written constitution; however, it has a Bill of Rights (1689), a Sex Discrimination Act (1975, 1986) and a Human Rights Act 
which all form part of its Constitutional Documents. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL/BILL OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS 
 Equality Labour Family 
 Before the 
law 
Gender Equality at 
work 
Equal pay for 
equal work 
Maternity Promotion Domestic 
violence 
United States of America        
Uruguay        
Uzbekistan        
Vanuatu        
Vatican City State        
Venezuela        
Viet Nam        
Yemen  765      
Zambia        
Zimbabwe        
 
 
                                                
765
 Without prejudice to Sharia. 
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APPENDIX C  
NGOs and Domestic Violence 
C.1 Research and Advocacy Groups 
C.1.1 Trinidad and Tobago Coalition Against Domestic Violence (“The Coalition”) 
 
The Coalition was founded by Diana Mahabir-Wyatt and Radhica Saith in 1988 and is 
committed to developing responses and policies that address the specific issues of violence 
among men, women, children, and the elderly.766  As the foremost organisation in Trinidad and 
Tobago that deals with domestic violence, it provides counselling services and legal advice to 
victims of domestic violence.  While it does not provide financial assistance, the Coalition can 
get such assistance through the social services for those requiring it. 
 
The Coalition provides free counselling support services to persons who have been victims of 
domestic violence, as well as to perpetrators who wish to stop their abusive behaviour.  
Counselling is undertaken by the Coalition’s qualified in-house counsellors and is also done for 
couples and young persons.  This support is extended to help victims of serious crimes, such as 
sexual assault and domestic violence, in dealing with the fear of court appearances, especially 
where the offender is present.  A Legal Clinic has been established to give clients in domestic 
abusive situations legal advice.  Lawyers volunteer their time once a month to give advice on 
remedies available under the Domestic Violence Act, the most popular requests dealing with 
applications for protection and maintenance orders and divorce.   
 
Another important area of the Coalition’s work lies in training those from whom victims seek help 
(police, magistracy, etc.) how to deal with domestic violence situations.  The apathy and, 
                                               
766
 Kelli Coombs, Public Relations Officer, Interview with author, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 09 February 
2007.  Further information also available from pamphlets prepared by The Coalition as well as from its 
website: http://www.ttcadv.org/.  
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sometimes, clear reluctance to assist by some who deal with victims of domestic violence are 
well known.  The Coalition has been engaged in several projects with the police.  The main 
focus of this assistance has been in helping to train police officers to handle domestic violence 
and child sexual abuse cases with sensitivity, instead of relegating them to the category of 
family matters not for police action.   This has involved, among other things, explaining to the 
police the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act and the new provisions in the Sexual 
Offences Act, helping them to find more appropriate ways of dealing with their own anger (it is 
recognised that police officers are also abusers in their homes) and to, in turn, counsel batterers 
in their districts.  Among these initiatives are: 
 Funding of the furnishing of the Community Police Safe House. 
 Anger Management/Behaviour Modification training for community and other police 
officers and for 300 Police recruits in 2000. 
 Counselling services for officers who are high risk for violent behaviour in their own 
homes. 
 Sensitisation on domestic and gender-based violence and how to treat victims who 
report such instances. 
 
Counselling and legal aid are services that assist the victim directly.  The Coalition is also very 
much involved in advocacy at the national level and general sensitisation programmes.  
Together with other NGOs, the Coalition has been a chief advocate of legislation designed to 
protect women and children from abuse and sexual offences.  In terms of sensitisation, the 
Coalition has produced a DVD series and leaflets on domestic violence.  It participates in 
outreach by invitation and attends various fairs to distribute information on domestic violence.  
The Coalition is also requested to prepare speeches and talks to select groups, such as 
magistrates and police officers in training, groups of people who directly affect the lives of the 
abused.  In October 2004, the Coalition was involved in a seven day training workshop for the 
judiciary. 
 354
 
The Coalition has close ties with Canada and receives funding from the Canadian International 
Development Agency.  This relationship redounds to the benefit of victims in severely abusive 
domestic situations as the Coalition regularly supplies affidavits to lawyers, mainly in Canada, 
on behalf of applicants for refugee status on the grounds of domestic violence.  Some 60% of 
the applications are successful.  In unsuccessful cases, the Coalition also provides assistance 
with the appeal. 
 
C.1.2 Centre for Gender and Development Studies (“CGDS”) 
The Centre for Gender and Development Studies (“CGDS”) of the University of the West Indies, 
founded in September 1993, seeks to promote teaching, research and outreach activities in 
gender-related issues by: 
 Offering interdisciplinary courses in gender and development across faculties within the 
University of the West Indies, at both the undergraduate and post-graduate level. 
 Initiating collaborative research projects that address the relationship of gender to all 
areas of society. 
 Pursuing a programme of outreach activities that includes seminars, workshops and 
networking events.767 
 
There is a branch of the CGDS at each of the University of the West Indies’ three campuses - 
Mona, Jamaica; Cave Hill, Barbados; and St. Augustine, Trinidad - and has its origins in the 
University-wide Women and Development Studies Group.  The CGDS is regional in scope, with 
a Regional Co-ordinating Unit located at the Mona Campus in Jamaica, and headed by 
                                               
767
 Information on the Centre taken from its website: Centre for Gender and Development Studies [online], 
“About the Centre”.  [cited 20 March 2007].  Available from Internet: http://sta.uwi.edu/cgds/aboutus.asp.  
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Professor Barbara Bailey.  Professor Elsa Leo-Rhynie, also of the Mona Campus, holds the 
Chair in Gender and Development Studies.  
 
The Head of the St. Augustine Unit of the CGDS, Professor Rhoda Reddock, spearheads the 
mission to support research on all aspects of gender and feminist scholarship.  The centre also 
aims to act as a forum for work by scholars, artistes and teachers at all levels of the educational 
system, as well as by organisers from the national, regional and international community.  
 
An ongoing activity of the CGDS is the weekly Lunchtime Seminar Series in which local, 
regional and international faculty, writers, scholars and activists concerned with gender-related 
issues and actions present aspects of their work.  All talks are free and open to the public.  
Conferences, video showings, public lectures and workshops are organised periodically by the 
centre. 
 
Research at the CGDS focuses around seven key themes768: 
 Gender, Science and Technology (including Gender and the Environment) 
 Construction of Caribbean Masculinities 
 The Making of Feminisms in the Caribbean 
 Gender and Sexuality 
 Gender, Film, Image and Iconography 
 Gender and Ethnomusicology  
 Rethinking Caribbean Economy 
 
With respect to gender-based violence, the CGDS has produced a “Policy Roundtable on Data 
Collection on Domestic Violence”; the “National Report – Trinidad and Tobago: 1999-2000: 
                                               
768
 Centre for Gender and Development Studies, Research Activity and Output: 1993-2006 (St. 
Augustine, Trinidad: Centre for Gender and Development Studies, 2006), p. 6. 
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United Nations Inter-Agency Campaign on Gender Violence against Women and Girls”.  It has 
also prepared a Manual for Gender-Sensitive Policy Making, a National Gender Policy and 
Action Plan of Trinidad and Tobago (2004); and a National Gender Policy for Gender Equity and 
Equality for the Commonwealth of Dominica (2005). 
 
C.1.2.1 Women Development and Studies Group 
Since 1982, the Women and Development Studies Group (“WDSG”) has been committed to the 
maximisation and development of the human resource potential of women in the region.769   It 
aims to improve gender relations in society and the Caribbean region primarily through a variety 
of well-organised staff development and outreach activities within and outside of the Campus.  
The WDSG philosophy is based on the promotion, development and recognition of women's 
status in society through education, training and the legislative process.  Ultimately, the group is 
intent on empowering women to chart their own destiny, a destiny that involves gender equity, 
openness and sustainable growth and development. 
 
Along with the other two WDSG branches, at the Mona and Cavehill campuses, the Trinidad 
and Tobago arm of the WDSG has been successful in the creation of the CGDS, which was 
officially established as a University Unit in September 1993.  Cooperation between the CGDS 
and the WDSG has become vital to the effective functioning of both organisations.    
 
The WDSG was established: 
 To strengthen the foundation for gender equity in the University community, the society 
and the region. 
 To facilitate, support, promote and undertake research on women's issues with a view to 
influencing policy and generating feminine scholarship. 
                                               
769
 Taken from Centre for Gender and Development Studies [online], “Women Development and Studies 
Group”. [cited 20 March 2007].  Available from Internet: http://sta.uwi.edu/cgds/wdsg.asp.  
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 To organise public programmes and engage in public policy issues with a view to the 
recognition and celebration of the differences in gender. 
 To provide assistance and support to the CGDS in its work. 
 
The WDSG also promotes, undertakes and encourages research, and arranges or provides for 
the holding of workshops, lectures, exhibitions and other forums on gender related issues. 
 
C.1.3 Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (“CAFRA”) 
CAFRA is a regional network of feminists, individual researchers, activists and women’s 
organisations from the Dutch, Spanish, French and English speaking Caribbean who define 
feminist politics as a matter of both consciousness and action.770  CAFRA is an autonomous 
umbrella organisation that was founded on 02 April 1985 at an all-day meeting in Barbados of 
forty feminists and women activists from the region.  The organisation’s main areas of work 
include communication and networking; education and consciousness-raising; institutional 
development; research/action projects on issues of relevance to the regional women’s 
movement; solidarity/action on national, regional and international campaigns.  CAFRA is 
actively involved in promoting women’s rights and does in fact deal with domestic violence as a 
major area of concern; this is especially the case with respect to its programme on Women and 
the Law. 
 
C.1.4 Network of NGOs of Trinidad and Tobago for the Advancement of Women (“The 
Network”) 
The Network was founded in 1984 by a group of thirteen women to act as an umbrella 
organisation working towards ensuring gender equality, promoting women’s human rights, and 
                                               
770
 Information on CAFRA available from CAFRA, CAFRA Annual Report 2004 (CAFRA: Tunapuna, 
Trinidad, 2004) and a pamphlet prepared by the organisation in preparation for the Fourth World 
Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995. 
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women’s empowerment nationally, regionally, and globally.771  It is currently headed by Hazel 
Brown and its mission is to improve and enhance the quality of life for women and girls in TT 
through effective representation and advocacy.  While it does not generally deal with victims of 
domestic violence, the odd call from a victim would be referred to one of its member 
organisations.  The Network has also undertaken a project of “media monitoring”, with a focus 
on the media as one location from where domestic violence is learnt.  It reviews the portrayals 
of women and girls in the media to help further understand the problem. 
 
C.1.5 Women Working for Social Progress 
Women Working for Social Progress was established in 1985 by Rawwida Baksh-Soodeen, 
Merle Hodge and Jacquie Burgess.772  The purpose of the organisation is to empower women 
of all ethnicities and social groups in Trinidad and Tobago to improve their lives, and to bring 
about positive change in their communities and their country.  This is to be effected through 
advocacy campaigns, education programmes, and support systems.  These activities are 
guided by the core values of equitable access to economic resources and decision-making, 
non-violence, and mutual support. 
 
In 1999, the group established a drop-in centre for victims of domestic violence.  Some women 
are referred by the area police station while others come on their own.  There are three regular 
social workers who provide counselling services from Tuesdays to Thursdays.  The organisation 
also distributes food and small amounts of money (USD$15 or less) to assist with transportation 
costs to those who need it most.  General financing comes from membership dues, fund-raising 
activities, and workshops.  Those who require legal aid are usually referred to the Legal Aid 
Clinic at the Hugh Wooding Law School or to members (lawyers) of the group who explain the 
                                               
771
 Hazel Brown, Interview with author, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 12 February 2007 and pamphlet 
prepared by The Network for International Women’s Day 2006. 
772
 Jacquie Burgess, Interview with author, Tunapuna, Trinidad, 24 February 2007. 
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legal remedies available.  A School of Alternative Education was started at the organisation’s 
office where it offers (paid) courses on functional literacy (not just learning to read, but to be able 
to read and understand bills, notices, etc. that affect daily life); languages (Spanish, Patois); lay 
counselling; and English for tertiary education. 
 
Women Working for Social Progress engages in training, and campaigning and holds 
workshops.  With respect to domestic violence, it has undertaken training sessions for the area 
police station to explain to them their role under the Domestic Violence Act - they have a duty to 
intervene by law - and to solicit their views as well.  The group has also been very active in 
lobbying for legislative change.  They held a forum and a campaign with respect to the Sexual 
Offences Act of 1986 to have marital rape included as an offence which was finally done in 2000 
after much opposition by the government.773   
 
C.2 Support Service Groups 
C.2.1 Lifeline 
Lifeline was established some thirty years ago to provide a “listening” service to those in need of 
someone to talk to.774  It was founded by Dr. Lucy Gabriel due to her affiliation with the Central 
London Samaritans which was established to “offer confidential support to anyone passing 
through a crisis or thinking of taking their own lives”.775  Like this organisation, Lifeline offers 
time and space for people to express their feelings, helping them to talk through their options 
and find a way to face the future. It is made very clear that the service provided is one of 
                                               
773
 The original act only acknowledged sexual offences against a wife if the husband had intercourse 
with her without her consent or by force of fear where there was some degree of legal separation or an 
order by the court for the husband not to molest his wife.  Moreover, proceedings for an offence under 
this section could only have been instituted by or with the consent of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions.  See section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act, No. 27 of 1986 – now repealed. 
774
 Sylvia Brathwaite, Listener, Interview with author, St. Augustine, Trinidad, 07 February 2007. 
775
 Central London Samaritans [online], “Central London Samaritans”. [cited 23 February 2007].  
Available from Internet: http://www.samaritans.org/~cls/. 
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listening only – no judgements are made nor advice offered.  At present, Lifeline has two 
“listeners”. 
 
During any given month, Lifeline can receive up to an average of seven calls from women that 
are directly related to domestic violence.  When such calls are received and it becomes clear 
that the caller is a victim of emotional abuse, she is generally referred to The Coalition (no 
males call with respect to domestic violence).  In instances of physical abuse, the caller is 
referred to 800-SAVE, the Ministry’s/government’s domestic violence hotline. 
 
C.2.2 Families in Action  
Families In Action was established in 1988 by Ivis Gibson and is dedicated to the upliftment and 
healing of families and individuals, through counselling and group support.776  Its mission is to 
promote healthy family life, balancing emotional, spiritual, social and psychological needs and to 
regenerate both the family unit and/or any individual of that unit experiencing pain, isolation, 
addiction or dysfunction.  Before founding Families In Action, Ms. Gibson ran an employee’s 
assistance programme and was moved to start the NGO when she learnt that a former 
employee of hers killed his mother for money to purchase cocaine.   
 
In addition to employee assistance programmes, the organisation offers programmes on peer 
counselling, helpline training, community outreach and parenting.  Its services include a 24/7 
hotline, drop-in counselling centre and recovery therapy.  With respect to domestic violence, 
Families In Action offers counselling to victims.  It also assists in referrals to shelters, 800-
SAVE, or other organisations that are better equipped to deal with such issues.  When the 
person’s life is in danger, Families In Action will contact the police to have a report filed. 
 
                                               
776
 Ivis Gibson, Managing Director, Interview with author, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 26 February 2007 
and pamphlet prepared by Families In Action on their programmes and services. 
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C.2.3 Rape Crisis Society of Trinidad and Tobago 
The Rape Crisis Society was established in 1984 and had its beginnings in a committee 
organised by Eunice Gittens, Keith Joseph and Sr Marina Serrette the year before.777  It has two 
offices, one in Port of Spain and the other in San Fernando which was opened in 1988; an office 
will soon be opened in Tobago.  The Rape Crisis Society seeks to address the issues of sexual 
and domestic violence, particularly as they impact on the most vulnerable members of society, 
through counselling and public education.  A 24-hour hotline service is available to those who 
wish to talk and face-to-face counselling is offered free of charge and includes referral services 
to victims of domestic violence, among others.  Arrangements are also made for high risk 
women to send them to shelters in other Caribbean islands, such as the one in Antigua.  Small 
amounts of money (USD$15 or less) are sometimes given to assist with transportation costs. 
 
While one of the objectives of the organisation is to provide educational and outreach 
programmes, inadequate (government) funding has caused this to be done by invitation only.  
Basic and advanced counselling courses, however, are provided and, recently, this tends to be 
directed towards teachers to be able to detect signs of abuse among children.  Another 
important activity undertaken by the Rape Crisis Society is the agro-processing project which 
began in 1993 to give support and impart skills to survivors of rape and sexual violence.  Many 
of these survivors are unskilled and financially dependent on the abuser and this ten-week 
programme provides training in agro-processing.  In addition, these survivors, numbering 10-15 
per session, receive counselling, are exposed to health education and a small business-training 
component.   
 
                                               
777
 Rape Crisis Society of Trinidad and Tobago, The National Conference on Revisiting Abuse: The 
Impact on the Individual, Family and National Community (Rape Crisis Society: Port of Spain, 
Trinidad, 2005), p. 6.  Other information on the Rape Crisis Society was obtained from Cherise Clarke, 
Trained Social Worker, Interview with author, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 09 February 2007 and 
pamphlets published by the organisation. 
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A survivors’ support group was recently started and meets every fourth Thursday of the month 
to give members an opportunity to discuss issues pertinent to them.  Another important initiative 
undertaken by the Rape Crisis Society in 1995 was the Community Caravan.  Its mission is to 
stimulate community action and programmes that focus on family life and values, non-violent 
forms of conflict management, and resolution and improve levels of self-esteem.  Whether this 
still occurs is not clear, given the fact that the organisation, like many other NGOs, is under-
funded. 
 
C.2.4 Social Establishment for the Welfare of All (“SEWA”) 
The Social Establishment for the Welfare of All was established in 1997 under the auspices of 
the Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha, the foremost Hindu organisation in Trinidad and Tobago.778  
The organisation emerged out of a six month training programme conducted by Dr. Hari 
Maharaj for twenty-five members of the Hindu congregation of the Todds Road Hindu Temple 
on “Counselling Services for Victims of Domestic Violence.”  It subsequently became part of the 
Ministry of Social Development’s SHARE programme which is designed as an emergency 
measure towards alleviating the unfortunate situation of the new poor and expanded to engage 
in food distribution and provided relief to victims of different types of abuse, the unemployed, 
single parents with many dependents, and dysfunctional families.  SEWA also receives a 
government subvention. 
 
Its primary aims and objectives are to provide: 
 A social cushion to assist in instituting change through counselling, educational 
programmes, personal development and spiritual growth. 
 Temporary accommodation for displaced individuals with related social problems. 
                                               
778
 This organisation is currently closed and no interview was possible.  Information was therefore taken 
from the Coalition website and is available from the Internet at: http://www.ttcadv.org/sewa.shtml.  
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 A walk-in service to persons encountering domestic violence and/or related social 
problems so as to render positive rehabilitative solutions. 
 Social assistance to families that are plagued by sustained poverty and children who 
may suffer as a result of related afflictions. 
 And establish educational and training programmes to equip persons who may not be 
able to afford such services, so as to enhance the standard of living of such persons. 
 
C.2.5 Flaming Word Ministry 
Flaming Word Ministry is a religious organisation that began in 1985 and was formalised by an 
Act of Parliament ten years later.779  It was started by Prophet Dave Allen whose mission is to 
inspire people to have faith and praise God.  As a religious leader, he deals with victims of 
domestic violence of all socioeconomic classes, usually over the telephone, but some do come 
in to speak with him.  The organisation can provide temporary support to women facing 
dangerous situations at home.  It refers women to shelters, legal aid, assists in job placement 
and there is a security arm of the ministry that can be called upon to assist in physically 
threatening situations.  His membership has a women’s fellowship that is headed by a female 
pastor to ensure that the group is developed in line with the organisation’s vision.  Some victims 
of domestic violence are urged to join this group.  He also has a team of counsellors to whom 
he can refer such victims to be counselled under his guidance.  The organisation arranges 
women’s seminars where public figures are invited to talk to the women’s fellowship helping to 
empower the members. 
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 Dave Allen, Pastor, Interview with author, Chaguanas, Trinidad, 06 March 2007. 
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C.2.6 Legal Aid Clinic 
The Legal Aid Clinic forms part of the Hugh Wooding Law School of the University of the West 
Indies, St. Augustine Campus.780  It originally began under Hazel Thompson-Ahye in the early 
seventies to provide a teaching function to law students but is now also serviced by four 
Attorneys at Law who provide legal aid.  The students are allowed to prepare the ground work 
but the Attorneys at Law are the ones who will actually make court appearances.   
 
The Legal Aid Clinic provides for those of slightly better means who are not eligible for state 
assistance through the Legal Aid and Advisory Authority.  Some clients are referred to the clinic 
while others come on their own.  Whereas persons (mainly female applicants) do not generally 
seek help from the clinic specifically for domestic violence issues, they do come in to seek 
advice and assistance on divorce and maintenance proceedings.  Domestic violence does, 
however, form one of the main reasons why women seek to commence divorce and 
maintenance proceedings. 
 
C.2.7 Men Against Violence Against Women (“MAVAW”) 
MAVAW is the only men’s group specifically engaged in domestic violence issues and is 
currently headed by Superintendent Christopher Holder.  It was established in 1994 in 
recognition of the rising crime situation with particular emphasis on violent male behaviour and 
intended to develop strategies to reduce and eventually stop this undesirable behaviour.781  
According to its website, MAVAW is a proactive way to take responsibility for male violence and 
to contribute towards the creation of a violence free society.  The organisation believes in the 
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 Rhonda de Freitas, Director, Interview with author, St. Augustine, Trinidad, 13 February 2007. 
781
 Information on MAVAW available from “MAVAW’s Formal Documents” and MAVAW [online], 
“MAVAW”, last updated 06 April 2006.  [cited 27 February 2007].  Available from Internet: 
http://www.mavaw.com/.  Information also obtained from Donald Berment, Secretary, Interview with 
author, St. Augustine, Trinidad, 09 February 2007. 
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pursuit of equal rights while appreciating the differences between the sexes, utilizing the 
principle of equity, and focusing on (the return of) paternal care in the home. 
 
MAVAW’s philosophical approach to domestic violence appears to be radically different from 
the offerings of other NGOs.  They view domestic violence as resulting from dysfunctional 
relationships and do not believe in terms such as “abuser” and “victim”.  Their “BSD Syndrome 
Concept” focuses on identifying belief, behavioural, and biological “deficits” with a view to 
developing them appropriately, such as the belief that men are superior or the behaviour that 
allows hitting to be acceptable.  The concept also includes a “baggage system dependency” 
which requires the individual to completely resolve previous relationships before entering 
another.  The concept is meant to scientifically place the violence in relationship issue into a 
medium that takes away the stigma and gender polarisation previously associated with it.  
MAVAW anticipates resistance to the concept by some women, “primarily because every 
statistic, which lists one person being hurt, will also have to list the other person causing pain, 
as being hurt too”.782 
 
Since its inception, MAVAW has worked alongside and supported all the major social change 
NGOs in TT and alongside international NGOs in Canada, Barbados, Suriname, Guyana and 
Jamaica.  MAVAW members participated in the review of the Domestic Violence Act and have 
also assisted in the analysis of the status of the family in Trinidad and Tobago.  On a more 
localised level, MAVAW takes part in many sensitisation programmes.  They have produced a 
domestic violence handbook and a violence reduction CD.  They attend a weekly radio show, 
have produced a television programme for men, are involved in outreach by invitation and 
participate in conferences.  At the individual/family level, they offer peer and professional 
counselling and make referrals where needed.   
 
                                               
782
 Email communication between Donald Berment and Bert Hoff, 15 October 2003. 
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C.2.8 Women Against Abuse and Violent Encounters (Women’s Support Group) 
(“WAAVE”) 
Women Against Abuse and Violent Encounters (Women’s Support Group) is a unique group – it 
was founded in 1994 in Tobago by seven women who were themselves victims of domestic 
violence.783  They came together to provide support to one another.  One member found that 
during her experience with domestic violence, the support she got from the group gave her the 
strength to talk about her experience and deal with it.  
 
The group was forced to split between 1999-2006 due to a lack of money and inter-institutional 
support, and personal issues.784  The women are now trying to regroup and even though they 
do not meet as a group, they continue to work individually in the interim by providing support to 
members of their communities.  All members of the group received training in counselling and 
provide counselling to community members.  In its earlier days, members of the groups have 
also taken part in symposia on domestic violence, a radio-thon and sensitisation programmes at 
schools.  They would attend Court with women to provide them with emotional support in the 
court room.  It is their hope when they become fully operational again that they will continue 
their awareness-raising programmes and open a shelter.  From the perspective of those who 
know, they recognise the need for keeping families together and hope to have facilities for boys 
within the shelter.  Moreover, they see the need to have a programme on parenting which 
women will have to attend as part of their stay.  While they were indeed victims, they wish to 
fight that label and have themselves recognised as persons in their own right and not (only) as 
survivors of domestic violence. 
 
                                               
783
 Sherla Gordon, Founding Member; Gemma Joseph, Assistant Secretary/Treasurer; Allison 
Munroe, Secretary/Treasurer; Anita Joseph, Member, Interview with author, Scarborough, Tobago, 01 
March 2007. 
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 The group was blacklisted in 1999 when one of the members publicly spoke out against the poor 
financial support received from the Social Services Department of the Tobago House of Assembly. 
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C.3 Shelters 
C.3.1 Goshen House 
The Goshen Halfway House for Battered Wives and Teenage Pregnancies is one of four homes 
under management by the Eternal Light Community.785  This halfway house was established by 
Babsie Blesdell thirteen years ago.  Many people in her community sought help from her and 
she would provide meals, counselling, clothing and shelter in her own home to those in need.  
She eventually decided to find a home to accommodate everyone and money was donated for 
the purchase of the house.  Due to her busy schedule, she requested the Eternal Light 
Community, headed by Sr. Deborah de Rosia, to take over the management of the home.  This 
shelter is privately funded. 
 
The home can hold eighteen people comfortably but held as many as twenty-seven once.  Boys 
of schooling age are not allowed, but are sent to a sister organisation, Joshua House, where 
they live and attend school.  Girls of schooling can also be sent to Amica House, another sister 
organisation.  Besides this, there are no restrictions on the number of children a mother can 
bring nor on the length of stay at the home.  At Goshen House, the women are taught skills in 
food preparation, housekeeping and childcare.  The home recently purchased three computers 
and needs volunteers to teach the women computer literacy.  Those in need of counselling can 
receive it at the home or at the Eternal Light Community in Tunapuna. 
 
Women are generally referred to the house by the Court.  Those arriving at the house requiring 
medical attention are taken by ambulance to the district hospital; those under eighteen must be 
taken by the matron or person in charge.  At the hospital, a social worker will assist women with 
applying for a protection order if necessary and the women are escorted by police to and from 
the Court. 
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 Joyce Greyson, Matron, Interview with author, Arima, Trinidad, 12 March 2007.  The other three 
houses are Vision of Hope, Amica House for Girls and Joshua House for Boys. 
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C.3.2 Vision of Hope 
The Vision of Hope Halfway House is another of four homes under management by the Eternal 
Light Community.786  Prior to 1994, when the home was placed under its current management, 
the La Brea Social Action Group began working in the La Brea community to alleviate the social 
ills in the area.  During this time, they discovered that there were many battered women lacking 
economic security and with no place to go.  To help these women, the group identified an 
abandoned building in need of extensive repairs belonging to the State-owned oil company and 
approached the company about it.  It was agreed that the group could have use of the house 
and three acres of surrounding land once they took responsibility for refurbishment.  An Irish 
couple of missionaries, the Crowleys, assisted with the actual repairs and funds for materials 
came from companies and embassies.  On completion, the head of the group, Sr. Paul asked 
Eternal Light to take over management of the house and in December 1994 the keys were 
handed over. 
 
The house can accommodate 31 people and takes in mothers with children where the boys 
must be under 10.  Residents, preferably referred by the police, are generally allowed to stay six 
months, but depending on the nature of individual cases, they may be allowed to stay longer.  
The home, or rather the Eternal Light Community in general, receives no government 
subvention but relies on the charity of companies and individuals.  The home sometimes 
organises fund raising activities such as raffles.  To deal with women’s economic insecurity, the 
home began a skills training programme and animal farming.  With the assistance of another 
group, Women in Action for the Needy and Destitute, they raised funds to construct a Hope 
Learning Centre where skills in Literacy, Parenting/Child Care; Computer Literacy, Cookery, 
Garment Construction, Hair Dressing, Cosmetology and Counselling are taught.  These courses 
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 Sr. Jude-Marie Aird, Assistant Administrator, Interview with author, Curepe, Trinidad, 07 March 
2007.  Information also obtained from document dealing with the home’s history and activities. 
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are all taught by retired teachers and principal who volunteer their time.  These volunteers also 
assist in job placements. 
 
C.3.3 MIZPEH House 
The MIZPEH Half Way House was incorporated by Act of Parliament, No. 3 of 1990.  Among its 
aims and objectives are to “(a) provide a programme of counselling, re-education and therapy 
for troubled young adults and women generally… (d) foster, feed, clothe or otherwise care and 
provide for poor, underprivileged, destitute, abandoned and abused young adults and women 
generally… (i) organise and conduct seminars to educate young adult and women generally…”.   
 
A Christian organisation, the Mizpeh Half Way House, provides temporary shelter for battered 
women and their children.787  Its services are targeted to women from all over the country; 
however, it has the capacity to house only a limited number of clients. 
 
There are voluntary counsellors who work in the house on a part-time basis, who can be 
contacted at short notice. The service also includes a doctor who is available to the home. 
Fortunately, the health services at the district hospital are very accessible and are utilised as 
required. 
 
Services provided by MIZPEH Half Way House include: 
 Education and skill training seminars for women are conducted in and around the 
community in Sangre Grande.  The shelter also conducts cooking and sewing training 
classes as well as an agricultural course. 
                                               
787
 This organisation is currently closed and no interview was possible.  Information was therefore 
taken and adapted from United Nations Development Programme, National Reports on the Situation 
of Gender Violence Against Women: National Report – Trinidad and Tobago, Regional Project 
RLA/97/014 (April 1999), pp. 78-80. 
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 Feeding and clothing programme that extends to individuals and families as far as 
Mayaro.  These families are often referred to MIZPEH through the school principals who 
identify the children in need of assistance. 
 Counsellor training programme in which individuals are trained to work with and care for 
abused women, incest victims, and substance abusers.  The counseling programme 
provides services to both the female and the male partner if the latter is willing to be 
counselled.  Fortunately, MIZPEH House has also been able to obtain male counsellors 
to work with the male partners.  Attempts are made to mediate between the partners 
and effect reconciliation.  When this is not possible the partners are encouraged to 
separate. 
 
The MIZPEH compound consists of several buildings, including one that needs to be 
refurbished to provide shelter for the young male children of the battered women who cannot 
always be accepted because of emotional state of some of the other clients housed at the 
shelter. 
 
The lack of financial response from the State and the public could threaten the sustainability and 
quality of the programmes.  Currently, the shelter is closed due to financial constraints.   The 
management of MIZPEH has recognised the important roles played by education and spirituality 
in interventions against domestic violence and has sought to impart this to all its clients, the 
communities within which it works, and among the staff and cadre of volunteers. 
 
C.3.4 Halfway House 
The Business and Professional Women’s Club Halfway House was established in 1986 and is 
now popularly known as the Halfway House.788  Before this, it started out as a halfway house for 
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 Joyce Blenman, Director, Interview with author, Gasparillo, Trinidad, 28 February 2007. 
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unwed mothers.  The founder, Mrs. Brooks, found herself unable to continue and asked the 
Club to take it over from her.  In so doing, the Club decided to expand its reach and make it a 
halfway house for victims of domestic violence, incest and rape.  The actual building was funded 
by donations from various sponsors and the government leased the land to the Club.  The 
shelter now receives a quarterly government subvention that covers some 13% of its monthly 
expenses while other money comes from various sponsors. 
 
Women are referred to the shelter by the police, 800-SAVE, other halfway houses and NGOs, 
and the Court.  It can accommodate 25 women and children, including boys under seven years.  
There is a dormitory for single women and several family rooms.  Generally, women are allowed 
to stay three months, but this timeframe is flexible, depending on individual needs.  A part time 
counsellor is available to speak to those who need counselling.  The shelter has developed a 
relationship with the nearby health centre so that women who are taken there for medical 
attention are seen and sent back immediately.  The Halfway House also provides support with 
respect to Court – someone from the organisation makes the appointment and the victim is 
taken to and from Court.  A skills programme is run by volunteers for the women.  Depending on 
the number of women in the shelter at any time, the volunteers would teach the women pastry-
making, crafts (sewing, flower-making using plastic soft drink bottles), and gardening.  If there 
are courses at the nearby community centre, the shelter would make arrangements for the 
women to attend.  For women with children, the shelter has an arrangement with two secondary 
schools in the area to take the children in. 
 
C.3.5 Madinah House 
Madinah House was founded in 1998 by Gayaz Rajab to provide temporary shelter in a secure 
environment for female victims and children (of any religion) who suffer from domestic violence 
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and abuse.789  The shelter can accommodate eighteen mothers and children and takes boys 
under twelve years old.  Most clients are referred to the shelter by the police, Muslim 
organisations, social workers, and other NGOs that deal with domestic violence.  While it 
provides emergency shelter (food, clothing, medical assistance, counselling) for up to six 
months, many women stay only between 2-4 weeks.  Counselling can also be obtained over the 
telephone.  A skills enhancement programme aimed at empowering women provides them with 
skills in crafts, such as needle work, recycling, sewing, and gardening.  Madinah House assists 
in job placement, relocation, legal aid, and provides support for those who have to attend Court.  
It also provides outreach programmes with respect to education and counselling for the wider 
community.  While it receives no government subvention, it did receive USD$3,968 to outfit a 
counselling room.  The shelter is financed by corporate and individual contributions and fund-
raising activities. 
 
Madinah House keeps track of the clients who seek refuge at the shelter.  Several trends were 
observed and, from discussions with other interviewees, can be said to be generally applicable 
to women victims of domestic violence.  Women: 
 
 Stay one week to one month 
 Are generally of East Indian or African descent 
 Are young mothers up to age forty 
 Are of all religious backgrounds 
 Bring at least two children 
 Are in a common-law relationship 
 Are unemployed and/or unskilled 
 Have a history of abuse 
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 Lydia Choate, President, Interview with author, Valsayn, Trinidad, 27 February 2007 and pamphlet 
prepared by Madinah House. 
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There also tend to be more women seeking shelter between November and February. 
 
C.3.6 The Shelter 
Formerly known as the Samaan Shelter, the Shelter was established in 1987 by a group of 
(prominent) concerned citizens.790  Recognising the problem of ‘family’ violence in society, the 
group approached the then government for assistance.  The group was given the building by 
the then government and continues to receive a quarterly government subvention.  Other 
monies come from private donors.   
 
The shelter can accommodate ten adults and twenty-four children.  They try to limit it to no more 
than three children per mother with boys under eleven and girls under fifteen.  Women are 
allowed to stay between three weeks to three months, depending on the nature of their case.  
During their stay, they receive individual and group counselling and the counsellor then advises 
whether the women should be kept on or makes other recommendations.  Apart from 
counselling, women may receive medical care, psychiatric help, assistance to receive welfare 
cheques (in instances of child welfare, the process takes about three months) and benefit from 
a skills enhancement programme.  The Ministry of Community Development, Culture and 
Gender Affairs offers courses for free, such as geriatric nursing, which the women are allowed 
to attend.  If there are other programmes that the women may be interested in, (such as 
computer literacy, culinary courses, sewing) the shelter tries to locate venues where they are 
taught, and where possible, pays for their attendance. 
 
Most women are referred to the shelter by the police.  For their safety, the women are generally 
escorted to and from Court by police officers when filing for a protection order or when the case 
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 Jennifer Talma, Shelter Coordinator, Interview with author, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 07 March 2007. 
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is being heard.  In very severe cases, women are moved to other shelters in the Caribbean 
(such as Antigua) or Canada, England or the United States where these women can seek 
refuge with family. 
 
Sensitisation programmes are offered by the Shelter when invited to do so for businesses, 
schools, and rallies.  They have also worked with the Coalition in training members of the police 
force and judiciary to sensitise them in their dealings with victims of domestic violence. 
 
C.3.7 Hope Shelter for Battered Women and Children 
Dr. Vishnu Jeelal, a medical doctor, founded the Hope Shelter for Battered Women and 
Children in 1999.791  As a District Medical Officer, Dr. Jeelal has worked alongside the police for 
twenty years in cases of murder, rape, and physical abuse and it was due to this exposure to 
violence against women that he decided to open the shelter.  When the facility received 
government assistance, it was able to accommodate 3-4 families; now it can only facilitate 1-2 
families, where a family consists, on average, of a mother and two children with no boys over 
five years.  All cases are by referral from the police, 800-SAVE or the Family Court.  There is no 
time restriction on women’s stay.  One woman was known to live at the shelter for nearly three 
years!  The shelter has applied for some UNDP funding to develop an agricultural field near by.  
The intention (in part), if successful, is to provide the women with basic agricultural skills as a 
means of empowerment. 
 
C.3.8 National Home for Family Reconciliation  
The National Home for Family Reconciliation is a shelter for Hindu women.792  It was founded 
some fourteen years ago by Pundit Bramanand Rambachan who recognised the growing 
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 Dr. Vishnu Jeelal, Interview with author, Chaguanas, Trinidad, 22 February 2007. 
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 Pundit Bramanand Rambachan, Interview with author, El Socorro, Trinidad, 22 February 2007. 
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scourge of domestic violence in East Indian homes and the fact that these women needed a 
safe place to seek refuge.  The facility was originally able of accommodate twenty-one people 
but can now only cater for ten as government assistance is no longer provided.  Women are 
generally referred to the shelter by the area police station and are allowed to stay for up to one 
month.  According to Pundit Rambachan, the women are supposed to use this time to “rest” and 
gather themselves.  Women with female children are allowed, but no male children.  As a 
religious leader, Pundit Rambachan has a large membership to draw from in the event that the 
women require medical or legal assistance.  There is a pool of fifteen medical doctors, eight 
nurses and two attorneys at law who give of their time and services.  Women who require it can 
also receive counselling from a psychologist.  The shelter also assists in job placements for the 
women if necessary. 
 
C.3.9 Our Lady of the Wayside Shelter 
The shelter was established in Belmont, Port of Spain as a temporary home and transition 
service for women and children in crisis.793  A client coming from any area in Trinidad is usually 
brought to the home by the police, welfare officers, by order of the Court, or sometimes parents.  
The board of directors of the Living Water Community manages the shelter. 
 
A coordinator from the board liaises with the manager/administrator of the shelter.  In addition to 
the manager there is one welfare officer; five paid trained counsellors (one full-time and the 
others part-time); a paid full-time clerical assistant; and a psychologist who volunteers.  The 
shelter has also been able to obtain the services of two visiting psychologists with expertise in 
behaviour management for disturbed and autistic children.  The psychologists provide training 
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 An interview with this organisation was not possible; however, the author did speak briefly via 
telephone with one of the co-ordinators from the shelter who stated that the home is now primarily for 
children and that only in emergency situations, when called upon by the police and when other 
shelters are full, are women taken in and only for very short stays.  Information was taken and adapted 
from UNDP, National Reports on the Situation of Gender Violence Against Women, pp. 80-82. 
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for the staff, as well as the mandatory counselling programme.  While all training is provided in-
house, some staff members have professional qualifications in nursery and childcare. 
 
The shelter provides different services to its clients.  It provides: 
a. Shelter for children from the age of infancy to ten years old.  However, in a few cases, 
teenagers are also granted temporary accommodation. 
b. Counselling for children as well as loving care and assistance in re-organising their lives. 
Parents that have abused children as well as those who were witnesses to the abuse are 
given special counselling. 
c. When necessary, training in parenting and other specific skills for employment purposes.  
Accordingly, the shelter must be sure that there is clear evidence of rehabilitation of all 
family members before the child is returned to his/her home. 
 
Funds are disbursed to the shelter by its parent body, the Living Water Community which is 
funded through private donations; fundraising activities; deeds of covenants; donations; revenue 
from a coffee and bookshop; donations of foodstuff, medical supplies and clothing; and a food 
catering ministry. 
 
C.3.10 Tobago Women’s Enterprise for Empowerment and Rehabilitation Towards Self-
Sufficiency (“TOWERS”) 
Tobago Women’s Enterprise for Empowerment and Rehabilitation Towards Self-Sufficiency 
was established twenty years ago to provide a temporary haven for women and children who 
suffer from domestic violence as well as to empower these women by working to secure their 
physical safety, emotional well-being, individual freedom and economic independence.794  It was 
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 Barbara Stewart, Chairperson; Sherma Joseph, Secretary; Shirley Leith, House Mother, Interview 
with author, Mt. Grace, Tobago, 01 March 2007 and organisation’s report for May 1995 to August 
1997. 
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established when a medical social worker who dealt with domestic violence victims recognised 
that there was an increase in the reported incidents of domestic violence in Tobago and the 
consequent need to provide a shelter for such women.  This is the only women’s shelter in 
Tobago.   
 
Women are referred to the shelter by the police, social services, or come on their own.  High 
risk women are referred to any shelter in Trinidad that can accommodate them and these 
women also benefit from police escort to and from the shelters when they are being moved.  
Within Tobago, women are provided with transportation money when necessary.  Management 
from the shelter will provide support to victims when they have to go to Court.  TOWERS also 
assists with job placements, apartment placements (where the women is financially 
independent) and will refer victims to legal aid if they require legal assistance. 
 
TOWERS allows women to stay for three months, but as with other shelters, this timeframe is 
flexible and women have stayed for as long as two years.  While boys under eleven are 
generally not allowed, the shelter has adopted a certain degree of flexibility and allows mothers 
to bring their sons of all ages depending on the other residents at the time (whether there are 
other children or the number of girls at the shelter).  The facility can accommodate ten single 
women or as many as twenty mothers and children.  The chairperson and the secretary are 
both social workers and they provide counselling to the residents.  Skills training is also provided 
in house, such as cooking, baking, sewing, and general etiquette (setting the table, use of 
cutlery).  If women wish to pursue training TOWERS does not offer, such as hairdressing, then it 
will pay for the course on behalf of the woman or solicit help to do so. 
 
TOWERS currently receives a monthly government subvention of USD$436.50.  The building 
used for the shelter is a rented property and the government also covers the cost of rent 
(USD$556.00).  Other money comes from corporate sponsors. 
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APPENDIX D  
NGO Questionnaire  
 
1) Name of Organisation 
 
 
 
2) Date of Establishment 
 
 
 
3) Mission Statement / Purpose of Organisation 
 
 
 
4) Name of Founder 
 
 
 
5) Head of NGO (if different from above) 
 
 
 
6) Can victims of domestic violence seek refuge / assistance from NGO? 
 
 
 
7) What kind – financial, shelter, legal aid (filing actions under the Domestic Violence Act, 
representation in Court, etc.), starting over (if leaving abuser)? 
 
 
 
8) With respect to legal aid given, if applicable, describe process of filing a Domestic 
Violence complaint from moment of registering complaint with police to moment of 
hearing by Magistrate. 
 
 
 
9) What type of relief is sought and what type is given?  What type of considerations goes 
into granting relief (by Magistrate)? 
 
 
 
10) Average number of victims that come to NGO per week / month? 
 
 
 
11) Are they male, female? (Numbers of each) 
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12) Type of abuse suffered 
 
 
 
13) Does NGO seek police assistance? 
 
 
 
14) What is the police response like? 
 
 
 
15) Does the NGO interact with the Judiciary? 
 
 
 
16) What is the Judiciary’s response like? 
 
 
 
17) In what type of advocacy programmes does your organisation engage? 
 
 
 
18) In what type of sensitisation programmes (workshops, lectures, etc.) does your 
organisation engage? 
 
 
 
19) While your organisation does not actually offer assistance to victims of domestic abuse, 
they do come to you for referral.  What types of abuse do these women suffer? 
 
 
 
20) How can Domestic Violence be abated in Trinidad and Tobago?  
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